00037826

00037826

Digitized with financial assistance from

HT Parekh FOUNDATION

An Initiative by HDFC

WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 15 October, 2018

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

From a Painting by Mierevelt

HISTORY

OF

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS

37826 3962

BY

JOHN L. STEVENS, LL.D.

RECENTLY UNITED STATES MINISTER AT STOCKHOLM

149
157 ff.

WW-b-34.

LONDON
RICHARD BENTLEY AND SON
Publishers in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen
1885

378.6

PREFATORY.

AMONG the persons whose genius, heroism, and force of character influenced events, and won commanding fame, in the seventeenth century, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden is justly regarded of the first. The War of Thirty Years, a long and terrible struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism, largely influenced by the rivalry and bitter hostility between France and the House of Austria, called out the strong qualities of the Swedish king. The influence of his reign on his own country, and of his career in Germany on the prospects of Protestantism in continental Europe, will always constitute an interesting theme for historical students and readers. A military man of remarkable powers, his high moral qualities and lofty purposes forbid his standing in the category of the Alexanders, the Marlboroughs, and Napoleons. As fascinating as romance, thrilling with all that is exciting and terrible in war, his life is perused with interest and profit by those who wish to understand some of the most momentous events which have influenced the history of the modern world. The author has read and carefully considered whatever might throw light on his character and career. To this end he has studied the best Swedish, German, French, and English writers on the subject, and has improved suggestive conversations with Swedish scholars and statesmen; and this volume is the result. He realizes its imperfection and inadequacy as a full statement of the genius and work of the remarkable personage it attempts to represent.

But the essential facts and import of his history are presented, and to these the critical reader will be able to supply what is wanting in our manner of statement.

To better elucidate the life and deeds of the illustrious hero, we have given a brief sketch of earlier Swedish history, of the causes and beginning of the War of Thirty Years, and of some of the chief men with whom his career was identified.

We here tender our thanks to those in charge of the Royal Library in Stockholm for the kindness shown in promptly granting our numerous requests while engaged in gathering the data for this volume.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

Sketch of Swedish History to the Time of the First Vasa . . . 1

CHAPTER II.

Gustavus Vasa, and his Sons Erik, John, and Charles. — The Remarkable Facts of their Reigns 22

CHAPTER III.

Birth and Early Life of Gustavus Adolphus. — Close of the Wars with Denmark and Russia 53

CHAPTER IV.

Gustavus makes Change in the Swedish Government. — Views of Oxenstierna and Skytte. — House of Nobles. — Religion. — Education 68

CHAPTER V.

He organizes his Finances. — Mines. — Taxation. — Conscription. — Industries. — Methods of Administration. — The Judicial Forms, 94

CHAPTER VI.

The Marriage of Gustavus Adolphus. — The Story of Ebba Brahe . 114

CHAPTER VII.

The War with Poland 125

CHAPTER VIII.

Considerations which draw Gustavus Adolphus to the German War. — The Belligerent Parties. — Chief Actors in the Struggle. — Louis XIII. — Richelieu. — Ferdinand II. — Maximilian. — John George. — Wallenstein 156

CHAPTER IX.

PAGE

Origin and First Years of the Thirty Years' War. — The Imperial Constitution. — Treaty of Pacification 181

CHAPTER X.

Revolt in Bohemia. — Frederick of Palatine crowned King. — Ferdinand II. chosen Emperor by the Electors. — The Subjection of Bohemia by Ferdinand and the League. — Mansfeld. — Christian of Brunswick. — Tilly. — Elizabeth of the Palatinate . . . 202

CHAPTER XI.

Gustavus Adolphus preceded in Germany by Christian IV. of Denmark. — The Latter defeated, and compelled to make Peace with the Emperor. — Siege of Stralsund — Wallenstein compelled to abandon the Siege. — Discussion of the King of Sweden with Oxenstierna and the Senate on the German Campaign . . . 235

CHAPTER XII.

Gustavus assembles his Army for his German Expedition. — Takes Leave of the Swedish Estates. — Disembarks in Germany. — Advances into Pomerania. — Stettin surrenders. — His Encounter with the Imperialists. — An Attempt to assassinate the King of Sweden 267

CHAPTER XIII.

Tilly chosen by the Emperor to confront the King of Sweden. — Protestant Princes join Gustavus. — Capture of Greiffenhagen, Gartz, Demmin, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and other Cities 287

CHAPTER XIV.

Advance of Gustavus. — Siege and Destruction of Magdeburg by the Imperialists. — The Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony. — Battle of Breitenfeld, and Defeat of Tilly 303

CHAPTER XV.

The Importance of the Victory of Breitenfeld. — Separation of the Swedish and Saxon Armies. — Reasons for not advancing on Vienna. — Marches into Franconia. — Frankfort-on-the-Main surrenders. — Successes on the Rhine. — Negotiations with Bavaria and other Members of the League. — Richelieu. — Conditions of Peace proposed by Gustavus Adolphus 338

CHAPTER XVI.

PAGE

Military Operations renewed. — Welcomed by Nuremberg. — Bold Passage of the Lech, and Brilliant Victory over the Imperialists. — Received joyfully by Augsburg, and marches to Ingolstadt. — Advances into Bavaria. — French Minister seeks to serve Maximilian by Negotiations. — Surrender of Munich to the Swedes. — Gustavus forms Closer Union with Nuremberg. 361

CHAPTER XVII.

Restoration of Wallenstein to the Imperial Command. — His Method and Success of raising an Army. — Gustavus Adolphus fails to prevent the Junction of the Armies of Wallenstein and Maximilian. — The Armies of Gustavus and Wallenstein at Nuremberg. — Attempt of the Former to drive the Imperialists from their Position. — Great Loss of both Armies around Nuremberg, and their Retirement from their Fortified Positions . . . 378

CHAPTER XVIII.

The First Serious Check of Gustavus in Germany. — Marches again into Bavaria, and prepares to carry his Arms into the Hereditary Dominions of Austria. — Returns suddenly Northward to save Saxony from the Army of Wallenstein. — Advances to Naumburg and Weissenfels. — The Battle of Lutzen. — The Swedish Army victorious, but the King is slain. — The Effect of the Death of Gustavus Adolphus. — Concluding Remarks. 400

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

CHAPTER I.

SKETCH OF SWEDISH HISTORY TO THE TIME OF THE FIRST VASA.

BEFORE entering on the principal work which the author has undertaken in the writing of this volume, — an historical account of GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, — it is fitting to give a brief sketch of Sweden from the earliest times, presenting the more salient and important events and incidents of her history; and thus we shall be able to gain a better understanding of the national life and force which were behind the great leader who achieved so much for the renown of his people, and left so permanent an impression on the Europe of the seventeenth century. It may be said, in truth, that prior to nearly the close of the tenth century, Swedish annals, as known to us, are very confused, and not much is entirely reliable. Scandinavia, of which Sweden forms so important a part, was almost unknown to the nations of antiquity, if it really was known at all by them. The ancient Greeks and Romans had very erroneous ideas of the North of Europe, regarding it as made up of snow, ice, mists, and darkness, and believed that somewhere beyond those regions lived the Hyperboreans, — mortals dwelling in perfect peace with their gods, in a rich land, under sunny skies, where grains and fruits ripened without the toil of the husband-

man, and plenty and comfort were the common lot of all. There none suffered by sickness and pain; neither the young nor the old died by disease, but those who became weary of life ended their days by casting themselves from some lofty cliff into the foaming and mysterious depths of the sea. Later it began to be doubted if mortals were really in possession of such charming abodes anywhere on the earth, and the Hyperborean conception began to drop out of belief. The oldest account of the North which has been preserved to modern history is that given by Pytheas, who lived three hundred and fifty years prior to the Christian era. This man was a native of the old Grecian city, now Marseilles in France, who was sent by his government to make inquiries into the situation and condition of those remote lands of the North from which Phœnicians brought valuable articles of commerce. Pytheas must have been a well-instructed man for his time, and of a bold resolution; for he had to leave the bright skies of Southern Europe, take his perilous chances along the uncertain shores of the Atlantic to that distant region which the learned men of his time believed covered with snow and mist. The spirit of commerce is often bolder than science itself; and, as a citizen of an enterprising and commercial city, he felt the impulse of the atmosphere around him. The classic authors of Greece and Rome three centuries after him ridiculed his accounts; but the intrinsic evidence is now in favor of their authenticity in the opinion of modern historians. His voyages carried him to the shores of Britain and Scandinavia. Of his visit to the former country, which he called Albion, nothing is known, except that he travelled over a large part of what is now England and Scotland. He describes a place called Thule, which he regarded an island. From what he says of the great length of the days at midsummer, his description would apply to one of the numerous islands which are situated along the northern coasts of Sweden

and Norway, though it might refer to one of the Danish isles. Strabo represents Pytheas as saying, that, in Thule, the nights at midsummer were only two or three hours in length. The weight of probability is, that it must have been somewhere in Scandinavia; and, for this reason, what is said of Thule and the lands in its vicinity has important value in its bearing on the early history of the Northmen. According to Pytheas, the inhabitants of the country at the south of Thule thrashed their grain in roofed buildings, where it was stowed away under cover, "because the sun did not always shine there, and the rain and the snow often came and spoiled the crops in open air." They had a strong desire to trade with foreigners who came to their coasts, were keen to drive a bargain, and always ready to fight if they thought they had been insulted or ill-used. According to the view of the most careful of the Scandinavian historians, whose investigations as to all matters pertaining to their countries and people are elaborate and thorough, it is probable that Thule was a part of Scandinavia inhabitated and cultivated many centuries before the Christian era. It is certain that the picture which Tacitus traces of it, in the first Christian century, implies a culture more ancient. The states of the Sueones, according to what Tacitus had learned, were important by their population, their fleets, and their arms. Their vessels were particularly fitted to the navigation of the coasts and rivers. They attached much value to fortune. The sea which surrounded them guaranteed them from the surprises of their enemies. It is thought that the Goths were the most ancient inhabitants of Scandinavia, occupying the south, and were earlier in Sweden than the Sueones. The Goths and the Sueones long fought each other, but finally fused, and formed the Swedish nation. The little that has come down to us, from the classic authors, of what Pytheas had written of his travels is all that we have of any voyager's

report of the North of Europe until the time of Alfred of England. Twelve hundred years after Pytheas, two travellers from Scandinavia, whose names were Wulfstan and Othere, came to the court of the English king, who always gave a warm welcome to those who would bring him information from foreign lands. Alfred was pleased to listen to their story of what they had seen, and of the country from which they came. From their account of their travels, he wrote a brief history, and made a chart of modern Europe. The description of Scandinavia in this book is valuable. During the twelve centuries from the Marseilles traveller to Alfred of England, nothing was heard in Central and Southern Europe of the lives, customs, and doings of the Scandinavian people in their own homes; although within that period tribes of half-savage, resolute, blue-eyed, tall, strong men from the North poured southward, and became known to the Romans as Cimbri, Teutons, Germans, and Goths. At first the novel and fierce modes of attack used by these men, and their great strength and courage, carried terror and defeat among the trained soldiers of Rome, who knew not how to break through the long wall of shields chained together which those strange and audacious foes brought against them. But in time the superior discipline and arms of the Romans overcame the fierce Northern warriors. Notwithstanding their sanguinary experience and dread of these warlike strangers from the North, the Romans did not take pains to discover the precise part of Europe from which they came. It is said that finally, by chance, some strings of amber beads had been brought to Rome; and soon these ornaments were so much admired that the fashionable ladies of that city thought their dress incomplete unless they had an adequate number to ornament the neck and hair. Then, as in modern times, fashion was powerful to stimulate commerce. As soon as the amber beads were in demand by the Roman ladies,

the agencies of Roman trade were put in motion, and found their way along the great rivers, and through the half-savage and little-known countries of Eastern and Northern Europe, till they reached the shores of those seas where it was believed the precious material so much coveted could be found in abundance. In this way, by degrees, the Romans became better acquainted with the location and nature of the lands from which the Goths and Germans had come. The Northmen themselves aided to dispel the prevailing ignorance in their own regard; for, in their roamings and voyages, they took with them their bards, who sung of the deeds of their ancestors, and the wonderful manner in which they feasted, fought, and conquered in their far-off homes among the fjords, mountains, and snows of the North. It is probable, that, in the course of time, these tales of the Gothic bards became known to the people of Southern Europe, and thus the latter came to know more of Scandinavia and its people.

According to the records of the Northmen and the evidences of modern research, the Scandinavians were a Gothic or German race. Like all the nations who now people Europe, they came originally from Asia, and belong to the Aryan race. Leaving their home in the East, they made their way westward, till they turned aside to follow the route which each tribe selected for itself. The special German nation to which the Scandinavians belong was early known as the Goths. These people had pushed themselves, from their old Eastern homes, westward and northward, until they arrived on the shores of the Baltic and the German seas, where they took possession of the islands and coast-lands, driving out or enslaving the older tribes, which, long before, had come from the regions beyond the Black Sea. The people driven out by the new-comers were compelled to find homes in colder and less fruitful lands, where their descendants, in modern times, are known as Finns and Lapps. There are no reliable data to show

the precise time when the Goths first came to the North of Europe. These people, in their new homes, in time increased so in numbers that they began to swarm south in pursuit of more fertile lands, and for war and pillage. For centuries from the declining period of the Roman Republic, the Northmen were known as a restless, wandering, piratical race of people, who continually invaded and ravaged the more southern countries of Europe, ever eager to plant themselves on the first fertile spot which promised them food and shelter, or to capture and sack the village or town which promised them rich plunder. Tribe after tribe appeared almost every year with the opening of spring; and when Rome ceased to exist as a dominating power, and Charlemagne had organized a new European empire, these Goths from the North continued their roving and aggressive habits, hanging on every frontier and coast, and penetrating through bay and river which opened the way to successful attack and pillage. The viking expeditions were a terror to every city and country on the Atlantic coasts and inlets from the English Channel to the Mediterranean. Their boldness, fierceness, and vigor of body and mind, made an ever-enduring impression on the people of the more favored countries of the South. Of authentic and entirely reliable history of that portion of the Scandinavian people who became known as the Swedes, there is not much until the Christian period of Swedish history. There is a degree of probable history of Scandinavia and its people in the *sagas*, the general name of those compositions which contain the history and mythology of the Northern people of Europe. At the courts of the Northern kings, the skald, or bard, was accustomed to compose poetry and chants in honor of those who had distinguished themselves in warlike exploits, and to recite and sing them on festive and public occasions. These productions abounded in historical recitals of the chief families, and the ancestry of those who listened to them with lively

interest. These were repeated until they were fully engraved in the memory of those who heard them, and handed down from one generation to another. Later this oral poetry was put in writing, and constituted the *sagas*. The most important of these were the productions of Icelanders, who made considerable progress in literature in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The "New Edda" is a Scandinavian work drawn from these *sagas* by Snorre Sturleson, who was a judge in Iceland from 1215 to 1222. This book contains an account of the mythology, poetry, and philosophy of the Scandinavian people, and gives valuable information on their history. These recitals of the *sagas* are too much intermixed with mythology and fiction to furnish very much positive data for authentic history, so far, at least, as Sweden is concerned. It would be foreign to the historic sketch we are now attempting, to bring forward this class of testimony. As tending to show the spirit, resolution, vigor, and character of the Northmen, these *sagas* are referred to as of value, and, were we not here making but a meagre outline, would be considered at length. It is correct to say, that the reliable history of Sweden of chief importance begins after the introduction of Christianity into the country in the reign of King Olaf, which was from 993 to 1024. Of the three Scandinavian countries, Sweden became known to the intelligent world of Europe at a later period than the other two. Denmark was farther south, and composed of islands favorably situated, and that country and Norway were more adjacent to the Atlantic, which made them more accessible to the nations of the South; while Sweden, which had its water domain chiefly on the Baltic, became known to the more advanced people of Europe at a later date than Denmark and Norway, whose theatre of activity was more on the western seas. The mythology and religion of the Swedes show them, as well as the Danes and Norwegians, to have been a vigorous, warlike people, among whom personal

independence and strength of character were fostered. Like the Danes, the Swedes traced the descent of their early kings back to Odin. Throughout the North every king was the pontiff, or high-priest, of his people; and one of his chief duties was to offer annual sacrifices within the temples of his kingdom. The accounts given of the rise of the Swedish monarchy, in the legend known as the "Ynglina Saga," was written by the Iceland scribes from the old songs brought down from former generations. This and other *sagas*, which give an account of the royal races of Sweden, were doubtless based on real facts which had become intermixed with many fables. That these people, in their dark and bloody Paganism, lived in much turbulence and strife, cannot be doubted. Their kings were elective, and often changed. The people with arms in their hands were powerful, though they followed their sovereigns with obedience in warlike enterprises. In the period in which the Danes were hovering on the coasts of Great Britain, and making hostile inroads into Germany and Gaul, the Swedes were striking out boldly into Eastern Europe, turning their arms against the Finns, Lapps, and Wends, and making much of the territory which is now in Russia, the theatre of their warlike success. Making, thus, a brief glance at these early centuries of Swedish history, we come to the time when Olaf became known as the first Christian king of Sweden, since whose reign there are reliable data for history. He was taught Christianity by Siegfred, an English missionary, who devoted a long life to the work of teaching the Pagan Swedes the religion of the gospel. Olaf had been seven years king when he received Christian baptism, about the year 1000. He died in 1024, not having been able to induce his people to follow his example in adopting the new faith. They compelled him to leave them free to follow the religion of their fathers; while they allowed him to erect a bishopric, and gave him choice of any district in Sweden in which he

might build Christian churches. For this purpose, he selected West Gothland, which continued to be the chief seat of the Christian faith; while the lands of the Svea would not allow Christian priests within their limits, or acknowledge Christian kings for their rulers, for more than a hundred and fifty years after the death of Olaf. An effort had been made to introduce Christianity into Sweden more than a hundred and fifty years earlier by Frankish monks. The son and successor of Charlemagne, Louis le Débonnaire, took an ardent interest in sending Christian missionaries to the Pagans of the North. Under the auspices of this pious emperor, a monk from Picardy named Anscarius, and his friend, another monk, called Autbert, went to Denmark in 827. But these missionaries did not meet with the reception they expected, and were soon driven from the country to which they had gone with such devotion and sacrifice. This was a keen disappointment to the pious Louis, as well as to Anscarius and his friend. Two years later, in 829, Björn, a Swedish king, sent to Louis, asking him to send Christian teachers to his country, that he and his people might be taught the new religion. This Björn was king of Upper Sweden, and had his royal residence and chief town at Upsala, near the great temple of Odin, and the consecrated centre of the Norse Paganism. Receiving this information, the Emperor Louis again sent for Anscarius, who at once responded to the call, and, with monks and servants, entered on their long and dangerous journey to the North. In the course of their voyage on the Baltic they were beset with pirates, robbed of the valuable manuscript-books given them by the emperor, and put on shore in destitution. In this forlorn condition they made their way to Sweden, where they were well received by the king and his people, and allowed to preach to and baptize all who were willing to accept the new faith. As soon, however, as Anscarius went away, the influence of his work rapidly disappeared.

Twenty years later, when he returned, he found the Swedes so afraid of bringing on their heads the wrath of the gods if they listened to the Christian teachers, that they threatened to put them to death unless they immediately abandoned the country. Thus the missionaries, whom the son of Charlemagne had induced to go to the remote North to convert the Pagans, were compelled to leave their work unfinished. Other attempts were made to introduce the Christian doctrines among the Swedes at different times after Anscarius and his fellow monks were driven from the country; but it was more than one hundred and seventy years from the first unsuccessful effort of the Emperor Louis and his monks to evangelize the people of Sweden, to the date of the baptism of Olaf, the first Christian king. Olaf had passed some of his early life in Denmark, where Christianity had sooner made progress; and there he had undoubtedly been favorably impressed in its regard. But the stern resistance it met with among his people after his own public adoption of the new faith showed how little real hold it had then obtained, and how tenaciously the old religion maintained its power over the inhabitants of Sweden. Siegfred, the English missionary, had, indeed, been more successful than Anscarius, but to a limited degree only. A long and troublesome struggle was to continue between the old Scandinavian religion and what was then taught as Christianity, before the latter would acquire full supremacy in the country. The Swedish peasants of that age had great power in the State, and were not slow to exercise it, not alone in matters of religion, but in other important affairs. The baptism of their king to the new faith, and the authority his example implied, were not enough to win or compel them to its adoption, as the sequel most forcibly showed. Olaf died in 1024; and his two sons, Jacob and Edmund, successively reigned nearly thirty years, the last dying about 1054.

The Stenkil line of kings began in 1055, and continued

nearly seventy years. During that period the country was torn by factions, religious wars raged with violence, and finally all the reigning family and many of the chief men were slain together. In this state of violence and anarchy no bishops remained in Sweden, and the old religion regained chiefly its ascendency. In 1130 the Sverker line of kings began its rule, and continued ninety or more years. This also was a period of turbulence, strife, and bloodshed. Sverker Carlsson, who reigned from 1135 to 1155, under whom the condition of the country somewhat improved, was a believer in Christianity; and under him the Church of Rome obtained some form of official recognition. In his old age this Sverker king was troubled by civil wars, and finally slain by his own servants while on the way to hear mass in a Christian church. He was succeeded in 1155 by Erik, whose reign formed an epoch in Swedish history. This king (after his death called St. Erik) worked earnestly and effectively during his reign to improve the state of the country. The old *sagas* assert that King Erik sought to accomplish three things: "to build churches and improve the services of religion, to rule his people according to law and right, and to subdue the enemies of his faith and realm." He enjoys the credit of having gained the love and gratitude of all the women of Sweden by the laws which he made to secure them valuable rights, of which the following were the most important, — that "every wife shall have equal power with her husband over locks, bolts, and bars; that she may claim half his bed during his life, and enjoy one-third of his property after his death." It was not until the reign of this king that the Christian religion fully secured its ascendency in Sweden. Until this time the worship of Odin had been kept up, at the cost of Christians as well as Pagans. He was the first king who erected a church at Upsala, thus disregarding the Pagan claims as to its special sanctity as the long-recognized centre of the old faith.

Under his protection an archbishopric was created, to which Henrik, who had the reputation of being a learned and pious man, was appointed.

This prelate went with the king on an expedition to Finland. The idolaters of that country had repeatedly desolated the coasts of Sweden, and it became necessary to bring them to better behavior. Accompanied by Henrik as Christian missionary, King Erik succeeded in putting down Paganism in that country by the establishment of the new faith, and probably planted there some Swedish colonies. Bishop Henrik was the first Christian apostle to the Finns, and died a martyr. It was during the reign of this king that Finland, a large and important country, was joined with Sweden, — a union which remained unbroken until the Machiavelian insinuation of Napoleon on the raft of Tilsit, and the ambition of the czar, caused the former country to be absorbed in the Russian Empire, after the connection had been maintained with Sweden six hundred and fifty years. King Erik lost his life in an attack by Magnus Henriksson of Denmark, who, claiming to have some rights to the Swedish throne, marched in force to Upsala. Erik was then attending mass at the church, and, when warned of the near approach of the enemy, would not quit service until its close. He then pressed forward at the head of his men to encounter the force of the hostile prince, and, in the fierce fight which ensued, was slain by the invaders on the public square, May, 1160. The virtues and religious devotion of this king gained for him the love of the Swedes, who cherished him as their patron saint. For a long time his remains were preserved in the cathedral at Upsala, and venerated as holy relics. His arms were emblazoned on the national flag, which the Swedes bore in the wars against the enemies of the State. They celebrated the anniversary of his death, and the city of Stockholm has his image on its seal and banner. For nearly a hundred years after the death

of St. Erik kings of his line continued to reign in Sweden, and during this period there was much turbulence and repeated civil war. There was frequent repetition of bitter and destructive struggles for the throne between rival princely aspirants and their partisans. The prelates and the nobles increased their power and pretensions amid these bloody turmoils, and assumed the right to elect the king, which in former generations had long been the prerogative of the people assembled with arms in their hands. Compacts and conventions were often arranged for the transmission of the royal sceptre, made with armed hands, and written in blood, and as often broken after brief continuance. To this internal strife were added bloody quarrels with Denmark and Norway, with which dynastic claims and ambitions had more or less to do. The murder of rival royal families by the successful aspirant to power was carried to the extent of slaying even the sons and grandsons, and assassination was a frequent expedient of the contending factions. The last of the house of Sverker having died in 1222, Erik Eriksson came to the vacant throne. Though the last scion of the family who had disputed with his own for its possession had gone to the tomb, Erik did not long enjoy its undisputed control. These continual struggles of the rival monarchical families tended to weaken the royal power, and to increase the influence and pretensions of the chief nobles, from whom now sprang a powerful family who finally obtained the throne, — the Folkungar race, who were to hold the kingly office for a century. One of its members, Birger Brosa, exercised the functions of jarl, dying in 1202, for the ancient princely dignity of jarl had become the first place of the court and the government. He who filled it had the title of Jarl of the Swedes, of the Sueones, and of the Goths, prince by the grace of Gǫd. In official acts he came next after the king. His functions and relation to the royal power were similar to those once held by the

mayors of the palace among the French. Out of this family was now to come a more powerful man than Birger Brosa. It was after the Sverker line of kings had become extinct, nearly one hundred years after St. Erik, that a man of conspicuous ability and force of character ruled the kingdom, though he never became the crowned king. This man, Birger Jarl, ruled in the name of another. In 1248 he was clothed with the dignity of jarl. The words of the Roman prelate in regard to him gave the measure of power of this prince: "The whole country is governed by this man." The legal king dying in 1252, in whom the family of Erik became extinct, the question of a new king being raised, Birger Jarl being then in Finland, choice was promptly made of the young son of Jarl, named Valdemar. To raise the child Valdemar to the throne was to give the government to the father, who administered it with marked energy and success. He made several improvements in the laws and regulations of the kingdom. He abolished the custom of liquidating crime by money, and put an end to the trial by red-hot iron. The foundation of Stockholm is attributed to him. He sought to open relations with England, was esteemed as a mediator in the differences between Denmark and Norway, and gave asylum at his court to the Grand Duke of Russia. He died in 1266. The powerful family of Folkungar, of whom Birger Jarl was its ablest representative, was excluded from the throne in 1365, after having ruled a century. During that period important changes took place, — the people lost much of their influence in the affairs of their government, special privileges to the clergy were secured, the power of the nobles was increased, and the authority of the king extended. The animosity and strife of rival princes continued, and violence and war often prevailed.

The next period of Swedish history, from 1365 to 1470, is termed that of the foreign kings and the union of

the three crowns. In the latter part of the reign of the Folkungar family, the royal power was much constrained by the intrigues and grasping ambition of the higher nobles. It was by the efforts of these Swedish lords that foreign rulers were brought into the country. Disturbed by the turbulence of these lords, Magnus, the last of the Folkungar kings, had driven twenty-four of them into exile. These went into Germany. Arrived at the court of Mecklenburg, they offered the crown of Sweden to Albrekt, a son of a sister of Magnus married to a German prince. A fleet transported Albrekt, with the exiled lords, into Sweden. This German prince was proclaimed king at Stockholm. Thus the higher nobles disposed of the throne and the destiny of the country according to their own ambitions and interests. And it was through their intrigues and influence that the union of the three crowns of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway was brought about, — called the Union of Calmar, taking its name from the old Swedish city of Calmar on the Baltic coast of the south-eastern part of the kingdom. This period of a century was one of great calamities, strife, and bloodshed for Sweden. A united Scandinavia would seem to be a result plainly indicated by geography and the ethnology of the people who inhabit it; but it failed at this time, chiefly because those men who brought it about sought to wield its power and advantages for the promotion of their personal and family interests. It was obnoxious to the people of Sweden; because these privileged lords, a limited number, were the representatives and executive agents of a foreign rule, chiefly to their own aggrandizement. Therefore the country was continually distracted by the violent efforts made to get rid of what seemed foreign despotism. The union, which became so detested in Swedish memories and Swedish history, was consummated in 1387. The king of Denmark died in 1375, and the king of Norway in 1380. The son of the latter (Olaf, after his father)

reigned over Denmark and Norway until his death, in 1387, when his mother, Margaret, was proclaimed regent of these two kingdoms; and the same year she received the Swedish crown from those in the kingdom who had concentrated in their hands the interests and the power of the factions hostile to Albrekt and the German rule. The long period of misgovernment, violence, and anarchy which followed brought their evils to all; but the peasantry, as usual, were the greatest sufferers. Ambitious nobles, powerful prelates, and rival competitors for the throne, were the agencies of strife. The elements of opposition to the union and foreign rule finally concentrated around the family of Sture, who became in a large degree the representative of Swedish patriotisn and nationality. Sture the elder became the real ruler of the country in 1470, though he did not assume the title of king. Several years before, the cry had been raised throughout the country, "Sweden is a kingdom, not a farm or a parish, to be ruled over by bailiffs; and we will have no Danish overseers, but a genuine Swede for our king." The resistance to Christian I. of Denmark was so strong that the Swedish Council of State was obliged to yield; and Charles Knutsson was recalled to the throne, Christian having been defeated and driven from the kingdom. This Charles Knutsson had been previously twice temporarily on the throne. He died in 1470, after having committed the government of the country to his nephew, Sten Sture, earnestly entreating him never to attempt to gain the throne for himself. The Council of State proclaimed him regent in 1471. Six months later, Christian I. made another and last attempt to regain control of the kingdom by landing, near Stockholm, a numerous army of hired German troops, and was signally defeated. For a short period Sweden was said to have enjoyed more quiet and prosperity than it had known for a long time. Christian I. reigned ten years after his defeat in the Swedish capital, and died in 1481, leaving to his

son Christian II. the crowns of Denmark and Norway, and his claim to the throne of Sweden, which the Calmar Union gave him. The successful party did not long have quiet and uncontested rule in Sweden. The partisans of the Danish dynasty were still strong, and improved their opportunities to sow discord and disaffection to the rule of the Stures. Hans, the son of Christian, was resolved to regain control of the Swedish kingdom. The nobles who had assented to the rule of Sture as regent did not like him; for he was the favorite of the peasants, and defended them against the cruel exactions of the nobles. Hans, with his army and naval force, aided by his powerful Swedish partisans, finally regained the upper hand, and was crowned king at Stockholm in 1499, when he conferred knighthood on all the nobles who had taken part in his proclamation as lawful sovereign. But Sten Sture was still popular with the Swedish peasants. In 1500 a powerful and successful revolt took place against the Danish king and his partisans; and Sture, in the name of the Swedish people, declared the country independent of Denmark. Sten Sture died in 1503; and, having adopted Svante Sture as his heir, the latter was made regent and marshal of the kingdom. This man was of a daring, frank, and generous nature, with the spirit and bearing of a warrior. He cherished the soldiery, and cared more for war than peace. He and his friend, a bishop, Hemming Gade, who were the real rulers of the country during the lifetime of the former, were very hostile to the union, and did what they could to foster hostility to the Danes. Svante Sture died suddenly in 1512; and his son, Sten Sture, was chosen to fill his place. This man was regarded as the best of the Sture race; and he did much to relieve the people from oppressive burdens of taxation, and to ameliorate their general condition, while his efforts to achieve the freedom of his country from the Danes, and to strengthen the national sentiment, made him a favorite

with his countrymen. He had a powerful opponent in the Archbishop Trolle, who hated the Stures, and finally became a traitor to his country. This man became the leader of the party in Sweden which wished to bring the Danish king to the throne. Hans of Denmark died in 1513; and Christian II. was proclaimed king of that country, and came into possession of whatever legal right there may have belonged to his family to the crown of Sweden. He was a more resolute and determined man than his father, and had the support of Archbishop Trolle and a strong faction of partisans. The young nobility and the peasantry generally favored Sten Sture, but the old senators followed the lead of Trolle in the support of Christian II. and his cause. The principal senators, who were no more nor less than the chief nobles, who had been gathering, step by step, as much power as possible in their hands, banded themselves together, under oath, to resist, with all the means at their command, every attempt to take from them what they termed their liberty, their influence, and the right, which they claimed to have possessed for a long time, to regulate the administration of the kingdom whenever the throne became vacant. They agreed to hold fast to the union with Denmark, and to restore the authority of the Danish sovereign; but the resistance led by Sture was so strong that the higher nobles were obliged to yield. This concession by the chief lords to Sture and his party had been made before the death of Hans and the coming to the throne of Christian II. When the latter assumed power, and made vigorous assertion of his legal claims to the Swedish throne, the opponents of Sture at once assumed a determined front. Christian brought an army to the gates of Stockholm, but was defeated by Sture and his adherents in 1518. After the battle, the Danish king sought an interview with Sture, and, in proof of good faith, asked that Swedish hostages should be sent on board the Danish

fleet, and there remain until Christian returned safe from the interview. Sture agreed to this proposition, and made choice, with their own assent, of bishop Hemming Gade and five other persons of noble birth, one of whom was young Gastavus Vasa, who was to play such an important part in the future history of Sweden. This young man was a warm supporter of the party hostile to Danish rule, and in the recent war had borne the standard of his country in the battle before Stockholm. While the meeting between Sture and Christian was taking place, by the order of the latter the Danish ship on board of which were the six hostages sailed to Denmark, where Hemming Gade, Gustavus Vasa, and their four associates were kept in prison as rebels. The result of this infamous and cruel breach of faith was the renewal of the civil war. On his return to Copenhagen, Christian sought and obtained a bull from the Pope to place Sweden under an interdict, and to excommunicate Sten Sture and all his supporters.

Thus terminated Christian's treacherous pretension of the wish to be reconciled with the regent and his party. A Danish army was sent into Sweden, and its commander ordered to affix to all church-doors throughout the kingdom copies of the papal decrees. Although at first the forces of Christian were defeated, their superior strength, aided by the partisans of the union in Sweden, led by the archbishop, finally prevailed. Sten Sture died in 1520, and his loss to the party of Swedish independence left his country at the mercy of Christian II. and his imbittered and sanguinary partisans. In the autumn of the same year Christian was crowned at Stockholm with much splendor, and, by his affability and grace of manners, made a strong impression on the Swedes who took part in his coronation. The Swedish chroniclers say that he showed himself benevolent, pleasant, and gay, receiving some by embracing them, and others by grasping their hands, and that all his conduct announced reassuring dispositions;

and this when he must have had in mind the atrocious proceedings which soon followed, which stained his memory forever as a brutal tyrant. Immediately after these reassuring indications, the king's chief officers of state came before Christian while surrounded by his court, and, in the name of the Archbishop Trolle, demanded justice for the wrongs which the latter claimed to have suffered at the hands of Sture and his councillors, who had deprived him of his see for his treasonous conduct. On the pretence of maintaining the authority of the church, Christian demanded to know the names of all who had signed the deposition of Trolle. The document was produced; and all those whose names were attached to it were arrested at once, although they were bravely defended by Christine Gyllenstjerna, the widow of the regent Sture, who showed plainly that the doomed men had acted only in conformity with the act of the national Diet. On the 8th of November, 1520, only a few days after the pompous and flattering circumstances of the coronation, ninety persons, who had been the chief supporters of Sture and the patriotic cause, were led forth into the market-place of Stockholm, where, surrounded by the Danish troops, they were decapitated, one after the other, in the presence of the terror-stricken Swedes. The first who suffered was a Bishop Mads, who, as the fatal blow was about to be struck, cried aloud, "The king is a traitor, and God will avenge this wrong." Among the condemned was Erik Johansson Vasa, the father of the future kings of Sweden. When he was led out, a messenger came to him from Christian, offering him pardon. "No," he cried: "for God's sake, let me die with all these honest men, my brethren!" and then laid his neck on the block. Of such parentage was the young hero who had been treacherously carried away as a hostage, and who was to play such a part in the future history of his country.

That tragic episode in Swedish history has been well

named the "blood-bath," and its author handed down the ages as a tyrant. Others were hanged, or perished in tortures. The murders continued several days. The bodies of the victims remained three days on the public square, after which they were dragged into a suburb of the city, and burned. The remains of Sten Sture and those of his child were taken from their tomb, and thrown into the flames. On all the road, as he quit Stockholm, Christian scattered terror by similar deeds of cruelty; and at the commencement of 1521, before he had passed the frontiers of Sweden, more than six hundred persons had perished by his vengeance. Thus the Union of Calmar had finally been drowned in blood, and was thereafter, for the patriotic Swedes, to be but a synonyme of treachery and brutal violence; and their writers have not unfittingly called the time of the Stockholm massacre their Bartholomew's Day.

CHAPTER II.

GUSTAVUS VASA, AND HIS SONS ERIK, JOHN, AND CHARLES. — THE REMARKABLE FACTS OF THEIR REIGNS.

WHILE these sanguinary proscriptions were occurring, the young Gustavus Vasa, having escaped from his enemies, was wandering in the forests of Dalecarlia, a province of the country where the spirit of resistance to tyranny had before repeatedly manifested itself with vigor and determination, as it did in subsequent times. Flying from the minions of Christian and Trolle, he was able to conceal himself from his persecutors, sometimes in a carriage loaded with straw, sometimes under the branches of trees, and at other times in caves and ditches, cherishing the firm resolution to save his country, with the assistance of God and the Swedish peasants. Everywhere the terrorizing effects of the recent successes of Christian and the organized force at his command had intimidated the Swedish population, and tended to make his authority supreme. But Gustavus soon obtained a small following among the Dalecarlian peasantry. At first cautious, and reluctant to follow him, the fervid eloquence of the young hero, who had escaped from the captivity of which he had been so perfidiously made the victim, his vivid representation of the wrongs of his countrymen, of the bloody proceedings of Christian and his partisans and their hired mercenaries, finally told on the peasants, and brought to his standard a small force, with which he marched against his enemies. The first successes of his arms soon brought numbers to

his standard; and he finally defeated the main army of Christian, in which served nearly eight thousand Germans. This victory was the turning-point in the career of the Swedish leader, and rendered his country's deliverance only a question of months. He showed great skill and energy in organizing his party, and securing the necessary financial means to resist successfully the powerful elements of force still at the command of Christian and his partisans. The Lubeck merchants and brokers, always ready to advance money to those whose necessities obliged them to pay large dividends, favored him by loans, which, added to what he had been able to secure in Sweden by great diligence and care, put him in financial condition to maintain his army. In the mean time the cruelties and brutalities of Christian and his adherents became more and more known to the entire kingdom. At the time of the blood-bath on the public square of Stockholm, in November, 1520, many of the widows and children of the victims had been carried away to Denmark. The news now came, that these prisoners had perished in horrible dungeons into which they had been thrown. At this tragic intelligence the anger of the Swedes knew no bounds. The mother of young Gustavus and his two sisters were among these victims, the husband and the father of whom had before perished on the block. These sanguinary transactions of the Danish king were laid before the Pope and the Emperor Charles V., in a letter by young Gustavus, as justification of his taking up arms. When the information of this came to the ears of Christian, he sent orders to his commander to put to death every Swedish noble he could lay his hands on. This cruel order was evaded, to the credit of the Danish general, saying it was "better that men should have a chance of getting a knock on the head in battle, than to wring their necks as if they were chickens." Other officers of King Christian were less scrupulous, and carried out his relentless orders of murder. Finally driven

from Sweden by the general uprising, and the able leadership of young Vasa, on the 23d of June, 1523, at a meeting of the Swedish Diet, the union with Denmark, which had lasted one hundred and twenty-six years, was forever dissolved, and Gustavus Vasa proclaimed king of Sweden. The Danish garrisons were driven from all the fortified places, and the national independence of Sweden became an accomplished fact. By the commencement of 1524 Finland declared in favor of Gustavus; and thus the entire dominion of the Swedes recognized the new order of things, and came under the rule of the heroic leader whose strong and brilliant qualities inspired the hopes of the nation.

This man, who had been thus successful in the liberation of his country, was now about thirty years of age. Born in 1495 or 1496 (as to which year there is not conclusive historic evidence), he was the descendant of an old Swedish family which for two centuries had given members to the senate of the kingdom. His real name at this time was Gustavus Eriksson, which he bore and signed before being king. He never used the name of Vasa himself, nor had it belonged to any of his ancestors. According to some, it was derived from the estate of Vasa in Upland; but others, with more probability, say it was taken from his escutcheon, Vasa signifying, in the arms of Gustavus, fascine, with which ditches are filled when a body of troops march to an assault. Originally the fascine was black in the family arms: Gustavus made it yellow. It was after his time that they regarded it as a sheaf. In 1509 he began his studies at Upsala. He entered the service of the regent Sture in 1514. The Swedish chroniclers say that he early left his studies, to take the profession of arms, and to conform to the manners of courtiers, and that, when the Danish monarch advanced with his army on Stockholm to crush the patriotic forces of Sture, the gallantry of young Vasa made itself conspicuous. He was, they said, "a noble, handsome, and intelligent young man, whom

God had caused to be born to save the country." At the date of the complete expulsion of the Danes from the country, the repeal of the Union of Calmar by the Diet, and his recognition as king, Gustavus was about thirty years of age. While he then did not underestimate what he and his brave supporters had accomplished, he did not blind himself to the immense work before him yet to be achieved. The country had long been distracted and impoverished by faction, strife, and anarchy. He had incurred heavy debts to provide means to carry on the war against Christian and his party. The kingdom must now be organized, consolidated, and governed; the struggle of factions must be terminated, the resources of the country developed, the finances organized and stimulated, and the debts due exacting creditors paid. He set himself to his task with unshrinking resolution. He saw the necessity of taking from the powerful prelates of the Roman Church the enormous privileges of power and property which they usurped, of bringing the nobles into subjection to the authority of the crown, and of providing better security for the peasantry, who had done so much to secure his triumph, and who were at the mercy of the cupidity and oppression of the clericals and the nobles. Whether from motives of policy or reasons of religious conviction, probably through the combined force of these motives and reasons, he determined to make of Sweden a Protestant kingdom. He had previously made himself acquainted with the import of the new formula of faith taught by Luther; and when two Swedish students who had studied at Wittenberg, a Lutheran college in Germany, returned to Sweden, in 1519, and began to make known to the people the Reformed religion, he had given them encouragement so far as it was then in his power. When he had been proclaimed king, he appointed one of these men, Olaus Petri, to a church in Stockholm, and gave the younger brother a professorship at Upsala University. Not long after, he selected

for his chancellor Laurentius Andrea, who had previously renounced the Catholic teachings, and translated the New Testament into Swedish, regardless of the theological authorities of the kingdom. He allowed public discussion between the supporters of the old and the new doctrines, and disregarded the papal letter in which the Roman autocrat ordered a court of Inquisition to be opened in Stockholm, for the trial and punishment of heretics, and the condemnation of the writings of Luther and his disciples. It is, then, just to presume that the young king was moved by sincere religious reasons, as well as by the financial necessities of his country, when he resolved to grapple boldly with the papal authority intrenched in the faith, prejudice, and property of Sweden. He used much discretion in carrying out his designs. Perhaps he did not always at first disclose his full purposes. When the people declared that they wished to hold fast to the religious teachings of their fathers, he assured them that he did not care to set up new dogmas, but desired to put an end to abuses. He demanded, in a visit to the Chapter, from whom the church held its temporal power, and if the Bible conferred it? He had the sagacity and tact to induce the nobility to aid him in his efforts to take the immense landed interests from the high clergy, by showing the advantage the former would gain by becoming possessors of a portion of them, subject to certain obligations to the nation. While supporting himself on the nobles in his contest with the Roman usurpation, he confirmed their privileges, reserving for the future his purpose to bring them more under the authority of the crown. In a Diet at Vesterås, in 1527, he completely crushed the papal power in the kingdom, and compelled the high prelates to assent to their fall. The convents, one after another, were taken possession of by the young king. The temporal fiefs of the bishops were suppressed. The fines which the bishops had been accustomed to receive were collected by the agents of Gustavus.

The jurisdiction which had been exercised by the clergy became nearly null. Letters of protection were granted to the monks and nuns who wished to leave their cloisters, and the nullity of their excommunication was pronounced. The king did not stop here. He removed and appointed clergymen. To the prejudice of the bishops, he declared himself the legal successor of the clergy who died intestate, and sometimes took possession of their fortunes against their last will, and in some cases shared the revenues with bishops, according to his good pleasure. With a firm hand he pushed these reforms in the midst of a people who often strongly evinced the spirit of revolt against them. He knew that the independence and necessities of the nation required them; and he boldly maintained his resolution to carry them forward to conclusion against whatever resistance might arise, and, despite innumerable difficulties, triumphed in the end. The Swedes of all classes and beliefs were taught to realize, that, in dethroning the tyrant Christian, and gaining their separation from the union, they had found a ruler who knew how to put down faction, to stifle revolt, to correct great abuses, and to govern with firmness and irresistible power; but this was not accomplished at once, nor without a long, patient, and continued struggle of years. His ability as a statesman, his tact and remarkable common sense, his clear comprehension of the work he had in hand and of the end to be gained, finally enabled him to triumph. He gave his personal attention to whatever he thought would advance the interests, develop the resources, and increase the wealth, of his dominions. The mines, the fisheries, the commerce, of the country, received his fostering care. With his own hands he corresponded with persons in all sections of the country, instructing them in agriculture, and stimulating them to the production of crops. He gave precepts of economy even in the most insignificant details, and the acts of his government often resembled the journal of a great farm.

He looked out the favorable places for the erection of hydraulic works, and constructed the first saw-mills in the kingdom driven by water-power. At one time, seeing his revenues lower, he gave orders for the cultivation of hops, to work the fields more extensively, to dry the meadows, and to rightly manage the swine. Many of his circulars, teaching a wise economy, were sent into all the parishes of the kingdom; and the authority of these was that of royal orders. In the end the people largely embraced the ideas of the king. His queen, Margaret, inspired by his example, kept cows, and had an extensive dairy to take care of; for which she had the service of twenty-two women, and personally supervised its management. The king had a sharp and vigilant eye on whatever tended to increase the royal finances. In this regard he was not always overscrupulous as to his means of success. He trafficked in all the profits of the soil more than any one else in the kingdom, and in this way amassed large wealth. His intendants feared him, though they were as little scrupulous as he when there was question of increasing the revenues. Even the public women, who lived by their shame, paid to the king a stipulated sum per week; and everywhere the fiscal instrumentalities were rigidly operative. On the other hand, this king, who gathered money with such watchful care and rigorous methods, was not avaricious of his wealth when the service of the State demanded an expenditure. At one period of his reign he lost heavily by war with Lubeck and its Hanseatic allies, and by the burning of the royal palace at Stockholm. He commenced anew to amass money. At another time he expended heavily in suppressing a powerful revolt, and complained that it cost him seven years of savings. He repaired his losses, and at his death left four large vaults filled with silver, and magazines abundantly provided with precious merchandise. Thus he was able to leave to his successors a well-filled treasury, and a well-organized army of nearly

sixteen thousand men. For the last twenty years of his reign the kingdom was undisturbed by revolt. He was a man of strong personality, one of the ablest of the European monarchs of the sixteenth century; and the history of his reign is, in a remarkable degree, the history of the Swedish nation from the day of his ascent to the throne to the hour of his death.

We have given this somewhat extended *résumé* of the career and administrative efforts of the first Vasa king of Sweden, because he was the near ancestor of him whose history is the principal object of this book, and because the Sweden which he did so much to create and consolidate as a nation was the Sweden which Gustavus Adolphus had behind him in his remarkable career as warrior, king, and statesman. Compared with the great Protestant liberator, this Vasa may not have been equal to his immortal grandson in the force of heroic sentiment, in the gifts and accomplishments of the warrior; but in balanced common sense, self-possession, executive capacity, and tenacity of grip, he may have been quite the equal of him whose renown was won on a larger sphere of action, and who perished on the bloody field of Lutzen.

Gustavus Vasa had four sons, Erik, John, Magnus, and Charles. Prior to his death the two oldest had given decided indications that they could not be trusted to walk in the footsteps of their illustrious parent, and possessed qualities and tendencies of character which would be likely to give more or less trouble to the kingdom. Gustavus had been thrice married, and Erik was the only son of his first queen, Catharine of Saxe-Lauenburg. Early had he caused his father much anxiety by his excitable and capricious conduct, manifesting at times a condition of mind bordering on insanity. Knowing, thus, the unreliability and violence of Erik, the father had sought to protect the other sons against their eldest brother's abuse of power, and by his will left them certain hereditary

rights over parts of the kingdom. To John, whose restless and turbulent characteristics also early showed themselves, he gave Finland as duchy, Ostrogothland to Magnus, and another duchy to Charles, who was then but a child of ten years. Before his reign began, Erik had commenced to make himself conspicuous by his ambitious and eccentric scheme of obtaining in marriage the hand of Elizabeth of England, whose coquetry with foreign princes is historically as well known as her astuteness in politics and diplomacy, with which the first was so closely blended that the dividing line is not always plain. Before the death of his father, Erik had begun the preliminaries of this royal marriage scheme, and was about to leave Sweden on a voyage to England to see if he could win his way to the plighted faith of England's queen. He had fitted out a large fleet at great expense, and numerous attendants had been assigned him, in order that he might make an appearance corresponding to the brilliant and gallant mission on which he was about to embark. He was reviewing his ships and men at Elfsborg, a western port of Sweden, when he received the intelligence of the death of King Gustavus. He at once disbanded his troops, hastened back to Stockholm, and was speedily proclaimed king, then at the age of twenty-seven, handsome in person, graceful, accomplished, speaking and writing several languages, musician, poet, and painter. At the commencement of his reign, he sought to conciliate the nobility, showing thus a change of the policy of his father, who had aimed, during his long and successful rule, to make the nobles and church prelates know their place. His coronation was celebrated at Upsala, June 29, 1561, with a magnificence until then unknown in Sweden. After he had received the homages and the oath of the dukes, he named counts and barons, in order to diminish the distance between the first and the nobility, and because he deemed it necessary "that there should be hereditary dignities in

an hereditary kingdom." A friendly language served at first to veil the misintelligence which really existed between the royal brothers, particularly Erik and John. The first letter which the former received from the latter, written the next day after the death of the father, contained complaints as to the terms of the testamentary will which Gustavus had left, by which he had sought, as much as possible, to prevent disputes and quarrels among the brothers. The evidences of jealousy and disagreement between Erik and John rapidly increased, and were soon to result in a collision of violence and bloodshed. John had sought and obtained in marriage, Catharine Jagellonica, sister of Sigismund II., King of Poland, to which Erik had assented, then had changed his mind when it was too late to prevent it. John claimed more authority in Finland, than Erik deemed him legally entitled to, and differed with the latter as to the steps to be taken in Livonia, and the policy in respect to Poland. On return to Finland, with his wife, John was bitterly reproached for having allied himself to the enemies of Sweden, and ordered to Stockholm to give an account of his conduct. Instead of complying with this order, John imprisoned the envoys of the king, stimulated the Finlanders to revolt, and sought the alliance of Poland and Prussia. He was accused by Erik of exciting insurrection against the royal authority, and condemned to death by the Swedish States, which had been convoked for that purpose, only a small part of which attended. The rigor of the sentence against the offending duke was mitigated by recourse to the king's merciful consideration. John, receiving no foreign support, was obliged to surrender at discretion. Taken to Stockholm, he was overwhelmed with reproaches by the despotic minister of the king, Göran Pehrsson, and the Duchess Catharine was offered a palace and sufficient revenue if she would separate from her husband. Her only answer to the base proposal was to show her ring, on

which was engraven, "Nothing except death;" and she followed Duke John to his prison in the castle of Gripsholm. The apartment assigned them, well-lighted, looking out on a fine view of Lake Mälar, was ornamented according to the taste of the times. That room is kept to this day, and shown to visitors and tourists, where John and his faithful wife passed four years of captivity. Erik took care that his brother should not be treated cruelly in his confinement, and sent him books of religion and of the classic authors, — a course of treatment which John was not to reciprocate when it came his turn to shut up Erik in another room of the same castle. In the mean time Erik's marriage ambitions had not been abandoned. As soon as his splendid Upsala coronation was over, he again put in activity his brilliant and costly preparations to gain the hand of the English queen, to whom he again sent his ambassador, Nils Gyllenierna, chancellor of the kingdom, who bore costly presents, — chests filled with gold and silver, strings of costly pearls, boxes of precious jewels, valuable furs, eighteen fine horses, and strange and rare animals for exhibitions and public games, with which to amuse the people. Besides these rare and costly gifts, Erik instructed his ambassador to use a liberal sum of money with which to bribe the English councillors of state, and to have Leicester, Elizabeth's favorite, put out of the way, even should it require a heavy cash expenditure. When the English courtiers heard that the king of Sweden had embarked with a numerous fleet, and was coming to ask the hand of their proud queen, they were preplexed as to the course to take. But they might have well spared all serious thought on the matter, for Erik did not prosecute his suit far enough to secure an affirmative or negative decision. His wooings had other directions to take. He sent a messenger to Scotland to see if Mary, whose life had the tragic ending in after-years, was as handsome as her fame had represented; while he negotiated with

and sent a bridal ring to the Princess of Lorraine, and had drawn up a marriage contract with Princess Christina of Hesse, whose hand he had solicited. But the triple threads of his marriage intrigues sometimes strangely crossed each other. While his negotiations were going on with the Hessian princess, a letter had been intercepted, addressed by him to Queen Elizabeth, proffering excuses relative to the proposals he had made to Christina, and assuring Elizabeth that they were not serious. This letter fell into the hands of the family of the Hessian princess, with a consequence easily understood. In the end Erik married a servant-girl of his own country, Cätharine Månsdotter, and caused her to be crowned at Stockholm with great pomp, to the keen disgust of the Swedish aristocracy. To her he was always faithful. His love for this humbly born woman was so earnest and sincere to the hour of his death that it was ascribed to sorcery. In the periods of his worst violence and sanguinary resolutions against those he regarded conspirators and enemies, she alone had power to calm him, and to checkmate the malignant and cruel advice of the worst of his ministerial advisers. This marriage took place in 1567, while Erik was engaged in war against Poland and Denmark. The latter was a long and destructive struggle of seven years, brought on by the mutual fault and restless ambition of the two young kings, Erik and Frederick II., and was carried on, with great atrocities on both sides, by sea and land. The deranged and inflamed condition of the mind of the Swedish king caused him to be suspicious of his best friends. The losses of the Swedes in this war with Denmark having been great, and its successes not equal to what Erik had anticipated, he conceived the idea that he who had the chief command of the army, Nils Sture, had been guilty of treason, —a suspicion without the least foundation. He deprived this man of all his dignities, and proclaimed him a traitor. After this he took him

again into favor, and sent him on an important mission. Soon after, he caused him and all the members of his family to be arrested and condemned to death for treason. In a paroxysm of excitement he finally stabbed to death, with his own hand, Nils Sture, in the place of his confinement. He was soon after smitten with the keenest remorse. This murder of Nils Sture, of an illustrious name, in his early prime, with its attending incidents and circumstances, made an indelible episode in Swedish annals, which has become classic in Swedish art and literature. About this time Duke Magnus, the third son of Gustavus Vasa, became insane by being forced to sign the death-warrant of his brother John, and for the remainder of his life had to be retained in confinement. But the career of Erik now brought things to a decisive crisis. The country was in a state of turmoil and anxiety. The well-filled treasury which Gustavus had left the nation at his death had been emptied by the wild extravagances of Erik; a large number of persons had been condemned to death for political reasons, and the future promised no improvement. Duke John now made his escape from the fate which Erik and his evil advisers had resolved to mete out to him; and he and Charles took up arms, and demanded of their royal brother that he should give up to them his corrupt and brutal favorite, Göran Pehrsson, who was known to be the adviser of the king in all his cruel transactions. So strong was the spirit of revolt against the general misrule, that John and Charles marched successfully to Stockholm, and took possession of all approaches to the palace, where Erik had shut himself, with his children and attendants. Göran Pehrsson was seized by the king's own guards, and delivered to the dukes. After a brief trial and horrible tortures the favorite was put to death. Hearing of the fate of his favorite minister, Erik surrendered to his brothers, who ordered him to be brought to trial before the assembled States of the kingdom. The

Swedish States pronounced against him, declaring that he had forfeited the crown for himself and his children, and condemned him to perpetual confinement, coupled with the stipulation that he should have the attendance and consideration due to a royal prisoner. John, who was now to take the place of Erik as king, had not the excuse of insanity for his want of humanity, justice, and good faith, and did not carry out the orders of the States in what regarded his elder brother's treatment in confinement; in this respect falling far short of what Erik's conduct towards him had been in like circumstances. Although John spared the brother's life for the present, he allowed him to be tortured most cruelly by his keepers, who repeatedly beat and wounded him in a brutal manner. The room in the Gripsholm Castle where he was confined was a miserable dungeon compared with the sumptuous apartment where Erik had kept John during his four years of imprisonment. John and Charles had acted unitedly in deposing their brother, and they received together the oath of the Swedish people. It was believed that they had agreed to reign simultaneously. Nevertheless, on his arrival at Stockholm John was saluted as king by the Senate, and he wrote his sisters that he had come to reign over Sweden. His attitude and movements, whatever may have been his previous promises to his brother, quickly showed that he intended to maintain his right and authority as sole sovereign. While Charles concealed not his discontent, he regarded it necessary for the time to sacrifice his pretensions. Though he did not share with his brother the title of king, events were to prove that he not only governed in his duchy, but his influence extended over much of the kingdom. John's weakness of character, his restless ambition, and unsteady and vacillating mind, were soon made manifest in his acts and policy. His first effort was to attach to himself the families to whose assistance he more or less was indebted for his elevation

to the throne. The Senate, in the act of allegiance, reports the promise of the king to give the nobility "the privileges which it desired and demanded a long time since." Consequently, two days before the coronation of John, July, 1569, appeared the ordinance which made an epoch in the annals of the Swedish nobility, in that it confirmed its ancient prerogatives, and contained new concessions. At the commencement of his reign Erik had greatly favored the nobility; in the last years of his rule he was called the peasant's king and the enemy of the nobles, and there is little doubt that it was owing to this fact that the latter class so generally co-operated to his dethronement. John was resolved to amend in this regard, hoping to make the nobles important supporters to his royal authority, thus radically deviating from the settled policy of his father. But John's incompetency for successful rule soon evinced itself in various ways. His reign of twenty-four years was unfortunate for Sweden in nearly all respects. The finances, the army and navy, and other important interests, were neglected or badly managed. Expensive wars were carried on against Russia and Poland, chiefly to maintain his son's claims to the throne of the latter country. Hostilities with Denmark were brought to conclusion by onerous conditions. That which left the most ineffaceable stain on the personal character of John was his treatment of his brother Erik, after the latter was, by his dethronement and incarceration, completely in the power of the former. During the eight years Erik was allowed to live after his fall in 1569, on various pretences he was carried from one place of confinement to another, for which the chief reason assigned was, that his presence had operated as a focus and stimulant of revolt. He was always under the guardianship of men who had formerly been his enemies, or were known for their brutality of character. The ferocious Olaf Gustafsson engaged in a bodily struggle with the royal prisoner, then

broke his arm with a pistol-ball, and left him bathed in blood.

In a letter which he addressed to King John, dated March 1, 1569, Erik said, —

"God knows the inhumanity with which they have made me suffer hunger, cold, infected air, darkness, blows of the club and of the sword. I cannot believe that my brother has knowledge of these barbarous treatments. Seek to deliver me from this miserable condition. I submit to exile. The world is large enough to afford a sufficient distance between us to deaden a brother's hatred."

But there were diverse testimonies of his sufferings which spoke more loudly than what he wrote. His menaces, his exasperation, his reiterated attempts to escape, were regarded sufficient to give occasion to the cruelties of which he was the object. In his calmer moments he occupied himself in reading, music, and writing, when his keepers would allow him to do so. He wrote his defence on the margins of his books, with charcoal dust saturated with water, instead of ink. Finally the Senate, at John's instigation, resolved to put an end to Erik's life. The decision was unanimous, and has the date of March 10, 1575. The document bearing this decree of death was kept secret; and its import was, that, "if they could not keep Erik in subjection in prison, where he showed himself wicked and intractable, it was necessary to get rid of him by some efficacious means, for that was contrary neither to the divine nor human law; . . . . that it was more proper, and more in the spirit of Christianity, that one alone should suffer than many." This death-sentence was signed by the temporal lords, church prelates, and pastors, of which the Senate, or Council of State, was composed. Yet that decision was not carried into effect until two years had passed, and then it was executed by the secretary of King John at the express order of his master. The name of this secretary was John Heinriksson, who was sent with a letter, written by the king's own hand,

to the locality where Erik was confined; in which the commander of the prison, Erik Andersson, was directed to administer to the prisoner a sufficient dose of opium or arsenic to kill in a few hours. If he would not drink the brewage, they must confine him to a chair, and open the veins of his arms and feet, and allow him to bleed until death should result. If he offered effective resistance to the last method of murder, they should force him on a bed, and strangle him with bolsters and pillows. John gave special orders, however, that, before his royal victim suffered death, he should properly receive the holy communion. The commander of the prison having hesitated to accept the fearful charge given him by his king, Heinriksson, the royal secretary, undertook the cruel task. The poison was prepared by Philip Kern, *valet de chambre* and surgeon of King John; and the secretary forced Erik to take it in a dish of pea-soup. After many hours of suffering, Erik died in the night of Feb. 26, 1577. These sufferings and tragic end of the eldest son of Gustavus Vasa by the direct action of King John throw a strange light on the character of the latter, as well as on the times in which these events took place; while the different conduct of the two brothers towards each other in their periods of imprisonment reveal a lower type of human nature in the second than in the elder brother.

But that which probably did the most to finally render it impracticable for John to rule the Swedish people, and to compel him to abandon the throne, was his attempt to restore the Catholic religion in his kingdom. To this he was led by his restless ambition and vacillation of character, and by the influence which his Catholic queen, Catharine Jagellonica, had exerted over him. She had faithfully shared with him his four years of imprisonment, during which John had earnestly devoted himself to study. This Polish princess knew how to render her influence over him effective in leading him to renounce Protestant-

ism, and to make use of the royal power for the re-establishment of Catholicism in Sweden; and so long as she lived he labored to that end. To accomplish his purpose in this regard he at first resorted to duplicity. Jesuits were solicited and secured to come and lecture in Stockholm, while they were expressly ordered to conceal their religion, and even to speak nominally in defence of the Lutherans. The man who chanced then to be upon the papal throne, Gregory XIII., would not approve such duplicity, but strongly censured this conduct of the disciples of Loyola, and insisted that the king should have the courage of his convictions, and openly proclaim his adhesion to the Church of Rome. John had prepared a liturgy with a view of reconciling the new with the old faith, a kind of amalgam of Catholicism and Lutheranism, which was to operate to the ultimate fatality of the latter. This liturgy of John was called the Red Book, and had been severely condemned by the papal authority. The king's determination to enforce this form of prayer on his subjects caused great discontent in the kingdom. The Pope's strong disapproval of John's weakness and unscrupulous means for the accomplishment of his aims, and the death of his Polish queen, tended to change his Catholic views and purposes; though for a time he insisted the more strongly on the adoption of his liturgy, punishing all preachers who opposed its adoption. In 1585 he married Gunilla Bjelke, a girl of sixteen, the daughter of an influential member of the State Council. The relatives of his young wife were zealous Lutherans, to whose influence John gradually yielded, and soon abandoned the Catholic party and all the schemes which he had himself previously advocated so earnestly in its behalf. At the same time inconstant and obstinate, feeble and violent, holding extravagant ideas of his own dignity and of the sacredness of the royal power, yet, through his susceptible vanity, he allowed himself to be greatly influenced by those immedi

ately around him. The Jesuits were now banished from the kingdom, their college at Stockholm broken up, and the professorships given to their adversaries. Royal ordinances menaced with banishment those who had embraced the Catholic faith, and the church of that communion at Stockholm was closed. After his marriage with Gunilla Bjelke he more and more identified himself with the leading Swedish nobles; and, to strengthen himself more in this direction, he established new privileges of nobility, and granted estates and manorial rights, in connection with title of count and baron, which had not been before conceded to them. But the rule of this proud, ambitious, and vacillating king approached its end. His hold on the country grew more and more uncertain: his embarrassments and perplexities constantly increased. In 1587 Sigismund, his only son by his first wife, Catharine Jagellonica, was elected by the magnates of Poland to the vacant throne of that kingdom. This young prince was received by the Poles with every mark of honor and esteem; but the cares of government, and the independent spirit of the nobles, made him regret his assumption of the Polish crown and separation of himself from his family. King John also longed for his son's return. In 1589 the father and son had a meeting, at which it was agreed between them that they would both renounce all claim to the Polish crown, and that Sigismund should return to Sweden as soon as his resignation had been accepted by the Polish magnates. This plan, however, met with strong opposition from the councillors and officials of the Swedish king; so that the royal father and son were under the necessity of returning to their respective capitals. John was enraged with the leading members of his own council, those high dignitaries whom he had thought to bind to himself by excessive honors and privileges, and required that they should defend themselves against the charge of treason. These persons, against whom the king now vented his

rage, were deprived of their land-tenures and dignities, and kept in close confinement for years, until, feeling his death was near, he released them. In the autumn of 1592 John died at the royal palace in Stockholm, having been upon the throne twenty-four years. Unwise and disastrous as had been his rule, and weak and inconstant as was his character, he was regarded as a learned man in his time. He was said to speak German, English, Italian, and Polish, in addition to his native tongue, to understand French, was not a stranger to Greek, and was so well versed in Latin, that, without preparation, he made long discourses in that language to foreign ambassadors. The two brothers, Erik and John, during their thirty-two years of reign, had undone a large amount of the effective work which their father had accomplished for the country. But power was now passing rapidly into the hands of him who possessed in a large degree the strength of character, and capacity to govern, which Gustavus Vasa had shown during his long and successful reign. It is true, Charles did not ascend the throne for some years after the death of John, whose son Sigismund had become the legal heir to the crown during the lifetime of his father, and with the assent of Charles, who waived his claim in favor of his nephew. Nevertheless, a large degree of influence had fallen into the hands of Charles prior to the death of John, and continued to be exerted in the affairs of Sweden during the few years that Sigismund occupied the throne. In his last years, feeling the need of support in his troubles, John had become reconciled to Charles, and intrusted to him a large degree of power. Charles, knowing Sigismund to be a devoted Catholic, and foreseeing the course his nephew would be likely to pursue in respect to religious questions, resolved to arrange the government of the Swedish church before the new king should arrive from Poland, where he was the ruling sovereign. Both from conviction and policy Charles was a confirmed

Lutheran, and so had proved himself through years of theological controversies and troubles which had taken place under the reign of John. At a meeting of the clergy and representatives of the other orders of the kingdom, held at Upsala in 1593, after long and heated discussions, the Lutheran confession of faith, identical with that adopted by the German Protestants at Augsburg, became the established religion of Sweden. The clerical and lay members of this important assemblage promised to give their blood and their life, if necessary, to maintain their faith at all hazards; uniting earnestly with the president in the words with which he closed his address, declaring, "Now Sweden is as one man, and we all have one God."

It was after strong opposition by the Polish magnates, after the death of John, that assent was given to allow their king, Sigismund, to return to Sweden to assume the crown, to which he had become entitled by the common agreement of the Swedish estates and Charles. A squadron of Swedish vessels met him at Dantzic; and he and his queen arrived at Stockholm in September, 1593, accompanied by a brilliant retinue of Swedish nobles and the papal legate. Duke Charles, his uncle, stood ready on the castle-bridge to welcome him. But it was not long before jealousies and differences manifested themselves between Charles and Sigismund; and the former soon returned to his duchy, leaving the Senate to manage the best it could with the young Catholic king, whose views and feelings differed so strongly from the most of those who had just welcomed him to his throne and palace. Sigismund very soon showed his lack of wisdom and tact by keeping himself chiefly to the society of his Polish friends and Jesuit supporters. The most of the Swedish people looked with distrust and dislike on the Catholic ceremonies which were introduced into some of the Stockholm churches. On the occasion of a Roman mass for the repose of the soul of the late King John, the Swedes and

Poles came to an open quarrel, and blood was shed within the church. Sigismund refused to approve the resolutions of the Upsala assemblage, or to confirm the election of the Lutheran primate of Sweden. The Council of State refused to grant supplies for the royal coronation unless the action of the Upsala assemblage establishing the religion of the kingdom was sanctioned by Sigismund. The king replied, that the estates would have to learn the difference between an hereditary and an elective monarchy, and declared that his conscience would not permit him to change his religion. He promised, however, that he would not molest the faith of his Swedish subjects until he knew what the estates would do as to those who cherished the Catholic faith. Early in the year 1594 Sigismund met the Swedish estates at Upsala, and was crowned with much ceremony in the cathedral. Prior to this coronation Duke Charles and the State Council had compelled the king to sign a charter confirming the religious liberty which had been secured by the synod at Upsala in the preceding year. With the weakness and insincerity peculiar to his character, which his Jesuit teachers and admirers had not failed to stimulate and justify, he agreed to all that was required of him at Upsala, with the mental reservation to evade whatever obligations he had taken which might conflict with his faith and his future plans and interests. On his arrival at Stockholm he allowed Catholic schools and churches to be opened, and services in the Lutheran churches to be interrupted; and the safety of the Protestant worshippers was so endangered as to require them to go to their church armed. To these violations of religious liberty and of the compact which had been solemnly agreed upon between king and subjects, Sigismund would give no redress; and as proof how little he intended to keep the pledges he had given at his Upsala coronation, he now appointed Catholic governors for every province in Sweden, and then returned to Poland. Had he been a

far abler man, and possessed a higher order of moral character, the task he had assumed would hardly have been susceptible of accomplishment. For one sovereign to rule over two separate kingdoms remote from each other according to the means of intercommunication then in use, the people of one strongly Catholic, and those of the other largely Protestant, at a period when controversy between the representatives of the two forms of faith so often meant strife and bloodshed, — that was certainly an utter impossibility for one like Sigismund. On his return to Poland he found the affairs of that kingdom in confusion; the nobles, so often turbulent, being unwilling to obey the officers to whom he had given authority. The Swedes were unwilling to be ruled by an absent king; and the Council of State declared, that, unless Sigismund promptly returned to Sweden, a regent must be appointed to act for him. With the pressing need of his presence in the two kingdoms at the same time, the harassed king was reluctantly brought to the resolution to designate Duke Charles to govern, in concert with the Senate; but at the same time, with characteristic duplicity, he gave secret orders to his chief admiral and governor-general of Finland, and to all the provincial governors of Sweden, not to obey the government of the regent. Duke Charles, who well understood his ground, and fully knew his own mind, conducted affairs with marked vigor and success. He succeeded in making an advantageous peace with Russia after prolonged negotiations, thus bringing to termination a war which had for twenty-six years inflicted its ravages and sufferings on the two countries; and he accomplished other important work for the kingdom not long after he had accepted the regency. But Charles and the Senate did not long get on in harmony. The clear understanding and energetic will of the former came in direct antagonism with the lordly pride and conceit of the latter. Charles wrote Sigismund, soliciting new instructions on the subject of the regency.

The king responded, that the duke and the Senate must be content with the instructions they had until his return from Poland. That answer caused open disagreement between Charles and the Senate. The duke wished that the senators should unite to execute all his demands: to this the senators opposed an earnest resistance. Charles then spoke of the States-general, and wished to convoke a Diet. The Senate equally opposed this resolution, referring to the orders of the king. The duke responded, that he did not need the advice of the king, and that he himself had the power to convoke the States. The senators wrote the king a collective letter, praying him to send them troops and money to oppose force to the violent demands of the duke. In the mean time Charles had drawn up, in his own name and that of the Senate, the convocation of the Diet at Söderköping. When the document was presented to the senators for their signature, they declared that they did not regard such a meeting of the Diet necessary. Then the duke said, in anger, "It is necessary that you should sign the letters of convocation, and that you go to the Diet in person, or I will take other measures. Remember Engelbrekt, the Dalecarlian, was but the son of a peasant, yet he gave orders to the Senate. But I am the son of a king and an hereditary prince. Do my will, or I will expel you from the country, bound prisoners." The senators were compelled to yield their assent to the meeting of the States. At the Diet of Söderköping, after its decrees had been drawn up, the senators present were constrained to give them the sanction of their signatures and seal. Afterwards, addressing the States in deliberate assembly, Charles remarked, "As we have received satisfactory responses on all points which have been referred to you, we desire to know if you are disposed to defend all which has been determined here, and if you recognize yourselves collectively responsible; because all is supported on the oath and promises of the king, and, besides, nothing

has been done except in the interest of the country and of his magistry." He again repeated his question. The peasants responded, "Yes, yes, sire." With uplifted hands they swore to assist the duke, one and all. Afterwards he addressed the senators, bishops, and the nobles, who were near him: "And you, what do you say? Have you heard the oath of those who have declared themselves? Do you wish to separate yourselves from them?" The senators, responding in the name of the nobility, promised obedience to the regent in every thing which could be useful to the country and to the service of the king. Charles saw clearly that beneath those carefully balanced words was the spirit of resistance to his authority. Raising his hand, he said to the senators, "Swear to obey me in all which I shall command you." The larger number raised the hand, but many did not. Charles caused to be published the deliberations of the Diet of Söderköping, which confirmed the decrees against the Catholics of the kingdom, interdicted their worship in the places where it had been set up, proscribed their priests, and suppressed the last of the remaining convents. From this time Charles saw the necessity of decreasing the power of the higher nobles, of moderating their pretensions, and compelling them to obey law and authority like other subjects in the kingdom. He made himself the representative of the peasantry and smaller land-holders of the country, while he constrained the high-pretending and rebellious lords with a remorseless policy and a strong hand. In this regard he reversed the course of Erik and John in the early periods of their reigns, which was to elevate the nobility at the expense of the peasantry, and returned to the line of action followed by his father, Gustavus Vasa, — to strengthen and support the peasantry against the exactions and pretensions of the nobles and high prelates. Like his father, he clearly saw that the unity and welfare of the kingdom demanded that all classes and factions must

obey a central authority. The chief nobles, some of whom were secretly and others openly Catholics, were led more and more to involve themselves in the designs of Sigismund. In 1598 the king, encouraged by his partisans in Sweden, came with a Polish army to compel Charles to give up the regency. The principal senators had previously left Sweden and gone to Poland, for their personal safety, as well as to stimulate Sigismund to assert his royal authority in Sweden. They now accompanied the king and his Polish army, thus rendering themselves responsible for introducing a foreign force into their country. The king and his army landed at Calmar, and his force was increased by his Swedish partisans in the country. The armies of Sigismund and Charles met at Strangebro, where the former suffered a complete defeat. Immediately after the battle an armistice was agreed upon between the belligerents, which resulted in the treaty of Linköping, Sept. 28, 1598; providing that both armies should lay down their arms, the foreign soldiers be dismissed, remitting the government to the king, who should rule according to his oath, and assemble the Diet before the expiration of four months, until which time those whom the duke had put in official places should be there maintained. Charles required to be excepted from the general amnesty solely five of the senators who had accompanied the king and his army from Poland. The conditions imposed as to the five senators were resisted by Sigismund. To this Charles said there were men enough in his camp who would go and bring the enemies of the country and traitors from the midst of the soldiers who surrounded the king. Then he pointed out a troop of armed peasants who had just arrived to increase the ranks of his warriors. The recalcitrant senators were surrendered. It was agreed, in the treaty of Linköping, that the States were excused from obedience to him who violated it. They assembled early in 1599 at Jönköping, and broke the oaths which bound them to the king, for the

time, however, conditionally. In a new Diet at Stockholm in July of the same year, the breaking of all allegiance to Sigismund was pronounced with this addition: "That, if the king, in the course of six months, did not send his son Vladislaus into Sweden to occupy the throne, and be instructed in the Protestant religion, he and his race should lose forever their rights to the crown." Duke Charles was named hereditary and reigning prince of the kingdom. If the Finlanders refused obedience, they must be constrained by force. Whoever opposed themselves to the resolution of the States would be treated as a traitor to the country. Thus was effectively terminated the reign of Sigismund in Sweden. In this vigorous and conclusive action of the Diet were the clear decision and the strong hand of Charles. Soon after the conclusion of the treaty of Linköping, Sigismund, finding himself well out of the hands of the duke, left the country in haste, returned to his Polish kingdom, allowing his friends to take care of themselves the best they could, without sending them the strong armaments which he had promised them as soon as he arrived in Poland. Sigismund had powerful supporters among the chief nobles of Finland. Charles, in a brief campaign, reduced to subjection the hostile forces in that province, and twenty-nine of the principal nobles were brought to the scaffold in his presence at Åbo. In all the Swedish provinces the resolute will and decisive action of the duke were felt, and the leading partisans of the dethroned king were treated with great severity. At the Diet of Linköping, in 1600, Charles caused a number of those nobles who had been surrendered to him by Sigismund to be tried for treason and disobedience of his orders while he was regent of the kingdom. Some of these persons acknowledged that they had wished to subvert the Lutheran religion, and were guilty of the offences with which they were charged, and were pardoned. Others, including the heads of some of the principal noble families in the kingdom, were con-

demned to death, regardless of the tears and entreaties of their wives and children, who threw themselves on their knees before Charles, and begged for mercy. Some were executed without pity, others of equal rank were banished, while many fled from the country. The property of these was confiscated and assigned to others. Thus the duke mercilessly crushed his personal enemies and the enemies of the State in a comprehensive punishment and spoliation. It is only the spirit of the times and the state of civilization thus early in the seventeenth century which can palliate in history these sweeping measures of vengeance.

There was now no real obstacle in the way of the formal acceptance of the crown by Charles. This step he did not take until 1604, when he was proclaimed king by the Diet which was assembled at Norköping. He now applied himself to restore order, to consolidate his power, and to improve the finances, which he managed with great economy and much success. He took care to foster and extend commerce, to regulate the mines, and to promote whatever he thought would increase the prosperity of the kingdom. He sought to repress the exorbitant demands of the clergy, discussed theology with their leading members, and expressed the wish that the Bible alone should be the guide of faith, and not the Confession of Augsburg; while he desired to apply to the divine doctrine the employment of reason and philosophy. In 1604 he wrote to the Senate, "We are little indebted to the clergy: most of its members have already betrayed the Confession of Augsburg. Do not confide in the constancy of the priests; for when there is danger, they throw their cloak over their shoulder, and return to their ancient superstitions." But if Charles discussed with the archbishop, he did not persecute him. He punished the clergy with words only. He finally yielded in the principal affairs, and recognized the Confession of Augsburg. He always stood by the peasants and

lower classes against the exactions and abuses of the privileged ranks, and thus secured for himself the name of the peasant's king. While he managed the internal affairs of the kingdom with so much success, he was constantly involved in war with Denmark, Russia, or Poland. In 1595 he had secured a favorable peace with Russia, by which Esthonia and Narva were conceded to Sweden; but in 1609 he became involved in hostile operations in Russia, by sending a Swedish army, under La Gardie and Horn, to relieve Moscow from the assault of the impostor Demetrius, who was supported by Poland. Though these generals were at first successful, they were finally driven back in consequence of mutiny in their ranks, which were largely filled with foreign auxiliaries. Not at all discouraged by this want of success, Charles sent another army to Russia in 1611, took Novogorod, and compelled the Russians to sign a treaty which he regarded advantageous to Sweden and to the dynastic interests of his family. When the news of this triumph of his arms arrived in Sweden, Charles was on his death-bed. The kingdom had then become involved in hostilities with Denmark. This is known as the Calmar War, because it was prosecuted chiefly in the vicinity of the old Swedish city of that name. It was the result largely of the ambition of Christian IV., the young king of Denmark, who deemed it a favorable time to retaliate on Sweden for some losses which Denmark had suffered by the former's monopoly of the trade of Riga; thinking Charles's old age and sickness, and the youth of his heir, Gustavus, would render Sweden incapable of making successful defence. But the sequel proved how much the Danish king and his councillors were mistaken in their calculations. Full of resolution and activity of mind until the last, Charles died in 1611, at Nyköping, at the age of sixty, soon after he had arranged a brief armistice with Christian IV., leaving the future conduct of the war, and all the other grave responsibilities in which his country

was involved, to his son Gustavus Adolphus, then but sixteen years of age, whose future career was to be so renowned.

The ambitions and views of Charles seemed to increase and broaden with his advancing years. Prior to his death he had engaged in friendly alliances with all the principal Protestant powers. In 1608 he had sent his agents to Holland. That republic was on the point of making peace with Spain, after its long and terrible struggle of so many years. His envoys were instructed to insinuate that all the princes and powers ought to oppose the superstitions of the Papists, and also to ask the States-general of that country to obtain the mediation of Spain in the war between Sweden and Poland. If the war continued with Spain, Charles would agree to furnish to the republic a military force of one thousand men, in exchange for the privilege of exporting salt to Holland. In 1610 Gustavus Stenbock and John Skytte were sent to England, instructed to seek the mediation of that government in the war with Poland, and to make known the intention of the Swedish king to form an alliance with France and Holland. It was for the same object that he had sent a diplomatic agent to Henry IV., when it was learned that the king of France, from whom the Protestants of Europe and the opponents of Spain and Austria had hoped so much, had fallen by the dagger of Ravaillac. Thus for the first time in her history had Sweden been brought into important political relations with the more influential European nations, and secured an independent position among them. Possibly it is a debatable question among historical critics, whose rule exerted the most decisive and lasting influence on Sweden, — this king, known as Charles IX., his father, the first Vasa sovereign, or his illustrious son who succeeded him on the throne, and was to fall on the bloody field of a foreign land. By his first wife, Maria of the Palatinate, Charles had only one child who grew to maturity, a daughter, Catharine,

the ancestress of the Palatinate branch of the Vasa line in Sweden; and by his second wife, Christina of Holstein-Gottorp, he had two sons, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles Philip.

CHAPTER III.

BIRTH AND EARLY LIFE OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. — CLOSE OF THE WARS WITH DENMARK AND RUSSIA.

GUSTAVUS VASA, second of that name, was born at the royal palace in Stockholm, Dec. 9, 1594. The mother of the young prince was Christine, daughter of Adolphus, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and grand-daughter of Frederick I, king of Denmark, and descendant, by his mother, of Christine, daughter of Philip the Generous, margrave of Hesse. Thus he was partly of German origin. His birth was in an epoch when much significance was attached to portents and stellar indications. His countrymen sought to apply to him the prediction of a Danish man of science, Tycho Brahe, of astronomic fame, who, at the appearance of a comet in 1572, announced there would spring up in Finland a prince destined to accomplish great changes in Germany, and deliver the Protestant people from the oppression of the popes. As Gustavus advanced in his career, great importance among his subjects was attached to the prophetic words of the astronomer. He was born with a vigorous constitution, which was rendered hardy and robust by his experience and habits from infancy, which was passed in the midst of the civil war maintained by his father and the Swedish estates on one side, and King Sigismund and his partisans on the other. He went with his father and mother into Livonia in 1600, and accompanied them at the end of autumn on their return from Revel to Finland. The illustrious Oxenstierna gave

an interesting account of the early years of Gustavus, with whom his own future career and fame were to be closely identified, which has been preserved to history as the best extant. It is in these terms: —

"To be the tutor of the prince was appointed Master John Skytte, and Otto von Mörner, his chamberlain. The last-named was marshal of the court of Charles IX., and born of noble parents in Brandenburg. He had acquired extensive learning and distinguished manners in the numerous countries in which he had travelled. John Skytte, after having employed nine years in visiting foreign lands, had become one of the secretaries of the king's government, and in that capacity had assisted at the concluding of the treaty with Denmark on the subject of the frontiers. Gustavus received all the instructions necessary to a prince destined to reign. Skytte directed him in the study of Latin, of history, and of the laws of his country. As Charles was a strict ruler and martial prince, and as Christine had, besides her beauty, the soul proud and courageous, the education of the prince was free from softness: he was habituated to labor, and had always before his eyes the virtues of his parents. At times in his early youth, particularly after he had arrived at his tenth year, he was more and more allowed by his father, as he grew up, to attend the deliberations of the Council. He was habituated also to be present at the audiences of the foreign embassies, and was finally directed by his royal father to answer these foreign dignitaries, in order thus to accustom him to weighty affairs and their treatment. As it was a period of warlike turmoils, there was much resort to the king's court, especially by officers, — not only Swedes, but also Germans, French, English, Scots, Netherlanders, and some Italians and Spaniards, who after the twelve years' truce, then just concluded between Spain and Holland, sought their fortune in Sweden. These often waited upon the young prince, by the will and order of the king. Their conversation relating to the wars waged by other nations, battles, sieges, and discipline, both by sea and land, as well as ships and navigation, did so arouse and stimulate the mind of the young prince, by nature already thus inclined, that he spent almost every day in putting questions concerning what had happened at one place and another in the wars. Besides, he acquired in his youthful years no little insight into the science of war, especially into the mode and means how a regular war, well directed, and suited to the circumstances of Sweden, was to be carried on; having the character and rules of Maurice, Prince of Orange, as a pattern before his eyes. By the intercourse and converse of the gen-

tlemen already named, in which each told the most glorious acts of his own nation, the young prince was enkindled to act like others, and, if possible, to excel them.

"In his early years he gained also a complete and ready knowledge of many foreign languages; so that he spoke Latin, German, Dutch, French, and Italian, as purely as a native, and, besides, had some knowledge of the Russian and Polish tongues. When he was of the age of sixteen years his father made him Grand Duke of Finland and Duke of Esthonia and Westmanland, and presently bestowed upon him the town of Vesterâs, with the principal portion of Westmanland, over which was placed John Skytte to be governor."

It is authentically affirmed that Gustavus knew Greek; and of Xenophon, whom he best loved to read in that tongue, he said he knew of "no writer better than he for a true military historian." It is well attested that for some years after Gustavus ascended the throne, he continued his studies with his tutor, John Skytte. "Every day he devoted at least one hour or another to reading; preferring to all others the works of Grotius, especially his treatise on 'War and Peace.'"

If Charles IX. was severe in his royal rule over his subjects, he was careful and tender to his son. In the manuscript direction, written by his own hand, for the guidance of young Gustavus, among other remarks elaborately made, he says, —

"Fear God before all; honor father and mother; show brotherly affection to those of thine own blood; love the servants of thy father, requite them after their due; be gracious to thy subordinates; punish evil; love goodness and meekness; put good trust in all, yet with moderation, and learn first to know persons; hold by the law without respect to persons; impair no man's well-won privileges in so far as they agree with the law; diminish not thy princely income but with caution, that they who share thy bounty may remember the source whence it has flowed; depress the proud and the impudent, and be the benefactor of the humble and timid. May thy liberality never tend to profusion, and thy gifts always be distributed with choice and moderation!"

Christine, the mother of Gustavus Adolphus, possessed a strong and positive character. Of striking and impos-

ing figure, and expressive features, she did not fail to make a marked impression on those around her. With high forehead, large piercing blue eyes, and an aquiline nose, her imposing physiognomy, stamped with severity, made her an object of fear in her household, where she maintained a rigid discipline. She equalled and surpassed her husband in economy. History does not mention that she interceded for the unfortunate victims of the civil wars: it says, on the contrary, that she stimulated the ambitious temper of Charles IX., and pushed him to acts of cruelty which obscured his great qualities. In the early part of their married life she and her royal husband lived happily together; but subsequently their severity and impetuosity came in collision, and an explosion was the result, which produced scandalous episodes. She was rigidly exacting in her requirements of the ladies of her household, holding them to a daily prescribed task of spinning, and watched her pecuniary interests with a vigilant eye. Though she did not exercise any decisive influence on the scholastic and political education of young Gustavus, it was to be seen that she would act a resolute part in arranging for him that sacred relation in which kings and subjects alike are accustomed to think their own affection and choice should be primarily consulted. Queen Christine showed a marked partiality for her younger son, Charles Philip, whose ducal rights she defended with an ardor which might have compromised the tranquillity of the kingdom if Gustavus had not been a good son as well as a great king. The precocious application of Gustavus to public affairs had its origin partly in the customs of the times, but his father had many reasons to cause him to favor this. He believed in the great natural endowments of his son, and knew of his remarkable progress in knowledge, and his rapid comprehension of the responsibilities of government. On a throne still tottering, it was important to Charles that the nation at

an early hour should commence to know the heir of the crown, and that it could be said that Gustavus had grown up under the eyes of the people. The choice of his preceptor had been left to the Swedish estates. At the age of ten years he attended the deliberations of the Senate, and was scarcely fourteen when he accompanied his mother at the time she took an important voyage to the south part of the kingdom, when he received from his father the following exhortation: —

"Receive with kindness those who seek your support, for the fear they may quit you in despair. If you receive complaints from your subjects, you should sustain them each in his rights so far as it may be in your power. So conduct that your governors and your provosts will follow your example, and God will come in aid of your efforts."

Very soon essential affairs of government are managed by Gustavus, sometimes in his own duchy, and sometimes in other parts of the kingdom, in the name of King Charles. Often he employs his influence to conciliate differences or to obtain pardons, following the counsels of his mother. To his precocious courage, the young prince is reputed to have joined a striking benignity of character, which he did not inherit from his parents. He was the only member of the royal family who dared attempt to pacify the father when he was in anger, and often succeeded, which made him beloved by the Swedes. His liberality, of which numerous examples are cited, likewise caused him to be esteemed. Matured early for important affairs, he rarely gave himself to the ordinary pleasures of childhood. The chase and military exercises were his only distractions. While he was maintaining court in his ducal capital, Vesterås, he submitted himself to a careful training in the art of war, and in all kinds of military exercises and evolutions, informing himself in all the recent changes made by the great commanders in warlike armaments and discipline. In all his actions was indicated his warlike disposition. He was scarcely fifteen years of age,

when, in 1610, he dared to make known his wish to be placed in the command of troops in the war against Russia. But the king refused the request, and confided the expedition to other hands and older heads. Says Oxenstierna: —

"Since this was intrusted to others, he was not without his discontent, restrained for the year to abide at the court of his father, until he had passed his sixteenth year, and entered his seventeenth. Then, in April of the year 1611, as King Christian IV. of Denmark had declared war, the prince was, by his father, according to ancient custom, pronounced, in the Diet of April 24, fit to bear the sword, with which, the following day, he was invested in most splendid guise. Thereafter he immediately caused the forces of West Gothland to assemble, especially the foreign troops, which there had winter quarters, in order to join his father with the same at Jönköping, and likewise march to Calmar, at that time beleagured, for the relief of the town. In this expedition of Calmar, the young prince, under the guidance of his father, King Charles, endured the first trial of warfare; being present at all the remarkable encounters and actions, holding chief command in most of them, from the beginning to the end."

It was in this campaign that the young prince gained his spurs under the eyes of his father. Afterwards he was in all the engagements and marches, the most of which he directed. This war may be said to be chiefly memorable for having served as the practical school in which Gustavus improved himself in the art of warfare, and showed his great military capacity, which future experience and events were to develop in such grand proportions. King Charles dying at Nyköping on his return from Calmar, in 1611, after the arrangement of a brief armistice with the king of Denmark, thenceforth the conduct of the war was left to Gustavus, then seventeen years of age. On the death of Charles, his son did not immediately assume the title of king. Sweden remained without a sovereign for two months; for, according to the will of the deceased king, the queen and his nephew (Duke John), with six councillors of state, were to rule till the wishes of the people could be made known in the customary manner. After an

interregnum of two months, the Diet opened at Nyköping, Dec. 10, 1611. The first proposition was made in the name of Queen Christine, of Duke John, and of the senators. Duke John was the son of Sigismund, king of Poland, had been brought up in Sweden, and might be considered as having some just claim to the throne. The queen mother and Duke John laid down the tutelage and the regency which they had held for two months, which they confided, in the name of the estates of the kingdom, to Gustavus Adolphus. Nine days later the young king, in the presence of the representatives of the estates of Sweden, received the reins of government. He took the title of his father,—king-elect and hereditary prince of Sweden, of the Goths, and of the Wends. He was then in the first month of his eighteenth year. He took charge of the kingdom when it was in a critical condition. Since the death of Gustavus Vasa, his grandfather, a period of more than fifty years, Sweden had not enjoyed a single year of peace. In that long space of time, there had been constant dissensions and violence. There had been wars of brother against brother, insurrections, bloody discords relative to religion and the crown. Two kings had been dethroned, with whatever of crimes, catastrophes, and individual suffering such events usually involve. His father had left him the throne soiled in blood, and in unfriendly relations with all the neighboring kingdoms. He had stifled rebellion by the execution and expatriation of many of the chief men of the country, and foreign complications and dangers were of the most serious character. At this time Sweden was much constrained and embarrassed by her boundaries, and by the jealousies and hostile feelings of her neighbors on the north and the south. Denmark and Norway were united in a kind of dual government under the same king; and both alike were opposed to the growth of Swedish power, and were in continual dispute with her in respect to territory, as well

as to the naval and commercial uses of the adjacent seas. On the North Sea, Denmark and Norway nearly joined their borders, where Sweden held but a single city and a limited area, which her united rivals wished to wrest from her, and thus completely close up her access to the ocean on the west. Those provinces in the south which are now the most productive and valuable of Sweden, then belonged to Denmark, or were in dispute between the two countries. On the east, Russia and Poland embarrassed and threatened her; and thus she was constantly compelled to keep anxious watch, lest both the North and the Baltic Seas should be closed against her. He who was to finish his career as military chief and statesman by powerfully aiding to dictate laws to Europe, commenced it at an early age in defending himself by main strength at the centre of his own country. He was obliged to recover the keys of his kingdom, and gain its freedom of action, by taking the important Swedish city of Calmar on the Baltic, and Elfsborg, the only Swedish city on the North Sea, from the Danes. To achieve the result so imperatively necessary to his country, Gustavus, then scarcely eighteen years of age, hastened to close his first Diet, and, early in 1612, to place himself at the head of his troops, after having offered peace, and renounced the title of king of the Laplanders, which was, ostensibly at least, one of the causes of the war. The herald bearing the propositions of peace was repelled on the Danish frontier; and later, when negotiations took place in relation to the exchange of prisoners, Gustavus received from his foe, only the title of duke. In the midst of winter the Danes pushed hostilities with vigor, having the advantage of numbers, the superior strength of which was increased by the fortresses which they held within the limits of Sweden and on its sea approaches. During the entire year the war raged between the belligerents, with much loss of life, suffering, and the devastation of towns and territory. The young

king showed great capacity and bravery in command. In a furious combat on a frozen lake, on an evening of February, 1612, he came near losing his life by his horse breaking through the ice, and was saved only by the heroic courage of two young Swedes, Peter Baner, his chamberlain, and Thomas Larsson, a cavalry soldier. At the coronation of Gustavus, Peter Baner received promotion in rank, and always enjoyed marked favor with the king. He was the only son of Gustavus Baner, who perished on the scaffold in the reign of Charles IX. He afterwards became senator, and discharged the home duties of chancellor during the ten years of foreign absence of Oxenstierna. To Thomas Larsson and his decendants was given, in perpetuity, the estates of Igelstad of Romfertuna parish.

During the following months of the year the campaign was pushed on both sides with unyielding determination, the preponderance of numbers and armaments being decidedly with the Danes. Besides, Gustavus had not then the support of any of those able generals whom subsequently he trained, and advanced to important commands. The chief officers and many of the nobles did not prove equal to the dangerous crisis. It was only the undaunted determination of the young king, and the spirit of resistance with which his presence and example inspired the Swedish peasantry, which finally checked the advance of the Danes by land. The brave yeomanry of the country stood as a wall of fire against the invaders, while the nobles but too generally were found wanting in those qualities which the crisis demanded. The former laid waste their farms and homes, rather than they should be used as a means of support by their enemies. They retired into the forests, there reared intrenchments, and, wherever they had an opportunity, fell upon the hostile Danes and the foreign mercenaries in their service, causing them continual losses. The entire Danish forces in

the country at the command of Christian and his chief general Rantzau numbered nearly forty thousand; while the young king of Sweden had under him not more than thirty thousand,—large armies on each side considering the small population and limited resources of the respective countries. The Danes had in pay numerous foreign soldiers, and the Swedes a less number, among whom were battalions of Scotch and Irish, some of whom engaged in a serious mutiny at Linköping, plundering the town, driving out the inhabitants, and marching away at the approach of the Danes. Of twelve hundred Hollanders and Scotchmen who had been raised for the service of Gustavus, the most of them were brought into the country by Mounickhof, the Dutch officer to whom is attributed the terse remark relative to the remarkable unity of opinion in Sweden as to religion and medicine. Another division of this levy of foreign troops landed in Norway, under Col. Sinclair, with the intention of going by land to join the army of the Swedish king, but was cut to pieces by the peasants of that country in a narrow pass, after landing at Romsdal, and marching on the road to Gullbransdal.

The skill and resolution of Gustavus, and the patriotic uprising of the Swedish masses, finally convinced the Danish king and his generals that they could make no farther progress in the campaign by land. Knowing the advantage he then possessed on water by his superior fleet, Christian resolved to make a bold and powerful movement by sea to capture Stockholm. Embarking at Copenhagen on his fleet of thirty-six vessels, the Danish king made sail for the Swedish capital, being joined on the way by an additional army under the command of one of his chief generals. The Swedish fleet was compelled to retire under the shelter of the fortress of Waxholm, which guards the access to Stockholm. Informed at once of the danger which threatened his capital, Gustavus marched with all haste from the south to its de-

fence. The brave Dalecarlians, who bore the first Vasa king to the throne, and did so much to aid him to free his country from Danish rule a century before, now raised themselves in mass to aid his heroic grandson to save his threatened capital. Marching night and day, the young king arrived at Stockholm at three in the morning, and placed himself immediately at the head of the troops who had come to his aid. Proceeding at once to Waxholm, thirty miles below Stockholm, on the strait which leads to the Baltic, he was in hope to surprise the Danish fleet retained in the pass by adverse winds. But the same day the wind changed, and the Danes took sail before the arrival of Gustavus and his troops.

Both the Danes and the Swedes had pressing needs of peace. The former, who had been much stronger by show of superior forces and means, had greatly exhausted themselves; and the Danish nobility began to manifest unmistakable jealousy of King Christian, who, they thought, was increasing his power at their expense. In January, 1613, negotiations for peace were opened through English mediation. After two months of negotiations, terms of peace were agreed upon. Sweden renounced some of its conquests and pretensions, and the Danes gave up to Sweden the city of Calmar on the Baltic, and at the end of six years were to surrender to Sweden its city of Elfsborg on the North Sea; the latter agreeing to pay to the Danes a million of thalers for the surrender. Thus, partly by force of arms and partly by the payment of money from the slender treasures of his country, the young Gustavus was enabled to secure the two keys of his kingdom on the seas of the east and west. One of the conditions of peace was the free passage of the Sound, and unobstructed commerce between the subjects of the two kingdoms. Holland also had offered its mediation, which the Danish king refused because he considered he had some griefs against that newly born republic. Hol-

land did not wish to recognize Danish domination on the Sound, and had remonstrated against paying customs for the passage, — a long-existing pretension of the Danes. Negotiations on that subject terminated, in 1614, by an alliance of fifteen years between Holland and Sweden. The latter entered into a defensive alliance with Lubeck and the Dutch Republic for the protection of commerce, having in reserve the purpose to assert its superiority on the Baltic.

There can be no doubt that Gustavus, as well as his great adviser, Oxenstierna, early saw that the most sure and effective way to free itself from Danish aggressions and its constraining environments was for Sweden to secure a firm position on the main continent south of the Baltic; thus enabling it easier to hold Poland in check, as well as to outflank Denmark, and to attack it in the rear should war between the two kingdoms be renewed, and thus to remove devastating hostilities from its territories, which had so much suffered. It is fair to presume, from the then existing facts and circumstances, that the principles of offensive-defensive warfare were then carefully considered by the young hero and his confidential advisers, with the design of carrying them into practice at no distant day. If his brilliant campaigns in Germany in future years were largely inspired for the protection of the Protestant religion and its believers, there is no need of forgetting that the security and independence of Sweden from neighboring perils were ever in his thought. It is plain that he now made peace with Denmark, not only because of immediate necessity, and on terms which his lofty spirit regarded somewhat humiliating, but because he wanted to gain time for bolder and more far-reaching plans in the future. The immediate need was, that his hands should be freed from the Danes in order that he might confront the dangers threatening from Russia and Poland. Sigismund, backed by his Catholic kingdom and

his still existing supporters in Sweden, regarding himself legally entitled to the throne now held by Gustavus, was seeking to make the most of events to enforce his claims.

At the death of Charles IX., and the ascension of Gustavus to the throne, Sweden was in a state of war with Russia, and was so to continue for several years; though hostilties were not all the time prosecuted with vigor, and were some of the time practically suspended. At that period Russia was not in condition to send forces beyond her frontier. It was just before the elevation of the house of Romanoff to sovereign power; and the country was far on the road of anarchy, dismemberment, and ruin. Its nobility was warlike, but ignorant and immoral; and the clergy, fearfully depraved, and addicted to the lowest of human vices, were often guilty of atrocious crimes. Foreign mercenaries were numerously employed, and were a great scourge.

The Swedes held possession of a large area of what is now Russian territory, as well as important towns and fortresses. The extensive country of Finland, which makes to-day so important a province of Russia, had been united with Sweden nearly five centuries, as it continued to be nearly two hundred years longer. But towns and territory, also a long distance within the lines of the Russian population, were then in the power of the Swedish forces. The troubles and dissensions relative to the succession, and extreme dislike to the Poles, had caused a numerous party to seek a Swedish prince for its sovereign, and to this end had sent an embassy to Stockholm near the date of the death of Charles IX. Finding that the young Gustavus had acceded to the crown of his father, this Russian party desired to secure for the Russian throne Charles Philip, a younger brother of Gustavus. The Swedish king did not show eagerness to bring this plan to success; but, the war being terminated with Denmark, he was resolved to draw what advantage he could from the weakened con-

dition of Russia, to the advancement and security of the interests of Sweden. In July, 1613, the Russians chose, for czar, Michael Romanoff, then sixteen years of age. That throne was then considered so dangerous to its occupant, that, when elected, Michael wished to fly; and at the news of the choice of her son, his mother burst out into sobs. Gustavus proceeded to push military operations with as much vigor as possible, leading the campaigns in person. He kept open the Baltic for his ships; Finland was near, from which to draw supplies and soldiers; and the hostile relations of Poland to Russia tended to strengthen the Swedish arms, though the Polish king was a rival of Gustavus for the Swedish throne. Though unable to make war outside of their own territory, and because of their demoralization unfit to push properly organized campaigns, the Russian soldiers defended fortresses and towns, when attacked, with a dogged pertinacity and endurance. In that regard the young Gustavus found them to possess those qualities which Frederick the Great of Prussia discovered to be formidable one hundred and fifty years later, and against which Napoleon struck, with fatal consequences, at the summit of his power, in 1812. For four years more the war between these two countries continued, in which the young Swedish monarch was acquiring discipline and valuable experience for the great work to which he was to be called in his subsequent career; the advantages being generally on the side of the Swedes, though they were not always successful in important sieges. The English and the Dutch governments sought earnestly and persistently to bring about peace between the belligerents. Finally, through the mediation of the English agents, negotiations were renewed with success; Gustavus remaining unshaken in his demands, and securing terms advantageous to the Swedes. The war had continued ten years, and the treaty was signed February, 1617. Russia yielded to Sweden a large breadth of territory, shutting herself out from the

Baltic; the land where St. Petersburg now stands becoming Swedish territory. On the frontiers they raised a monumental stone, with the crowns of Sweden and this inscription: "HERE GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, KING OF SWEDEN, ESTABLISHES THE FRONTIERS OF HIS KINGDOM. MAY IT PLEASE GOD THAT THEY SHALL ALWAYS THUS REMAIN." It is well authenticated, that, as long as Gustavus Adolphus lived, he never ceased to have his eye on Russia. During his campaigns and victories in Germany, he caused to be investigated and reported to him, by Swedish agents, the state of that country, — a work which was committed to the sons of his preceptor, John Skytte, now of the State Council, and so often employed by his royal pupil as diplomate on important special missions abroad. Peace being thus made with Russia on advantageous terms, following that with Denmark secured four years before, the renown of the young Swedish sovereign began to be widely recognized abroad.

CHAPTER IV.

GUSTAVUS MAKES CHANGE IN THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT. — VIEWS OF OXENSTIERNA AND SKYTTE. — HOUSE OF NOBLES. — RELIGION. — EDUCATION.

It is well to pause here a while in following the early military career of Gustavus Adolphus, in order that a view may be taken of the deviations he saw fit to effect in the home policy of the Swedish government practised by his royal predecessors, the modifications he deemed expedient to be made in the laws and civil institutions of the kingdom, the changes he introduced in methods of administration, and the financial measures he was led to adopt.

Towards the chief families and nobility, whose proceedings, controversies, and interests had so much influenced movements and events in Sweden during the reigns of Charles IX., and his two brothers, the young king was to assume an attitude essentially different from that which his father had maintained. The circumstances of the two reigns were unlike, and admitted of a change in this regard. But aside from the underlying and surrounding facts with which the two kings had to deal, and by which they might be supposed to be influenced, the young Gustavus and his chief advisers must have thought the policy of Charles in respect to the higher nobility not altogether wise of itself and in its time. The strong influence of Oxenstierna in the early years of his reign was probably more decisive than when Gustavus had grown older, though at no time was it unimportant. Ten years his senior, the scion of a

family which had given senators to the kingdom for two centuries, proud of his ancestry, attached to his order, able, learned, skilful in giving advice, it is to be presumed that he would know how to make his influence felt with the young sovereign, especially as he does not seem to have given any sign of distrust of the chief families. Indeed, the facts seem to show that the unbiassed tendency of the young king's mind was in the same direction as Oxenstierna's as to the expediency of a change of policy on the part of the throne towards the nobility. It soon became apparent, that though his grandfather, the first Vasa sovereign, and his own father, during their reigns had sought greatly to reduce the power and importance of the chief nobles, the young Gustavus Adolphus thought the time and the circumstances required a change of policy in that regard. Oxenstierna thought it wiser to make of the nobility a strong prop, if not the chief reliance, of the throne; though he would have it subordinate and obedient to the royal will. Gustavus seems to have reached the conclusion, that the nobility had been sufficiently crushed by the stern course of his father, and that it would be well to make it more influential; at the same time cherishing the purpose to make its power co-operate in rendering the throne strong and secure. The pledges which he made on his coronation indicated a purpose to deviate from the course of his predecessors. The exercise of arbitrary power, which under Charles had resulted in misfortune to many persons, occasioned an express confirmation of the principle, sanctioned by law, that no one could be arrested or judged on a simple denunciation without knowing his accuser, and that the latter should appear at the tribunal with him. The king must respect all the estates, especially the nobility and the high functionaries, and could not remove any without bringing them before the tribunals according to the legal forms. The provisions of the fundamental law of the country, that a new law could not be promulgated, new

imposts raised, nor war undertaken beyond the frontiers, without the consent of the people, were assured anew. The Senate was restored to its functions as mediator between king and people, and the estates demanded not to be so often convoked. As the crown had pressing needs, the right of the estates to determine the imposts was exposed to dangers, so much more so as there was vaguely a question of the contributions in the oath of the king, which were not to be raised without the knowledge of the Senate and the consent of those interested. Thus the power of the Senate was increased, diminishing that of king and people. The disposition of the ancient oath of the king relative to the prohibition to make any dotation of, or to alienate, the domains of the crown, was suppressed in the sworn promise of young Gustavus Adolphus. The development of his idea as to the nobility included all the civil and military functions, and nearly all persons who were devoted to the service of the State. Thus the nobility regarded as a right its admission to all the public functions. All capacities were admitted into the nobility, and continually increased its authority. This fact was sometimes opposed to the feelings of the peasants, who complained of the increase of this privileged class. Once, when Oxenstierna, in a session of the Diet, responded to the complaints of the peasants as to the increase of the nobles, "But they are your own sons who became nobles," a peasant replied, "You give us little joy in augmenting thus the number of the Pagans." At this time the nobility was military; for each noble was at least a soldier, if no more, and was born such. Charles had increased the influence of the military profession in calling the principal officers to the Diets, a usuage which was long maintained. The deputies of the army, though they had no voice, were a re-enforcement for the nobility at the Diets, where all the other nobles of the legal age were obliged to attend. The wars preceding and during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus

gave Sweden, in fact, a military monarchy. The military spirit penetrated everywhere. Changes were operated by considerations arising from friendly dispositions of the young king towards the old families, who had been treated so severely by his father. Charles had stifled revolt in blood. He had put aside forever, by his rigorous action, all future danger of the country becoming Catholic; and the interior condition of the kingdom and its dangers abroad required amnesty for the past and the union of all for the common good. The recognition of the hereditary right of the crown, unanimously accorded by the Diet, the justice of the king in repulsing the terrible arm of illegal confiscations, his liberality, the hopes which were founded on him, his age, which had need of counsel, and the deference with which he received it, — all this had the desired result of a complete reconciliation. The accession of Gustavus Adolphus, after the long civil wars which had taken place, was the pledge of this reconciliation of parties and factions. It was celebrated in haste, and without conditions. The Diet which voted the hereditary right of the crown, the constitution, the imposts, and responded to the complaint of the estates, was in session only three weeks; and the young king departed to open the campaign against a dangerous foreign enemy the same day in which he confirmed the privileges of the nobility. It did not require a long experience to lead him to modify somewhat his opinion of the nobility as it then existed. In the war which he was compelled to prosecute with Denmark, many of the nobles had evaded their obligations, and usurped privileges. He was obliged to censure them severely, and threatened to take from such their privileges to the extent that they could not act according to their own pleasure. The disappointment which he had experienced at the unfaithful conduct of many of the nobility, and the want of a more clear defining of their duties and obligations, were the chief causes which led to the establishment of the House of Nobles in 1625.

The design of this institution, as carried out, was to support the throne, and govern the kingdom through four classes, — the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants, — and to make these four estates work in harmony to a common end, without antagonizing each other enough to weaken the State. The nobility as hereditary was separated by distinctly marked lines from the other estates, though access to it was easy to all talents. It was an institution almost exclusively warlike. Thus the permanent army and the House of Nobles in Sweden were of corresponding date. All the ancient and modern nobility in Sweden and Finland were inscribed, divided into families and into three orders. The first was composed of those who became chief lords by their nomination to the dignities of count and baron, according to the priority of their nomination; the second was comprised of those who could prove that their ancestors had been members of the Senate, their places on the benches to be determined by lot; the third was made up of those who, as nobles, and exempt from imposts, had equipped cavaliers for the army. They must sit in the assembled House of Nobles, the old families in the rank assigned them by lot, and the others according to the date of their diploma. Each family must have its seal marked with its arms and its name, and this was employed to sign the decrees of the Diet and the public acts. The senators had the first place on the seats of this assemblage of chevaliers, but without deliberative voice. The functions of the Swedish senators were not like those of the Roman Senate, or of the American or French senators of the present time, nor of the British House of Lords. They were essentially those of a State Council. All the other nobles who had arrived at the legal age, and to whom there was no legal impediment, were obliged to attend the deliberations of the Diet, and to remain by themselves in a more humble place, observing absolute silence. The one occupying the first place in each class gathered the ballots in

an urn, read them distinctly, and remitted them to the marshal of the diet. The majority of the voices of each class constituted the vote of the class. The marshal of the Diet had the right to convoke the nobility, to communicate the propositions of the king, to direct the discussions, and to cause to be drawn up by the secretary a condensed abstract or report of the deliberations. The marshal was appointed by the king. To the marshal, in practice, was attributed no inconsiderable power. The execution of what had been resolved by the nobility, and received the royal assent, must be remitted to the marshal of the Diet; and no one had the right to oppose any measures he might take. The governors of the provinces in their respective jurisdictions must co-operate to the carrying into effect the decisions of the Diet. The preponderance of the old families appears in this arrangement of voting by classes, and that of the nobility over the other estates is revealed by the formal demand which it secures to sit as distinct bodies in the Diets. It was also among the powers of the marshal of the Diet, assisted by two nobles of each class, to remit to the chancellor of the kingdom the decrees of the Diet. The practice of convoking to the Diets the superior officers of the army was continued. The decrees were published in the name of the Senate, and of the counts, barons, bishops, the nobility, the priests, officers of the army, burghers, and peasants. Though the officers of the army were not named in the regulations of the House of Nobles, they no less belonged to the nobility. The orator of the nobility spoke, not alone in the name of his estate, but in the name of the deputies of the army.

Notwithstanding this large increase of the influence of the nobility, the king retained, in presence of all the estates, the power which appertained to a chief, and always had the preponderance in the deliberations and decrees. When the Diet was convoked, and the estates were assembled in the hall of the kingdom, the king took his seat

on the throne, having at his right his brother, Prince Charles Philip, and the five great functionaries of the State. On the benches were the counts, the barons, nobility, and deputies of the army. At the left of the king was Duke John, the Senate, the bishops, and the clergy; and farther down, in the middle of the hall, were the burghers and the peasants. Only the deputies of the Diet could be present, besides the young nobility, who were at the door. When the king had saluted the assembly, the princes, counts, and all the other classes, each in their order of rank, made to their sovereign very humble felicitations. The king then communicated to the estates the propositions on which they had been called to deliberate, and then retired. The estates, after having thus assembled in the hall of the kingdom, separated; each retiring for the purpose of deliberating by order, and gathering the votes by writing. If the operations could not be concluded in a single session, they continued two or three or more days. The estates had the power to assemble for deliberation. For the purpose of maintaining secrecy, there were appointed sworn secretaries for the peasants. Each order must examine the propositions of the king in its own hall. When the responses were ready, the orders re-assembled, and retook their places. The king returned to know the result, which was announced through the deputies of each order. If the king was satisfied with the responses which had been made as to his propositions, no more was said; if not, he replied verbally or by writing, according to the importance of the matter in consideration. If the estates were not of accord, the question was debated in the presence of the king, who sought to bring them to an agreement; or else the king took the resolution which seemed to him most beneficial to the kingdom. This regulation, which the estates judged convenient and proper to favor the rapid progress of affairs, was accepted without opposition. These forms were the first which were adopted for

a Swedish Diet represented by estates, and they differed little from the old Diets, where the king spoke to the people in arms, and the decrees were voted by acclamations. The representation by estates was not fully carried out. These advantages appertained only to the nobility, who encroached on the other orders. The presence of all the nobles who were not prevented by age, sickness, or service for the king, was legal, but practically impossible. The clergy was represented by the bishop of the diocese, assisted by one member of the Chapter and a priest of each district; the burghers of each city by three of their number; the peasants, by one or two from each district. The frequency and the short duration of the Diets, the lack of good roads and convenient means of intercommunication, war, and other obstacles, prevented many of the members from presenting themselves, especially from the remote sections of the country. In the important Diet held at Örebro in 1614, there was no representative from Finland. For that reason, the king convoked in that great duchy a separate Diet of the estates, at Borgo, to confirm the resolutions taken by the Swedish Diet at the former place. They collected the signatures of the absent deputies in their respective districts. Two years later, during the war with Russia, the king held, at Helsingförs, an assemblage of the estates of Finland, which continued a week, in which was voted a contribution equal to what they had paid three years previously. These facts go to show how strongly taken and maintained was the resolution of the king and his influential advisers to put an end to the conflict of classes, factions, and violences which had characterized preceding reigns, to unite within appropriately defined limits the inherent forces of all his people, and make them co-operate to the support of the throne and the strength of the country against external foes. The preponderance which was given to the influence of the nobles in these fundamental arrangements was cer-

tainly very objectionable, likely to bring its harvest of evils at a future period of the country; but, as a means of getting out of the then existing difficulties, and strengthening the kingdom for the important work which Sweden was about assuming on herself among the nations of Northern Europe under the lead of her heroic king and great chancellor, the system adopted was certainly effective, and calculated to stimulate the military capacity and ambition of a people to the utmost.

Early in the reign of Gustavus Adolphus were manifested around him two divergent, and more or less antagonistic, tendencies of opinion and influence. The men at the head of these two schools of political doctrine and state policy were Axel Oxenstierna and John Skytte. The former appears conspicuously throughout the career of this illustrious king, and became the trusted representative of his plans and work after the death of Gustavus. But Skytte does not so often appear on the stage in the great drama of events which followed; and, in regard to him, history has been, perhaps, too silent. It is just, and not without interest, that his opinions as to the questions and events of his time should be allowed to speak for themselves. It is historically well authenticated that Skytte, who was a learned and gifted man, the preceptor of young Gustavus in his varied studies, who had possessed the confidence and support of King Charles, held views very different from those of Oxenstierna. Between these two men, there were earnest discussions; and each had his partisans and supporters, — the first being the champion of the aristocracy, and the other of the democracy. Each sought to impress his views and policy on the young king. Skytte maintained, that it was necessary to finish the work which Charles had prosecuted so vigorously by completely crushing out the nobility, and no longer to have a privileged, dominating class between the throne and the people. The king could then govern according to his will,

without fear of contradiction and of the haughty insolence of faction. The slender revenues of the crown could be increased by the confiscation of the lands which the nobles held in possession by violence and usurpation. On this bold and thorough proposition Gustavus reflected. He addressed himself to Oxenstierna for advice, communicating to him the plan and counsel of Skytte. Oxenstierna gave his answer with emphasis and vigor:—

"He who has given such counsel is an enemy of the king and country. I wish not to accuse the deceased king of injustice, nor defend the lords whom he caused to perish; but it is well not to forget, that, at this time, it is difficult for each to distinguish the master whom one should obey. In sparing so large a number of the first members of the State, assuring himself of their fidelity by kindness and conciliation, he would do a laudable action. Besides, it is impossible to prove that the intention of King Charles was to uproot entirely the chief order of the State. He would have rendered himself culpable of ingratitude; it being that order which had given the crown to the Vasa family, and later recognized it hereditary in that house. The kings of Sweden have promised to protect the people, and not to oppress them. To take possession of the property possessed from time immemorial by the Swedish nobility, to banish from the kingdom those whose fathers had defended it during so many centuries, would be an injustice. It is well to recall, also, that neither the king nor the kingdom could get along without a nobility. The instructed men, the high functionaries of the State, both civil and military, go from its midst; because the nobles repeat to their sons in their infancy that they should show themselves worthy, by courage and their instruction, of their ancestors and of the advantages attached to birth. It is rare to find emulation of that kind among the multitude occupied with its daily needs, and seeking the occasion to amass riches. One does not often see the son of a burgher or a peasant raise himself to the first dignities; and when that happens, he changes his place, and conserves always, in his speaking and in his manners, traces of his origin. If the king should take the nobility under his protection, he would be respected by it and loved, and the nobility would serve him faithfully: in following another road, he would precipitate himself into an abyss of distrust and trouble."

The opinion and advice of Oxenstierna accorded nearer with the controlling sentiments of Gustavus than did those

of Skytte; and the earnest and forcible manner with which they were presented by one endowed so richly with the gifts of argument and persuasion, and the accomplishments of the courtier, as Oxenstierna, did not fail to make the young king decide that he could deal more successfully with existing facts and difficulties by adopting the line of action marked out by him who was destined to be his great chancellor, rather than the policy advised by his former teacher, who was regarded somewhat of a theorist by his contemporaries. At that epoch the nobility possessed almost solely the education and knowledge which qualified them to fill the offices of state. It was difficult, if not impossible, to find other subjects sufficiently apt to fill the public employs. Naturally inclined towards what was grand and magnificent, young Gustavus admired the nobility, with its glorious memories and its intellectual accomplishments. Besides, it was easier to forgive than to be severely vindictive against those who had shown no signs of hostility, who had hopefully accepted his elevation to the throne, and whose services he wished to secure. Though the policy counselled by Skytte was more in harmony with that followed by his grandfather, the first Vasa king, and by his father Charles, who had left him the crown, he thought a change of facts and circumstances demanded an oblivion of the past and amnesty for offences which he trusted would not be repeated. Gustavus Adolphus followed the advice of Oxenstierna. A large number of nobles banished by Charles obtained permission to return to their country, and many of them were restored to the possession of the property taken from their parents by confiscation. The privileges of the nobility were maintained in spite of the great negligence with which they had often fulfilled their obligations. Some of the privileged persons treated so humanely by the young king proved themselves shamefully unworthy of the generous favor of their sovereign. The pride, the egotism, the grasping

cupidity and brutality, of some of these nobles in the first years of his reign were very conspicuous. They braved law and authority with impunity, they committed cruel exactions and violences on the peasantry, and neglected the military service to which their privileged rank pledged them. The letters, the orders, the menaces, of the king, were treated with contempt. Privileges excessively extended and family alliances protected this wanton violation of law and disregard of royal authority. At first the young king feigned not to see the illegalities and violences committed by the nobles, in whose defence his authority and generosity had been given: he did not feel himself sufficiently strong to repress them. But by degrees a change was operated. The increasing consideration which rapidly passing events gave Gustavus Adolphus, the devotion of the people to him, augmented his confidence in his authority, and inspired the nobility with salutary fear. From year to year was remarked more firmness and vigor in the conduct of the king, and the complaints of the grasping greed and violences of the aristocratic families correspondingly diminished. This result was not regarded as the product of any diminishing of their privileges, nor their severe and frequent chastisements, but of the new spirit with which Gustavus was able to inspire the nobles. The wars which he carried on so successfully, the new and bold enterprises which he had in hand, afforded him the opportunities, and the means to employ them, to furnish them the stimulus of honors and rewards, diverted them from internal faction and strife, and made their energies and efforts conduce to the national union, power, and renown. He called near him the most distinguished member of each noble family. In peace and in war he surrounded himself with Axel Oxenstierna, Peter and Nils Brahe, Peter, John, and Axel Baner, Gustavus, Henrik, and Clas Horn, also Claes Fleming, and him so illustrious in arms, Lenart Torstenson. Nor did he discard his old

teacher, John Skytte, of plebeian birth: though he rejected his democratic tendencies, and his radical method of crushing the nobility, he did not repel him by a stern and frigid attitude, nor drive him from the royal service. Skytte was often sent on delicate and important missions to foreign courts, and elevated to the Senate. Perhaps the astute advice of Oxenstierna was not wanting in the selection of Skytte so often for important work abroad. Indeed, the latter did not fail to complain that he was employed away so much as envoy. He wished to be more at home, and nearer the centre of power, and could scarcely fail to believe that the chancellor, if not the king, thought his views of foreign affairs more sound than his domestic politics. But he continued to have consideration in Swedish affairs. His learning and character compelled respect, though some of his political ideas may have been in advance of his time. He evinced his estimation of institutions of education and knowledge by founding at Upsala a new professorship of politics and eloquence, which still bears his name. This was two years before Gustavus Adolphus made the donation of royal domains to that institution. He became the first regular chancellor of the university. He continues to flit across the stage of Swedish history through the momentous years of its illustrious king and the period which followed his death. It could well be wished that the chroniclers of his time had told us more of him; for flashes of democratic thinking at a period when the power of kings, high nobles, and prelates overshadowed every thing, were phenomena not without interest to the historical student.

This brilliant circle which Gustavus had called around him, composed of all that Sweden had of the illustrious, was animated by the ideas and the spirit of the heroic king. Self-sacrifice, bravery, the love of country and of glory, a sincere respect for religion, and a scrupulous morality, were shown in the actions of the king. Those

whom he had called around him, and made conspicuous in his service, followed his example by attachment as well as by respect. The result of this was a noble emulation of courage, and of devotion to the country. These sentiments and influences were felt, not only by the senators, the officers of the army, the members of the court, but they were reflected into the provinces; and the result was a great improvement in the nobility, of whom many had formerly been turbulent and rebellious. Thus the result seemed to vindicate the advice of Oxenstierna to Gustavus, — to make of the nobility the strong bulwark of the Swedish throne, — as against the plan of Skytte, to dig it up by the roots, and make the people the chief buttress of the monarchy. Oxenstierna had not only been successful in securing the ingrafting of his views as to the nobility in the fundamental laws of the kingdom, but from this time onward he grew more and more in the confidence of the king. Hereafter they were a dual power, which practically constituted the government So close and united became their relation and mutual confidence, that in a large degree it was not apparent with whom was the real spring of power. If Oxenstierna, by his large wisdom, his astuteness and tact, often proved himself the brain of the duality, it is certain that Gustavus was the directing will and the executive hand. To know how to select the wise counsellor, to be able correctly to receive and rightly digest advice, to discriminate readily and well what may be opportune and practical in the ideas of others, is a capacity perhaps as rare and important in the statesman and ruler as genius itself. Both of these men had a large degree of the two kinds of power; and in what occurred in Swedish affairs during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, often it could not be known by their contemporaries, if it was known always to the king and the illustrious chancellor, from whom sprung the initial thought, though it was more obvious from whence came the incisive resolution. But

though the privileges and position of the nobles in the State had been recognized, and amnesty for the past guaranteed, it was to be far from being always smooth work with them, according to their expectations and demands. They were to learn, that, if the burghers and peasants were to be inferior and subservient to them, they themselves must be subordinate and obedient to the king. By his success in arms, his skill in affairs, his power of commanding respect, the high esteem he had acquired among the Swedish population, his power became strikingly marked as to the laws in vigor. In 1617 some of the highest nobility demanded that an accused noble should not be imprisoned, but allowed to go free, under bonds, until the time he might be convicted. The young sovereign responded, with firmness, that such a concession would annihilate the force of law, and favor pride and injustice; that it was impossible for him to accord a privilege of that kind, and at the same time hold his hand to the maintenance of the laws, an essential part of the royal oath. The nobility was compelled to be silent. What entire respect for his royal dignity and obedience to his authority Gustavus demanded of the nobility, is plainly evinced by an incident which seems well authenticated. At a dinner in Germany, a young noble, Erik Rålamb, being ordered by the king to assist in waiting on him and his guests, refused to serve the court as a gentleman, a function which he proudly regarded below his dignity. The king was so incensed against him, that, in a letter to the State Council, he ordered the father of the young noble to be removed from the presidency of the superior court of Åbo for not having better brought up his son. Swedish historians have regarded this a rare stain on the character of Gustavus. The king's account of this affair shows to what extent he regarded the young man as having offended him: —

"Our subject, Erik Rålamb, has shown disobedience to us, and in

such manner set at defiance our will and command, that while we sat at supper yesterday evening with divers foreign princes, and no other was present who might go to the table and give us due attendance at such feast, and we commanded him, in order that all might not end indecorously, to come to the table, and there perform the ordinary foretasting, he gave so little heed to our order, in the presence of such princes and lords, and being in such need, when no other was at hand, that he immediately left the room, and rendered no farther service to us during the repast."

The king commanded that this young noble be sent home and tried, but he effected his escape. Four years after (in 1635) he died in Paris, in the house of Grotius, the distinguished publicist and author, who is said to have much esteemed the young man. The Swedish magnates of this period, as much as had been conceded them, thought the king was inclined to trench on their dignity and rights. Count Peter Brahe, one of the chief of that class, said, in the Senate in 1636, that "the late king was a heroical prince, of such an honor, that, to subdue others and aggrandize his own power, he laid hands on the privileges of others." He of so high consideration in Swedish affairs of this reign as Jacob de la Gardie remarked, "It was commonly the nature of King Gustavus Adolphus, of happy memory, that he gladly augmented his regalities and high grandeur, but diminished and cut down the privileges of others." It appears equally well verified, that, as the king advanced in his career, he increased his consideration for the peasantry and the other classes outside of the nobility, and was indignant and severe against those who wronged or oppressed them.

The same decision and directness of purpose which Gustavus evinced in affairs of war and politics, he brought into exercise in dealing with questions of religion and the church. The great evils which had been brought on the country in preceding reigns by church prelates and theological strife, were too conspicuous not to have deeply impressed so ardent and resolute a nature as his. He

wished order and discipline everywhere, that his throne might be respected and his kingdom powerful. It was in an age when two great antagonistic forces in the religious world were grappling with each other, and seeking an extension of their dominion. Men, events, the very air, were electric with the spirit and the energy of the contending elements of this struggle; and the Swedish king knew well that he must take his part, and he deeply shared in the spirit and impulses of the time. From deep conviction and natural policy he was a Protestant monarch, fully resolved to make his people a Protestant unit, both by teaching and law, and, if the former failed, to render the latter surely effective. For religious, political, and military reasons as well, he deemed it imperative that the church powers should be harmonized and made obedient to royal authority. Regarding himself the head of the church of his realm, as well as of its civil authority, he gave earnest thought and effort to bring order out of confusion; wishing to restrain the exorbitant demands of the prelates, as well as to help the poor and humble clergymen, and to benefit the people. At an age when real tolerance was unknown, it was not strange that he did not in this regard rise above the highest level of his times. He was penetrated with a sincere regard for religion, and took much care to impress the sentiment which he shared on the opinions and feelings of his subjects. With great vigilance and severity he had regard to the order and discipline of the church. Contempt or lightness in these respects, as well as want of reverenee for public worship and all that relates to it, were rigorously punished, sometimes by banishment and death. The troubles caused by changes of religion in the preceding reigns served as warnings to Gustavus Adolphus. He held himself with strict fidelity to evangelical doctrine, the best expression of which he regarded the Confession of Augsburg. A fusion of the doctrines of Calvin and Luther was proposed by some for-

eign persons, to which Oxenstierna was inclined to give friendly consideration. The king, on the contrary, repelled the proposition with firmness, and caused its authors to leave the country. He would have in Sweden but one faith, one confession. It was not without reason that Mounickhof, a foreign officer in the Swedish service, who fell at the siege of Augdow in 1614, used to extol Sweden for three things: "It had one king, one religion, and one physician, which was some sign of health." Many Jesuits who had come into the country were driven out; and three Swedes who had embraced the Catholic religion, and would not renounce, were condemned to death and executed, according to the letter of the law. He was the enemy of the Catholics on the field of battle and in council. In after-years, when he conquered them on a foreign soil, he was considerate of them to the degree of securing their praise for his indulgence and mildness. The disciples of Loyola were those alone with whom he never became reconciled. He was careful of the consideration of the clergy. "The priests," he said, "ought to be the real tribunes of the people; for they know them better than any other persons, and it is for them to direct rightly the people by their precepts and examples." But he stripped unworthy priests of their functions without mercy. The spiritual welfare of the parishioners he regarded superior to the interest inspired by the wife and children of the culpable pastor. He encountered considerable difficulty in bringing the bishops under proper restraint, and putting an end to the abuses which they had often practised. In the reign of King John, the authority of these prelates had been augmented. They claimed the right of filling all the benefices, even those formerly in the control of the crown, and were accused, not without good reasons, of ordaining, for corrupt motives, more clergymen than were necessary. To put an end to abuses of this character, Charles IX. provided, that, when the bishop wished to pre-

sent a minister to a vacant parish, the parishioners should first give their assent to the reception of the candidate as their pastor, who was then to ask the royal confirmation of his pastoral office. Charles had also ordained that no one should be consecrated a priest without royal permission thereto, and due information had been given as to the place where his priestly labors were needed. When Gustavus Adolphus came to the throne, the bishops, like the chief nobles, looked sharply to their own interests, and obtained the revocation of the ordinance which Charles had taken so much care to issue and enforce for the welfare of the realm. At his coronation the young king promised to protect the rights of the church. When the nobility and the officers of the army solicited an explanation of the full meaning and extent of this royal pledge, he answered that he intended to be understood as meaning the ordinances of the church, and his obligation to maintain schools to God's honor and the good of the congregation. In the attempt to define the relations of the church, he encountered difficulties. To give unity and system to the constitution of the church, he proposed a general consistory. The records which remain relating to his views and efforts to establish this authoritative ecclesiastical body show the difficulties and perplexities he had to meet. It was to consist of six ecclesiastical and six laical members. The former were to consist of the archbishop, two other of the principal bishops, the royal chaplain, the first professor of theology at Upsala, and the first minister at Stockholm; and the latter were to include the marshal of the court, two senators, and three members of the superior court of the kingdom. The consistory was to meet yearly, on a specified day, in the capital; and the marshal and the archbishop were to preside alternately. Before this body all complaints touching ecclesiastical affairs, referred to the king, and demanding redress, were to be laid. These twelve men were to revise the ordinance for the church, and, when

confirmed by the king, to see it properly enforced in the kingdom. The consistory was also to have the superintendence of all the theology of Sweden, of colleges, schools, hospitals, and houses for orphans. Dissensions and contests had often taken place between bishops and parishes respecting the choice of pastors. The parishes had complained that ministers had been often violently forced on them, while the bishops alleged the disobedience of the parishes; one party or the other in the sequel attempting, by false information or otherwise, to obtain a royal warrant in their own behalf. The extensive rights of patronage claimed by the nobles often resulted in disputes between them and the bishops: in future the complaining party was to cite the other before the consistory, and there the dispute should be determined. A catalogue was to be made of all benefices to which the king had special right of patronage. From their own number the consistory was to designate annually certain persons to visit all the schools of the realm, and, in conjunction with the bishop of each diocese, to make public examinations. This body was also to watch over purity of doctrine as against all heretical teachings and opinions, and to have inspection and censorship over printers and booksellers. Gustavus had less to offer the prelates and the clergy than he had granted to the higher nobles, reversing, in the interests of the latter, the policy of Charles. It was to be seen how they would receive his plan of the consistory. The clergy declared they would willingly see such a consistory established, if it was to be and continue a true ecclesiastical consistory, so that temporal and spiritual jurisdictions might not be confounded. In their view the controversy could be stated in the question, Whom had God commanded to take care of the flock? While all men, and especially the magistrates, were obliged to call for its welfare, yet God had in a special degree committed this duty to the clergy, who, when any troubles had arisen in the church or

parish, had put an end to them by councils, synods, and pastoral conferences. Though such assemblages had been called together by royal orders, neither emperors nor kings had adjudged the cause; but they left this to the authority of the bishops and ministers, and when their decision was pronounced, royal assistance was given to enforce that decision. The bishops enlarge further in the expression of their views:—

"The same grounds apply in like manner to the consistories, which may be regarded as lesser and ordinary councils, for matters of daily occurrence, whence it might well be useful to appoint some political person of authority to protect and assist the clergy in case of need; but that he should generally dispose of all cases would subserve no good end. Else he would virtually be the same as a priest and chief bishop, and thus the highest voice in both spiritual and temporal government, after the king, would fall to one person. If laymen took part in the consistory, ecclesiastics might demand the same with respect to the royal court and other secular judicatories, before which were often brought subjects affecting the clergy, churches, and God's congregation. It were best that every matter were treated in its own place. In the consistory no other matters are desired to be handled than such as appertain thereto by divine right and the usuage of the church; and a general consistory might be held when the clergy were summoned to the Diet,"

To obviate objections to his first plan, the king, who called himself the "defender of the church, and charged, as such, to watch over the community of God in the country over which he had been called to reign," presented two new projects, touching the same subject, at the Diet of 1625. According to the first proposition, the general consistory would be composed of priests, with some individuals named by the king, who should attend the deliberations, without participating by their vote. In the second plan, there is no question of these persons named in the first, but only that the "king would designate sundry discreet and learned theologians, who had the fear of God." The new body should consist of three of the royal chaplains, a professor of theology at Upsala, and the pri-

mate of Stockholm, as the bishops could not be spared from their dioceses. But the bishops were found as unwilling to submit to the authority of the priests, their inferiors, as the clergy in general were to recognize the laymen for judges. The different modifications of the consistory plan all failed, not without the king's discontent. He was now too much absorbed in other great responsibilities and enterprises at home and abroad to effectively take up the subject, and prosecute it to the full accomplishment of his wishes. Why his project of church administration had failed this time is made plain by the following testimony of three of the public men of Sweden of that time, one of whom was the great chancellor himself. Jacob de la Gardie, in the Senate, 1636, said that "King Gustavus Adolphus declared to the bishops, when they would not consent, that, if they transgressed or committed any misdemeanor, they should be brought before the royal court, and be amerced as the matter required. The principal end designed by the general consistory was to bind the bishops to give an acount of their administration."

In the Senate, the same year, Gabriel Oxenstierna said, "His Majesty wished to be relieved from the great pressure of business which oppressed him. If one came in the matter of justice, the king referred him to the royal court; in a matter of finance, to the exchequer; but whither he should refer the complaint of a clergyman, his Majesty was uncertain, and therefore he wished to erect the sixth college." Axel Oxenstierna, the chancellor of the kingdom in 1636, said in the Senate that "the intention was to preserve concord among the estates; but the bishops sought only an extension of their jurisdiction, and the contraction of that of the magistry." Though Gustavus did not have time, amid his other pressing labors, to reconstruct the organization of the church entirely to his wishes, his example and authority accomplished consider-

able to its improvement and usefulness. In the great efforts and sacrifices which he asked his country to make in the wars with Denmark, Poland, and in Germany, he made strong demands on the clergy, as well as on the other orders of his kingdom; and there were few who ventured to disregard his mandate. The clergy assisted in raising the taxes for the war expenses, and in the enlistment and conscription of soldiers to fill the army quotas. If the inspiration of his heroic and self-sacrificing example strongly influenced and elevated the conduct of some, his authoritative word moved others to effective efforts.

While Gustavus had taken a deep interest in the organization and welfare of the church, his care for education and schools of learning was warmly evinced. By all the means at his command he sought to advance instruction and the sciences among the various classes of his subjects. At the time of his ascension to the throne, the University of Upsala was no more than a school, and the schools were in a low condition. Individuals were found qualified to exercise the chief public functions, but there were very few fitted for the professions. The professors dishonored themselves and instruction by quarrels and divisions, accompanied by insults and squandering of time, and combats between their respective partisans among the youth, with blows of fist and club. "If we had not known by our own experience," wrote the king, "all the good which one obtains from books, we should be little disposed to occupy ourselves of our university to regard with favor and kindness masters who know not to respect themselves nor to fulfil their mission." In 1620 the king consulted the bishops as to the most effective means of propagating knowledge in the kingdom. Such schools and academies as then existed were badly organized. There went out from them but few young men who could be called well-instructed, capable of usefulness in the Christian ministry, or fitted for public positions in civil

life. The employees of the magistracy in the cities and towns were so ignorant that they could not sign their names. The extreme poverty of the students was for them an almost insuperable obstacle, and the long vacations retarded their studies. The professors were priests, and the religious instructions may have been regarded equal to the spirit and demand of the period. But these teachers, understanding little of government and of public life, could not teach their pupils what they themselves did not understand. The circumstances were then pressing; and the court lacked able men, and the army capable officers, rather than money. The bishops were required to give their advice on the number of schools and gymnasiums which it was urgent should be established, as to the sciences which should there be taught, and as to the means of securing capable and efficient professors. As learned men were rare, it was well for the bishops to declare if professors should be brought from foreign countries. The bishops were also to give their opinion as to the number of professors required in the university, how much they should be paid, — since the manner then in use by church tithes was ineffective and uncertain, yielding more one year and less in another, — also to advise how the community of the students, the privileges of the university, and the rendering of accounts by the professors, could be best arranged. The response of the bishops to the inquiries of the king were not marked by wisdom, and evinced a very inadequate comprehension of the evils and questions with which he wished to deal effectively. To the disorders and dissensions at Upsala he put an end with a vigorous hand. The turbulent professors, as well as the incapable, were dismissed, punished, or charged with other functions; and the students were kept in proper restraint by salutary fear. The number of masters and the order of their lessons were arranged with precision. The professors were allowed sufficient salaries, poor students

were aided, and the university obtained important privileges. The royal dotation which Gustavus Adolphus made to Upsala bears the date of Aug. 31, 1625, by which that institution was given certain hereditary estates then united in his tenure, three hundred and fifty manors; declaring at the same time, that, as these estates were his own heritage, he bestowed them on the university, "to remain in its possession forever." Besides, the king assigned to the university the crown tithes of several parishes, and made liberal annual grants in cash in aid of the professors and students, with prizes to stimulate the latter in their studies. He also transferred to the Upsala University his own printing-house, founded its library by a grant of his own collection of books and the appointment of a yearly revenue. To these library donations were afterwards added many books which the laws of war brought to his possession, taken from the Jesuits in Germany, — a class of persons whose interests Gustavus never treated with gloved hands. He was likewise successful in establishing gymnasiums at different points in his kingdom. The conduct of Gustavus in these diverse regards presents the certain pledge of his love for the sciences and for his people, and shows how strongly he exerted himself to spread instruction and learning in his realm. As the result of his ardent patriotism, he supported himself earnestly on the employ of the maternal tongue, even for scientific works. Though well versed in foreign languages, he not the less saw all the advantages which could be gained by the cultivation of the Swedish tongue.

"A country is always praised [he wrote] when the sciences useful to humanity are there taught in the maternal tongue, and the people are able to exercise themselves in it from youth. Now, on the contrary, one is obliged to learn first a foreign language before treating the subject; whence it results sometimes that the accessory takes more time than the principal object, — the language more time than the sciences. We wish, then, that the persons who write books

would, at this time and in the future, do so in such a manner, so far as they can, as to treat their subjects in the maternal language."

Bismarck's wish, that German scientific treatises should be printed in the German, instead of the Roman text, is not more emphatically expressed. Thus this king early in his reign showed his comprehensive mind, his grasp of the future, by doing all that his time and resources could possibly allow for the enlightenment and intellectual advancement of the kingdom over which he had been called to rule. In the midst of wars and dangers he becomes the founder of Sweden's system of education. It was with noble and elevating hopes, that, by his institutions of learning, Gustavus Adolphus opened the way to future generations. They were not less important for their political than for their scientific results. Differ as did Oxenstierna and John Skytte in their political theories, there can be no doubt that their blended intelligence served their sovereign well in these important educational provisions for his people.

CHAPTER V.

HE ORGANIZES HIS FINANCES. — MINES. — TAXATION. — CONSCRIPTION. — INDUSTRIES. — METHODS OF ADMINISTRATION. — THE JUDICIAL FORMS.

To enable Gustavus to govern successfully, and to embark in those great enterprises abroad to which the foreign relations of his kingdom rendered him liable, it was necessary for him to give careful attention to the finances. When he came to the throne, the industries and finances of the country were in a sadly depressed condition. Under the long reign of the first Vasa the prosperity of the kingdom had largely increased, and he was successful in his firm resolution to pay off the national debt. But the favorable aspect was changed entirely by the civil and foreign wars which took place during the reigns of his three sons, especially by the improvident and bad management of Erik and John. Though Charles was an efficient ruler, and well understood the importance of promoting the industrial and commercial interests of his dominion, yet the grave difficulties which the reigns of his brothers had left on his hands, the struggles which Sigismund and his partisans had made for the possession of the throne, and the foreign wars into which he had been led, had resulted in leaving the industries and finances of the kingdom at his death in a strained and dilapidated state. On ascending the throne, Gustavus Adolphus found the crown and the inhabitants of Sweden equally impoverished. He found his subjects obtaining from abroad many products, both natural and manufactured, which could well

be produced at home. He sought by all means in his power to remedy this evil. He encouraged the national industry in all its parts, and, by conversing with his people in his travels among them, sought to fix their attention on divers means of augmenting the revenues of their properties and investments. Though some of the measures adopted, and methods commended, accord little with the teachings and practical experience of the nineteenth century, they were such as had the approval of the most sagacious and enterprising men of those times. German sheep were imported and distributed among the people to improve the native breed. Citizens of Holland were induced by the government to come into Sweden to aid in improving the raising of beasts. The first manufacture of arms and of paper was of that period, also numerous tanneries and breweries. There were established also artisans for the weaving of wool and silk. New regulations were published; and numerous commercial associations were formed under various names, and many of them gave considerable gains to individuals and to the crown. These hopes of prosperity were in part the result of the efforts of Gustavus and his friends, though the epoch in itself was little favorable to such enterprises. War, with its continual levies of men and imposts, put frequent obstacles to the development of industry, which has need of the arm and of money. The manufacturing and commercial establishments rarely arrived to full maturity, the government finding itself in the necessity of demanding of them money as soon as they had amassed any considerable sum. Agriculture likewise suffered severely, as the result of the high taxes which were imposed on it under divers denominations. The people generally believed these efforts indispensable, that the king demanded money, not on his own account, but for an object of general utility, and in this respect were more content than they had been in preceding reigns. Yet a considerable number of farms

were abandoned; and the peasants in numbers wished to quit their country to try fortune in a land possessing more resources, and better opportunities to secure the fruits of their industry.

But to make fully obvious the stern truth of history, and to understand clearly the strength of the financial obstacles with which Gustavus and his government had to grapple, it is necessary to proceed from general statements to specific facts and details. The resources of the country appear not to have been equal to its great undertakings. In 1620, according to the best available data, the revenues of the crown, in money and produce, amounted to 1,280,652 Swedish dollars.[1] This amount was considerably increased in the later years of this reign by new imposts, by the reversion of various valuable fiefs which fell to the crown in consequence of deaths in the royal family. The inadequacy of the income is attested by the extraordinary means which the government made use of, especially to procure ready money, of which there was the most pressing need to carry on the war; while the crown revenues were paid mostly in produce, or in the performance of personal service. An extended list of different burdens is mentioned, among which were post-carriage and purveyance, voluntary aids, days' works, and portages of all kinds. The extraordinary means put in exercise were: —

(1) Loans. There was a national debt contracted by Erik, and this had been increased under John and Charles. At the commencement of his reign Gustavus Adolphus deplored this condition of things. His mother, Christine, the queen-dowager, with an eye as sharply open to her own purse as to the immediate financial necessities of the kingdom, had counselled Gustavus, who had consulted her

[1] Equal to 190,000 pounds sterling, or 923,000 American dollars; though the value of money then, as compared with its present intrinsic value, would more than double these figures.

in his trials, that it was impossible to make war and pay old debts, and urged him not to recognize those which bore date prior to 1598,[1] a period at which Charles IX. had published that all creditors should make known their titles, under the penalty of proscription. New loans were negotiated. For money borrowed in Holland, interest at the rate of six and a quarter per cent was paid. For domestic loans, ten per cent and upwards was the rate; and for this the government was obliged to give security. For a loan of two hundred thousand Swedish dollars, the dowager Queen Catharine received, in 1624, the ordinary crown-revenues of Nerike as security for the interest. For another loan of fifty thousand Swedish dollars she demanded and received twelve per cent; although she did not advance this sum in money, but in copper. For the capital invested in the copper company in 1628, the government agreed to pay twenty per cent, on condition that it might have this loan for four years.

2. The second expedient put in practice was the sale and hypothecation of the crown estates, with mortgage on their revenues. The sales were made to the nobles, with perpetual exemption from taxation. Mortgages were also given to others, especially rich burghers and merchants, often foreigners by birth. Some of these mortgages were afterwards converted into leases for a term of years, including tolls, mines, and the rents of whole fiefs and provinces.

3. Monopolies, by which the government, in its own name or in that of different companies, sought to gather in its hands the commerce of the country. As a large proportion of the taxes was collected in produce, the government was obliged to engage in traffic; its concerns being managed by an official, under the superintendence of the high treasurer and his council. On their representation, that they were unable to transact the business pressing upon them, a special officer, subordinate to them, was added the

[1] This advice seems to have been followed.

next year after Gustavus came to the throne, who, with the assistance of the crown factor and a clerk, was to receive all commodities entering the royal storehouses, and procure, in return, whatever was required on account of the crown, likewise having oversight of tolls and trade in general. This was an office which afforded great temptations to corrupt gains; and the first man who held it, the Swedish historian Erik Göranson Tegel, was justly accused of criminal frauds in its administration. He was tried and condemned for them by the royal court in 1614, but escaped lightly, as such peculators too often do in other countries and in later times. The crown became the only buyer at the copper-mines; although it often ceded its right, and generally the export of the copper-wares, to other parties. Oxenstierna called copper "the noblest staple of which the crown of Sweden can boast." In 1619 the government transferred the copper-trade to a company, which likewise enjoyed other rights and advantages in respect of trade. This copper company, whose privileges were repeatedly renewed, was obliged, in 1629, to restore the copper-trade to the crown, having vainly attempted to keep the prices of copper productions too high. It finally found itself unable to complete its engagements. In 1624 a "General Commercial Company," to transact business with "Asia, Africa, America, and the Straits of Magellan," was chartered. In 1627 this project was discussed by the king with the estates; and he wrote the bishops in relation to it, because it touched the question of laboring for the conversion of the heathen. This enterprise was not wholly without results; although the contingency expressed in the charter, that it might "furnish means for the defence of the State," may have awakened apprehension in many of the partners, which finally found vent in complaints after losses had been experienced. This project led to the establishment of the colony called "New Sweden," at the mouth of the Delaware River, which was intended

to be accomplished in this reign, though the execution of it was postponed.[1] In 1628 the crown monopolized the salt-trade, and in 1631 the grain-trade. Not long after, the salt and grain commerce was thrown open, the government imposing high duties.

These extraordinary expedients for procuring financial resources for the crown show what a tremendous strain was put on Sweden to carry on the enterprises to which the government, by the force of events, had committed itself. These stringent measures were of a character to lead to all kinds of abuses and inequalities. All who possessed influence through property, however dishonorably acquired, became lenders, brokers, holders of land-fiefs, and managers of profitable enterprises, standing between the government and the heavily taxed people, much embarrassing the former, while shamefully wronging the latter. These forced means of raising revenues, while the list of exempted nobles was so numerous, attest the enormous injustice of the excessive privileges which had been conceded them to win their full loyalty and obedience. Much is authentically related of the ferocious Count Sten Lejonhufoud, who, the king declared, gave him more trouble than half of Finland; as well as of Joachim Berndes, notorious for his atrocities in the government of Wiborg. Berndes was one of the principal share-holders in the copper company, and the king needed his whole influence to maintain an undertaking important to the royal designs. Earnest and persistent efforts were made to extract the largest possible amount of available revenue from the mines. Necessity and hope united to exaggerate the profits to be drawn from this source. The belief in the great metallic riches of Sweden spread to other lands, and attracted enterprising foreigners with their capital into the kingdom. The king himself gave special attention to this subject, invited miners from abroad,

[1] The full permission to found the colony was not given by government until 1640. In 1642 John Printz was appointed the first governor.

opened new works, issued new ordinances for the mining districts, and visited them himself in the intervals of his campaigns. The mines were placed under a separate board of administration, whose members fully appreciated the care and efforts which the king had made to foster the metallic resources in the interest of the nation. This body, in a memorial to Christina after her father's death, remarked, that "Gustavus Adolphus, who not only excelled all the princes of his age in military science, but also had no equal in civil affairs, had perceived that the mines were not so improved as they might be, since the metals were exported in coarse assortments, while the German towns bought them at a low price, and worked them up in their own manufactories, to be resold to us at the highest price; so that, what was hard, the Swedish kings were formerly compelled to draw all their stores of ammunition from foreign countries. Therefore his Majesty had found it advisable to procure the erection of refineries, forges, and factories of all kinds. When the wars took up more of his time, his Majesty appointed a captain of the mines, with assistants. But when his Majesty had gone to Germany, he directed the Council of State to form a complete board of mines, who should superintend these affairs." The mine office was established in 1630, confirmed in 1634, and after 1640 was known as the College of Mines. The improvement of the mines stimulated much the commerce of the country, to which they furnished the chief article of exportation, besides aiding effectively to the product of the material for the munitions of war made in the Swedish founderies and workshops.

Notwithstanding the loans, the extraordinary expedients, the utmost resources which could be extracted from the mines, the profits of commercial companies and monopolies, the taxes imposed directly on the Swedish peasants were very heavy, their means of payment considered. To the long-established and usual taxes, of which the tax im-

posed on real estate was the principal, and which in 1620 produced 1,280,652 Swedish dollars, the Diet at one time added a tax on beasts of every kind, in ratio to the number of horses, cows, beeves, sheep, goats, and swine. The peasants of the crown and the treasury paid the whole of their impost, those of the nobility only half; the clergy and the burghers redeemed themselves from impost by a special contribution; the nobles were entirely exempted from it. In 1622 a much heavier impost was adopted by the Diet. This was the excise bearing on all merchandises or commodities useful to life. For the collection of this impost, the cities and market-towns were surrounded with palisades, and every thing which entered paid tribute to the royal treasury. The citizens no longer possessed the right to knead their bread, to kill their beasts, to brew their beer: there were slaughter-houses and city bakeries placed under the inspection of the fiscal agents of the crown. The brewers were obliged to pay a tax corresponding to the amount of their sales. The nobility was likewise exempt from this impost. The demands increased with the wars; and though in 1624 the tax had been doubled, a new impost was established on the grinding of grain, and this the nobility was obliged to support, like the rest of the population. This mill-tax amounted to one-ninth of the value of the grain ground, — a very onerous charge in a country where the unfortunate peasant was often under the necessity of mixing with his grain reindeer moss and the pulverized bark of trees. Grinding by hand-mill was forbidden, which brought about such resistance that the king deemed it expedient to yield. This royal concession reduced the tax to a small amount. But the necessary demands for the extended warlike enterprises of Gustavus finally went beyond the utmost financial resources of his subjects, and he was brought to the determination to support war by the results of war. In his German campaigns he did this to a degree which reduced the charges of his

own people, though in a manner much better regulated and restrained than was practised by the generals and armies of the emperor and his allies. For this policy he had some justification, as he and his Swedish soldiers were engaged in fighting for the German people oppressed by the imperial bigotry and despotism. The population of Sweden, and its limited resources compared with the figures of its receipts and expenses, show how severely the people were taxed. In 1630 the entire inhabitants of Sweden and Finland were estimated to number less than one million and a half; and according to good authority the budget of the Swedish expenses that year reached the sum of 13,072,000 rix-dollars, of which 9,535,000 were for war alone. In the following year the military expenses paid were reduced to 5,568,000 rix-dollars, and in 1632 to 2,220,000 rix-dollars. The receipts were less than the expenses, though the monopoly of grain and copper was still maintained. These are the figures of Droysen. Other authority makes the receipts and expenditures less during these specified years. It is doubtful if they are attainable with entire accuracy, though they are with approximate correctness.

These enormous burdens, endured through so many years, led to more or less complaints and sharp resistance, if not open revolt. The king complains that an unruly mob in Stockholm had attacked the toll-men, making mockery of the ordinance for toll and excise, wherefore such law-breakers are threatened to be punished with death. In West Gothland, where the peasants at a fair drove away the inspectors, and burned the toll-house, two of the ringleaders were condemned to death. A miller was beheaded on the market-place of Upsala because he had excited the peasants at the fair of Elfskarleby to refuse the toll, as not having been granted by the estates in the Diet. Other tumults arose because of the mill-tax, the rigors of which Gustavus relaxed by express orders from Germany,

to avoid evil results among the peasantry. But the aggregate resistance and disorder resulting from the excessive taxation and exactions of all kinds were much less than in the preceding reigns. The confidence cherished by the people in Gustavus Adolphus, the lofty and heroic spirit he breathed into his undertakings, and with which he had inspired so many of his subjects, the national as well as high religious motives with which his foreign campaigns were prosecuted, not only retained their loyal obedience, but caused them to make sacrifices to a remarkable degree, and enabled their king to play a *rôle* beyond their material and intrinsic forces.

But severe as was the long-continued strain on the productive and financial resources of Sweden, harder to bear was the enormous draught continually made on the blood and muscle of her population. These conscriptions became for the people well nigh appalling.

"We followed [says Oxenstierna] different systems in the time of Gustavus Adolphus. Often was a levy made of all the young men in mass. Under the two preceding reigns, all the inhabitants of cottages, and if there was more than one peasant found on a farm, all the others, were enrolled for military service. Sometimes the conscription was based on the extent of the family, and at other times on the farm."

To give a distinct idea of the course of conscription procedure under the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, we state the substance of the royal orders to the conscription commissioners after the abolishment of nearly all the exemptions. These orders were issued for the whole kingdom in 1627:—

"The peasants are to be convoked by districts; the summons being given from the pulpits by the pastors, with the exhortation for every man to attend,—household servants, officers and soldiers of the army, bailiffs, farmers of the crown revenues, clerks, boatmen, bailiffs' men, and servants of the tribunals. The pastors shall first, aided by a sufficient number of assistants in their respective parishes, make out a list of all the male inhabitants of fifteen years and upwards, for the correctness of which they are held responsible. The

justices and bailiffs of the districts shall see that this is faithfully done by the parish clergymen. On the day of the conscription the commissioners of the king shall first cause the warrants to be read, and demand whether all are present. A jury of twelve men shall be formed, the same who sit at the *ting*, or district court. With the assistance of this jury, the royal commissioners are to cause the assembled men to be divided into groups or lists of ten each. These are arranged, not according to the number of farms or landed estates, but by the count of heads. In conducting the conscription, care is to be exercised that he who is taken for military service from every group or list shall be fresh and sound, strong of limb, and, so far as it can be ascertained, courageous, in years from eighteen to thirty. It is provided, that, where there are servants in the group, they shall be taken before the peasants, yet so that the son of parents who already have one son in the service, or have lost one in battle, shall be spared if any other help may be found. The situation of the farms shall also be considered, so that he who possesses a large farm may have the preference of being spared in the selection made. The commissioners are to count in the list those absent, as well as those present; the latter being held responsible for the former. If any one has been kept concealed, the parish minister, his assistants in the enrolment, the jury of twelve, or whoever has been cognizant of the offence, is to be fined, and the person secreted to be held as a vagabond."

The presence of the jury gave to this rigorous conscription institution a kind of democratic complexion. The jury pronounced on the validity of the operations. All that was done in its absence was illegal. From the conscription no one was exempt, excepting the house and farm servants of the nobles, though not their retainers, with the needful attendants of the clergy, whether in town or country. In mine and saltpetre works, arms factories, and ship-wharfs, only superfluous hands were to be liable to conscription; and all new settlers on lands were to be spared as much as possible. Vagabonds were not to be counted on the conscription lists, but to be held without reserve or delay to serve in the army; but notorious criminals, murderers, homicides, and adulterers were not received. The conscription of sailors was to be made in

the towns, for which purpose lists were drawn up by the proper officials. In the country the lists made out by the parish pastors were to be examined, and then deposited in the archives of the district. This was a service repugnant to the clergymen. This repugnance was regarded as somewhat mitigated by the received opinion that it was their province to care for the weal of the flock. Count Jacob de la Gardie, one of the chief men during this reign, said in the State Council, years after this king's death, that "King Gustavus kept the clergy constantly in good humor; for they are, as it were, the tribunes of the people." The principal wars of Gustavus Adolphus were stamped more or less with religious motives. His Polish campaigns were largely against the Catholic designs of King Sigismund and his allies, and those in Germany avowedly in defence of Protestantism and the princes and peoples who had embraced it; and his heroic efforts in these regards interested deeply the Protestant clergy of his own country.

Light is thrown on the result of the conscription just described, by some remarks of Oxenstierna:—

"When King Gustavus Adolphus set about the great Prussian war, conscription was voted according to the number of heads, and the crown obtained at first, by one year's conscription over the whole kingdom, fifteen thousand; from that of the following year, twelve thousand; but afterwards, when every man had time to think of some evasion, not more than six or seven thousand. Conscription by the count of heads was the old custom; and the king vainly endeavored to persuade the people to allow it to be made by the number of farms, so that one soldier might be furnished by a certain number of peasants, by an arrangement among themselves."

Sometimes the severity of these conscriptions drove the peasants to resistance. Once in Dalecarlia they refused to allow the officers to hold the conscription, and proceeded to do so themselves. In this case the king did not manifest his displeasure, partly not to increase former disturbances in that province caused by the burthen of taxes, for

which the peasants accused the nobles, and partly because the Dalecarlians had punished deserters from the army who had returned to their homes. Perhaps, also, the king was not unmindful of the fact that it was among the Dalecarlian peasantry that the first Vasa king, fleeing from his enemies in his youth, found an asylum, and that they were the first who flocked to his standard of revolt against the Danish rule, and bravely aided him to drive the tyrant Christian from Sweden. A more serious revolt broke out in 1624 on the frontiers of Bleking. It was soon suppressed by the punishment of the instigators. A number of the revolted peasants, with their wives and children, were banished to Ingermanland, which was then a kind of Swedish Siberia. The remainder promised to be tranquil, and the king ordered that the prosecutions against them should cease. Similar means were employed in 1627 to put down an insurrection in the parish of Orsa, in Dalecarlia, headed by a tailor. The leaders were executed, four were banished to Ingermanland, and the remainder pardoned; the king at the same time issuing a letter forbidding that persons should reproach the Dalecarlians because of the offence of those who had instigated the troubles. These conscriptions were all to fill the ranks of the infantry, from which the nobility was exempt. Every noble was held for the cavalry service; in the pay of the crown if he was indigent, or furnishing his own horse if he was able to do so. As Gustavus Adolphus advanced in military renown, and extended the influence of his arms, foreign recruits flocked to his standard to fill up his ranks; otherwise his own country would have become exhausted by the great and continuous depletion of its most vigorous men, and he could not have successfully prosecuted the undertakings of his later years. His bold and heroic championship of Protestantism was a stimulating motive with some of these foreign volunteers, and the desire of serving under a capable and victorious commander was a stronger motive

with others. Both of these stimulating considerations were plainly operative with the men who composed the English and Scotch regiments in his service, and were not less potential with the thousands of various Continental nationalities who swelled his ranks in his German campaigns.

In important resolutions, and measures as to finances, imposts, and conscriptions, Gustavus Adolphus not only consulted with the Council of State, but required the views and action of the Diet. As he advanced in years and influence, and was more absent on foreign campaigns, he seems necessarily to have done this to a less degree. He consulted the estates on that essential to be done, but said not much to them of his manner of executing what had been resolved. In 1617 the estates were convoked at Örebro and at Stockholm, and they consented to the war with Poland and the requisite expenses. His plans he confidentially communicated to certain senators. In 1620 deputies of the nobility of each province, the bishops, and some deputies of the cities, assembled at Stockholm, to deliberate with the members of the State Council and the governors of provinces on the subject of the differences with Denmark. It was that committee, or assemblage, which voted the impost on horses and horned cattle. That contribution was established in proportion to the fortune of the contributor. In 1621 the Diet of the estates was convoked, and again voted the military appropriations. At the Diet of 1622 was established a customs and excise tax: the tax on beasts was maintained, but the king yielded half of the latter for the repair of the castles. In 1624 the Diet voted to double the beast-tax for two years. It was at the Diet of 1625 that the mill-tax was voted, for the maintenance of a permanent army. In 1627 two sessions of the Diet were held. At the first was renewed the tax on beasts, and at the second the mill-tax was changed into a capitation impost. At the same time, according to

the wish of the king, was formed a Secret Committee, composed of members of all the estates. This committee represented the Diet, and would give its advice on the religious war in Germany. The report of this committee, dated June 28, 1629, was approved that year by the assembled estates. That was the last assemblage of the estates during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus. In 1630, 1631, and 1632, there were committees formed of nobles, priests, deputies of the army, and of the merchants. The king consulted the nobility to know if his subjects had rather pay contributions than to furnish a contingent for the army. The nobles responded, that the proposition related to the peasant sespecially; and, as these were not represented on the committee, they believed it was more proper that his Majesty should send commissioners into each province to treat with them. The letters of Gustavus Adolphus to the people are dated from the fleet on which he had embarked for Germany. At the commencement of 1631 the Senate informed him that neither the subsidy of conscription which he had demanded nor that of beasts could be raised, because of the bad harvest. The king, being then in embarrassment, suppressed these two contributions. He wrote: "We prefer to deprive ourselves of these succours than to give occasion to complaints, and to enrich hard and avaricious provosts at the expense of the poor people, paying us and the army with poor words." In the election of deputies to the Diet some royal pressure seems to have been exerted, though not all the influence in this regard was used which the governments after him allowed.

The reign of Gustavus Adolphus was not less marked in industry than in legislation, in administration, and in improved provisions for the education of youth. At that period the Swedes, as they are to-day, were a hardy and industrious people; producing among themselves nearly every thing for their clothing, food, and arms, and bringing

little from abroad. Their attention was turned largely towards war, from which resulted such continuous excitement and uncertainty, unfavorable to arts and industry. In 1624 the Swedish infantry, none of whom were from the nobility, amounted to nearly forty thousand men. The soldiers were required to procure good clothes, such as were suited to their occupation, which pertained rather to the quality than the form. In the war with Poland the officers and courtiers of Sigismund considered the Swedish peasant soldiers as little formidable because of their bad clothing. The sequel was to show what this estimate was worth. The garments of these soldiers, and their arms, were chiefly productions of the Swedish peasants. At that epoch they devoted themselves much to the making of arms, specimens of which, now to be seen in the national museums of the country, furnish good illustrations of their skill and success. Muskets, which were so difficult to obtain in the foreign armies, were made in the country districts of the provinces by the cannon founders. The concession of new privileges, and the foundation of seventeen cities, during this reign filled with wars, prove the solicitude of which their industry was the object. The roads were widened and cleared. The first canal of the country was completed during this reign, which had been commenced by Charles IX. Oxenstierna, in a memorial dated at Frankfort-on-the-Main, Oct. 1, 1633, showed the advantages of uniting the chief lakes by means of canals, — undertakings which in subsequent times proved greatly advantageous to the internal communication and commercial development of the country.

It was not until this time that Sweden had known what was termed the authority of high functionaries. Formerly the struggle had been between the power of the chief nobles and the good pleasure of the king, and in that conflict the first represented the forms of legality during the Middle Age. The old state of things, whether regarded as

order or a kind of legalized anarchy, was but an oligarchy formed by the proprietors of fiefs. In reality, most of the legal claims of feudalism in Europe in those days, as in other times, were, at the bottom, but the boldest usurpations. The rude notion of a public functionary had begun to disappear. Charles IX., with his direct and vigorous way of administration, dealt strong blows against the old oligarchical forms. There had been around the king what has been termed the government of the secretaries, in the provinces the rule of the provosts. The fears and suspicions inspired by the Senate and governors of the provinces had caused the places to be confided to persons, who, according to the views of the aristocracy, were of low extraction, particularly dependants of the kings, which caused numerous reclamations. That had been a necessity of the royal situation. Thus had governed the first kings of the Vasa family. Charles was bold and resolute enough to break the old power of the governors, — "these kings of their provinces," as he called them. It was after this vigorous policy had been practised by his father that Gustavus Adolphus dared to surround his throne with high legal authorities. The long and severe trial through which the country was passing demanded strong and firm hands to hold the reins of state. There was soon made apparent more unity in the centre of action, a better understood division of labor in administration so far as the immense preponderance of the military system permitted it, for the activity imprinted on that branch of the government drew every thing in its course. Oxenstierna, logical to his idea of administering the chief functions of the government through the aristocracy as an agency subordinate to the crown, developed afterwards, in the Constitution of 1634, a full hierarchy of functionaries, which weakened the ancient political rights of the people. Five chief royal officials, at the head of an equal number of branches of administration, with the aid of royal councillors, and cer-

tain boards or colleges placed in legal relations with the provincial governments, — all this belonged to the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, and in his time received in a large degree its application. The Senate regained an influence which the king knew how to limit. The creation of the College of War gave to that branch of the administration a new and more uniform direction. Instructions for this college bear the date of 1630; but in substance it was in operation at an earlier day, and was called the King's Council of War. The College of Admiralty was organized in 1619. Oxenstierna organized the chancellry, was placed at its head, and became the chief functionary of what might be termed the Swedish cabinet, and in reality its directing and animating soul.

Another important step taken was the change made in the machinery and methods of judicial administration. During many years the necessity of a supreme tribunal had been realized. One of the Vasa kings had made an attempt to establish a royal jury, which did not survive him. The nobility afterwards imputed to him this jury experiment as a crime. The creation of a superior court was the work of Gustavus Adolphus. In 1614 it was determined by the Diet that the king, not being able personally to take cognizance of all disputes, there should be created at Stockholm a superior court, composed of fourteen members, of whom four should be learned jurisconsults, the other ten to be made up of senators, nobles, and high officials. This new tribunal, called also parliament, was solemnly installed at the royal palace in Stockholm, May, 1614. The penalties imposed for crime, and the forms and rules of criminal and judicial proceedings, in vogue or created at this epoch, are stamped with much severity, and would not bear comparison with modern standards and examples. The love of justice was formulated often in the language of the sultan. It appears from a protocol of the superior court, of the date of November,

1614, that it must not pronounce in the interest of parties, but follow strict justice; that, if any judge pronounced a sentence dictated by the intention of pleasing the king, his Majesty should so treat him that no one would be tempted to imitate him, — that is, he should be skinned, his skin should be hung at the door of the tribunal, and his ears be nailed to a post. But, in spite of the changes he had made, the king ceased not to conserve a great influence over the administration of justice; and the peasants could not give up the custom of addressing themselves directly to their sovereign, who often pronounced according to his first inspiration, or decided that the affairs should be examined, or gave counsels, exhortations, and menaces. He who feared some act of violence received a letter of protection. Notorious homicides the king punishes with death, and in less serious cases pardon is granted if the prosecutor does not insist on the life of the accused. Adultery, he declares, is to be judged according to the law of God; but mitigation and pardon lie with the crown, or, in his absence, with the royal court. Soldiers who abandoned their wives, and consorted with loose women, the king condemns to death. Sometimes examination by torture was ordered by the royal court. In doubtful cases of assassination, the king enjoined that the accused shall be exhorted by the clergy, and then threatened with torture, though not actually made to suffer it. Enforced labor is mentioned as a punishment, — carrying the lime-hod, as it was termed, or work at the galleys. To four thieves of the mines the king granted life, but to be sent to Livonia to the nobility, "to be their serfs and chattels." The superior or royal court established the usage of presenting by writing the accusation and defence. It sought also to revise the old custom, which rendered the administration of justice independent of advocates. Oxenstierna said that it was necessary to suppress the attorneys, "because they corrupted justice." The wars, which compelled so much

the absence of Gustavus Adolphus from the country, not unfrequently interrupted the watchful attention which he gave to the administration of justice. The Senate became, in fact, the supreme court, as it had been before the installation of the superior court. The limited number of prosecutions and trials which then took place in Sweden before the courts, speaks strongly as to the state of morals of the people at that period. The condition of the Swedish population at the king's death does not seem to have been such as might well be imagined after so many years of war. Though the full force of it may need some qualification, the following testimony is valuable as well as interesting: d'Ogier, who made a visit to Sweden in the winter of 1634, in company with the ambassador of France, Count d'Avaux, says in his journal that he did not remember to have seen in the whole country any one naked or in rags. Peasant lads and lasses sprang gladsomely about the sledges; and, though he had free portage, the country people were prompt in forwarding him on his way, "probably," he remarks, "because in other respects they are not heavily taxed." He saw the people assembled at a church in Dalecarlia, and exclaims, "These country-folk are neither ragged nor hungry, as with us!"

CHAPTER VI.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. — THE STORY OF EBBA BRAHE.

THE courtships and marriage-plans of kings and princes may not be the most profitable of historical studies, and at the present time they have less general interest than in former centuries. Those of Gustavus Adolphus cannot be expected to enlist the same attention among persons of foreign nationalities as they awaken among the people by whom his name and renown are cherished as their special treasure. His early attachments, and original resolutions as to the relation which should ever be held equally sacred in all ranks and stations of life, have for two centuries and a half possessed a charm among Swedes equal to the pages of romance; and a history of his life for the perusal of others without some account of them would be incomplete. As long as the Swedish nation exists, and its memorials are read by its people, the name of Ebba Brahe will not be forgotten. Her father, Magnus Brahe, was a high official of the royal government, and his wife was a marriage relative of the first Vasa king. Their only child was Ebba, celebrated for her beauty, her amiable character, and the association of her name with the great Adolphus. Her mother was the intimate friend of Christine, the mother of Gustavus. When Madam Brahe, by mortal illness, knew that her last hour was near, she asked of the queen dowager, as the last favor to her dying friend, that she would take the place of mother to her cherished daugh-

ter. Queen Christine granted this solemn request, and soon took Ebba under her special care and protection. The orphan child, by her pleasing manners, the propriety of her conduct, and her remarkable beauty, soon became a favorite of the queen and of all persons of the court. Her attractive qualities, and the estimation with which her advantages of birth were held, rendered her an object of rivalry among the Swedish nobles. The intimacy which had existed between Christine and Madam Brahe had resulted in often bringing together Gustavus and Ebba in their infancy, and they cherished towards each other the warm friendship of childhood. As they grew older they saw each other less, the time of the young prince being chiefly taken up by his studies, voyages, and by the government affairs which so early came under his attention; but after Ebba had lost her mother, she and Gustavus saw each other more frequently. When he was eighteen years of age, and she fifteen, a silent admiration and increasing devotion were not long in developing into a mutual and ardent attachment. It was in 1612, when he had been nearly a year on the throne, that the young king made known his love for Ebba Brahe, and learned that it was reciprocated. This state of facts between the two young persons specially concerned could not long escape the attention of the court and the penetrating eyes of the queen mother, who had already shown her fixed resolution to be an important factor in arranging the marital relations of her son, and that he should not make a wife of one of his subjects. As soon as Christine saw the necessity of action, she determined to employ her utmost efforts to prevent Gustavus marrying the young lady whom he had made the object of his choice. She made her son plainly understand that he must not expect her consent to the match, and endeavored as much as possible to prevent Gustavus and Ebba seeing each other; expecting time, pleasures, and occupation would distract the attention of her son,

cool his attachment, and divert his partiality in some other direction. With her cold and severe character, and her rigid notions of dynastic ambitions and interests, she cared little for the plighted faith of the two lovers. But the obstacles which she had so promptly placed between them did not have the expected result, but only increased the devotion of the young king for Ebba Brahe, the assurance of which he made known to her by written communications of the usual character in such contingencies. Through his own sister he learned accurately all that was said on the subject at court, and whatever was done to baffle his hopes. Whenever has a devoted sister been otherwise than faithful to a brother in such circumstances? The father of Ebba was still living, and Gustavus now formally solicited of Count Brahe the hand of his daughter. Ebba, exposed to the banter and raillery of the courtiers and to the manifest displeasure of the queen mother, wrote repeatedly to Gustavus, praying him to renounce the proposed union, releasing him from all obligation. To this he would not assent, but responded with the most earnest supplications never to make him hear or read words which invited him to forget her; expressing the ardent hope that their mutual constancy would finally cause the queen mother to yield. Underneath these emphatic communications the names of Gustavus Adolphus and Ebba Brahe were interlaced. Seeing she could gain nothing by the openly hostile course she had taken, with the cool self-command and diplomatic skill which she possessed the queen mother changed her attitude, and treated Ebba with kindly consideration. Gustavus took hope, and sought, by influential mediation, to obtain the consent of his mother to the proposed union with the young lady. To this she made an evasive reply, saying she preferred the king would not marry the daughter of one of his subjects; but, if that event was to occur, no person better deserved such an elevation than Ebba Brahe, who justly merited general esteem.

When she made this apparently sincere statement to her son's mediator, she never was more resolved to thwart his cherished hopes. She said she desired a delay of several years to prove the solidity of the affection of Gustavus and Ebba. Time was to show who would prevail, — the cold, diplomatic queen mother, or the royal son. The latter no more doubted a successful issue, and in his letters he painted with roseate colors the auspicious day when his Ebba should be his wedded queen. Count Brahe and the daughter for a while thought the obstacles removed and the marriage would be consummated. But opposition, instead of growing weaker by time, was gaining strength. The queen mother held firmly to her resolution, and she had now secured an influential ally to aid in its success. Oxenstierna, eleven years the senior of Gustavus, stately, impressive, adroit, whose friendship and counsel had already acquired great influence over the young king, strongly urged reasons of state against the proposed match; and in this advice he was supported warmly by the chief nobles and the prevailing court influences. These adverse efforts all remained for a while useless. Gustavus wished not, in so important a matter, to act in opposition to the positive will of his mother; but at the same time he declared firmly that he would await the expiration of the delay which had been requested, and in the event he became not the husband of Ebba Brahe, he would never marry. The dowager queen again assumed an unfriendly attitude towards the young lady in question. The young king remained respectful to his mother, but at once took measures to remove Ebba from the court; and she went to reside with the aged royal widow, Catharine Stenbock, now living in retirement, whom, when she was quite young, the first Vasa king had married a few years before his death in 1560.

Gustavus still kept up his correspondence with the lady of his choice; and on his Russian campaign, after his suc-

cessful assault on the fortress of Augdow, in September, 1614, he wrote her, "Especially do I thank divine Omnipotence, who hath granted me this honor, that I in your favor have overcome my foes." But the proud and coldly selfish queen dowager had not miscalculated. Time and absence seem insensibly to have operated some change in the views and feelings of the young king. Or was he influenced only by his mother and the potential counsel of Oxenstierna to sacrifice the inclinations of his heart to state interests and dynastic policy? Tradition and historic evidence tend to prove that it was a great struggle for him to yield his resolution to marry Ebba Brahe. He would not for the time hear any other union spoken of, and declared he would never take a princess for a queen. The young lady observed the change on the part of Gustavus; but, silent in grief, she did not complain, and repulsed every other plan of marriage. And now comes a passage in the life of the young king which left a stain on his memory, but against which his subsequent conduct in that respect was an emphatic protest, and proof of sincere repentance. He was, while absent from the country on a military campaign, drawn into a temporary illicit intimacy with the handsome daughter of a wealthy Dutch merchant who had become a resident in Gothenburg. Her name was Marguerite Cabeliau. For some unexplained reason she accompanied her father, in 1615, to the Swedish army in Livonia, where Gustavus was in command. A son was born to the young king, of whom Marguerite was the mother; and this child was called Gustaf Gustafson, and afterwards known as Count Wasaborg. The queen dowager, still fearing that Gustavus would renew his addresses to Ebba Brahe, at once seized with dexterity this immoral episode in the life of her royal son, and represented to Ebba Brahe how little she could depend on the assurances of a king so young and so light. The friends of Ebba, as well as her own reason and pride, reached the same con-

clusion. A year after, on the conclusion of peace with Russia, Jacob de la Gardie, then the most distinguished of the Swedish generals, returned to his country covered with the laurels he had won in his campaigns against the Czar. The entire kingdom resounded with his praise, and Gustavus hastened to reward his distinguished services by giving him the highest dignity at the royal command. La Gardie had occasion to make a visit to the residence of the aged queen of Gustavus Vasa, and there saw Ebba Brahe. Her beauty and noble deportment captivated him, and he soon offered her his hand. The two queen widows and all the court supported this marriage proposal, and especially all those courtiers who were so desirous that the king should seek a foreign princess for a queen. Ebba did not ignore the high qualities and the attractive exterior of the brilliant and successful general. His age was then thirty years and she was twenty-one. Their marriage took place in 1618, and proved to be a union mutually happy. Always maintaining the confidence and respect of her husband, she accompanied him on his campaigns, caring for his health and wants and for those of the soldiers. They were favored with a numerous family of children, and always had a high place in the regard of their Swedish contemporaries. The portrait of her which hangs in Gripsholm Castle justifies the high estimation in which her beauty and amiable qualities were held while living; and among the numerous portraits of celebrities suspended on its ancient walls, none is sought out by the visiting crowds with more avidity than that of Ebba Brahe.

The queen mother and the State councillors, now that their management and the concurrence of events had terminated the long earnestly cherished marriage-plan of the young king, applied themselves actively in formulating new schemes to induce him to select a wife among foreign princesses. Various propositions had been discussed and

commended to his consideration, which he then emphatically refused to consider, while he still cherished his resolution to adhere to his first love by taking a Swedish subject for his royal companion. In 1615 the question had been raised of his marriage with Marie Eleonore, daughter of the elector of Brandenburg, then sixteen years of age, possessing remarkable beauty. The Brandenburg court, having then an issue with Poland, sought to gain strength by an alliance with Sweden. Birkholt, the Swedish envoy, became interested in the project, and was the medium of the most flattering representations as to the attractiveness, intelligence, and commendable qualities of this German princess. Her black hair, large, dark-blue eyes, high forehead, arched eyebrows, finely chiselled nose, fine figure, lively spirit, and affability of manners, had rendered her celebrated even in foreign courts; all of which, as a courtier and a political agent, Birkholt glowingly transmitted to his young sovereign. But Gustavus was not then in a condition of mind to listen to such representations; and the Swedish envoy was ordered to concern himself with State affairs, and not with marriage alliances. In the mean while the Brandenburg elector, having adjusted his differences with his territorial neighbor, appeared to be less concerned that his daughter should become the Swedish queen. But while the father had been coolly settling his dispute with Poland on business principles, the young princess had been thinking, and indulging in sentiments of her own. The court talk about the proposed alliance with Sweden, and the increasing renown of its king, had come to the ears of Marie Eleonore, not without leaving its impression on her inclinations; and the elector had often indulged in badinage with her as to the future queen of the rising hero. After the marriage of Jacob de la Gardie with Ebba Brahe was an accomplished fact, the young king resolved to see with his own eyes the Brandenburg princess, whom his envoy Birkholt and others

had described with such roseate hues. This visit to Germany was made in great secrecy: Oxenstierna and a few intimate associates only, had information of it. He sailed from Calmar in August, 1618; it being generally believed by his subjects that he went for a pleasure-trip on the Baltic, and to make trial of a newly completed naval vessel, to be absent for a few days only. Before his return he had been able to go to Berlin, and to see the daughter of the elector without making himself known. What he had seen and heard in his brief visit had made so favorable an impression, that not long after his return to Stockholm he occupied himself in corresponding on matrimonial affairs with the same Swedish envoy at the Brandenburg court whom he had formerly directed to confine himself to affairs of State. Various difficulties arose at Berlin in arranging the match. The elector was a Calvinist; Gustavus was a Lutheran; while Anne, the wife of the elector, was likewise of the Lutheran faith. The elector and his party were reluctant to have Marie Eleonore become the wife of a Lutheran prince. The mother of the young princess thought differently. She was an energetic and resolute woman, and had brought up her daughter in the faith which she herself professed. Very soon the poor health of the elector precluded him from longer occupying himself with affairs, and the electress succeeded in her marriage-plans for her daughter. New obstacles now arose to the proposed union of the Swedish king with the German princess. The father of Marie Eleonore died, and his son George William became his successor. The new elector, like his father, was a Calvinist, and had repugnance to his sister marrying a Lutheran king; and in this he was strengthened by the views of foreign courts. The Catholic princes did not wish to see Sweden and Brandenburg made more powerful by an alliance; and Sigismund of Poland, as a claimant of the Swedish crown, was especially averse to his rival

Gustavus allying himself to his Brandenburg neighbor, and solicited the hand of Marie Eleonore for his son. But electress Anne, with her mind fully made up, with the persistent resolution which a woman of energy in such affairs knows how to make prevail, firmly adhered to her plan of marrying her daughter to Gustavus.

But the opposing obstacles had served to prolong the affair; and the Swedish king resolved to go himself in person to Berlin, accompanied by a small suite, the councillors of the two courts solely being advised of the visit. In the springtime of 1620, at evening, after taking quarters, he privately notified the electress mother of his arrival. She requested him to come on the following day, the sabbath, to the church of the palace. At the regular hour of morning service the young king came promptly to the place indicated, and there found the entire electoral court assembled, who had received no instruction as to who might be that tall, noble, and majestic-looking stranger who then appeared in their midst. The curiosity increased, when, at the close of the religious worship, the electress invited him into the interior departments, without admitting any other person. Marie Eleonore saw him then for the first time, with profound admiration, as the hero of her dreams; and Gustavus was even more impressed with the beauty of the young princess than when he saw her furtively on his previous concealed visit. He was then twenty-six and she twenty-one. The betrothment was at once completed. The object of his visit at the court of Brandenburg having been accomplished, Gustavus made a journey incognito to other parts of Germany, passing himself for a Swedish captain named Gars. For the first time he saw the Rhine, with all its attractions and natural resources, which made on him a deep impression. He visited German relatives, and saw much of the cities, the fertile districts, and the people, with which and whom his future career was to be so much identified.

He was not pleased that church prelates monopolized so largely the lands of that region, so richly favored by nature, and made so smiling and productive by the hand of industry and the sweat of patient toil. He soon concluded his foreign journey, and returned to his kingdom to make the necessary preparations for the reception of his royal bride. Eight of the largest ships of the Swedish navy were fitted out, and placed under the command of the chief admiral, Charles Carlson Gyllenhielm, a natural son of Charles IX., and half-brother of Gustavus Adolphus, to go and bring Eleonore to Sweden. A numerous and brilliant deputation, at the head of which was Chancellor Oxenstierna, accompanied the fleet to receive the princess. New vexations having been caused by the Brandenburg elector, Oxenstierna was instructed by the king not to be too exacting on the terms of the marriage-contract, and to hasten the departure of the princess. The chancellor did his work with his usual practical sense and success. The mother of Marie Eleonore did not require the contract to be signed, but, confiding in the sincere faith of Gustavus, wished to defer that matter until her arrival in Sweden. To baffle all the obstacles freshly raised at the electoral court by the opposing party to the union, electress Anne resolved herself to conduct her daughter as promptly as possible to the Swedish king. She arrived with the young princess at the port where lay the Swedish fleet, and, accompanied by several near relatives, went on board the ships prepared to receive them, which soon sailed for Calmar. In the mean time Gustavus had gone to Calmar to direct the preparations to receive his proposed bride. In that old Swedish city, there had just broken out a fatal and contagious sickness. The king sought to make all traces of the dangerous disease disappear by removing the sick from the city, and burning their houses. It was early in October that the Swedish fleet was seen coming into the harbor. Several of the most distinguished of the

Swedish senators went on board to meet the princess, and Gustavus stood on shore to receive her. Many days were passed in balls and festivities at the Castle of Calmar; and then the *cortége* moved slowly northward, the king preceding it with haste to Stockholm, deeming his presence there necessary to have every thing in readiness. He came anew to meet his betrothed at Vesterås, then returned to Stockholm, where he received her on the day of her formal entrance in the national capital, Nov. 25, 1620, on which day the marriage was celebrated. The coronation took place three days later. Both ceremonies were celebrated with great splendor and expense. One merchant had a bill of supplies furnished for the festivities, among the items of which were one hundred and seventy-seven hogsheads of Rhine wine, one hundred and seventy hogsheads of French wine, fifteen pipes of Spanish wine, and five hundred and twenty-eight casks of German beer. Sweden now had a beautiful German princess for its queen; the mother of the young king had triumphed in her long cherished purpose against the choice of Ebbe Brahe; the advice of the astute chancellor had been followed; and the courtiers had seen their wishes prevail. But time was to show who had been the more fortunate in their marital arrangements, — Gustavus Adolphus, or his subject, Jacob de la Gardie; whether state policy, or the language of the human heart, is the better guide in forming the sacred union between two souls for life, whatever be their political or social sphere.

CHAPTER VII.

THE WAR WITH POLAND.

AFTER prolonged negotiations, Sweden had secured peace with Russia by the treaty signed at Stolbova, Feb. 27, 1617, terminating a war of ten years, by which Gustavus had increased his prestige, and his kingdom had gained important advantages and favorable stipulations for the future. The next important work in hand was to deal with Poland. It was imperatively necessary to the peace and welfare of Sweden, as well as to the larger designs cherished for the future, that the war with that country should be brought to an end. At the death of Charles IX. an armistice had been signed, which was to continue until July, 1612. This was thrice extended, the last time to January, 1616. The latter date had not been reached when the Polish partisans began to intrigue actively in Sweden, and those Swedes who still adhered to the religion and the dynastic rights of Sigismund could not be otherwise than secretly or openly stirred. Sigismund was not only supported by the power of Poland and by his strong show of legal title to the Swedish crown, but there were strong influences on his side in European high political and religious quarters. He was united to the house of Hapsburg by the bonds of relationship, as well as of theology. Philip III. of Spain, and he who afterwards became Ferdinand II. of Austria, were his brothers-in-law. Sigismund sent to Spain a renegade Swede, to secure support to his cause from that powerful monarchy. As showing the state of governmental morality and the uses of diplo-

macy in those times, there is the well-authenticated fact, that this agent of the Polish king was able to engage the Spanish government to agree to declare legitimate prize all Swedish vessels entering the ports of Spain. The Jesuits were then active intriguers, and often employed by ambitious monarchs and leaders as intermediary agents for the accomplishment of their designs, especially where it was at all obvious that the interests of the Roman Church were involved. There is historic evidence that such agents were made use of to serve the cause of Sigismund by seeking to bring about a formidable combination against Gustavus as the rising champion of an heretical religion, and the illegal sovereign of Sweden. Denmark was to be excited to declare war, because its king had reason to fear that the growing power of Gustavus would render him a dangerously aggressive neighbor; and Spain was stimulated to assist in establishing Sigismund on the throne occupied by Gustavus, because the former was a Catholic and the latter a heretic, and because Sweden, ruled by Gustavus and Oxenstierna, was an ally of Holland, against whose independence it had waged so many years of relentless war, and whose rising power Spain regarded as dangerous to the Netherland provinces remaining under its domination. The Swedes thought they had reasons to believe that the king of Spain cherished the intention of commencing conquests in the North by gaining possession of the Sound. He would hope to maintain it if Sigismund succeeded in gaining possession of the Swedish throne. In the light of the facts and well-grounded suspicions as they presented themselves to Gustavus and his advisers, the armistices with Poland were little likely to result in permanent peace. Sigismund still distinctly avowed his right to the Swedish crown; and it was not forgotten that in 1587, thirty years before, at the time of the election of Sigismund to the crown of Poland, Pope Sixtus V. had expressed the wish that this king would ex-

tirpate heresy in Poland and also in Sweden. This was an age when Protestant nations, statesmen, and kings knew but too well that such an expression of desire by the Roman autocrat was no mere sentiment of a day, but a settled purpose and policy, which years nor events would change. One party in Russia had recently made choice of the son of Sigismund as Czar, and this had caused the Polish king to have some desire to formulate pretensions to that empire. He protested against the terms of peace which Russia had just made with Sweden, as too favorable to the latter. Sigismund came then to the resolution to make war for the possession of Sweden. He was promised enrolment of troops in Germany, the Spaniards had engaged to arm a fleet in his support, and the estates of Poland were to furnish their quota. The Hanseatic cities were expected to abstain from all relations with Sweden, for the agents and priestly partisans of Sigismund said that God would send very soon the legitimate king on the road to his kingdom. The Polish king sent ambassadors to the king of Denmark, promising to yield to him the citadel of Elfsborg, that gateway of Sweden on the west, for which she had paid so expensively in the last arrangement of the terms of peace with her neighbor on the south. Spain proposed to the king of Denmark a defensive alliance against Holland and an offensive engagement against Sweden. Efforts were made to stir up revolt against Gustavus in his own kingdom. The Swedish king, then twenty-three years of age, saw the time had come to take decided steps in regard to Poland, and its sovereign who aspired to his throne. In the same Diet in which he made known to his country the advantageous conditions of peace with Russia, he gave information of his declaration of war against Poland. During the year 1617 hostilities were prosecuted on both sides with much vigor, and loss of life. Towns and strong positions were taken, and invasions and sudden attacks were made on

both sides; the advantages being generally with the Swedes, though not decisive. During the winter of 1618 the Poles invaded Livonia and Esthonia, carrying pillage and fire in their march, and then retiring. The Swedish general urged Gustavus to retaliate by making a similar invasion and devastation of the Polish territory, which the young king refused. Instead of following the example of his enemies by pillaging and burning innocent provinces, he would, while marching across the enemy's country, treat the inhabitants as though they belonged to his own kingdom. But when he had the opportunity he attacked fortresses. "We wish not," he said, "to war against the peasant, whom we had rather protect than ruin." Thus early in his career he recognized the more advanced and elevated principles of warfare, strongly in contrast to the example of most of the distinguished commanders of his time; and this he was more signally to illustrate in his great German campaigns as compared with the chief generals of his foes.

A new armistice was negotiated on the earnest demands of the population of the section principally suffering from the ravages of the war. The new agreement for the suspension of hostilities, in which the Swedes were to retain what they had in possession, was concluded for two years from Oct. 1, 1618, with the pledge of the two sides to signify the rupture three months in advance. Poland would not sanction the truce. Gustavus announced the rupture at the expiration of the specified delay; expressing the desire that peace might be maintained, and giving his plenipotentiaries the order to treat. He was willing to leave the frontiers substantially as they were in 1600. If they could not agree on terms of permanent peace, he was ready to sign an armistice for ten years, and allow Sigismund to bear the title of king of Sweden on condition that the bearing of title should not carry with it any right to the crown. That was in an age when sovereigns placed

a value on wearing a kingly title to countries and kingdoms which they knew they could not possess, and this royal vanity has hardly yet become obsolete. The Poles gave an answer which Gustavus considered could lead to no practical result in the sense of substantial peace. It was then that he notified Poland that he was forced to continue the war. The objective point against which his efforts were now directed was Riga. That city, on the river Duna, a short distance from its entrance into a large bay which is an adjunct of the Baltic, was comparatively near Finland, accessible to Sweden, and important to Swedish interests as Sweden was then constituted.

In July, 1621, Gustavus Adolphus assembled his fleet and army to move against Riga, which, several years before, the Swedish generals had failed to take, after having been partly successful in the first attack. The fleet was detained some time by adverse winds. In the interval of forced delay Gustavus published his military code. It was written by his own hand. He therein says that the king is the representative of God on earth, and is the supreme judge in time of peace and of war. The spirit and terms of this military document are severe, its specifications and requirements tersely drawn, and, if faithfully enforced on his officers and soldiers, could not fail to secure rigid discipline and order. In some respects it was an advance on the military customs of those times. The troops were to be under the jurisdiction of special courts, superior and inferior. The lower were the regimental court for the infantry, and the cavalry court for the trial of those belonging to that branch of the service. In the regimental court, the colonel, or in his stead the lieutenant-colonel, presided. There were twelve assistant justices, chosen by the whole regiment from among the officers. In the superior court the high marshal presided, or, in his absence, the field-marshal. The superior court likewise had its twelve assistant justices. In the superior court the pro

vost-general was prosecutor; and he had power to arrest and imprison whom he held to be an offender, but not to execute him without the receipt of special orders. Whoever resisted him or his officer, forfeited his life. In the inferior court the regimental provost was prosecutor, and had the same power in his regiment, and the battalion provosts in their battalions, as the provost-general in the camps. The superior court had authority to try all treasonable and other heinous offences, and all civil causes which came by appeal from the inferior court. In criminal cases there was no appeal; but the sentence was to be referred to the marshal, or to the king when present. In whatever touched life, limb, or honor, the court was to be held within a circle of troops under the open sky, but in civil cases within a tent. The penalties are various. The severest, and that which but too well illustrates the spirit of the times, and what the terrible necessities were supposed to justify, even in an improved military code, was the penalty of hanging, which every tenth man by lot must suffer if a squadron of cavalry, or regiment of infantry, took flight during an engagement before they were disabled from using their swords. Riding on the wooden horse, imprisonment in fetters, bread and water, deprivation and degradation for officers, ignominious ejection from the camp for privates, were other punishments. The beating of private soldiers by cane or club was not allowed. Only for grave offences of insubordination they received blows with the flat sabre. Prostitutes were not to be received in the camp, as they were then by the German armies to an extensive degree. Clergymen were to perform divine service each sabbath, and to preach once in the week if the opportunity was presented. Prayers were to be had morning and evening of each day. The military code was read to the regiments once a month. The first time, it was read by the chancellor of the kingdom, Axel Oxenstierna, in the camp composed of nine regiments of infantry and ten

regiments of cavalry, — in all, twenty thousand men, formed in battle-array in the plain. All the royal family were present.

The fleet numbered one hundred and forty-eight vessels and ten yachts. It was dispersed by a violent storm before arriving at the mouth of the Duna. The vessel on which the king voyaged arrived at another point on the coast; and then he went by land to Riga, the appointed rendezvous of the fleet. On the 5th of August the Swedish admiral, Gyllenhielm, without obstacles, entered the Duna, while the inhabitants of Riga set fire to those parts of the town not within the walls. Gustavus formed his camp on a sandy elevation to the east of Riga, and divided his army into four corps. The first camp was commanded by the king, and his brother Duke Charles Philip, who had under their orders Philip Mansfeld and Gustavus Horn. The second camp to the right was commanded by Jacob de la Gardie, who had brought by land troops from Finland. To the left was the third camp, under field-marshal Wrangel, a grade which then corresponded to lieutenant-general. The fourth camp had at its head Col. Seaton, a Scotchman; and this force was nearest to the city. On the other side of the Duna, and on the small islands near, in front of the chief citadel, Gen. Fleming raised fortifications of attack. The fleet intercepted all communication with the sea. All negotiations having failed, Gustavus Adolphus commenced the siege of Riga, Aug. 13, 1621. The fortifications on the little islands were finished under the fire of the enemy, and the Swedes opened fire from all their intrenchments on the city. They discharged more than a thousand cannon-balls per hour. But a few days had passed when the chief defences of the besieged were so damaged as to afford little protection to their defenders. The 29th of August Gustavus Adolphus wrote his brother-in-law, the elector of Brandenburg, that the city opposed an earnest resistance, but he expected a complete success.

Riga was defended by its citizens, aided by only three hundred soldiers. Sigismund had promised to send assistance from Dantzic, but failed to do so. In the last days of August Gen. Radziwill showed himself on the other side of the river with a Polish cavalry force, but could not effect his passage of the Duna, and was compelled to retire. The 2d of September the king summoned the city to surrender. As the courier sent with this message had been retained in the city during the deliberations of the magistrates and the Polish envoys, the king regarded that fact as a formal manifestation of the continuation of hostilities. He directed the renewal of the fire on the fortifications, and repeatedly attempted the assault; but he was repulsed by the balls of the besieged or by the explosion of mines. The attack continued during forty-eight hours from the Swedish camp and from the fleet stationed in the Duna. The principal citadels and fortifications were destroyed. During the night the ditches were filled, and a bridge was successfully placed on which the soldiers could pass to the assault of the city. But the bridge was riddled with balls and burnt, and many of the Swedish troops were killed. Three days after, a messenger from the besieged arrived in the Swedish camp, bearing severe reproaches that an attack had been renewed upon them while the authorities were in deliberation. It was declared that the city could not violate the faith promised and sworn to the king of Poland: it would leave its fate to the will of God. On both sides they labored with such persistent energy that the defenders of Riga and the Swedes encountered each other in their mining operations face to face, while attacks and *sorties* continued alternately above their heads. The 11th of September the Swedes had mined the remaining fortifications in three places, and commenced to divert the water from filling the fosses. Two bridges were now constructed, and Gustavus resolved to deliver a general assault the next day. It was to begin

on the evening of Sept. 12. The besiegers had fired red-hot balls all day. But before commencing the attack, a new summons was made to the city. The authorities demanded two days of postponement, hoping that the assistance which they awaited from the Poles would arrive within that time. The king would allow but twenty-four hours, at the expiration of which the magistrates of Riga should consent to treat on the conditions of surrender of the city. Sept. 16 Gustavus made formal entrance into Riga, with all his army. The humanity with which the city was treated was strikingly in advance of the times, and secured the eulogy of the conquered. The siege had lasted six weeks, and had been prosecuted with great resolution and dangers. The young king ran great perils while encouraging the soldiers in the trenches, where he was seen with spade in hand. When, prior to his attack on the city, he had selected the location of his camps on the sandy eminence, a ball passed over the spot which he but a moment before occupied. Many persons were killed near him during the siege, and the blood of a Livonia noble spirted on his clothes. Another time a bullet passed through his tent above his head. After the capture of Riga, Gustavus went into Courland, where one of the dukes embraced the Swedish cause, while another remained faithful to Poland and the interests of Sigismund. Towns and fortresses, one after another, fell into the hands of Gustavus Adolphus before the close of autumn. His brother, Prince Charles Philip, was taken seriously ill before Riga. After the successful termination of the siege and the surrender of that city, the sick prince did not recover, but grew worse. Returning to Sweden, the young king was compelled to leave his brother at Narva, where he died January, 1622, at the age of twenty-one. He was considered a discreet young man, resolute and brave, who, burning with the desire to distinguish himself, had solicited permission to take part in the war. Gustavus was deeply affected by the death of

his brother, and of him traced the following portrait: "He bore with courage all which life has of the painful and the difficult. Through love for his country he wished not to return to his home pending the last campaign against the Poles, to the end that he might give good example to the young nobility of Sweden. He had for thee, Country, generous sentiments, and he considered himself happy to die for thee. O Sweden, what a loss thou hast made!"

The young king, who had returned to Stockholm in January, 1622, went through Finland to the theatre of war to attend carefully to its responsibilities and dangers. A pestilential fever which attacked his soldiers, and of which he was twice affected, delayed and paralyzed his military movements for the present. At an interview which he had with Sigismund's chief commander, Gustavus offered peace, and terminated his remarks on the occasion by these words: "So act that this hand given may be the sign of an accord of our opinions, to the end that I may be able to lead these troops one day, which you see, against your enemies the Turks." He signed an armistice with Poland for one year. He took all the necessary steps for the defence of Riga, arranged the government of Livonia, and returned into Sweden in August of that year. That armistice was prolonged, but so little confidence was cherished as to its duration, because Sigismund had not ratified it, that when Gustavus, in the summer of 1623, directed an expedition on Dantzic, an attack on Sweden was feared. For this reason Gustavus blockaded the port of that city, and would not retire except on the stipulated condition that Dantzic should undertake nothing against Sweden during the armistice. The year 1624 is declared by the Swedish historians to have been the only one in which Gustavus Adolphus was able to devote all his labors and cares to the interior administration of his country. In the following year the war was renewed. The third campaign of the Swedish king against Poland was termi-

nated by the completion of the conquest of Livonia; and the possession of Courland assured to him Riga, the object of his special care, because of its commanding position on the Duna and its relation to that side of the Baltic. The occupation of the chief ports of the Baltic Sea was the object of the constant policy of Gustavus Adolphus. The ports of Livonia were already in his hands; and those of Courland, of Eastern Prussia, and of Germany were successively subdued.

In June, 1625, the king embarked, with a strong force of infantry and cavalry, on a fleet of seventy-six vessels at Sandhamn, the important Swedish station on the naval route from Stockholm, and near its entrance to the Baltic. He effected the landing of these troops at Riga early in July. Uniting these fresh soldiers to the forces already in that vicinity under the command of some of his most trusted generals, he assumed the direction of the combined troops, and pushed farther into the interior of the country, leaving Riga properly guarded. Vigorously advancing into the territory held by the enemy, towns and fortresses were successively captured, rarely encountering repulse, and steadily triumphing over the obstacles and resistance placed in his course. The Poles proposed to open new negotiations. Gustavus sent chancellor Oxenstierna, who had accompanied him in his campaign, to treat with the Polish plenipotentiaries, but refused the enemy armistice. The negotiations having broken off, Gustavus resolved in the midst of winter to push the progress of his arms. Early in January, 1626, the king passed the Duna at the head of his troops, — foot-soldiers and cavalry. On the march he encountered in the night a corps of the enemy, which he repulsed. On the morning of the 7th Gustavus attacked the Poles, who were drawn up in battle order in a plain in front of his intrenchments, after they had put fire to the village of Wallhof. A charge of Swedish cavalry decided the victory. The enemy left five hundred

dead on the field; and prisoners, baggage, and cannon fell into the hands of the victors. Another Polish force, under the command of Radziwill, Sigismund's chief general, retreated on hearing this news of Polish defeat. Livonia had nothing more to fear from the attacks of forces in the interests of the Polish king. Before his departure from the country, Gustavus took various measures relative to the administration and defence of the country, as well as to the maintenance of his troops. He established a military colony at Dorpt, an important town from its position, which he had taken and wished to secure. He gave the soldiers lands: the peasants were to aid in their cultivation, and to be freed from the forced labors for the crown to which they had been subjected by the laws of the country. The king went to Revel to meet his queen, and then returned to Sweden to pay his last duties to the remains of his mother, the queen-dowager Catharine, who had died early in December, 1625.

After the success of the Swedes at Wallhof, there was some interruption to active hostilities; and an armistice was concluded for six weeks, which, after the departure of the king, was prolonged until the last of May. Gustavus had ordered his chief general in command, La Gardie, not to consent to an armistice except of short duration, without, however, refusing to negotiate. He should before all render himself master of the Duna, and watch over the strong places which had been conquered in Courland, and which "were the ramparts of Livonia." For the part of the country which the duke still possessed, and which offered no advantage to Sweden in the estimation of its king, there might be accorded neutrality under certain conditions. Gustavus had resolved to transport the theatre of war from the banks of the Duna to those of the Vistula, to attack Poland at the heart, and approach Germany. Here commences that part of the war of Poland which is called also the war of Prussia.

The plan of the Swedish king had its political difficulties and perplexing contingencies. He realized the need of a port in Eastern Prussia; and the elector of Brandenburg, his brother-in-law, was invested with that duchy under the suzerainty of Poland. Gustavus did not allow these considerations to arrest his course, holding that marriage relationships should not stand in the way of the interests of the State. After having re-enforced his army with Swedish and foreign soldiers, in the middle of June, 1626, he embarked with a fleet of one hundred and fifty vessels, taking thirteen regiments of infantry and nine companies of cavalry, from fifteen to twenty thousand men in all. June 26 the king arrived before Pillau, and possessed himself of that city without much resistance, the garrison being small. Four armed vessels were left in front of Pillau; and the admiral of the kingdom, with six vessels, which were strongly re-enforced by others, was sent to the road of Dantzic to take possession of the customs receipts of that important post. Gustavus himself commanded the land-forces which were marched against the Polish possessions; the debarkation having been effected at Braunsberg, near the city. In spite of the fire of the enemy, the Swedes advanced to the ramparts, drove in the post-guards, and pursued the Polish garrison, which in its flight put fire to the faubourgs. Braunsberg capitulated June 30. July 1 Flanenberg surrendered, and Elbing on the 6th, which was followed by Marienberg on the 8th; the last a well-fortified city. Many towns of less importance were likewise soon captured. Gustavus rapidly pushed aside all resistance, and soon reached the frontiers of Pomerania. His court chaplain, in speaking of this expedition, said, "The king took cities with as much promptitude as he crossed the country on horseback." The most of the inhabitants of the territory through which he had passed in his successful march were Protestants in belief, and the persecutions which they claimed to have suffered from

Sigismund because of their religion rendered them favorable to Gustavus Adolphus. The property of the Jesuits, of the clergy, of the nobility, also all which belonged to the crown of Poland, was sequestered. Those who voluntarily surrendered to the Swedes were alone exempted from pillage. What war then was, even under a commander so humane as Adolphus, is plainly evinced by the exactions of his army, which he tolerated, in the country of the enemy. Each morning it was ordered there should be sent from the Swedish camp three hundred men commanded by a colonel, and a hundred and fifty cavaliers under the orders of a captain. These were to gather up the booty, and transport it to the camp, where it was divided by the military official especially assigned to that duty. A portion was first devoted to the kitchen of the king, then to the generals and officers, and finally to the soldiers. Whoever, while on such an expedition for booty, was convicted of having diverted something to his own profit, was hanged without mercy. The same punishment was reserved to him who pillaged in a village occupied or guarded by Swedish troops. No person could, under penalty of death, take lodgings without having received permission of the quartermaster.

After his arrival in Prussia, Gustavus Adolphus uttered some striking remarks, in the interviews which he had with the deputies of that country, relative to neutrality, and to his conduct in the complicated relations of the duchy of Prussia with Poland and Brandenburg.

"In taking Pillau [he says], I acted by natural, civil, and every law; for the king of Poland, my enemy, might have come with his fleet to me in Sweden. The port of Dantzic is not so dangerous for me; since it is but ten to eleven feet deep, and consequently no war-fleet can enter or leave it: while I regard Pillau, with its depth of twenty-eight feet, to be commodious for war-ships. Therefore it was needful for the security of my States to take and fortify it."

The city of Konigsberg was regarded as neutral; but

Dantzic refused that advantage, and put itself in open hostility to Sweden. The king said, —

"I ought to go directly to Konigsberg, but I have wished to spare my brother-in-law and his country. I see clearly that you wish to maintain medium ground, but you run risks. It is necessary that you march with me or with the Poles. I profess your belief: I have a Brandenburger for a wife. I wish to combat for you, and fortify your city. I have brought with me good engineers, and I know also the art of fortifications. I will defend myself against all Poland, and against the Devil if it becomes necessary."

In the mean time Gustavus fortified. His army was much weakened by having furnished so many garrisons. It was re-enforced at the end of August by the arrival of Oxenstierna, who had brought fresh troops from Finland. The chancellor seems one of those men who always turn up in the king's need. Those under Count Thurn, who had been expected from Livonia, were delayed, to the great annoyance of Gustavus; but they finally arrived, and rendered the army sufficiently strong to march to the encounter of the army of Sigismund, which was assembled in the environs of Graüdentz, and had besieged a small fortified town in the neighborhood. In a few days the Poles were compelled to retreat. Oxenstierna was then named envoy of the king, commander of the troops in Prussia, and governor-general of the cities and districts of which Sweden was in possession. At the end of October Gustavus embarked at Pillau, which he had fortified, and arrived in Stockholm early in November.

Dec. 8, 1626, a daughter was born at the royal palace, who was named Christine, and who was to develop remarkable gifts of person and mind, to become queen of Sweden, whose power and glory her father had done so much to extend, and then to abandon the throne and country, leaving a shadow forever on her character and name. The months of that winter were devoted to the interior administration of the kingdom and to preparations for the sec-

ond campaign in Prussia. During his impending absence the king placed the government in the control of the Senate. He gave the command of the troops which remained in Sweden to his brother-in-law, Count John Casimir. An extreme prudence was recommended in the collection of the imposts, especially of the mill-tax, for fear of causing troubles during the absence of the king; and if any symptoms of difficulty were remarked, it would be well to yield, and await a better occasion. Enrolment of troops at this time was made in Germany and Scotland.

In 1627, after having made passage across the Baltic and begun his Polish campaign of this year, Gustavus wrote home to John Casimir, left in Sweden in command of troops, in regard to his intended advance into the duchy of Prussia. As the subsequent course of the elector of Brandenburg, his bond of relationship to the Swedish king, and the location of the territory of which he was the hereditary ruler, had considerable bearing on the early campaigns of the great Protestant champion in Germany, the following, from this letter of Gustavus Adolphus to the husband of his sister, is interesting and suggestive: —

"We sailed the 4th of May with a good wind, and arrived here successfully to-day, the 8th, at Pillau. We found affairs in a good condition. We immediately disembarked our soldiers to offer battle to the enemy, who has nine thousand men under arms, and cantoned in several cities of Pomerania, according to his custom. In the mean while he has advanced on the Dantziger-Werder. Count Palatine should accelerate the arrival of cavalry and Swedish recruits. The elector has assembled troops one or two miles from Pillau. He redemands that city. We shall see what he wishes to do."

Soon after, Gustavus writes to the Swedish Senate at Stockholm, —

"The demand of the elector, that Pillau should be delivered to him, has been put aside by negotiation. He will do no more against us than necessity compels him so that Poland may not deprive him of his fief."

In another letter the king says, —

"We have treated with our brother-in-law, the elector, and have obtained from him an armistice until Michaelmas. Since then we have made new labors on the fortifications of Pillau, and placed there a garrison of three regiments, and with the remainder we moved on Hoft. The enemy took position in front, at Dantziger-Werder, that he might not lose all communication with his artillery. As he was in force, we decided to attack him the 25th of May. We had taken our position in a manner that Count Thurn and John Baner might be enlisted, and the halberdiers were to strike afterwards. The soldiers were distributed on boats; and all would have certainly succeeded to our desire if each had done his duty, and followed our orders. But a single barge, commanded by Axel Duval, reached the opposite shore. One party neglected to direct themselves, with the aid of oars, to the point indicated, others struck on sand-banks, and some went where we had wished, so that our plan was disordered. Then we threw ourself into a small boat to execute our dispositions; and, as in such circumstances combat often becomes very warm, we were wounded in the groin by a ball. Nevertheless, we ought to thank God that that accident did not have grievous results. We hope to be re-established in a few days, and be able to place ourself at the head of affairs. In this situation we have been obliged to retire our troops, which have not suffered great losses. Count Thurn is wounded, as well as Capt. Axel Duval. As we are confident this news will be exaggerated, we desire to communicate all the details to warn you against versions which might be contrary to the truth."

In the king's boat, of which he held the helm, he was the only person wounded. This letter was written on the day of this unsuccessful encounter with the enemy. In its terms and spirit, there are evinced some of those traits of character which were shown strikingly afterwards in his great career, — the same fearlessness of danger, yet full command of his powers, and the same care to have his eye on all the main points of the work in hand. That he failed here, was owing to an accident, or contingency of non-execution, against which the most skilful and experienced commanders cannot always provide. The king, when struck by the musket-ball, thought his wound mortal; yet he maintained his self-possession, and while returning from the place of assault coolly conversed with his attending officer, and said, that, should he die, the

Swedes must not be discouraged, nor put down their arms until they had gained an advantageous peace. His wound proved to be less dangerous than supposed; though the ball had passed into the lower part of the abdomen, and several weeks elapsed before it could be extracted. The wound was cured without long delay or great inconvenience. But the friends of Gustavus, warned by this narrow escape, and fearing a greater misfortune in the future, supplicated him through Oxenstierna to expose less his person. Gustavus responded, as he usually did in such cases, —

"Not a king has been killed yet by a ball. The soldier follows the example of his chief; and a general who keeps himself out of danger can gain neither victories nor laurels. Cæsar always showed himself in the first rank, and Alexander watered with his blood fields of battle."

The wound of the Swedish king having been sufficiently cured to enable him to continue his plans, he re-assembled his troops at Dirschau with the intention of attacking the Polish commander, whose camp was not distant. The Poles, intrenched in front of Hoft, were attacked by Gustavus, and beaten, July 4. Immediately after this success he wrote to the Swedish Senate, —

"We announce to you the victory which has rendered us masters, almost without effusion of blood, of the forts raised by the Dantzic men. Having learned of the defection of the elector, and of his design to pass to the enemy considerable assistance, we left the chancellor at Hoft, and on the 12th entered into the principality to baffle that project."

A more important encounter between the hostile forces took place Aug. 7. The Swedish cavalry, commanded by the king in person, with Thurn and Wrangel under his orders, and the Polish cavalry, commanded by Koniecpolski, gave numerous proofs of their valor. One of the attacks of the Polish cavalry was so vigorous and determined, that the whole Swedish cavalry was driven back,

except one regiment under Erik Soop, which sustained the shock of the enemy until their comrades had time to rally, and return to the combat. Koniecpolski, having had his horse killed under him, was obliged to fight on foot until a Cossack soldier was able to bring him another; yet, neither of the chiefs wishing to push to a more serious fight, the troops retired, and returned to camp. On the following day Gustavus marched his whole army into the open field. He commanded the centre with John Baner, Count Thurn had charge of the left wing, and Gen. Wrangel the right. Koniecpolski remaining tranquilly in his intrenchments, the Swedish king resolved to attack him. The Swedish cannon were moved to the summits of some neighboring heights, from which they spread disorder and death among the Poles, compelling them to retreat. To hasten their flight, Baner received orders to drive out from a neighboring village some Polish musketeers; but in that moment a ball struck the king in the right shoulder with such force that his arm was raised in the air. Gustavus thought it had been carried away. He fainted in the arms of his faithful officer Peter Brahe. The blood flowed freely from his nose and mouth, and those present awaited his last breath. A surgeon was called, who bandaged the wound; and the king was carried to the camp. The Swedes feigned to continue the battle, but soon retired; while the Poles, already in flight, were extremely surprised on seeing that the Swedes did not improve their advantages. A deserter, having seen Gustavus Adolphus faint, and his blood flow freely, informed Koniecpolski of the death of the king. The Polish general was so much affected by the misfortune of his illustrious adversary that he remained some minutes motionless and in uncertainty. Finally, however, he conducted his troops into camp, which he had nearly abandoned, and did not disturb the Swedes in their retreat. On a later examination of the king's wound, it was found dangerous but not

mortal. The ball had entered just above the breast-bone, two inches from the throat, towards the right shoulder, and lodged in the back, near the spine, at the upper corner of the shoulder-blade. The surgeons having declared the impossibility of extracting it, the king responded, "Let it there remain as a souvenir." The wound closed up; but he retained stiffness in his right arm, and two fingers remained paralyzed. He could write with difficulty, and could no more support the cuirass on that shoulder. Giving an account to the Swedish Senate of this encounter with the enemy, and of his wound, the king says, —

"On the 7th of August, when we had brought all our cavalry out of the camp, and the enemy his against us, the half of ours — for the remaining nineteen companies did not come — put the foe to flight, so that he was forced to run headforemost into his own camp, where the general himself, Koniecpolski, without hat, and on foot, took refuge. Many of his chief officers were wounded or slain, and three standards taken; and had it not been evening, we would have driven the enemy out of his camp. The day after, we presented ourselves, with horse and foot, before the enemy's camp, and caused our guns to play upon it, so that he seemed to be making all ready for flight; but so it pleased not God, since in the outset, at a pass whither we wished to drive the enemy's musketeers, we were striken by a musket-shot in the right shoulder, at the neck, whereby our design was broken off, and the victory prevented. Yet we thank God, who hath so disposed this hurt that we hope soon to be set at rights. It seemeth as if the emperor's victories in Germany inspirit our foes too much."

These repeated proofs of the king's undaunted courage inspired great admiration, and the ardent desire to imitate his example, among the Swedish soldiers. But the chief officers, foreseeing the troubles which his death would occasion, thought differently. They earnestly prayed Gustavus, through the intermediation of Oxenstierna, asking the latter to bear the word in their name, to think how precious his life was for the country, not to expose it, as he often did, especially in circumstances so little impor-

tant as the last, and that to the detriment of the public welfare. He caused thus the greatest apprehensions for the future. Gustavus Adolphus responded, —

"I cannot believe, gentlemen, that my person is so precious as you suppose. If death comes to me, Providence will not less continue to watch over Sweden as before. Because God has made me king, because he has imposed this burden upon me, I ought not to discharge myself of it through fear or indolence, nor think of my particular interest. If death must be my portion in the vicissitudes of this war, can a king succumb more gloriously than in defending his God and his people?"

The declaration of the king, that the victories of the emperor had too much encouraged the enemies of Sweden, is confirmed by Oxenstierna, whose eye was always open, and whose opinion had great weight. Thus begins to appear plainly, in this war against Poland and in the avowed designs of Sigismund on the Swedish throne, the relation of the military conflicts of Germany to the subsequent career of Gustavus Adolphus in the gigantic struggle on the Continent, which terminated his life on the memorable field of Lutzen, but which did not close until the treaty of Westphalia was signed and recognized by the contending nations. It was a time when the worthless baubles of orders, and the trinkets which represent them, were passed around from one court to another as marks of royal condescension or royal honors. Then, as now, the English Garter was flaunted in the faces of struggling peoples, and offered as the cheap reward of heroes. James I. was then on the British throne, and much interested to enlist the Swedish king in the cause of the German Protestant princes and estates. Frederick, hereditary ruler of the Palatinate, whose wife was the daughter of the English monarch, had been driven, by the troops of the emperor, from the throne of Bohemia, to which he had been elevated by the Protestant nobility of that kingdom, and afterwards from his Palatinate possessions. James had now become fully aroused, so far as such a nature as his

could be stirred, to the necessity of sustaining the cause of his son-in-law and the Protestant cause on the Continent. He and his ministers, seeing the great capacity of the Swedish king for military leadership, were strongly desirous of securing his alliance against the Austrian Ferdinand, and in behalf of the suffering Protestants of Germany. They saw that he must have interests more or less in common with England; for Sigismund was a representative of the Catholic sentiments and interests in the North, and a brother-in-law of Ferdinand, who was then supporting the Polish cause, and encouraging the claims of the Polish king to the crown worn by Gustavus Adolphus. For these reasons James of England had repeatedly sent ambassadors to the camp of the Swedish king, and now despatched an envoy to bestow upon him the order of the Garter.

After several more successes in this year's campaign against Sigismund, Gustavus returned to Stockholm late in October, leaving the command to Oxenstierna, who found this official responsibility more trying by its embarrassments for money than the labors of war. During the following winter, there was a kind of armistice without any express stipulation, and a substantial suspension of arms. But Gustavus and his trusted officers and agents gave no signs of weariness or rest. Never was he more sleepless and resolute in his labors and preparations for the future. Wherever he and the chancellor moved, every thing stirred, nobody slumbered. While the work of administration and preparation went energetically on at home, vigilance and activity were not wanting abroad. Negotiations continued with Poland. The elector of Brandenburg offered his mediation. Gustavus refused this offer, for he had the best reasons to know that the Brandenburg prince could not be a disinterested mediator between the belligerents. The Poles, pressed by the Swedes, whose royal leader was increasing his fame and power in each successive campaign

on their border, were still too proud to yield to terms which Gustavus was ready to offer them. They were encouraged by the sympathy and support of the Hapsburg monarch, whose power had been greatly increased by the armies and successes of Tilly and Wallenstein. The position of things became more and more critical. Sigismund would not make peace unless his rights to the Swedish crown were recognized. For an armistice of long duration his negotiators demanded the restitution of all which Gustavus and his brave Swedes had conquered. The Poles would agree to abandon temporarily the territory which Gustavus had conquered, but only to retake it if the occasion should present itself. "As to titles," said Gustavus, "the king of Poland may take all which pleases him, except that of the king of Sweden. If there were any way not to speak of him or of me, that would be better." But he forbade concluding the armistice without the specific agreement that the ports of the country in contention should not be put in the hands of his enemies. He then knew well the designs of Ferdinand and his commanders to increase their power in that direction, and was fully resolved that his negotiations with Sigismund should not serve the cause of the Hapsburg party. In March, 1628, he arrived again at Pillau, in the duchy of Prussia. The campaign during the spring and summer months was pressed with vigor and some successes; the enemy generally avoiding to meet him in battle, preferring to devastate the country and strip it of its supplies, and to weary the Swedish commander by fatiguing marches. The troops of Gustavus suffered much from want of proper provisions, clothing, and money. The roads were extremely bad, and the movement of artillery difficult. Oxenstierna wrote that the king was able in this campaign to do little, because of his fear of what might happen on the side of Germany. Finally the army took its winter quarters; and Gustavus returned to Sweden at the end

of October, after having again confided the government of Prussia to Oxenstierna, who, aided by Gen. Wrangle, afterwards distinguished in the Continental campaigns, repulsed the attacks of the Poles and their allies during the winter. The events in Germany, now taking such formidable proportions, commenced to draw the principal attention of Gustavus Adolphus. During his campaign in Poland the past year, he had occupied himself with events in Prussia. In that which he had just terminated he had rendered assistance in the siege of Stralsund, where Wallenstein, in the earlier years of his great military reputation and remarkable career, suffered defeat after great sacrifices and efforts. Gustavus clearly understood the importance of keeping that commanding position on the Baltic from falling into the hands of the imperialists. Wallenstein for some time had had his eye fixed on Sweden and the rising power of its young king. His ambitious designs made him desirous of getting possession of Stralsund as a means of access to the Baltic, and perhaps to Sweden itself, as strongly as Gustavus was resolved that it must be held by those whom he could make his future allies. Of the significance of the siege of Stralsund and its relation to important events to follow, more will be said when we come to the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany. In 1629 he appeared again in the Prussian duchy to push operations against the forces of Sigismund, who was now supported by an imperial army. A few days after his arrival he wrote to the Senate at Stockholm, —

"We have found here against us Arnheim with an army of ten thousand men. He calculates to do marvels when he shall be united to the Polish army. We cannot think of quitting immediately these countries. We have made new propositions to the estates in consequence of the changes in the situation: it is necessary that they should not separate before several weeks. It appears that the enemy has some designs on Konisgberg. We do not yet know if our brother-in-law is conniving with him. We have ordered that they should send

more troops from Sweden to the defence of Konigsberg. Three Scotch regiments newly enrolled will remain in Sweden, to be formed to our discipline. Gyllenhielm, the admiral of the kingdom, and Claes Fleming, the vice-admiral, will go, with nine of our largest vessels and sixteen which the cities have promised, to be stationed at Dalehamn. John Baner, with six vessels of war, will go to protect the liberty of the passage at Stralsund, and Erik Ryning, with three small ships, will defend Calmar."

During the summer of this year the war was carried on with considerable vigor on both sides, without any very decisive results. On the 17th of June, there was a heated engagement at Stum, in which Gustavus ran great danger, his force being inferior to the enemy, and in which the advantages and losses were about equal on the two sides. Gustavus fortified his camp under the walls of Marienberg, where his soldiers suffered by a contagious disease. The enemy followed the movements of the Swedish king, but dared not undertake any thing serious after the arrival of the Swedish re-enforcements; though partial encounters took place almost daily between the two fortified camps. Sigismund and two of his sons assisted in these partial engagements. The important work which Gustavus had in contemplation outside of Poland, overshadowing the issues which he had with the Poles, tended more and more to bring him to the decision to conclude hostilities with Sigismund as soon as it could be done with entire safety to his future plans. Both France and England were desirous that the war between the Swedes and Poles should terminate. Richelieu had begun his remarkable career as diplomatist and statesman; and in the name of the king of France had sent an ambassador at this time to the camp of Gustavus, offering mediation between the belligerents. Oxenstierna had in his possession the terms on which his king would treat. On the 30th of July, Oxenstierna, Gen. La Gardie, and John Baner, the chosen negotiators of Gustavus, had an interview with the Poles, in which it was decided that not Sigismund alone,

but also the Republic of Poland, as the nation was then called, should give Gustavus Adolphus the title of King of Sweden. Through the following August negotiations continued under the mediation of the king of France, and from the beginning of September under the mediation of England. The sovereigns of these two nations, the one Catholic and the other Protestant, for reasons and interests of their own, were strongly desirous that the services of Gustavus and his brave Swedes should be disengaged from the Polish war, and called to a larger and vastly more important theatre of action. Therefore their ambassadors were instructed to spare no efforts in their negotiations with Gustavus and Sigismund. Several times the negotiations were on the point of being broken, not only on account of the opposing claims of the Swedes and Poles, but also of the mediators. Gustavus did not wait for the issue before returning to Sweden. Sept. 16, 1629, an armistice was concluded for six years between the belligerent kingdoms. Five cities which had been conquered by Swedish arms were given up to Poland, and three others delivered to the elector of Brandenburg, to be held during the armistice. Gustavus was to continue to occupy Pillau and three other towns of some importance. Liberty of conscience was to be accorded to Protestants and Catholics, and commerce was declared free between the two nations.

Thus, one after the other, Gustavus had prosecuted wars with Denmark, Russia, and Poland, and secured advantageous terms of peace and extension of Swedish limits with these nations against which he had made years of dangerous and expensive campaigns. He was now thirty-four years of age, in the full maturity of his mental powers, and of his extraordinary genius for military organization and command. Reviewing the period which had passed since he ascended the throne at the age of seventeen, it is plainly perceived that only the possession of great abilities, and of

unswerving resolution to advance the strength and fame of his country, could have brought Sweden to its present important position, and given him his great prestige and elevation before the world. He had assumed the crown when his country was grievously suffering by Danish invasions, some of its most important strategical and commercial towns occupied by Danish troops, and its finances and means of military defence in a wretched condition. In two years, before he had reached his twentieth year, he had driven back or baffled the invaders, and secured terms of peace, which, hard as they might seem, gave Sweden independence, and opened a road of future success to him who had the foresight and the genius to traverse it. In four years more, at the age of twenty-three, his military victories over his eastern enemies enabled him to say with cheerful confidence, "Russia cannot now, without our consent, launch a single boat on the Baltic." These successes against the Danes and Muscovites had been persistently followed up against the dangers threatening from Poland, and the terms of the truce with Sigismund practically extinguished all further doubt and debate as to his title to the Swedish crown, while he had secured important vantage-ground for the undertakings in Germany which he had for years meditated, and to which he was being led by the logic of events and the strong influence of foreign cabinets. Wearied and impatient as he must have finally become by being so long occupied by the fatigues and perplexing difficulties of the Polish campaigns, he held firmly to his resolution not to cease his efforts in that direction until he felt confident he could do so without leaving serious dangers on his flank and rear while advancing southward on his Continental work. Holland, England, and France had earnestly pressed him to conclude the Polish wars; for their interests and plans required another employment of his military genius, and his brave soldiers, whom he had trained to rigid discipline, and accustomed to scorn

cold, fatigue, hard fare, and the perils of war. As throwing a ray of light on the manner of the diplomacy of the time, as well as on the character of Gustavus, it is related that while visits of the English and French ambassadors were taking place at the Swedish camp, there arose between them a dispute as to who should have the precedence in rank; and neither would yield. This disagreement of the two foreign ministers was necessarily embarrassing to the Swedish high officials; and in regard to it Gustavus Adolphus wrote Oxenstierna at this time, "Regulate your affairs without consulting them, and leave them to arrange between themselves." It seems to be a historical verity that Richelieu, through Charnacé, his unsuspected agent, was chiefly effective in finally bringing about the Polish truce. Alternately visiting the camps of Sigismund and the Swedes, the persuasions of the cardinal minister of a Catholic king finally convinced the Catholic Sigismund of the deceitful and dangerous policy of the Hapsburg emperor, and opened his eyes to his true interests. As to what the interests of Sweden demanded and the necessities and conditions the future career of Gustavus required, to him no arguments of Richelieu or English or Dutch ministers were necessary. The aggressive advances and schemes of Ferdinand and his advisers, the dashing and destructive campaigns of Tilly and Wallenstein, approaching and threatening the Baltic, spoke to the Swedish king with an emphasis which he comprehended with the instinct of genius. The eagle was now free from his toils, and there could be no mistaking the direction of his flight.

"The king of Sweden [said Richelieu] is a new sun which has just risen; young, but of vast renown. The ill-treated or banished princes of Germany in their misfortunes have turned their eyes towards him, as the mariner does to the polar star."

The unfolding of his character to Europe, his discipline and experience in war, the manner of using his advantages when obtained, the impress he had stamped upon his ar-

mies, and his success in making the most of his resources and opportunities, had been shown through a career of seventeen years of unsleeping activity. It was by no sudden turn of events, by no hasty impulse or unmatured resolution, that the ablest statesmen of Europe now turned their attention towards him, and sought his aid to bring about far-reaching national designs. He was admitted to be the ablest general of his time, and in the army which he had formed there was no braver soldier than its chief. Familiar with the military tactics of ancient and of modern times, he had devised a more effective system of warfare than his predecessors had known. The changes and improvements which Maurice of the Dutch Commonwealth had made in the organization and discipline of the armies, by which he had made successful campaigns against the proud commanders and powerful armies of Spain, were learned thoroughly by Gustavus Adolphus in his early youth; and these were improved upon by his own genius and experience. so that he had moulded to himself a system of military organization, discipline, and warfare, which was justly considered his own. He changed the heavy and unwieldy squadrons of cavalry so much in vogue with the old Spanish and German commanders, and rendered their movements more easy and rapid, to which he also contributed by widening the distance between his battalions. For his deficiency in cavalry, owing to his limited financial means, he made up by placing infantry between the ranks of his horsemen, — a practice to which he was frequently indebted for victory. European commanders learned much from him as to the uses and importance of infantry. The strict military code which he had adopted early in his career, and the careful discipline which was its legitimate outgrowth, had so told on the military character and conduct of the Swedish army, that, when it advanced into Ger many, the population, which had suffered so much by the violence, rapacity, and disorder of the soldiers of Tilly,

Mansfeld, and Wallenstein, was surprised. In conformity with the enforced rules of his military code, all disorders were punished with great severity; and no tolerance was allowed to impiety, theft, gambling, duelling, and other offences which were so often the scourge of armies, some of which even at the present time are the scandal of military men. Gustavus's articles of war enforced frugality, and simplicity of living. Not even in his own tent was gold and silver plate brought into use. The example of economy and good conduct among those high in rank had its influence on the common soldiers. The morals and the martial bearing of his troops Gustavus alike considered to require strict attention. Morning and evening the regiments formed around their chaplains in prayer, and attested their regard for religious instruction; the sincere example of their king showing them that this devotion was far more than a rigid form and rule of policy. A reverent piety exalted his courage, and made him a noble commander and a just ruler. His ethical standard was high, and his sense of honor, of keen and exacting force. If the thought of the hero was in his mind, it was not that of the Grecian and Roman so much as of the Christian type that inspired his resolution. The perils and hardships of war he shared with the common soldiers, who filled his ranks and flocked to his standard from foreign countries. If he is open to criticism in this regard, it is that he too often forgot the value of his life as a great commander and the leader in a great cause, and allowed his natural courage to carry him where a controlling sense of his high responsibility should have restrained his impetuosity. These high moral qualities in such an age, and surrounded by such circumstances, shown alike to officers and private soldiers, to the exalted and the lowly, could not fail to awaken enthusiasm for his name at home and abroad, and bring to his following those who would be readily taught by his example and inspired by his resolutions and enthusiasm. In his kingdom at

home he had proved himself, not only a brave commander, but a successful ruler and administrator; and thus far his course abroad justified the great esteem with which his country regarded him. The renown of their sovereign in foreign lands, which their ambassadors were careful to make known at home, excited among the Swedes a sense of their own importance. The peasants of Finland, of Dalecarlia, of Gothland, of the remotest districts and of the humblest condition, were stirred by the common enthusiasm, and contributed of their slender means to support their king in his enterprises. Yet, with all his impetuosity in battle and his passionate longing for action, which seventeen years of constant exercise had only intensified, he had the capacity of seeing facts in their variety, and the full force of obstacles as they really existed.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONSIDERATIONS WHICH DRAW GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS TO THE GERMAN WAR. — THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES. — CHIEF ACTORS IN THE STRUGGLE. — LOUIS XIII. — RICHELIEU. — FERDINAND II. — MAXIMILIAN. — JOHN GEORGE. — WALLENSTEIN.

If the king of Sweden was now drawn towards great undertakings in Germany, it was not that he did not comprehend the difficulties and dangers which these enterprises involved, and the careful and elaborate preparations required to encounter them. He was not an unreflective enthusiast, to rush heedlessly to a Protestant crusade, trusting to Providence to furnish means and insure success, regardless of the weight of battalions, well-stored fortresses, and the stern mathematics of war. Before Cromwell had combined the quaint terms and solid sense of "dry powder with earnest prayers," Gustavus Adolphus had learned that it was neither good religion nor sound military science to ignore any of the essential details and preparations for military success. In all his plans and high ambitions abroad he never forgot that his first duty was to his own country. If he was to lead his brave soldiers to foreign lands, and become the champion of other people and interests, Sweden must be made strong and secure; and however remote his march should extend, his eye was never to be closed to the wants and perils that might assail the country which his heroic ancestor had wrung from foreign domination, and stamped with self-relying nationality. Sweden was his base, and the control

of the Baltic his uncompromising purpose, so that his path to the Continent might be kept open, and the foundation of his power be more secure. He was about to attempt the efforts in foreign lands on which he had long meditated, and to which he had been repeatedly urged by powerful influences and various parties in high quarters. If strong reasons and powerful interests urged him to remain at home, and confine his labors to the security and improvement of the area which had been the theatre of his busy years and successful campaigns, there were reasons which he deemed more controlling why he should carry the prestige of his country and the power of his name and genius to deal with the issues and events of Germany.

Stated in defined terms, and made clear and distinct as governing motives, why did Gustavus Adolphus launch into the German territory, and assume the commanding place he filled in that terrible struggle known as the Thirty Years' War? From whence came the strongest pressure for him to take this bold and decisive step? Who were the foreign statesmen and rulers that sought his support, and on whose pledged faith he placed reliance for support in the great enterprises he was about to undertake? Whom did he most fear? and what dangers, deemed the greatest, did he provide against by all the means at his command? Was there any single personal motive stronger than all others, overmastering all others, which finally decided him to his German career? Who were the few powerful names, the strong individual wills, the commanding personalities, stirred by lofty schemes and comprehensive plans, that then ruled the councils and governing forces of Europe, and were busy dealing with those tangled, tough, and terrible problems to be wrought out in suffering, devastation, and blood, running through the first sixteen of the thirty memorable years which history will never allow to become extinct from the memory of men? Facts and events are their own best interpreters, provided these are

regarded but as the uttered speech, the representative expression, of the ideas, faith, interests, motives, and passions, which are behind and underlie them. Gustavus Adolphus was about to carry into effect the bold resolution of quitting his country, of leaving his kingdom to the care of those whom he had learned to trust, and with Swedish troops march into an empire which could raise great armies, had in its service some of the ablest generals of the age, and possessed territories and cities with resources many fold greater than his own. Most of the monarchs, statesmen, and generals who at this time were influential factors in moulding the policy and guiding the destiny of Europe, were, by interest, faith, or ambition, watching the course of events in Germany. The fact that religion was ostensibly put forward as the chief motive of the quarrel was enough to attract the universal interest from Rome and the Mediterranean to the northern shores of the Baltic, and from London to Constantinople. And underlying and intermixed with the intense and stormy issues of theology were potential interests of politics, princely ambitions, national sympathies and hatreds, and the audacious schemes of military chiefs. If it was not then clearly seen who were the few men, the powerful wills, the controlling personal agencies, then shaping and moving the events of Europe, history has long since made it plain. The Hapsburg monarchy, by its hereditary and religious grasp, by its princes, courtiers, and armies, its swarms of bishops, priests, monks, and spies, was in the general estimation the centre and sign of power most regarded, dreaded, or hated. France was strong by her position, numbers, and wealth, her military galantry and resources. Her Henry IV., with his great capacity for war, the flower of whose life had been spent in opposing the dark designs and the selfish greed of Austria and Spain, was no more. Assassination was then a fanatical device, for which Jesuitical morality could apologize, if it did not sharpen the steel with which

Ravaillac struck down the liberal monarch, who had substantial reasons for his uncompromising attitude towards the Hapsburg dynasty; and in him the Protestants of Germany had lost a defender who had done much for them, and had large and comprehensive plans in their behalf in the future. As the wise and far-seeing adviser of Louis XIII., Richelieu knew how to comprehend, and possessed the skill, the persistent and balanced will, to enforce, so much of the plan and policy of Henry as would tend to the unity of France, and render her powerful in the councils of Europe, and an unrelenting enemy of the house of Austria. One of the most gifted and capacious minds of the century for statesmanship and diplomacy, time was to show how the cardinal minister and Gustavus Adolphus were to accord in dealing with the issues and deadly struggles on the Rhine, and with the elements of intrigue, ambition, and combat centred around Vienna, with powerful ramifications from one end of Europe to the other. England, strong by her insular position and commercial opportunities and wealth, by the indomitable pugnacity of her aristocracy, by the general make-up, the bone and fibre, of her population, had been for years diminished in her importance abroad by the weak and vascillating reign of James I., and now, under Charles I., was beginning those years of home difficulties and struggles which would prevent her being a strong force in Continental politics until she would find Cromwell and his Ironsides; though she was still counted an element of power in the plans and combinations already matured, or being carefully weighed in the diplomatic and financial scales. Spain, though she had lost not a little of her former great military prestige and power by her long and exhaustive struggle against the Dutch aspirations for independence, by which she had taught her enemies war, and helped create for them abler generals than her own, was still proud and strong, and held tight her grip on the rich territories and mines of the new world, by which her

coffers were supplied; and by her dynastic union and religious accord with Austria, she could not be otherwise regarded than a powerful factor in the combined obstacles which stood against the advance of Gustavus and his allies to success. Italy then, as she had been for centuries before, and as her fate was to continue to be for long years to come, did not weigh in the European councils except so far as her fair territories and attractive cities might be coveted by her powerful neighbors; while her forces were weakened and diverted in continual struggles, and not a few of her generals and soldiers were in the service and pay of their Austrian and Spanish masters. The Dutch Republic, then ruled by Maurice and his school of statesmen, was a power by her marine, her commercial wealth, by the skill and vigilance of her ambassadors, by the undaunted courage of her sailors and soldiers, and the skill of her admirals and generals. She was as adverse as the Scandinavian countries to the Hapsburg rulers gaining foothold in the Northern seas, and was of the Reformed religion to the core. Turkey, strong, perplexing, and anomalous in the field of European politics, as she was long to continue to be, cared nothing for the Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinistic controversies, except so far as those who directed her destinies could make them serve the cause of the crescent against the cross; yet not rarely in the great European struggles of those centuries the influence of the Sultan was cast in the scale of justice and the better cause. In any event he must be reckoned as one of the then existing political and military forces of Europe. And there were Transylvania and its Bethlem Gabor, with much of semi-barbarian audacity and military energy, a threatening war-cloud hovering over the eastern borders of Austria, compelling the Vienna rulers to keep upon it an anxious eye. The wars and the truces which Gustavus had made with Russia and Poland, prior to getting ready for his German campaign, serve to indicate that

his eye must still be anxiously upon them, and that his cause could have no aid from them. On his right flank was Denmark, between which and Sweden there still rankled long-enduring national animosities; and the Danish king's jealousy of Gustavus and his rising power was known to be increased in consequence of Christian's recent military defeats by the generals of Ferdinand. Though Sweden and Denmark were strongly Lutheran kingdoms, would this religious bond be sufficient to prevent the bursting out again of the powerful antagonisms of national passions and interests?

To the brief analytical review already given in this chapter of the forces, relations, antagonisms, and political tendencies of Europe at this period, may be added short sketches of a few of the guiding personalities, who, by hereditary possession of power, or by native genius and acquired skill, were to play the chief parts in that long and terrible game of war and politics through these years which were to be made forever memorable in the annals of the human race. The number was not large, and none could then know them as they are now known but the All-Seeing himself. In a large degree, it was after the heroic Swedish king set his feet on German territory that the character and capacity of these men to act in the great struggle were to be developed and made known by experience and events. Therefore Gustavus, Oxenstierna, and Richelieu could not always correctly gauge those on whom the first must rely for support, or those against whom he must contend. Yet important facts and events, the ebb and flow of the tide of controversy and war, the direction and the color of the currents, the perils, sufferings, the startling episodes, which had recently transpired, had brought out prominently a few persons around whom centred the signs of power; and these could not fail to be carefully measured and weighed by the master-mind who was now to advance into the arena.

Louis XIII., eldest son of Henry IV. by Maria de Medici, succeeded his father in 1610, at the age of nine years; his mother occupying the regency during his minority. A weak woman in the hands of her Italian favorites, she did not take care of the education of her son, whose time, which should have been diligently employed to fit him for his duties as sovereign ruler, was spent in useless occupations. At the age of fifteen he married Anne of Austria, daughter of Philip III. of Spain, whose character and life in after-years left no fragrant memory in French annals. Submissive as young Louis was for some time in the hands of his mother and the court favorites, he was finally moved to shake off the yoke, and gave orders for the arrest, dead or alive, of the notorious Concini, the chief agent of the regent queen; and when this person was murdered on the bridge of the Louvre, the young king, then in his seventeenth year, showed himself at a window, and exclaimed, "Thanks to you, my friends, now I am king." Although not endowed with those qualities which would enable him to be a successful ruler, he possessed unquestioned personal bravery, which he evinced on repeated occasions, especially at the siege of Montauban, which he sought to take from the Huguenots, with whom he concluded a peace in 1621. He was unable, however, to put an end to the disorders which prevailed in many parts of France. In 1624, reconciled to his mother, he then had the good fortune to obtain Richelieu as his chief minister, to whom he had previously shown a strong dislike, who had become, after the death of Concini, the chief adviser of Maria de Medici. Defective as was the character of Louis in important respects, the personal bravery of this monarch in the presence of danger and amid the grave responsibilities of war, and his high appreciation of Richelieu, redeem him from the contempt of history, as they did from the malediction of his contemporaries. On pressing emergencies he did not hesitate to place himself at the head of his armies, to maintain

the policy of his great minister, when he won deserved admiration by his valor, and the fortitude with which he bore campaign hardships. At the ever memorable siege of Rochelle he distinguished himself by his military behavior, and in the following year conducted a brilliant attack against the aspiring Duke of Savoy. In 1636 his firmness and courage are held to have saved France from invasion. But his perception of the qualities and value of Richelieu, and the tenacity with which he retained him against the powerful intrigues and conspiracies of the queen mother, and his turbulent Catholic lords, his brother Gaston of Orleans, Dukes Montmorency and Bouillon, and Count Soissons, prince of the blood, and the open resistance of Rohan and Soubise, unworthy representatives of the Protestant cause, are facts which will ever mark conspicuously the reign of Louis XIII., which the genius and renown of the great cardinal minister did so much to render potential and illustrious in the annals of the Europe of the seventeenth century.

The remarkable man whose abilities and actions so powerfully affected the events of his time, Armand Jean Duplessis, son of a French nobleman, was born in Paris, Sept. 5, 1585. First destined to the career of arms, he began his military education preparatory to the profession which had been chosen for him as the second son of the lord of Richelieu. But his elder brother having resigned the bishopric of Lucon, which had been for a lengthy period held by some member of the family, he relinquished his military studies and plans, and resolved to become a bishop. He then devoted himself to the study of theology, and at the age of twenty-two succeeded to the bishopric. At the age of twenty-nine he was chosen one of the deputies of the clergy to the States-general, a kind of national representation then recognized in France, whose chief and active members had access to, as well as influence with, those immediately about the throne. This young bishop, with

his ready aptitude for politics and diplomacy, was not long in improving his opportunity to ingratiate himself with Maria de Medici, supported as he was by influential persons then in the service of the government. Soon he was chosen almoner of the queen, who was able to bring him into the cabinet of the State against the strong aversion of the young king. When Louis, not long after, came to an open rupture with the queen mother and her party at court, Richelieu accompanied her into exile, either because of his sense of gratitude for what she had done for him, or because of his clear prevision of what his future career demanded; perhaps a close mingling of the two reasons. His efforts to bring about an agreement between the exiled queen and her royal son resulted in his banishment to his diocese, and then to Avignon, where he devoted himself to theological study and authorship. When Maria de Medici was recalled to the court, she did not forget the talented bishop who had faithfully adhered to her cause, but promptly restored him to favor. His influence speedily increased in matters of the court and government; and soon he entered the State Council, was made cardinal in 1622, and in 1624, at the age of thirty-five, arose to the premiership of the royal cabinet, — a position which he retained for thirty-three years, until, an invalid, he returned to Paris in triumph carried on a litter by his guards, escorted by an army, and surrounded by all the pomp of power; dying two months after, at the zenith of his fame, in the royal palace which so long bore testimony to the statesman who did so much to accomplish the unity and affirm the power of France. The policy for which Richelieu labored through his long career as minister embraced the resolution to extinguish feudalism, which had long been a scourge of that country, — a work which was not fully accomplished until the great revolution of 1789, — to break down the high nobility, whose ambitious pretensions and turbulence had so often come in collision with the throne, and made national unity a nul-

lity, and subdue the political power of Protestantism so far as the Huguenot nobles claimed to assert the privileges and power of a kind of aristocratic confederacy, largely independent of the royal government of the nation. The anarchical tendencies and national weakness of these claims of the Catholic and Huguenot lords had been so often attested by experience, and were so logically obvious to the mind of Richelieu, that he saw no way to effect a real government of France, and to make her strong against her external enemies, except by striking down with remorseless vigor and completeness whatever stood in the way of national unity. He saw the national necessity as the statesman of Athens saw the necessity of resisting the centrifugal tendencies of the Spartans, the continuance of which against the efforts of the former was the ruin of Greece. Richelieu was instinct with the idea of national unity, as American statesmen were in 1788-89, and German patriots were from Sadowa to Sedan. To these efforts of the cardinal minister for national supremacy, were joined the unsleeping determination to effect the overthrow of the power of Austria, to which the last years of the great Henry had been devoted, and with which his brain was busy when struck down by the assassin. He believed that the dynastic union of Austria with Spain was menacing to the security of France and to the peace of Europe. He knew that Austrian intrigue and Spanish gold had been often used to foment those factional troubles and civil wars by which his country had so much suffered. If he was a Catholic cardinal, he was a Frenchman before he was a disciple of the Roman faith. If he used the utmost power of the royal government to subdue the Huguenot confederacy, he was ready to co-operate with the Protestants of other countries to crush the coalesced power of Austria and Spain, even though Catholic princes of Germany were defeated. Hence it was, that, when the young king of Sweden had shown of what stuff he was made, and the ele-

ments of power began to gather around his name, the sagacious eye of Richelieu did not fail to see it. And when Gustavus Adolphus thought his time had come to begin his work in Germany, the cardinal statesman of Catholic France was ready to greet and aid him, even before he had done what he could, through his diplomatic agents, to enable the Swedish king to come to terms with Sigismund, so that the Polish war should no longer prevent the chosen champion of the Protestants of the Oder and the Rhine responding to the call which they had so long and earnestly made for his coming.

The important part which Ferdinand II. of Austria performed in the eventful years of which we are now taking a survey, makes it proper briefly to consider the general composite of his character and its ruling tendencies. It has been said with axiomatic brevity, that "some men are born to greatness, some have greatness thrust upon them," and others reach this elevation by their own individual force of mental and moral qualities inspired by the daring and persistent resolution which opportunity and occasion furnish them. He who was chosen German emperor in August, 1619, and whose name has passed into history closely identified with the struggles and calamities of the German people for more than eighteen years, to February, 1637, belonged not entirely to either of the types described. He certainly cannot be classified in the last-named category of great men. The father of this Ferdinand II. of Austria was the Archduke Charles, who held, as his ducal domains, the territories known as Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria; and his mother was a princess of Bavaria. He was born in 1580; and, losing his father by death in 1592, at the age of twelve years, Ferdinand was left to the care of his mother, and of her brother William, Duke of Bavaria. The archduchess and her ducal brother thought faithfully to discharge their duties to a son and nephew by placing him under the

educational direction of the Jesuits, in an institution at Ingolstadt, under their auspices and control. His uncle William was blindly devoted to the Romanist faith, and held, with others of his family, that Maximilian, the then reigning emperor, was too mild and tolerant towards the adherents of the Reformed religion, and had brought trouble and confusion among his imperial subjects by too much forbearance towards the Protestant princes and people. Under the teachings of the Jesuits, and the influence of such a guardian prince, Ferdinand did not fail to receive the strong impress of the prevailing surrounding influences. He thus grew up an earnest champion of the Catholic faith, and at the age of seventeen left Bavaria, and passed to the government of his hereditary dominions, — the territories which his father before him had held. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the dominions of the German branch of the Hapsburg family were parcelled out amongst the descendants of Ferdinand, the brother of Charles V. The head of the family was the Archduke of Austria, a designation of territory not at all corresponding to what is now termed Austria, but meant in those times only the archduchy itself. Tyrol was governed by the Duke Maximilian; while the young prince, who was afterwards to be known as Ferdinand II., now entered on the possession of the ducal dominions Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria. The estates of these territories, which were mainly Protestant, demanded, before recognizing their ducal ruler, that they should have a guaranty for the security of their religious faith and freedom. They were promptly informed that religious liberty had nothing to do with their allegiance to their hereditary duke, and induced to take the oath without conditions. In the earnest resolution of princely youth, and inspired by the Jesuit maxims which he had imbibed from his uncle William and the professors of Ingolstadt, the exercise of the Protestant religion was suppressed with a

strong hand in the dominions of Ferdinand; though under the rule of his father the Reformed religion had been there recognized as legal by a formal act of toleration. Before carrying into effect sweeping measures, he had sought in person, at Loretto, the favor of the Virgin, and received the apostolic benediction of Pope Clement at Rome. In the execution of these intolerant and unjust designs against the rights of his own ducal subjects, Ferdinand showed no hesitation, no signs of administrative forbearance, but displayed courage and perseverance in carrying out rigidly to its logical conclusion the policy he had undertaken. It is not charged, that, in accomplishing this result, he exercised any special acts of cruelty or created much tumult; but by a skilful, patient, and persistent application of Jesuit methods the work had been accomplished. The characteristics which he had thus exhibited in his hereditary domains, which served to make him known in the rest of Germany, he did not change on his advancement to the Austrian throne. With his ideas of imperial prerogative and his complete devotion to the Catholic religion, it is not difficult to previse what his career would be in the circumstances which were to surround him in dealing with the contingencies which would arise. He was not wanting in courage. He had a good deal of obstinacy, less pugnacity, and did not covet danger, and was much inclined to see if his aims could not be accomplished by waiting, rather than to anticipate danger, and meet it by prompt action. He was not a tyrant sovereign of the type of his royal relative Philip II. of Spain, who thought that no faith or compact with heretics was of binding effect, whose character became thoroughly chemicalized by priestly casuistry until he became a moral monster on the verge of madness. Ferdinand had some scruples as to plighted agreement and obligations; yet he would be led by his advisers, or by his strong belief in his imperial authority, so to construe laws and contracts

touching his Protestant subjects as practically to amount to breaking faith with them, and treating them as the worst of his alien enemies. He seemed not unaware that among the most effective ways to destroy a law or compact are subtle methods of interpretation and administration. By his violent and unjust suppression of the Reformed religion within his hereditary dominions, he had made himself known in Germany as an inexorable zealot for Popery. His languge was:—

"Disobedience, lawlessness, and insurrection go hand in hand with Protestantism. All the steps of heretics are aimed against imperial authority. In arms alone is there any safety against such an enemy. Security for the Catholic belief is to be found only in the destruction of this sect."

Surrounded by numerous and varied forms of danger, difficulty, and antagonism, some of these arising from the composing elements of his friends, others springing from the character and purposes of his enemies, with his ideas of religion and government, trying to wield the powers of that rickety, singularly constituted, and half-anarchical piece of political machinery called the German Empire, he would have failed as a ruler had he been endowed with much greater abilities and nobler qualities of heart than he possessed. From the Hapsburg imperial standpoint, the difficulties were probably too great for him to have succeeded with any amount of human capacity. With such qualities as he had, whatever his faults or his merits, his eighteen years of imperial rule were among the most terrible for wickedness, calamities, and suffering which the German people were ever called to endure. During the whole period of his reign Ferdinand never put aside the sword, nor tasted the blessings of peace. Through his strange ideas of the monarch's authority and duty he allowed himself to be the instrument, as well as the victim, of the evil passions and designs of others; and he was to close his career (by death

at fifty-seven) by leaving a record which was to carry his name down to after-centuries as the enemy of religious liberty and peace, the scourge of his people, and one of the chief oppressors of mankind.

Among the German princes who played a prominent and influential part in this period of commotion, war, and bloodshed, when all forms of ambition and strife seemed unchecked, Maximilian of Bavaria was to have a long career. Such was his character and qualities as princely ruler, and so strongly did his cause tell on important events in the great struggle, that he must be taken into account among the powerful personalities who cannot be overlooked in studying the dark and tragic epoch running from 1618 to 1648. With a character somewhat unlike Ferdinand, yet belonging to the same side in the great conflict of opinion and interests, Maximilian of Bavaria holds a position by himself more or less distinctive. Partly by the force of circumstances in which he was born and amid which he had grown up, partly by the inherent personal qualities with which nature had endowed him, he counted for much in the aggregate strength of the elements of power which were against the Protestant cause, and tended to the support of the Hapsburg supremacy in Germany. He was the only strictly political prince on the Catholic side of the controversy. The others on the same side were holders of ecclesiastical positions or functions, and too weak to make effective resistance by themselves, and thus became subservient either to Maximilian or the emperor. He was a champion self-poised, prudent, and brave. None of the other German rulers were adequately provided with a well-filled and carefully managed treasury. With his eye on surrounding dangers and future contingencies, he had taken care to have a well-trained army. More skilful than his princely neighbors, he had been able to form designs which could win the approval of others, and at the oppor-

tune hour be susceptible of practical enforcement. He was, in the opinion of his day, what at this age means more than it did then, — he was a practical man, especially in whatever tended to his own beliefs, interests, and political ambitions. He knew how to abide his time, and when to move, and to deal his most effective blows. It was said of him by one of his most clear-sighted opponents, "What the Duke of Bavaria does has hands and feet." So marked was his prestige in this regard, that, when he moved, his plans seemed to march to success by a strength of their own. As a champion he was as prudent as he was brave, and throughout the great war he adhered to one fixed plan. While he fought for a strong construction of the imperial claims, he was not a slavish dependent of the house of Austria. At no time did he lose sight of what would most certainly tend to the extension of the Bavarian territory and the surest line of advance to secure electoral dignity. As a true Catholic, he held, that, by faithful and effective service, he was entitled to his political reward. His eyes were carefully fixed on both worlds. When the Palatinate was lost to the Protestants through the weakness of its hereditary ruler, Maximilian did not fail to use his opportunities skilfully; and he knew how to make the weaker ecclesiastical princes contribute to the support of his cause. With all his rigid adherence to the claims and spirit of the Roman Church, he detested the Spaniards, partly perhaps from race incompatibility, partly from the fear that their counsels with Ferdinand might operate against his plans for Bavarian increase of dominions. Of such qualities of character as Maximilian was made up, with such opportunities presenting themselves as Germany afforded in his day, with such an army and such a general as Tilly subject to his orders, he could not fail to be a powerful obstacle to the work which the hero of Sweden was about to take in hand.

If Maximilian among his contemporary foes was not held in so high an estimation as the Lutheran champion John George of Saxony, the Catholic Bavarian duke receives higher respect from impartial history. From whatever place or standpoint of observation viewed, whether as defender of his avowed religious faith, as a champion of princely rights, as man, soldier, or statesman, the character and career of the Saxon elector have few aspects which win respectful regard. He was destitute of the principal qualities which are necessary to the leadership of men who have convictions and resolutions. He was weakest precisely where he needed to be strongest, in order to perform well his part in the position which circumstances had assigned him. By the extent of his territories, the resources at his command, the influence of his electoral vote, and the services of his ancestor Maurice in resistance to Catholic and imperial supremacy, this prince was considered the head of the Protestants of Germany. Reformers and Romanists alike knew the importance of his position. John George did not fail to comprehend the advantages which circumstances had placed at his disposal. With his eye constantly on what would tend to his own selfish aggrandizement, the coarseness of his ambitions prevented him from seeing clearly the enlightened self-interests of himself and his subjects. With so much of that local personal selfishness which for centuries too often characterized German princes and dukes, and brought so many discords and calamities on the German people, it was not possible that the elector of Saxony could effectively serve the Protestant cause. Indeed, his adherence to the Reformed faith seemed more a matter of expediency and princely interest than of any real convictions. As indifferent to those of the Calvinistic belief as he was to the Catholics, he thought to make his Lutheran position serve his purpose by dealing with rival interests and contending parties in a way to promote his

own special designs. Valuable as an ally to whichever side he gave his vote, his counsel, and his army, he was cautious to avoid committing himself to either party until he thought the step to be taken would gain his ends. But his mind was not capacious enough, his insight into men and events not sufficiently clairvoyant, to enable him to play his part in time to give him the prestige of power and success. To employ effectively such mean conceptions, to be a successful worker of the balances and checks between antagonistic parties stirred by contending ideas, required intellectual gifts, and a skill of action and self-possession, which John George was far from possessing. He had the gift of neither reading nor ruling men. He knew how to hunt wild boars, and was not a stranger to the other gross enjoyments of the princes of those times. He was a hard drinker; and such debasement could not have tended to his useful agency in a good cause, even in the seventeenth century. Such a party was neither valuable as a mediator between belligerents really in earnest, and, when driven to take one side against the other, would surely be distrusted as an ally and despised as a foe. As between the Lutheran John George and the Bavarian Catholic Maximilian, the Protestant student of history cannot fail to award his meed of respect for the latter. Yet the elector of Saxony was to serve as an important factor in the ebb and flow of the currents of the War of Thirty Years.

One of the most powerful individual forces with whom Gustavus will have to deal in Germany, and whom he was to encounter on his last field of battle, is Wallenstein, one of the strangest, most unique, and startling characters found in all the domain of history. It is with difficulty that a comparison can be drawn between him and another, for nature and time seem never to have produced his like. A compound of the brigand, of Julius Cæsar, and of some elements of mind and character akin to a German states-

man of the nineteenth century, the remarkable circumstances and events of his country and epoch developed him into a personality of great strength, about whom his contemporaries and historical critics widely differ. Albert of Waldstein, known as Count Wallenstein and the Duke of Friedland, was born in Bohemia of Lutheran parents belonging to the nobility of that country, and possessing only small estate. Left an orphan at the age of twelve years, his uncle sought to educate him in the doctrines and morals of the Moravians, known then, as they are now, for their simple religious faith and exemplary rules of life. But his active and imperious nature found it hard to conform to the strict discipline of the United Brethren, and sought easier and more congenial relations among the Jesuits at Olmutz, who knew how to blend indulgence and a more pliant morality so as to mould a young Protestant noble to their faith and policy. Early taking an interest in astrology,—a mystic science not then wanting in disciples among the ambitious and the learned, he soon imagined the powers of the sky had marked out for him a brilliant career. Most of the principal noble families of Bohemia at that time were Protestant; and the poor, ambitious orphan was not slow to perceive that his chance for fame and fortune would be better with the Catholic adherents of the empire than amid the humbler opportunities of his Protestant countrymen. He early took service with Ferdinand, while the future emperor ruled only over his three duchies, and was not long in showing his master of what stuff he was made. Step by step he won his reputation as a capable and brave officer. By marriage he acquired large wealth. When Bohemia elected and crowned as king, Frederick of Palatine, and Ferdinand resolved on his dethronement and the subjection of his subjects to the rule of Austria by the sword, Wallenstein aided in crushing the Protestants and destroying the independence of his native country, serving as a colonel at the battle of

Prague; and afterwards, as general, he defeated in Moravia a Hungarian force, allies of the Bohemians. The emperor rewarded the services of the brilliant and succesful soldier by granting him a large area of the confiscated lands of Bohemia, from which the Protestant nobles had been removed by perpetual banishment, or murder on the scaffold. Thus Wallenstein becomes the owner of vast estates, the richest man in Bohemia, and is advancing rapidly to be made Duke of Friedland. His ambition grows with success, and is stimulated by fresh opportunities: he is determined to occupy the nearest place to the emperor, and to advance his own plans by making the emperor more powerful. Holding in contempt the German princes of his time, inevitably he becomes the rival of Maximilian of Bavaria, who wishes to render the emperor dependent on his support, and jealous of Tilly, the successful general of the Bavarian duke. The thought which ferments in the brain of Wallenstein, if it never was fully evolved into a formula, is a strong central monarchy for entire Germany, sweeping away the greedy and grasping intermediaries of political and prelatical princes, allowing more freedom of action and a better chance for merit among all classes. When he makes to Ferdinand the bold proposition to raise a large, well-disciplined, and fully furnished army at his own expense, the emperor accepts the offer; as this enables him to husband his own financial resources, which have been depleted to an enormous extent by his courtiers and the Jesuits, and renders him more independent of Maximilian and the League. To bind his army to him, to make it a powerful machine in his hands, he gives liberal pay to his officers and men, and organizes it throughout with a magnificence and a splendor of equipments unknown to any other body of troops in Germany or adjacent kingdoms. Thus, by his skill, energy, audacity, and the *éclat* of his name, by the promotion of the common soldier for his bravery, the bestowment of numerous com-

missions as his gifts, his liberal uses of money where it brings results, he finds himself at the head of a hundred thousand men, the vast expense of which is paid out of the levies raised by robbing friend and foe wherever his army marches. In the magnitude and brilliant success of this manner of raising and supporting his army, he far surpasses Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, who had so severely scourged poor Germany.

Outside of his military organization and enterprises, he expends large sums for his spies and agents of intrigue, not only at the imperial court of Vienna, but in the courts of kings and princes. He has them even at Stockholm, and knows the intentions of the king of Sweden long before they are executed, and the decisions of the Swedish Diet before they are declared in Sweden. Surrounding his own plans with an impenetrable veil, his indefatigable brain and busy fingers are ever active over a vast area, unravelling the schemes of others, and baffling the devices of his foes; his eyes still steadily fixed on the stars, and reading in them prophetic words of his successful destiny.

His power has now become so great, his haughty bearing to his rivals so hard for them to endure, and his apparent designs so startling to the other supporters of the emperor, that a powerful combination is made for his overthrow. The imperial counsellors and courtiers at Vienna, the Catholic League, Maximilian of Bavaria, the advice of Spain, and Germany in the agony of her sufferings caused by the rapacities of his army, demand his removal from the imperial command; and to the same end Richelieu worked effectively through his supple and skilful secret agent, the Capuchin Father Joseph, acting as the seeming friend of the Duke of Bavaria and the Catholic interests. Ferdinand reluctantly yields; and Wallenstein submits, trusting to future events for his restoration, believing that the necessities of the emperor, against whom the hero of the North, the power of France, and the Protestant Ger-

man princes are uniting, will again demand his services: thus he will be revenged for his fall, and be enabled to baffle the designs of his enemies. To the messengers announcing the imperial decision taking from him his vast power, he remarks, "The emperor is betrayed: I pity, but forgive him. The grasping spirit of the Bavarian dictates to him. I grieve he has so weakly sacrificed me, but I will obey." The dissatisfaction in his army at the removal of their chief, whose creatures so many of its officers were, and whose bounty to them had been so prodigal, is general. Thousands of his soldiers enter the ranks of the emperor's foes; and many of his officers follow him to his vast estates in Bohemia and Moravia, where he now maintains more than the splendors of an Oriental monarch. To make his residence at Prague equal to his demands of magnificence and pomp, he removes a hundred houses to give place to his courtyard, and six gates conduct to its entrance. The chief nobles seek the honor of serving him, and sixty trained pages are at his bidding. A body of fifty life-guards protect his ante-chamber, and twelve barons and knights constantly attend his person. His table is maintained on a scale of regal magnitude and luxuriance. The splendor of his equipages is far surpassing any thing ever before witnessed in the Bohemian capital. When making journeys away from Prague, he travels in more than imperial state, accompanied by attendants filling a hundred wagons, each drawn by four horses; and his court follows in sixty carriages, with fifty led horses to increase the pomp. Yet, amid all this splendor and fatiguing show, his busy brain knows no rest in his present labors and plans for the future. That his palace might be quiet at night for the ceaseless toil of his restless genius, he keeps away the noise of coaches by blocking the streets leading to it with chains. His vast correspondence is made chiefly by his own hand, sometimes writing a hundred and fifty letters in a day. His eye on the future, informed

of what is transpiring in all the political centres of Europe, on the many webs of intrigue being woven by the leaders and agents of the rival parties and princes, he is biding his time to be recalled to the imperial command and to avenge himself on his enemies. To this trust in his future he is stimulated by Seni, an Italian astrologer in whose mystic prophecies Wallenstein has great confidence, who informs him that his splendid career of success and power is to be renewed. The victorious advancement of the king of Sweden from the North, strengthened by influential support in Germany, and aided by the powerful alliance of France, are rapidly hastening the event hoped for by the Duke of Friedland. And when Tilly has been driven with a defeated army from Breitenfeld, the victorious Swedes are marching on the Rhine, their Saxon allies making rapid progress towards Bohemia and Silesia, and the emperor and his courtiers are trembling for the safety of Vienna, Wallenstein knows that Ferdinand must call him again to his service.

And this man, so strange, so barbaric in some aspects, is yet in important respects in advance of his time. His cold, lucid reason teaches him that the true interests of Germany require unity without the interference of the foreigner, and by the recognition of the rights of the Protestants as well as the Catholics. He regards the Edict of Restitution a monstrous blunder. He is far less a bigot than Ferdinand and the rest of the chief imperial supporters. He is not blind to the wisdom of the lessons of Hugo Grotius, and invites him to his court. He says openly that he despises the policy which seeks to develop the Church powers at the expense and detriment of the State. He favored the Jesuits in his duchy, building them churches and seminaries, but often said he would give a large sum to be rid of them. He murmured that the greater part of the monks took on their vows and retired from the world, not to serve God, but to live with luxury

and license. In his army he makes no difference between Catholic and Protestant officers, unless he shows more confidence in the latter. He often exerts himself to reconcile those who hate each other because of different beliefs; always censuring the policy which sheds blood, and brings on whole countries the terrors of war, in order to force their religion upon them. If he sometimes seems the tool of Ferdinand and the Jesuits, a clear understanding of his policy and aims proves that he more often makes them do his work. Sometimes using the methods of the Jesuits to gain his ends, he has for them a strong dislike. He despises shams. He abhors flattery. The attendant who told him that everybody regarded him the greatest general the world had ever seen was dismissed from his service. Another attendant, who said he was called the great Bohemian beast, was given two thousand thalers. Low and cowardly actions awaken his whole scorn, and true worth is to him the best recommendation. The commands of the emperor and the favor of exalted personages could not influence in the arrangements and appointments of his army. Busy with his vast designs and immense labors for their advancement, he yet finds time to make persistent and careful efforts, by extensive correspondence and plans, to improve the agriculture, trade, and manufactures of his duchy. His manner of making war does not show him eager to shed blood. His aim seems to be always to avoid a battle if he can do so without imperilling the cause he serves, trusting to time to aid him to triumph, but when collision with his foe comes in spite of him, then to strike with the utmost possible energy, and to hold his position with unyielding obstinacy. It is against this man, supported by the mechanism of war which he has created, that Gustavus Adolphus is to strike, with a precision of military genius and energy even greater than his antagonist, on the fatal field where ends his career in a halo of glory, while Wal-

lenstein, with his shattered legions, retires from the bloody grounds of Lutzen, and passes rapidly along the path of his destiny to that tragic fate alone in the silent castle of Egra, where he falls a victim to imperial assassination, foully betrayed by those who had shared his confidence and his bounty.

CHAPTER IX.

ORIGIN AND FIRST YEARS OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. — THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION. — TREATY OF PACIFICATION.

In order to understand correctly the state and significance of the Thirty Years' War, when Gustavus Adolphus arrived on the theatre of action and assumed a responsible part among the belligerents, it is well to go back to the germs and causes of its origin, and to trace briefly the current of events to the period when the Swedish hero and his army placed their feet on German soil. If one were to seek to discover the negative or affirmative causes of the terrible carnival of bloodshed, devastation, anarchy, and suffering, which was finally terminated by the peace of Westphalia in 1648, he would find that the primal and fundamental facts which led to the strife were the inherent intellectual and moral forces of Protestantism and the lack of German unity. There certainly then existed in some degree the aspiration for, and some prevailing appreciation of the need and importance of, such unity to the German people. But that unity did not exist as a concrete fact, and there was not the central power to enforce it. Had the Austrian or German princes had among their numbers one equal in capacity and qualities to the Swedish king, or Henry IV. of France, and in their service statesmen like Oxenstierna, Sully, or Richelieu, it is possible that the explosion might have been prevented, or at least postponed, and its continuance shortened when the struggle could no longer have been prevented. But no Bismarck

was there; and had there been, the instruments would not have been forged ready to his hand; the circumstances were not such as could have made him successful master of the situation in the sense of controlling German patriotism to national ends. If remarkable men sometimes create events, and often largely influence them, it is more frequently that opportunities make great men; at least give them the necessary fields of action, and cause their greatness to be known. Such individuals are potential or powerless according as facts and events favor or oppose them. With men of this type in the place of Ferdinand II., and of the narrow-minded, egotistic, grossly selfish German princes of that period, — characteristics which they have but too generally exhibited in all periods of German history, — it is at best problematical if the tremendous struggle between the moral and political forces of Protestantism and Catholicism could have been obviated or greatly mitigated. Protestantism by its ideas and tendencies was aggressive; and it had enlisted in its cause powerful ambitions and interests, which were necessarily hostile to, and incompatible with, strongly organized interests and possessions of the Catholic prelates and princes. Between these powerful elements of antagonism, moving in diametrically opposite directions, collision would seem inevitable: there was an IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT between them, which diplomatists could not pacify, and whose consequences statesmen could not fully measure. The right of the individual to his religious convictions, boldly taught by Luther and others, had been potentially active for many years in German minds and hearts; and the idea of German national union had no governmental representative wise enough or strong enough to give it adequate protection and pacific direction, or to bring about *a mode of living* between the representatives and disciples of the old religion and the new. This is not the place to go at length into an historical statement of the early debates, the long and bitter

controversies, the conflicts and bloodshed, of which the Europe of the sixteenth century saw and experienced so much, and which took place between the adherents of the Catholic and the Reformed faiths; but there are certain facts and incidental events which precipitated the War of Thirty Years, and these it is necessary to our present purpose to briefly notice. In speaking of the German Empire of that time, it is well to keep in mind that it was a loosely and imperfectly organized conglomeration, whose constitution and laws, if they could be called such, could not be worked without a good deal of friction, and, on occasions of severe trial, with striking proofs of weakness and uncertainty. When, in the fifteenth century, there had been realized the necessity of creating an assemblage of the representatives of the princely and prelatical domains and of the cities of which Germany was composed, the result was what became known as the Diet. But, in forming this assemblage, it had never entered the thought of its authors that the tillers of the soil, the artisans, the men whose toil and sweat constituted the chief support of social life and government, — the people themselves, who made up the main strength of Germany in war and in peace, — should be represented in the Diet. The ecclesiastical and lay princes were recognized as the chief holders of the property, well-being, and authority of their respective domains; to whom the happiness and prosperity of the great mass of men and women were completely subordinate and secondary. The prelates and temporal princes, with the representatives of the cities, made up what were termed the estates of the empire. When they came together as a Diet, they were divided into three houses, each voting separately. In the first house sat the seven electors; these being the king of Bohemia, the electors of Brandenburg, Saxony, and the Palatinate, and the archbishops of Cologne, Mayence, and Treves. It was only when an emperor was to be chosen that the king of Bohemia was present, he

being excluded when all ordinary meetings for business or legislation took place. The second was termed the House of Princes; which was composed of fifty-six persons, to whom was recognized the right of sitting in the Diet. The third house comprised the representatives of the Free Imperial Cities, or cities which held directly from the emperor, and were not under the domination of a prelatical or lay prince. Thus the only members of the Diet who bore any semblance to representatives of the people were those of the free cities, and these were treated as markedly inferior to the members of the other houses. It was only after the electors and princes had deliberated upon and approved a measure that it was allowed to go to the House of the Cities, and the latter had no right to initiate a proposition. It is not difficult to perceive how utterly unfit for a numerous people was such a constitution in the stormy periods of Germanic history which followed the Reformation. It was unelastic, despotic, and in no sense fairly represented the constituent elements of which Germany was composed. If a large majority was stirred by some sincere and powerful conviction, and demanded a change, and the Diet wished to maintain the old order of things, they could not obtain it by the existing legal forms. Owing to one powerful cause, the lay princes might be likely to take the side of the cities on fundamental issues between Catholicism and Protestantism: for the tendency of the latter was to take large landed estates from the prelates, and put them within the grasp of the lay princes; and it cannot be ignored that the cupidity and avarice of the latter was often the mainspring of their Protestant course of action. But even with the delegates of the free cities, the majority of the lay princes, and a large majority of the German people, in favor of the new religion and its interests, the constitution of the Diet might still give an opposing voice. In the first house, the three votes of the electors of Brandenburg, Saxony, and the

Palatinate could be balanced by the three Catholic archbishops of Cologne, Mayence, and Treves. In the second division of the Diet,—the House of Princes,—there were thirty-eight ecclesiastical members and eighteen laymen. To pass measures through such a body, even to give Protestantism toleration or fair play, was impossible. Luther and Melanchthon had not been fifty years in their graves ere a large majority of the German population had become Protestant; and now, at the opening of the seventeenth century, with the great and stormy issues to be dealt with, was this Diet thus organized confronting the will and wishes of the German people. The lay princes, the free cities, and such of the people as ventured any freedom of action, were thus compelled to act outside of the Diet.

Turning from the contemplation of this peculiarly organized legislative body, a brief glance may be given, with interest, to the two judicial bodies, if such they can be called, of the German Empire. At the end of the fifteenth century, there had been created a regular and permanent tribunal, termed the Imperial Chamber of the Spires, in which the estates of the empire had reserved to themselves the right of selecting the assessors and of periodically reviewing its decrees. This court was principally nominated by the princes of the empire. In order to secure the carrying into effect of the decisions of this tribunal, Germany was divided into circles, in each of which the princes and the representatives of the free cities were authorized to assemble, and to raise means for the maintenance of order. By the terms of the religious peace, to which imperial sanction had been solemnly given, the rights of the estates had been extended to the Lutherans; so that Protestant judges had a voice in Protestant contested causes, and to some degree justice could be obtained for both religions in this Imperial Chamber. But those who were opposed to the freedom of the estates, and hostile to the Reformed

faith, did not long delay in finding effective means to weaken or destroy the beneficial results of this institution. There was in existence at Vienna a private imperial tribunal known as the Aulic Council, a court originally intended to advise the emperor in the exercise of his imperial and personal prerogatives. The members of this court were appointed and paid by the emperor; and they knew no law but what they deemed the interest of their master, whom as obsequious courtiers they would blindly serve. Partisans of the old forms of faith as they were, servile agents of their sovereign, equity and justice could expect no favor from them. Gradually this Aulic Council, this association of courtiers, usurped supreme jurisdiction over the Imperial Chamber of the Spires; and before the former were brought important suits of estates differing in religion, and which belonged to the jurisdiction of the latter tribunal. With a Diet whose majority was supported by only a minority of the nation, with such a shadow and mockery of judicial institutions as the Aulic Council had become by its usurpations over the authority of the Imperial Chamber, with the tillers of the soil, the artisans, and a great majority of the tradesmen, — the chief bulk of the inhabitants who constituted Germany, — having no voice in parliament, or chance of justice before any judicial tribunal, how long could anarchy and revolution be postponed when deeply pervading sentiments were stirred and burning issues demanded solution? With a ruler of large capacity, generous instincts, and a firm purpose to exercise with wisdom and justice his sovereign authority as emperor of Germany, even with this clumsy and distorted piece of constitutional machinery of the empire, peace might have been prolonged. But no such prince occupied the imperial throne in the years which preceded the breaking-out of the War of Thirty Years. With such parliamentary and judicial institutions, — if this violence of language may be tolerated, — with such occupants of the imperial throne, and such burning

questions in play, how was it possible that the Treaty of Passau could be longer maintained?

This treaty of religious pacification, made in 1552 and approved by the Diet of Augsburg in 1555, was secured under the restraining pressure of circumstances which no longer existed. It had been brought about at the close of great and costly struggles, in which both parties to the issue had become wearied. In the earlier part of this bloody debate, the imperial power was represented by the foremost monarch of the world. Charles V., king of Spain and emperor of Germany, a strong ruler by his capacities as well as by the extent of his empire, after having humbled France, beaten the Turks, and vindicated his vaunted claim to be the chief Catholic sovereign of Europe, resolved to bring the Protestants of his dominions to submission. It was in his power to influence largely the affairs of Germany without resort to arms, but he found the Reformed opinion and the consciences of men stronger than diplomacy and the prestige of his name. To accomplish the theological unity of the empire, he deemed it necessary to put forth his military power. Though claiming to be a German prince, the blood of a Spanish mother was in his veins; and he had the proud Castilian aversion to the Lutheran teaching, and to any new formula of faith which tended to subvert the Church, of which he considered himself the chief champion and defender. The disclosure of his subduing designs in respect to his Protestant subjects caused them to take the alarm, and led to their forming the league of Smalcalde, by which they met force with force. The strength of the emperor was too great for the Protestant league, and the result of the collision between the hostile parties was a treaty which placed the Protestants of Germany at the mercy of their enemies; but the cessation of hostilities proved but a temporary truce. The change of position of Maurice of Saxony took from the emperor a strong pillar of support where he

most needed it, and gave a large increase of strength to the Protestant belligerents. The result of the next encounter of the hostile forces was more than a restoration of Protestant prestige, followed by the treaty of Passau, which stipulated that a Diet should be held to settle the terms of a general pacification. This Diet assembled at Augsburg in 1555. Baffled in his plans, wearied with strife, and perplexed with the cares of ruling his vast dominions, Charles V. abdicated his thrones, and betook himself to a kind of monastic exile in Spain. He left as his representative in Germany his brother Ferdinand, of much less ruling capacity and more conciliatory than himself. Ferdinand was then king of Hungary and Bohemia, and was soon to become his imperial successor in Germany. Ferdinand and the chief men of both belligerent parties desired peace. The Diet of Augsburg recognized that Germany was divided into religious and political parties, conceded their independent rights, and proposed to establish the terms by which they could exist together under a common empire. The Protestants heretofore had been regarded as heretics and rebels: henceforth they were to be regarded as brothers by necessity, not by genuine fraternal affection. It was attempted, by terms on parchment, to hold in quiet abeyance irrepressible prejudices and sentiments, and to adjust sharply antagonistic claims of property and self-interest. It was agreed that the Protestant princes who had in their territories taken possession of ecclesiastical property prior to the Treaty of Passau, should cease to be under the law or authority of the Catholic prelates. These terms provided only for the past. Protestant thought and propagandism were still alive, and would expect to make new acquisitions. How should the future be provided for? It might happen that princes would wish to make additional appropriations of church property to secular uses. This difficulty was not clearly settled by the language of the arrangement sanctioned by

the Diet; but as it was plainly determined that the property taken by the Protestant princes prior to the Treaty of Passau should be theirs, and it was not so stipulated as to property taken after the date of the Passau treaty, therefore the Catholics maintained that they had never abandoned their right to lands secularized after the Passau adjustment. Then, again, it might be that bishops and abbots would turn Protestants. Must they surrender their property in doing so? Should Lutherans be compelled to give up possessions to which the benevolence of their fathers had contributed at a time when no issues between Lutheranism and Romanism were known? The Catholic members of the Diet urged with pertinacity that the bishop or abbot who changed his faith should be required to vacate his place, and take no ecclesiastical possessions to his new brotherhood. This demand of the Catholics was conceded under what was termed the Ecclesiastical Reservation. By its terms it was understood that every elector, bishop, or abbot holding directly from the empire forfeited his dignity and benefice whenever he became Protestant; and the Chapter was to proceed to a new election, precisely as though his place had been vacated by death. The principle of this provision of the Reservation, strongly opposed in the Diet by the Lutherans, was finally adopted in the treaty of peace; though it was accompanied with the declaration that no final determination of the question had been concluded. By this was left unsettled a subject which was to be one of the chief causes of future war. The feelings of subjects who had no representatives in the Diet were little cared for in this measure of pacification. The princely sovereigns, lay and clerical, were alone to determine what religion should prevail in their territories. The treaty recognized Catholics and Lutherans only, and Calvinists and other disciples of new beliefs were in no way considered as coming under the shield of the State. This religious adjustment utterly

ignored the philosophy of the human mind, outlawed the sacred rights of individuals, and had in it the seeds of inevitable strife and persecution. It was made by the sword, and by the sword it was to be maintained. Though brought about by the two powerful belligerent parties, who claimed to have negotiated as equals, to the Catholics was left the decided advantage. The Lutherans had gained by it only toleration, and had, by implication if not in express terms, tied their hands against further advancement. To become a Protestant hereafter was a crime, for which the Reservation provided the penalty, which was held over the spiritual princes who should abandon the Roman faith. Whatever was conceded to the Lutherans was under conditions. Such an arrangement could not in truth be termed a genuine treaty of peace: it was but a truce between parties who were still belligerents in spirit and purpose. But history compels the admission that for a time it was not utterly without success. For a while there was a cessation of strife in Germany. A transitory bond of union appeared to bind together the shattered parts of the empire, and for a time there seemed to be a feeling for the common weal. But a harmonious acquiescence in the original intent of the treaty did not long continue: the disagreement as to the interpretation of the compact ere long marked out the lines of division and conflict. The Catholics came to believe that they had surrendered too much, and the Protestants were not long in reaching the conclusion that they had not gained that to which they were justly entitled. The barriers which the Catholics had sought to set up against the Protestant inroads soon gave way, or were outflanked by powerful motives of interest. The Protestant princes continued to maintain the right to secularize the church lands within their territorial limits, as being the necessary sequence of their admitted authority to decide as to the religious formula of faith for their subjects. The motive which had undoubtedly induced the

majority of the Protestant princes to embrace Lutheranism was as powerful after the arrangement of Augsburg as before the Treaty of Passau. After the Augsburg agreement, nearly a hundred monasteries were seized in the Palatinate alone. Each party, where it was most powerful, encroached on the rights of the other. The Catholics living in the territories of Protestant princes complained bitterly of the violations of the terms of the Augsburg compromise, while the Lutherans living under Catholic princes were no less emphatic as to the oppressions which they suffered. The grievances of parties could be carried to the Imperial Chamber. With the Aulic Council to usurp the prerogatives of the Chamber, what chance was there for impartial justice? The Protestants found what they deemed sufficient excuse for evading an important provision of the Augsburg treaty. They maintained that the object of the Ecclesiastical Reservation was not to secure the bishoprics in the possession of the Catholics, but to prevent quarrels between the bishops and their subjects. Consequently, if a bishop elected as a Catholic became a Lutheran, he must be held to resign his see so as not to give offence to the Catholic Chapter; but, should a Chapter already Lutheran elect a Lutheran bishop, he should take the see, and hold it as long as he lived. It was by this construction of the terms of the pacification that eight of the chief bishoprics of North Germany come under Protestant control. The Protestant occupant was simply an elected prince, sometimes regarding himself a bishop, more often and more properly called an administrator, caring for the temporal affairs of his territory. On its face and in its practical operation this constructive claim of the Protestants was just, for the inhabitants of these territories were nearly all of the Protestant faith. On the other hand, the Catholics declared that these administrators were not bishops, that it was bald usurpation for them to hold the bishops' land and to occupy seats in the imperial Diet.

The Protestant claim was intrinsically just, but not in accord with the terms of the Ecclesiastical Reservation, and might be regarded an infringement of the Augsburg adjustment. The disagreement between the two parties about these administrators became one of the principal causes of the War of Thirty Years.

In the mean while the reforms and the sleepless activity of the positive men of one party, and the measures of resistance and repression of the other, kept both in constant vigilance; and the dispute as to the correct interpretation of the treaty of pacification was without cessation. Each party asserted that the other was constantly infringing its provisions and spirit, while the constant effort of its own was declared to be essential to its maintenance. The Protestants had certainly shown what the Catholics might expect if they should become the weaker party. On the other hand, it would be difficult to say that the Protestants were not excusable for not placing too much confidence in the good faith of the Catholics. All these years, while this treaty of peace, or armed truce, was maintained in Germany, the Protestants were subjected to the most inhuman treatment in other countries of Europe where Catholic domination was supreme. In Spain, France, among the Flemings, all tendencies to adopt the new religion were remorselessly stamped out in fire and blood. In the Netherlands the atrocities of the Duke of Alva and other minions of the Catholic king were enough to cause demons to blush. It was at a time when the infamous doctrine was taught and held that the Pope could relieve Catholic princes from their sacred oaths relative to their Protestant subjects; and the Jesuits were successful in disseminating the maxim that no faith was to be kept with heretics. What permanent security, then, could the Treaty of Augsburg guarantee, when the Jesuits, everywhere active, and received in high official quarters, represented it as an arrangement of temporary expedi-

ency, while in Rome itself it was openly repudiated. It was well understood that the German Catholics relied on Spain, whose bigoted and persecuting king was a near relative of the occupant of the imperial throne, and would be its powerful ally in case of need. Germany, in all these years following the convention of Passau, was the nursery from which nearly all the powers of Europe drew recruits for their armies, whom its mercenary princes did not scruple to sell for gain. On both sides, in the long and terrible struggle which the Dutch waged against the Spaniards for independence, the belligerents were largely aided by German troops. Every such levy tended to kindle the flame of conflict among the German populations, and was cause of alarm to one party or the other; and those who returned brought back the habits of soldiers and the passions of war. Thus for most of the period from the conclusion of the Treaty of Augsburg, in 1555, to its rupture, in 1607, there really existed between the two parties in Germany only a truce, by which nothing was settled; each party watching the future, and grasping tightly the sword.

To intensify the strained relations between the Catholic and Protestant parties in Germany, several incidents and events now took place. One of these grew out of a love-episode, in which religion played an essential part, and which resulted in political and military transactions of considerable importance. The Elector Gebhard of Cologne became deeply enamoured of the young Countess Agnes of Mansfeld, and his affection was reciprocated; but his prelatical office and obligations forbade the sanction of the union by marriage. The affair, having to do with one occupying so important a position as an elector, who composed one of the seven on whom depended the choice of an emperor, could not fail to draw towards it great interest among German princes and people. The two brothers of the lady, zealous disciples of Calvin, demanded

that Gebhard should abandon all connection with their sister unless he would promptly consent to make good her reputation by marriage. Regardless of the political and personal consequences of his conduct, the elector was true to the obligations of his love, renounced the faith of Rome, and consecrated his union with the beautiful Agnes by leading her to the altar. According to the Catholic and more literal construction of the Ecclesiastical Reservation of the Augsburg pacification, the Elector Gebhard had by this step forfeited all the property franchises and benefits of his bishopric. That Cologne was one of the three ecclesiastical electorates was enough to make the Catholics strongly determined to enforce their claims against the apostate elector; while the Protestants fully appreciated the advantage they would gain by securing the fourth electorate, which would give them a majority in the electoral college, urging in their cause that the terms of the Augsburg treaty did not guarantee the demands of their opponents. The Elector Gebhard soon had a numerous Protestant following within his jurisdiction; and encouraged by his friends and family connections, and the promise of influential support from Protestant German princes, he resolved to retain possession of his ecclesiastical territory as a bishop of the Protestant faith. But it did not take long to prove that he had attempted more than he could carry to a successful conclusion. There was soon a violent opposition to the exercise of the Protestant service within the Cologne territories. His Catholic opponents secured the assistance of the emperor and the Pope against him, and Gebhard was anathematized as an apostate, deprived of his dignities, and the subjects of his electoral territories armed against him. Gebhard organized in his defence a military force, and his opponents were equally prompt in taking up arms. These incidents and proceedings could have but one result, — civil war. It was plain to

the leaders of the two parties in Germany that the general breaking-up of the Augsburg pacification could be avoided with extreme difficulty. The Protestant princes took a lively interest in the affair, and Protestants abroad strongly urged the German princes to stand firmly by their rights against the imperial ban and papal anathemas. But there was one fatal link in Gebhard's chain of defence. He had become a Calvinist, and not a Lutheran. The Augsburg treaty of peace provided only for Catholics and Lutherans. Jealousy and dislike were so strong between the two churches of the Protestant faith, that the Lutheran princes and estates did not unite in giving the Calvinist Gebhard effective support. On the other hand, the Bavarian prince whom the Catholic Chapter of Cologne had chosen elector in place of the apostate, the husband of the beautiful Agnes, was vigorously sustained by his Bavarian relations and Spanish troops from the Netherlands. The troops of the Calvinist elector were outnumbered, defeated, and obliged to yield to superior force throughout his territories; and he sought in vain among the Protestants of foreign lands assistance to restore him to possession of the Cologne electorate.

Not long after this complicated and bitter quarrel in Cologne, there arose a serious dispute in Strasburg. This grew out of the attempts of Protestant canons who had been driven from Cologne, and who went to Strasburg, where the Catholics opposed their enjoying their prebends. The Protestant canons persisted in the maintenance of their rights, took possession of their benefices by force, and, aided by numerous Protestant supporters among the citizens, secured a majority in the Chapter. The Catholic canons outvoted, retired to the neighboring district, where they established themselves, and claimed to be the legal Chapter, and denounced that remaining in Strasburg as heretical and without authority. In the mean while the

Strasburg party had increased their numbers by the addition of influential Protestant colleagues; and the bishop having deceased, they nominated a Protestant to fill the vacancy, — John George of Brandenburg. The Catholic canons responded to this action of their opponents by selecting the bishop of Metz, a Lorraine prince, who at once commenced hostilities against Strasburg. That city took arms in defence of the Protestant Chapter and Bishop John George of Brandenburg. A prolonged and devastating war followed, and in vain did the emperor exert his authority to put an end to the quarrel. Finally the Protestant prince yielded his claims to the ecclesiastical property for a pecuniary consideration, leaving his opponent in possession of the territory. Though these disputes and struggles, of which Cologne and Strasburg had been the centres, and others of lesser importance involving similar passions and interests, served to intensify the distrust and ill-feeling between the two great parties in Germany, a general rupture of the compromises of Passau and Augsburg had not taken place.

But in 1607 occurred an incident which speedily resulted in transactions that might be regarded as a violation of the spirit and terms of the compact which had kept the contracting parties from general war for more than half a century. The free city of Donauwerth in South Germany had become so entirely Protestant that the Catholics had only a church in the monastery which remained to them. So averse were the citizens to the public ceremonies of the old religion, that the priests had found it expedient to suppress some of their rites; but finally a fanatical monk thought to openly defy the popular sentiment by sending out a procession with flaunting banners and the cross, but he was soon compelled to desist from his attempt. After some months had passed, the same abbot sent out another procession of a similar character, which resulted in the throwing of mud and

stones. Some of those who had participated in the procession were severely handled, and the monks were followed to their houses with opprobrius epithets. Complaint was made to the emperor against this conduct of the inhabitants of Donauwerth. Though it properly belonged to the Imperial Chamber to deal with such religious quarrels, this case fell into the hands of the Aulic Council, composed of courtiers; and Donauwerth was formally condemned to the ban of the empire, and Maximilian of Bavaria was appointed to execute the imperial decree. The Duke of Bavaria promptly marched an army, and took possession of the city, which offered no resistance. The Protestant religion within the walls was abolished; and Maximilian declared his intention to hold possession until his expenses had been paid, at the same time giving the parish church to the Catholics. The city was deprived of its free privileges, and changed into a municipal town, to belong to Bavaria. This affair produced among the Protestants of South Germany a deep feeling of indignation and alarm. It was regarded as seriously significant for several important reasons. It involved imperial responsibility, and plainly indicated what might be expected of imperial authority in the future. The sentence against Donauwerth had been pronounced by the usurping Aulic Council, an arbitrary Catholic tribunal, from which Protestants could never expect justice, and on any emergency could be used as an instrument of despotism and persecution. The enforcement of its decree against the offending city had been intrusted to the Duke of Bavaria, the head of another circle. This prince was known to be strong by his capacity as a ruler, and by the possession of a well-drilled army and a carefully managed treasury. He was ambitious, thoroughly devoted to the Roman Church by conviction and policy, and counted on an increase of territory. If one Protestant city could be deprived of its privileges by unconstitutional proceed-

ings, and converted into a Bavarian town by force, why could not another by some similar pretext and proceeding? The three Protestant cities of South Germany — Strasburg, Nüremburg, and Ulm — took the alarm, and made common cause with the neighboring Protestant princes. Measures were soon taken to bring together the separate Protestant territories and cities into an effective organization as a measure of defence against future dangers and encroachments from their enemies. This Evangelical Union came into existence in May, 1608, and was composed alike of Lutherans and Calvinists. Its strength was chiefly made up of the South German princes and cities. Of the princes, members of this union, were the electors of the Palatinate, Frederick IV., Philip Louis of Neuburg, John Frederick, Duke of Wurtemberg, the Margrave John Frederick of Baden, and two margraves of Brandenburg, Christian and Joachim Ernest. The busy brain and inspiring genius of the organization was Christian of Anhalt. He was an earnest Calvinist, impetuous, fertile in resources, indefatigable in his activity, well versed in the diplomacy and the affairs of his time. The real object and obligations of this union were, that its members should stand by each other, with counsels and arms, in all matters relating to religion and civil rights, and that, in case any one of its members was attacked, the aggressor should be resisted by armed force. To Frederick IV., the elector palatine, was given the general direction of the organization in time of peace; but his power was limited. To meet the necessary pecuniary expenses of the Union, a common fund was provided by subsidies and contributions. Subsequently the alliance was joined by the elector of Brandenburg; while the dukes of Hesse-Cassel, Luneburg, and Brunswick, Protestant princes though they were, hesitated to commit themselves. John George, the Saxon elector, true to his character of always having an eye to his own schemes of self-interest,

chose to stand aloof. This decided action of the Protestants led speedily to the creation of a counter organization by the Catholics, which was completed in Munich in 1609. It was composed of the three ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, Cologne, and Treves, the bishops of Wurtzburg, Constance, Augsburg, and other bishops and abbots, and the Duke of Bavaria, whose ability and force of character as a leader gave the Catholic union an effective direction which its Protestant opponent could never command. Both of these organizations claimed that they had been made for defence, and not for purposes of aggression. Both maintained that they would stand by the laws and existing compacts. It is undoubtedly true, that, whatever his associates intended, Christian of Anhalt, the inspiring soul of this association, meant more, — meant to push forward on ground held by the opposing party. But he and his associates had committed no overt act of aggression; while the Catholics had shown their intentions by overt and flagrant acts, and the dangers which the latter claimed to fear were contingent. The seizure of Donauwerth, the suppression of the religion of the great majority of its citizens, and turning the city into a Bavarian town, were clearly acts of aggression and conquest. The Protestant union laid its grievances before the emperor, and demanded justice and reparation. It asked that Donauwerth should be restored, that the Aulic Council, which had illegally pronounced its condemnation, should be abolished, and that the imperial administration should be reformed, — demands which, in view of what had recently taken place, and of dangers which threatened the future, could not be considered unreasonable.

Hardly had these somewhat ominous and energetic measures of the two parties been taken — the formation of the Evangelical Union and the Catholic League — than other events occurred to render the aspect of affairs more critical. In the spring of 1609 Duke John William of

Juliers and Cleves died, leaving in dispute the succession to the territory made vacant by his death. For this territory, there were not less than eight contestants, among whom were the Elector of Brandenburg, the Elector of Saxony, the Duke of Saxony, the Count Palatine of Neuburg, and the Count Palatine of Deux Ponts, the Margrave of Burgau. The claims of Neuburg and Brandenburg seemed to be the strongest, and they both proceeded to take possession. The dispute waxed warm, when the emperor took the affair in hand, which so alarmed these two claimants that they came to the agreement to govern the duchy jointly. The emperor forbade the estates to recognize the new masters, and sent an influential agent into the territory to strengthen the imperial party. The whole duchy, excepting the town of Juliers, acknowledged the Protestant princes. This dispute assumed grave importance, not only in Germany, but in other European countries. The Evangelical Union, the Dutch Republic, England, and Henry IV. of France, took an interest or active part in the controversy that touched jealousies and rights, and involved complications, which had more or less to do with the long and terrible struggle which was pending in the not distant future. Henry was the Catholic king of a Catholic nation, but he was not a bigot in theological affairs at home or abroad. He had cultivated sympathetic relations with the Evangelical Union, and was friendly to the influences in Germany, of which that body was the centre and the representative. He wished to throw every possible obstacle to the plans and aggressions of the house of Austria, which had done its utmost to block his ascent to the French throne, and which, allied to Spain by blood and religious bigotry, he regarded a dangerous foe of France and a menace to Europe. But the dagger of the assassin put an end to his reign; and it remained to Richelieu fifteen years later to take up his policy, and push it with consummate tact and energy for

many years, amid great opportunities and events. The effects of the death of Henry on the plans and success of the Protestant Union were not long in being made manifest. The expected French army did not arrive upon the Rhine. The supplies of the Union began to fail; and the free cities were displeased that their money was so lavishly expended by the princes in voting themselves pensions out of the common fund, while they had refused to give an exhibit of the Union's expenditures. Thus the Protestant organization, of which so much had been expected, was growing weak for want of supplies; while the Catholic League, more ably administered, was just coming into the vigor of its strength. Maximilian and his associates now assumed a bold and resolute tone, and the Protestant confederates were soon compelled to sue for peace. Both parties laid down their arms, with promises of improved behavior.

CHAPTER X.

REVOLT IN BOHEMIA. — FREDERICK OF PALATINE CROWNED KING. — FERDINAND II. CHOSEN EMPEROR BY THE ELECTORS. — THE SUBJECTION OF BOHEMIA BY FERDINAND AND THE LEAGUE. — MANSFELD. — CHRISTIAN OF BRUNSWICK. — TILLY. — ELIZABETH OF PALATINE.

But while these transactions were taking place among the German princes and cities of the west, in another quarter were occurring incidents and events which were to prove the more immediate precursors of the general storm, of which there were increasing indications in various directions. The antagonism and strife between Catholicism and different forms of the new faith in Bohemia were not of recent origin. A hundred years before Luther had published his bold theses against the extreme dogmas of the old religion, John Huss had expressed his opinion adverse to some of the authoritative teachings of the existing church; and the seeds which he planted did not fail to germinate and have vigorous growth. The sect which owed its name to its founder had long before this become numerous, and compelled recognition and protection by the authorities. In most respects it did not differ essentially from the Romish Church in doctrines and rites, excepting as to the administration of the communion, in which that sect allowed both kinds. This privilege had been conceded the Hussites by the Council of Basle in an express stipulation. But there was another sect in Bohemia, the United Brethren, which differed more radically from the Romanists, and resembled more nearly the German Protestants.

The teachings of Luther and Calvin had also there made progress; so that the dissenting believers had become more numerous in the country than the adherents of the old faith, and now sought immunity and the protection of the laws. The grandfather of the present emperor, Ferdinand I., had been one of the chief promoters of the Augsburg pacification; and his father, Maximilian, had been just and considerate towards his dissenting Bohemian subjects. The present emperor, Rudolph II., had not the qualities for a successful ruler. He was not wanting in mildness of character, and loved peace and the study of the sciences and antiquity; but he did not devote himself to the cares of government at a time when it demanded his constant and best efforts. He had passed his youth in Spain, where the insinuating teachings of the Jesuits, and associations with the Spanish court, had exerted upon him an unhealthy influence. If his mind was always entirely sane, of which there was some question, it took at times a direction that was eccentric, and little calculated to win the attachment of his subjects. He shut himself in his laboratory, and busied himself with his gems, his curiosities, and his astrological reveries, at a time when the passing necessities of the empire demanded his utmost attention and effort. He was archduke of Austria, which was then but a limited territory, and not that somewhat extended area now known as Austria; and he was likewise king of Bohemia and Hungary; while other members of the family governed other territories. Rudolph was a weak ruler at just the time when the questions and exigencies with which he had to deal required a wise brain and a vigorous hand. One of the chief difficulties which beset him was how to govern as a devoted Catholic while the majority of his subjects were adherents of the Protestant faith, especially as religion was the leading question of the day; and his difficulties in this regard were greatly augmented by the fact that the party opposed to his religion owed much of its

strength to the aristocracy, which otherwise would have been a powerful prop to his imperial authority. But closing his eyes to the obstacles in the way, he resolved to make his subjects conform their religion to his own. Having made peace with the Turks in 1606, he thought his hands sufficiently free to deal with the inhabitants of his dominions as his cousin Ferdinand, afterwards emperor, had done in his territories of Styria, Carinthia, and Carmiola, — subdue Protestantism with the strong hand, and everywhere set up the Catholic worship. But he had not the governing capacity of his cousin, and the magnitude of his undertakings was far greater and more complicated than that which Ferdinand had accomplished. The result was a general revolt. In the Austrian duchy, in Hungary and Transylvania, and in Bohemia, the resistance was general, and allegiance to him was renounced. To prevent the complete overthrow and dethronement of the Austrian Hapsburg house, his own brothers and relatives combined against him. His father, Maximilian, had left six sons, the second of whom was Matthias, who was now put forward to wrest from Rudolph the power which he did not know how to use. Securing strong support in Hungary, where he had served as viceroy, and encouraged by favorable information from other quarters, Matthias assumed a bold attitude towards the emperor. The Protestants of Austria and Moravia, won to Matthias by his promises of toleration, boldly espoused his cause; and soon he was on his march to Bohemia to seize his brother Rudolph, the emperor, in his palace, and compel his abdication. Abandoned by all his other subjects, Rudolph had no other resource left him but to do his utmost to secure the firm support of the Bohemians, who were equally resolved to improve their opportunity to enforce their just demands. Again the emperor appeared in the Diet at Prague, which he had not done before for a long period. The Diet, understanding the situation, and knowing their strength, refused

to take a single step for the defence of the emperor until he had confirmed their privileges, and granted them full religious toleration. Rudolph came to terms with the Diet, by which he acceded to their other demands; and it was arranged that religious questions should be considered at the next Diet. The Bohemians now supported the cause of the emperor by arms; but to keep from war with his brother, and to avoid being at the mercy of the Bohemian estates, he came to a reconciliation with Matthias, giving up to him Austria and Hungary, leaving Moravia, Silesia, and Bohemia to Rudolph for his lifetime, and acknowledging Matthias as his legal successor to the Bohemian crown. This pusillanimous and vacillating course of procedure towards the adversary in front was equalled by his lack of good faith to his Bohemian subjects, who had arisen in arms to defend him. But the result of the course of action taken by the emperor was to strengthen the cause of the Protestant estates of the kingdom. In 1609, by the action of the Diet, followed by bolder proceedings to which the estates were compelled to resort to accomplish their just demands, Rudolph finally granted the Letter of Majesty, which secured the freedom of conscience to every inhabitant of Bohemia provided he confined himself to certain recognized creeds, though this toleration did not carry with it freedom of worship. A person might believe as he wished, but the building of churches and the performance of public worship must be regulated by the authorities. By this Magna Charta of Bohemian Protestantism the authority to regulate worship was given to the nobility and the representatives of the towns, an exception being made in the document to the royal domains. The Protestants were put in possession of the University of Prague, and allowed a consistory of their own. All the churches in the cities, villages, and market-towns which the Protestants held at the date of this agreement were secured to them. If the nobles

and free cities wished to build other churches, that permission was stipulated. This clause in this Protestant Magna Charta led to disputes which culminated in war. Rudolph was bitterly dissatisfied with what he had been forced to do by Matthias on the one hand and his Bohemian subjects on the other. He tried to extricate himself from what he had agreed to; and the result of this was his dethronement in 1611, when the Protestants of Bohemia invited Matthias into the country, who entered Prague amid general rejoicings, and was soon after acknowledged king. The following year Rudolph died, and Matthias became emperor. For a while the rule of the new emperor gave a certain degree of quiet, but he was not long content with the privileges which had been allowed his Protestant subjects. He did not attack directly the guaranties of the Letter of Majesty on the lands of the nobles or in the free cities, but he took the more Jesuitical method of undermining the royal agreement on his own domains. There were soon bitter disputes about certain new churches which the Protestants had erected, and of which the Catholic abbot and bishop forbade the use. Matthias sustained the action of the Catholic ecclesiastics, appointed Catholic priests to Protestant churches, and permitted the enforcement of measures to compel Protestants to attend Catholic worship, and openly evaded the spirit and plain meaning of the royal letter. But the Bohemian Protestants did not at once take action in defence of their violated liberties. Matthias was now old and infirm; and it was supposed that it would not be long before the Protestant estates would be called to elect a new king, whom it was believed would be a Protestant. In 1617 the Diet was suddenly assembled, when it was informed that it was an error to suppose the Bohemian crown elective. Intimidation and force were used to sustain the argument that the throne was hereditary; and the Diet was compelled to acknowledge Ferdinand as king of Bohemia, — the man

whom the Bohemian Protestants dreaded, for he was the Austrian prince who was known as having stamped out Protestantism so completely in his ducal dominions. The Bohemians could not fail to know that in him they had a ruler of a different stamp from his predecessors, and a conscience quite as flexible as they had given proofs of when under the pressure of emergencies. Chosen king of a people largely Protestant, by fraud and force, it was for him to decide whether he should sustain the Letter of Majesty. Trained in the school of the Jesuits, and a faithful disciple of their ethical philosophy, he consulted them as to his duty relative to taking the oath to carry into effect the terms of the document which so deeply concerned his Bohemian subjects. He was told by these oily tongued advisers, that, though it had been a sin to make such a concession to heretical opinions, it would be no moral offence to swear to maintain it, now it was the law of the kingdom. On his way to his coronation he remarked to a Bohemian noble at his side, "I am happy that I have gained the Bohemian throne without any pangs of conscience." He took the oath without any qualms of dissent, though there can be no doubt he cherished mental reservation. Though under a kind of dual rule of emperor and king, the Bohemians soon realized that in the young Hapsburg they had a dangerous foe to all their best hopes. The Protestants on the royal domains were treated with more severity. In Braunau they were not allowed the use of their church, and the new church which they had erected at Klostergrab was torn down. The advanced age of the emperor, and his increasing infirmities, caused him to desire repose and quiet, and to leave the affairs of Bohemia almost entirely to Ferdinand. The privileges of the kingdom, which the new sovereign had sworn to maintain, required that the government officials should be equally divided between the members of the old and the new religion, and that the worship of both should be respected.

What had already taken place proved how little the obligations of his oath in these regards had been observed. Devoted friends of the house of Austria counselled prudence. Ferdinand remained inflexible in his policy of repression. The powerful Protestant nobility, largely in majority, was bitterly irritated, and the pride of the Bohemian Catholics was deeply wounded, by the violence practised against the national liberties. A general outcry was raised against the plain violation of the Letter of Majesty. Certain individuals, designated defenders, had the legal authority to call together the representatives of the Protestant Bohemian estates. An assemblage thus duly summoned met in March, 1618, and, after preparing a petition to the emperor, adjourned until the 21st of May following. An answer to the petition for redress of grievances was not long in being returned from Matthias, justifying the wrongs which had been committed, and pronouncing the assemblage of the Protestant estates illegal. The opinion was held at the time, though history now affirms it to have been erroneous, that the imperial answer was the work of two chief members of the royal council at Prague, Slawata and Martinitz. These two men had long evinced their hostile feelings towards the Protestants, and they alone had refused to be present when the Letter of Majesty had been made a part of the Bohemian constitution. Of the Catholic nobles these two had treated their Protestant peasantry with the greatest severity, and were accused even of hunting them with dogs to the mass, and forcing them to accept the Papal religion by denying them the rites of baptism, marriage, and burial. Among the incensed Bohemians, there was a number of resolute men, at the head of whom was Count Henry of Thurn, who were determined to expel Ferdinand from the throne. They had resolved to take advantage of the popular uprising and indignation, to put out of the way the two royal counsellors who were regarded the chief instigators of repressive and

persecuting measures, and thus take the first bold step, which would lead necessarily to effective action, to rid the country of the sovereign who had wantonly violated the charter of Bohemian liberties. On the 23d of May, 1618, Count Thurn—accompanied by many nobles, Bohemian soldiers, and many others, forming a numerous crowd, well armed—advanced to the castle; and the leaders, entering the room where the royal counsellors were assembled, accused the obnoxious persons of being the authors of the offensive reply of the king to the Protestant petition. After a violent altercation, Martinitz and Slawata were seized, dragged to the window, and pitched out at the height of seventy feet, and the secretary Fabricius, their creature, was thrown after them; while two others of the counsellors, less hated, were led out of the room. Owing to there being a large manure-heap at the foot of the wall, where the victims of popular indignation fell, they escaped nearly unhurt, which caused the Catholics to regard it as an evidence of divine interposition. This summary course of proceeding only served to precipitate events with the imperial authorities, but the result was reached which Count Thurn and his immediate associates desired. It was the signal of revolt for entire Bohemia. Protestants and Catholics rushed to arms, and drove out the Austrians. *And this was the commencement of the War of Thirty Years.* Thirty directors were chosen to constitute a kind of provisional government, and to push the insurrection to its triumphal conclusion. They took possession of all the offices of state, seized the imperial revenues, received into service the royal officials and soldiers, and called on the entire Bohemian nation to unite in defence of the common cause. The Jesuits were banished from the kingdom. The old emperor, and his intimate counsellor, Cardinal Klesel, proposed to calm the revolt by using indulgence and conciliation; but Ferdinand would hear nothing spoken of but severity and rigorous repression. He appeared gratified to

have a pretext to take from the Protestants the privileges guaranteed to them in the Letter of Majesty, and that the occasion presented itself to completely annihilate the detested party. As he feared the opposition of the powerful Klesel, he caused him to be carried away secretly from Vienna, and shut up in a remote castle. Wearied out with his trials and misfortunes, Matthias soon passed from the theatre of action to his tomb. The Bohemian insurrection had not been directed against the old emperor, but against Ferdinand, who had gathered into his hands nearly all that was left of the imperial power while Matthias still survived. It was not without unmistakable reasons that the Protestants of Bohemia and other parts of the empire feared the reign of the new occupant of the throne, and began to combine against him, their most dangerous enemy. Ferdinand soon had occasion to understand that the Bohemians did not stand alone in resistance to his absolutist designs. In whatever direction he turned his eyes he saw the menacing clouds of revolt. Silesia had already made common cause with Bohemia, and Moravia was soon to strike against the Hapsburg rule. In the Austrian provinces the Protestants were too numerous not to dare to show the spirit of liberty, and the estates refused to do homage to the new emperor. In Hungary affairs were menacing. In his hereditary dominions, where he had previously so summarily suppressed the new religion, the Protestants were again standing on their defence; and throughout Germany the Bohemian rebels were encouraged. Count Thurn, with a military force, marched to Moravia, where he was joined by the Moravian Protestants in arms; and throughout that province government and religion were changed. Gathering strength as it goes, the revolt seems to embrace entire Austria; and soon Thurn and his army are before Vienna, where there is a numerous Protestant party ready to join hands with their Bohemian brethren. Ferdinand had but a small body of troops to guard him in his capital, and

could make but a brief defence unless soon aided by re-enforcements. Sixteen Austrian barons entered his chamber by force, and demanded he should make terms with the Bohemians. There seemed left him but the alternative of flight or submission. Ferdinand stubbornly refused to listen to conditions or to abandon his capital. He is still in altercation with the deputation of barons, while Count Thurn and his confederates are outside of the walls losing precious time by negotiations. Suddenly the sound of trumpets is heard in the square below. The baronial deputation soon disappears, and many of the nobles and citizens of Vienna take refuge in the Bohemian camp. This sudden change of scene and circumstances is caused by the fact that a regiment of cavalry has just passed into the city through a gate which Thurn left unguarded, to strengthen the feeble force which the emperor had at his command, to which were soon added a body of infantry and the encouraging support of Catholic citizens. But with this small increase of defensive strength Ferdinand could not have long held out if the Bohemian commander had been prepared to assault the city. His army was unprepared with the necessary food-supplies and siege-munitions; as his confident reliance had been placed on the supporting strength of allies within the walls of Vienna, which the sudden dash of the arriving imperial cavalry had intimidated. In this critical hour of the imperial cause the news reached the belligerents at the Austrian capital that Bucquoi, the general of the principal army of Ferdinand, had completely defeated Count Ernest Mansfeld at Budweiss, one of the few towns in Bohemia which had held out against the revolt, and that the victorious army was now marching on Prague. Thus the same event which compelled the Bohemians to break up their camp before Vienna gave Ferdinand his freedom of action, which he did not fail to promptly make use of with signal effect. Though king of Hungary and of Bohemia, reigning arch-

duke of his hereditary dominions, and virtually emperor for the time by his having gathered into his hands the administrative authority which he had taken from Matthias, he had not yet been legally chosen by the electoral body, which was about to assemble at Frankfort, and where his fortunate liberation from his capital enabled him to be present. As king of Bohemia he made one of the seven electors on whom devolved the choice of emperor, and he was prompt to make his vote available to his own ambitions. To the Protestants of Germany, the transfer of the imperial crown to the head of a Hapsburg prince who had been educated by the Jesuits, and was obedient to the policy and expedients of Jesuits, could not be a matter of small importance. The numerous Protestant inhabitants of the Austrian provinces were even more hostile to him than the Protestant princes and cities of Germany. If he should be chosen, and get all the imperial power and resources in his possession, he would weigh far more heavily than his predecessors in the disputes with which Germany was distracted. The members of the Protestant Union exerted themselves to their utmost to prevent his election. John George, jealous of the Union, had a plan of his own, with secret proclivities towards Ferdinand. He claimed to favor postponement until the Bohemian question could be settled by mediation, until which there could be no kingly voice from Bohemia. The elector of Palatine had little faith in John George, and preferred a different plan. The Saxon elector was equally averse to adopt the suggestion of the Palatine Frederick, and gave his vote to Ferdinand. After a fruitless opposition by the Bohemian estates to his electoral right, Ferdinand was allowed his electoral vote; and then all further resistance became hopeless, for the three ecclesiastical votes of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence were certain for a Catholic prince. The elector of Brandenburg and Frederick of the Palatinate joined the other five, and made the choice unanimous, Aug. 28, 1619.

In the mean time important action had been taken in Bohemia. Two days before the imperial election at Frankfort, Frederick V. of the Palatinate had been chosen, at Prague, king of Bohemia; the estates of that kingdom having deposed Ferdinand, declaring him to be an enemy to the Bohemian religion and liberties, who had alienated them from the good will of the Emperor Matthias, had sent troops to oppress them, and given their country a prey to foreigners, and by a secret compact had treacherously bequeathed the crown to Spain. The Bohemians had thus taken their fate in their hands, boldly crossed the river, and torn up the bridges behind them. Their choice of a Protestant king had not been secured without previous disagreements among the members of the Diet, that body being made up of Calvinists, Lutherans, and persons of other shades of the Reformed faith; but finally, by their superior address and energy, the Calvinists were able to bring about the choice of Frederick, a prince of their own type of faith. Would he accept the proffered crown? He and his special advisers had been active in the preliminary efforts to bring about this election, and it did not come to him as a surprise. The prize once placed within his grasp, he began to show signs of hesitation as to its acceptance. He went through the form of seeking advice. The electoral princes warned him of the dangers which were before him. John George of Saxony and Maximilian of Bavaria had reasons of their own against it, and Frederick might well pay little heed to their counsels. But the princes of the Union, of which he was the recognized leader, and his own counsellors, were divided in their opinions on the question. Christian of Anhalt, whose busy brain and indefatigable activity never slackened in resisting imperial and Catholic domination, who had more influence with Frederick than any other prince, urged him to accept, and was bravely to stand by him when the hour of combat and peril arrived. His own mother, with her

intuitive sense of the danger involved, was averse to his leaving his own castled home to seek kingly honors in a foreign land. The father of his proud-spirited and beautiful wife, King James of England, had serious scruples lest his son-in-law might do violence to the sacred majesty of kings by accepting a crown from the Bohemian rebels. But Elizabeth herself, the future mother of the fiery Rupert of English history, the electress and wife of the Bohemian king-elect, was held back by none of her father's cherished veneration for hereditary kingly rights. She urged her husband boldly forward in the enterprise to which a brave nation had called him. "Had you," she demanded, "confidence enough in yourself to accept the hand of a king's daughter? and have you misgivings about taking a crown which is voluntarily offered you? I would rather eat bread at thy kingly table than to feast at thy electoral board." Against these emphatic words of a brilliant wife, the seductive arguments and kindling enthusiasm of Christian of Anhalt, and the dazzling gems of a proffered crown, how could a young man with a head not cool nor strong hold back? Besides, Frederick was a sincere Calvinist, not one from mere princely policy. To him an oppressed religion looked as a champion defender against its oppressors. Could he be guilty of betraying his faith when he had the precious opportunity of being one of its chief bulwarks of security against that imperial and priestly despotism which was conspiring everywhere, and threatened to overspread Germany and entire Europe? He was strengthened also in his resolution by the assuring belief that his election was the act of God. Frederick accepted the Bohemian crown; and the coronation took place at Prague, Nov. 4, 1619, with remarkable pomp. The adjoining provinces, Silesia and Moravia, followed the example of Bohemia, and did homage to the Protestant king. He had taken the decisive step, with all the responsibilities and perils it involved. On whom could he count for

support and defenders besides those who had just given the honors of coronation and homage? James of England was destitute of the qualities needed for such an emergency, even had he been unhesitatingly in favor of the husband of his daughter becoming the Bohemian king; and he was alike entangled by his own logic and his negotiations with Spain, and embarrassed by the condition of English politics at home. If the Protestant Union had been a compact unit like the Catholic League, and true to the logic of its existence and its dangers, it would have at once made itself the champion of the Bohemians and their king. But the Union did not know its own mind, and was made up of members among whom the more adroit tactics of its opponents were effective in producing division and hesitation, if not neutrality, at the time when it should have taken prompt and aggressive action. In France Henry IV. was no more, and Richelieu had not risen to power to give his strong hand of resistance to Austrian designs. The brave Hollanders had on their hands all the responsibilities they could well bear; for the twelve years' truce with a powerful foe was about to terminate, and the deadly struggle soon to be renewed. But as Spain was allied by blood and fanaticism to the cause of Ferdinand, the Dutch Republic in war with that government would in effect be an ally of Frederick and so much of Germany as stood in his defence. He counted on Bethlem Gabor, and the Duke of Savoy encouraged him with some assistance; but it took but a little while to show that his opponents could combine against him a much more numerous and effective military force. The Catholic League knew its own mind, and could strike rapidly by diplomatic devices and armed men. The elector of Saxony was against Bohemia and its king, for he had his Lutheran jealousy against his Calvinist neighbor of the Palatinate. If Frederick succeeded in establishing himself on the Bohemian throne, he would rule

far more territory than John George, and become a much more important personage. He would not only be a sovereign of extensive dominions, but would have two votes in the electoral college, and thus be able to largely influence, if not control, the election of emperor. This was enough to keep the Saxon elector from taking the side of Bohemia. Besides, as the sequel was to show, Ferdinand was able to offer inducements of reward strong enough to bring the Lutheran elector into the combination with the League in striking down the Calvinist king of a people largely Lutheran and Calvinist. And to the same work France was to be made to contribute. The North German Protestant princes were to be kept out of the strife by prudential motives, which Ferdinand, the Jesuits, and Maximilian knew well how to formulate. Under past compacts between the Catholics and Protestants, the latter held extensive bodies of ecclesiastical lands, which were guaranteed under specified conditions. The amount of this territory held thus by Protestant princes and administrators in North Germany was specially large. At a meeting of the Catholic League held at Mülhausen in March, 1620, the promise was given, that the attempt should never be made to take from the Protestant administrators any of the secularized lands in North Germany, provided the holders should continue to act as loyal subjects of the emperor; and this additional pledge of the League was confirmed by Ferdinand, of whose faithful servitors the League was composed. This certainly was well calculated to have a quieting influence on all those princes whose Protestantism had been originally and was still strongly influenced by the desire to retain possession of lands regarded by the Catholic prelates as rightfully the property of the Church. But the agents of Ferdinand understood John George well enough to know that it was expedient to offer considerations even more tangible and direct. A written assurance that his secularized lands

were not to be disturbed, and the promise of Lusatia as an addition to his dominions, were sufficient to induce the elector of Saxony so to handle his military forces as to effectively aid Ferdinand and the League in subduing the Bohemians, and crushing the ambitious hopes of King Frederick, of whom he was jealous as a rival. To this course of John George, the insinuations of his chaplain, who was in the pay of Ferdinand, are believed to have contributed. By imperial machinations Hesse-Darmstadt, though predominantly Protestant, had been secured to neutrality. What the Union would do when the real crisis of Bohemia's fate arrived was soon to be made manifest. Its leaders sought to gather an army, under the command of the margrave of Anspach, ready for some decisive action in the struggle which seemed rapidly hastening. The troops of the League, under the command of Maximilian of Bavaria, kept watch on the army of the Union, and was ready to strike effective blows for the emperor. And now France, whose influence before had been so important in all these struggles with the house of Austria, and was to be so potential in many years to come, steps in, with negotiations, to render effective assistance to Ferdinand and the League by taking from the Bohemians an important ally, who had encouraged them to revolt against imperial domination. On the 3d of June, 1620, the ultra-Catholic influence which then controlled France induced the alarmed Protestant Union to sign the treaty of Uim, by which it was stipulated that it would observe neutrality towards the League. France was then engaged in a severe conflict with its Huguenot subjects, and feared to have them encouraged by the success of the Palatine Frederick, the Calvinist king of the Bohemians. The principal article of the Ulm treaty required "that the Union should abandon all interference in the affairs of Bohemia, and confine the aid which it might afford to Frederick to his Palatine territories;" and, if attacked, it might defend its own terri-

tories. This arrangement admirably suited the purposes of the League, and enabled the astute Maximilian to throw the entire force of his army to the support of the emperor in crushing the Bohemians.

With the successful use of motives of self-interest, of adroit negotiations and combinations, which have been indicated, by which the legitimate allies of Frederick were taken from him, and his foes welded into a serried and compact combination, it was not difficult to foresee that the Bohemian cause was fated to ruin, even had Frederick been a far abler man, and supported by leaders who knew how to husband all his resources. But he was weak where he needed to be strong, and his want of wisdom was greatly to aid the cause of his enemies, and to render his destruction certain and sudden. By his quasi-alliance with Bethlem Gabor, the dashing revolutionary Prince of Transylvania, the open ally of the sultan of Turkey, he gave offence to those who believed any co-operation with an avowed enemy of the Christian religion little short of sacrilege. But his bigoted and intemperate zeal for Calvinism soon after his enthusiastic coronation by the several Protestant sects of his Bohemian subjects, was a striking proof of a lack of tact and considerate judgment. His course in this regard tended to weaken towards him the good will of the Hussites, especially of the Lutherans, who were more numerous in the kingdom than the disciples of his own faith, and the Lutheran princes of Germany, among whom it was necessary he should gain support. He caused the images in the churches of Prague to be destroyed, and the pictures of the saints to be torn from the walls of the royal chapel; and the great crucifix, an object of reverence to the Lutheran as well as the Catholic, was pushed aside with irreverence. He forbade the bells to be rung, exchanged the altars for tables, and silver and gold chalices for wooden cups in the dispensation of the Lord's Supper; thus evincing his intol-

erance of the opinions, and disregard of the susceptibilities, of those whose loyal support he imperatively needed. Nor did he at once devote himself with unflagging energy to the affairs of the kingdom, but wasted too much time in festivities. He squandered his revenues by needless pomp and magnificence, when it was his manifest duty to guard his treasury by a wise economy, and husband all his resources to enable him to prepare against the storm which was gathering to strike the throne which he had felt himself called to ascend.

The military transactions and events which were soon to take place were but the inevitable sequences of causes operating for and against the two belligerent parties. The strength of the two sides was certainly very unequal. Frederick could not count on more than thirty thousand men for the defence of his kingdom; while Ferdinand and the League could concentrate fifty thousand immediately against him, and there was more than that number additional not remotely placed, from whom assistance could be drawn. The troops of the emperor and the League were chiefly old soldiers, commanded by experienced generals, — Bucquoi, Dampier, Spinola, Tilly; and in their ranks young officers thirsting for combat and glory, — Wallenstein, Pappenheim, Altringer, and others whom the future was to know. The whole force of Maximilian and the League was now ready to move against the Bohemians; and at their head was placed Tilly, a general whose tried military capacity and thorough devotion to the Catholic cause inspired the confidence of the emperor and his partisans, though his chief in command was Maximilian. In twenty days after the conclusion of the treaty of Ulm this army crossed the Austrian frontier, bringing under subjection at once the Protestant estates; and within sixty days the numerous opponents of the emperor in Lower and Upper Austria had given in their obedience; and about the same time the elector of Saxony appeared with

his army in Lusatia, in support of the cause of Ferdinand, and to cut off all succors from that quarter to Frederick. All the Bohemian troops in Lower Austria and Moravia were driven rapidly before the forces of Maximilian, who had now united with those of Bucquoi; and the resisting towns were speedily taken by storm. The victorious troops of the enemy now appeared before Prague, to which the Bohemian army, under the command of the brave Christian of Anhalt, had retreated. Of the force available for the defence of Frederick in his beleagured capital, there were less than twelve thousand Bohemians, and ten thousand Hungarians sent by the Prince of Transylvania; and eight thousand had been furnished by Christian of Anhalt, who showed the strength of his convictions, though the Protestant Union, which he had done so much to organize, had not the courage to follow his example. There was a lack of unity and good feeling among the Bohemians, whose chief men were displeased because German generals had been placed over them: the soldiers had become dispirited, and the lack of discipline among them caused the Bohemian peasantry to utter bitter complaints. On the morning of Nov. 8, 1620, the imperial army commenced attack on Frederick's army, which had begun to intrench itself on the White Hill, an elevation of no great height outside of the walls of Prague. The imperial troops having been reduced by sickness, Bucquoi, trained in the Spanish army of the Netherlands, brave but prudent, counselled delay; while Tilly urged immediate advance, whose advice was strengthened by the fiery words of a Dominican friar, who, showing a figure of the Virgin defaced by Protestants, called on the commanders to "trust in God, and go boldly to the battle. He fights on your side, and will give you the victory." This appeal of the friar and the impetuous resolution of Tilly prevailed; and the imperialists advanced to the attack, which soon swept before it all resistance. The

Prince of Anhalt fought bravely, and at first gained some advantage with his cavalry; but the Hungarians soon took to flight, followed by the Bohemians, carrying with them the rest of the army. The rout was complete. Four thousand of the Bohemian army fell on the field and in flight, while the victors lost but a few hundreds. During the fight Frederick was inside the walls of Prague, at dinner with two English ambassadors. He was summoned from table to witness the defeat of his army and the ruin of his cause. He requested a suspension of arms for twenty-four hours, but Maximilian would grant him only eight. Frederick fled at once with his wife and chief officers, and in such haste that Anhalt left his private papers, and the Bohemian king his crown. Frederick fled to Breslau, thence to the court of Brandenburg, and finally to The Hague, where he and the proud-spirited Elizabeth were for some time refugees, and drank deeply of the bitter waters of humiliation. The next day after the battle the Bohemian capital surrendered to the imperial troops, and the other towns of the kingdom soon followed the example.

It was now to be seen how the triumphant emperor would use his victory. Would he exercise a wise forbearance, and temper his policy with mercy and conciliation? It must not be forgotten that this period was early in the seventeenth century, that Ferdinand's political character had been formed by Jesuitical teachings, and that he was a prince of the house of Hapsburg, and believed civil and religious liberty dangerous to his crown and to the supremacy of his church. Ferdinand allowed three months to pass before disclosing the designs he had in store for his offending subjects. Misled by this seeming clemency, many who had fled before his successful arms returned to their homes, and even ventured to make their appearance at Prague. But from this false security they were violently and cruelly undeceived. All at once the storm burst on

the heads of the Bohemian nobility and the chief men of the towns, most of whom were Protestants, and had sustained the cause of Bohemian independence. Forty-eight of the principal persons who had aided in bestowing the crown on Frederick were arrested the same day, and tried by an extraordinary tribunal made up of native Bohemians and Austrians, partisans of the emperor, whose animosities were sure to give their decision the stamp of vengeance. Of these proscribed victims of Ferdinand's tyranny a majority perished on the scaffold; while absent offenders were condemned to death as traitors to their imperial sovereign, and their property confiscated, also that of those who had fallen on the field of battle. The reign of the Bohemian nobility as it had been constituted was substantially at an end; and a Catholic nobility, of foreign German blood, took its place, occupying the confiscated Bohemian lands, which they now held directly from the emperor. Throughout Bohemia the Protestants were constrained to abjure their faith, or were driven from their homes when they refused. Their churches were torn down, or delivered up to Catholic worship. Thirty thousand families, among whom were nearly two hundred families of nobles, abandoned the country. All the Protestant preachers were banished, — the Moravian Brethren and Calvinists first, and afterwards the Lutherans. The Letter of Majesty, the Bohemian Magna Charta of religious liberty, Ferdinand tore up with his own hand; and seven years after the battle of Prague the toleration of the Protestant religion in Bohemia was forbidden, where it had been deeply rooted more than two centuries, and where it had been many years predominant. The effect of the battle of Prague was to establish the rule of Ferdinand over all his dominions; as the revolt in Moravia, Silesia, and other territories could not make front against his increased prestige, and the superior and victorious troops of Maximilian and the League.

The first act in the terrible drama of the War of Thirty

Years had been played. Why was not the curtain rolled down, and the recent combatants allowed an interlude of peace? There are historical teachers who maintain that the conflict might have closed here, and the blood-stained actors not have been again called on the stage. That the war continued, and broadened into startling dimensions, they attribute entirely to Ferdinand. An illustrious German author has said, —

"The fate of Germany was in his hands: the happiness and misery of millions depended on the resolution he should take. Never was so great a decision resting on a single mind: never did the blindness of one man produce so much ruin." [1]

As to the grave responsibility of the emperor for much that had taken place, and the moral turpitude of his subsequent action, there can be no question; but it is very doubtful, if, having subdued Bohemia in the way it had been subdued, it was then possible for him to prevent the Bohemian war from becoming a struggle for entire Germany, involving finally a European conflagration. The elements of strife were in the very structure of society — in relations of States, and the existing condition of the prejudices and passions of men — to a degree that no man, however powerful, could have controlled them. And the way the Bohemian campaign had been carried on, and its consequences made use of by the successful belligerent, served completely to destroy all confidence between the great parties in Germany and adjacent countries, rendering it thereafter impossible to stop the explosion of the fires which were already kindled. What was to come was but the inevitable product, the logical sequences, of the past. Ferdinand goes forward in his designs. He had made Maximilian his instrument of subjugation, and the Bavarian was too cautious and calculating a prince not to stipulate his pay before performing his work. In a treaty

[1] Schiller.

made with the emperor before he moved an army an inch, it had been expressly agreed that all the expenses which Maximilian should incur in the war against the Bohemians should be re-imbursed to him by Ferdinand. The emperor was resolved to pay the debt with as little cost to himself as possible. He would do it at the expense of the unfortunate Calvinist prince whose ambition caused him to accept the Bohemian throne, whom he claimed the right to punish. He would splendidly reward the loyal Bavarian duke by conferring on him the electoral dignity, of which he had deprived the Palatine prince, and further compensate him by taking a portion of Frederick's territory, and annexing it to Bavaria; thus at the same time punishing the fugitive Bohemian king, rewarding Maximilian, adding another Catholic member to the electoral college, reducing the Protestants in that body to two, and cutting off forever all possibility of electing other than a Catholic emperor for Germany, even though a vast majority of its princes and subjects should become Protestants. To make good this compensation to Maximilian, and secure its other revolutionary consequences, necessarily involved war. Hence it was that the Palatinate so long became the theatre of bloodshed, devastation, and misery.

But if the emperor had brought Bohemia, Moravia, and his hereditary dominions into subjection, and Frederick was a fugitive and an exile, the cause of the latter was still upheld by Mansfeld and considerable of an army. This officer was the illegitimate son of Ernest Mansfeld, an Austrian count who had won distinction as a general in the service of Spain, in the bloody campaigns which had been carried on against the Dutch, in their long and heroic struggle with Philip II. for independence. This son — Count Peter Ernest Mansfeld — had devoted his first years of military service to the house of Austria against the Protestant liberties of Germany. But, regard-

ing himself ill-treated by his leader, who had failed to re-imburse him for the money expended in his cause, he changed his religion, abandoned his king, transferred his sword to the Protestant Union, and became its avowed champion and defender. He was brave, brimful of irrepressible energy, and possessed those magnetic personal qualities well calculated to win the confidence of those professional soldiers with whom Germany then abounded. He was not scrupulous as to his methods of feeding and paying the men whom he was successful in drawing to his ranks. His first service for the Protestants was as the commander of three or four thousand troops who had been gathered for the service of the Duke of Savoy, an ally of the Union, in a campaign against Spain. This force was ready to march when the war between Frederick and Ferdinand burst out in Bohemia. But the Duke of Savoy, having terminated hostilities with Spain, allowed these troops to be transferred to the service of the Bohemians. After the overthrow of Frederick at the battle of Prague, and his flight from the country, Mansfeld was still able to hold one or two positions in Bohemia in the spring of 1621. He held commission from Frederick, and was resolved not to abandon his cause. But the conduct of his troops, now destitute of support, was such as to render them a terror to the country which they had been employed to defend. The behavior of the soldiers, even of the more disciplined and orderly armies of those times, would not bear careful inspection as compared with modern rules and standards; but that of the mercenary troops, under a dashing adventurer as Mansfeld was, passing from one side to the other as the allurement of pay or booty guided them, placed them in the catalogue of brigands, and rendered them a blasting scourge to whatever territory they occupied, or traversed in their marches. The soldiers of Tilly committed terrible excesses in Bohemia; but those of Mansfeld, pressed by more pinching

necessities, were authors of atrocities more beastly and barbarous than the troops of the stern disciplinarian, the successful general in command of the Bavarian army. The breaking up of the army of the Protestant Union, after the treaty of Ulm, threw out of employ thousands of soldiers; and these at once swarmed as recruits to the camp of Mansfeld, who soon found himself at the head of an army of fifteen or twenty thousand in the Upper Palatinate, which he claimed to defend for the elector, who had just lost his Bohemian crown. But it was not long before Mansfeld found it impossible to maintain his hold in the Upper Palatinate, the inhabitants preferring to make terms with the Bavarian ruler rather than longer submit to the evils inflicted upon them by their professed defenders. Late in the season of the same year he marched out of the country, closely followed by Tilly. Mansfeld did not stop to confront his pursuer, but marched rapidly on Alsace, and fortified himself at Hagenau.

In the following winter negotiations were attempted, in the course of which James of England thought to obtain some assistance from Spain, as to which he was as completely blinded and deceived as he was in his scheme of marrying his son, Prince Charles, to the Spanish infanta. Distracted with politics at home, governed by a sovereign whose capacity for ruling was not superior, and quite inadequate to some of the questions with which he had to deal, the influence of England on the affairs of the Continent at this time was not great. James found himself unable at this juncture to assist his son-in-law effectively in regaining the Bohemian throne; and Frederick was unwilling to abandon his claim to it, and submit to the inevitable. The real and the more practicable question in issue then was, Could his enemies be driven out of his hereditary territory, and he recover the full possession of the Palatinate? Where should he now look for reliable supporters, whose counsels and arms should favorably

influence his fate and fortunes? The Protestant and the North German princes did not care to espouse his quarrels, or become the avengers of his wrongs. Yet in 1622 he had more military strength on his side than in the year preceding: another German army had come together to re-enforce the troops of Mansfeld in the defence of the unfortunate Frederick. The margrave of Baden, who had an established reputation for his success in appropriating ecclesiastical property, was preparing to give military support to the Palatine prince. But in the North, there is one getting ready to march to the aid of Frederick who is not troubled with timidity or temporizing tendencies, — more of the type of Mansfeld, fitting and fated to have his fortune and fame closely connected with the latter in the whirl of events which are about to afflict distracted Germany. Christian of Brunswick had been one of those needy German princes who had no scruples in stealing other peoples' lands, that he might have some territory over which to exercise feudal domination, and where he could convert to his own uses the sweat of the labor of others. In 1616 he had been able to secure his election to the bishopric of Halberstadt. Chosen as a lay bishop, he was more fittingly termed an administrator, while sharing in all the franchises and emoluments of this ecclesiastical district. At the close of the imposing ceremonies which completed his institution, the preacher cried out from the pulpit of the cathedral, opposite to which the young prince was placed, "This is the bishop whom God himself has elected. This is the man whom God has set apart as the ruler of the land." The subsequent career of Christian shows how little he was the representative of the gospel of the Prince of peace. He proved a poor administrator of his domains; leaving his duties to be discharged by unworthy and incapable officials, whilst he was absent in quest of excitement and adventurous action. A dashing, impetuous individual,

with restless but weak brain, he took to fighting, where there was a chance, for the mere love of its exhilaration, if not for its immediate rewards. If the emperor and the League continued to be strong and successful in their aims and policy, the ecclesiastical lands on which he had foisted himself would be in jeopardy; or, if he was able to retain them, it would be by an abject promise of obedience to imperial authority, which would be extremely repulsive to one of his fiery and disorderly character. In a visit which he made to The Hague, where the fugitive king of Bohemia and his queen were in exile, the eyes of the proud and beautiful Elizabeth fell upon him, and her cause at once became his own. Besides, he had reason to fear, that, if Maximilian and the Spaniards could seize the Palatinate from Frederick, his own territory would become the spoil of a like aggression and greed. Thereafter he plunged as recklessly into war, and prosecuted it with as few restraints, as Peter Ernest Mansfeld, and for a considerable period became one of the factors of the German war. In the summer of 1621, with a military force, he had entered the Catholic bishopric of Paderborn, where a considerable portion of the population was of the Lutheran faith; but he made little distinction between the Catholic and Protestant in his forced levies and plunderings to obtain the means by which to recruit and support his army, ransacking castles, towns, and farmhouses. Claiming to be the "friend of God and the enemy of priests," he tore down the silver shrine of the cathedral; while he also proved himself the spoiler of the peasant, the purloiner of the treasure of the rich, as well as the scanty savings of the poor; and many a village, with its industries and homes, was given to the flames because it could not satisfy his rapacious demands. Having in this barbarous manner liberally supplied his military resources, he marched to the support of Mansfeld.

Though the military resources which Ferdinand and

the League could command were much superior to those of the Protestant generals in the field, yet if the armies of Christian of Brunswick, of the margrave of Baden, and of Mansfeld could be united, or brought to support effectively each other, they would be superior in numbers to those under Tilly, even with such assistance as he could immediately obtain from the Spaniards commanded by Cordova. But the army of Tilly was composed of veterans thoroughly disciplined and inured to war, who had implicit trust in their commander, and were not compelled to live on pillage. In April, 1622, the armies of both sides marched towards the Palatinate, where the chief fortresses were held by Sir Horace Vere, an English officer who had gone to the Palatinate the previous year with an English regiment of volunteers, and who was now in an important command for Frederick. The margrave of Baden, with his considerable army, effected a junction with Mansfeld; and the united forces of these two commanders came in collision with Tilly at Wiesloch, and the latter had the worst of the fight, retreated to Wimpfen, and immediately called to his aid the Spaniards, then in the Lower Palatinate, under Cordova. But while the League commander was at once successful in strengthening himself with effective re-enforcements, the margrave of Baden and Mansfeld had come to a disagreement, which resulted in the separation of their two armies just at the time when their salvation required their united action. The consequence was the battle of Wimpfen a few days later, in which the Baden chief was caught alone, and completely whipped by Tilly and his Spanish allies. No sooner was this battle decided, than the Spanish general immediately marched to confront Mansfeld, whose soldiers were now in extreme want. Mansfeld found it necessary to abandon the Palatine territories, and make a hasty retreat into Alsace, where his soldiers held to their customary methods of forced levies and pillage to secure themselves from starvation.

About the date of the battle of Wimpfen, the diplomatists, among whom were those of England and Spain, met at Brussels to see what could be done to allay the strife, and secure to Frederick some portion of his claims and rights; but these pacific attempts failed. Early in June, Mansfeld, whom Frederick had now joined, marched from Mannheim to combine with Christian of Brunswick, but was soon confronted by Tilly, and driven back to Mannheim without having made the proposed union with Christian. The Bavarian and Spanish forces, now combined, on the 20th of June encountered Christian of Brunswick at Höchst, and beat him so badly that he was enabled to join Mansfeld with only a small portion of his army. This defeat of Christian so discouraged George Frederick of Baden that he immediately abandoned the cause of the Protestant princes; and Mansfeld and Christian found it necessary to retire from Mannheim, and retreat into Alsace, taking with them the recent king of Bohemia and the fallen elector of the Palatinate.

Following the advice of his father-in-law, who had again been duped by Austrian cunning in the negotiations which had been had with Ferdinand, who had thrown out some hints of clemency in respect to the Palatine elector provided he would first lay down his arms, — an implied promise which he had not the remotest thought of making good, — Frederick now dismissed his dashing and marauding generals from his service, and again found his way to The Hague, there to pluck the bitter apples of exile, plead for assistance, and hope for favoring events to restore his fallen fortunes, — a future of prosperity which was never to come again to him and the high-spirited Elizabeth. Abandoned by the margrave of Baden, driven from the Palatinate by the Bavarian general and his Spanish allies, dismissed from the service of the defeated and baffled Frederick, what were Mansfeld and Christian to do? For a while they fed their army in Alsace in their usual man-

ner; and when their plundering hordes had there eaten up every thing within their reach, they advanced into Lorraine, where there was a better opportunity for food and forage, and where they remained until they received and accepted an offer to enter the service of the Dutch, who, the previous year, had renewed their war of independence against Spain, by whose general, Spinola, they were now severely pressed. The Spaniards attempted to intercept their march to Holland; but, after a bloody fight at Fleurus, with great loss on both sides, they made good their passage to the point were their new employers required their services. Bergen-op-Zoom, to retain possession of which the Dutch justly attached great importance, was in danger from the Spanish general-in-chief; but on the arrival of Mansfeld to co-operate with the Dutch army in defence, Spinola raised the siege, and that important stronghold of the republic was saved. But the disorderly habits of the troops of Mansfeld and Christian soon rendered them unwelcome guests in Holland, and at the end of three months it was decided that their assistance was no longer needed by the Dutch patriots. Leaving Holland in November, Mansfeld took his march into the diocese of Munster; but there meeting with too much resistance, he advanced to East Friesland, a fertile province, where he allowed his troops to recruit themselves until the resources of the inhabitants became exhausted: while Christian, who had lost an arm in the battle of Fleurus, led his army into Lower Saxony; having lost none of his ardor for war, bearing in his hat the glove of Elizabeth of Palatine, and on his standards the motto, "All for God and her."

What would be the next revelation in the chapter of German events about to be opened? What would be the effect, on the emperor and his advisers, of the march of Mansfeld into East Friesland, and of Christian of Brunswick into Lower Saxony? The Emperor Maximilian and

the League had secured full sway in the South, the Duke of Bavaria had obtained his reward, John George had yielded his opposition to stripping Frederick of the electorate, by the assent of Ferdinand to the cession of Lusatia to Saxony. Would Ferdinand and the League now resolve to deal effectively with the latent and the open resistance to their domination in North Germany? The ambition of power and the warmth of theological zeal and bigotry are stimulated by success, and grow by what they feed on. There was a vague and unceasing fear among the Protestant princes of the North, and this feeling was not without reasons more or less justifiable. Would the emperor, whose Jesuitical teachings and maxims were so real with him, whose fidelity to the Catholic Church and its aggressive policy were so unyielding, backed as he now was by a victorious army, continue in bringing dissenting princes and refractory cities into obedience? Would he continue to respect the Mülhausen agreement? With Mansfeld and his army in East Friesland, and Christian and his army in Lower Saxony, live issues were brought home to the Northern princes. It was obvious that Ferdinand and the League would not be inclined to construe any past pledges of theirs as securing the Halberstadt territory to Christian of Brunswick. It could not be claimed that they had made any engagements which would operate to the advantage of bishops or administrators who did not remain loyal to the emperor, and he who had been and still was in arms against him was certainly not obedient to the emperor. With the strongest of reasons, then, Christian of Brunswick sought, by words and deeds, to impress on the Protestant princes of the North the impossibility of their remaining neutral, and the strong reasons why they should unite in common defence against a surely encroaching enemy. On the other hand, the partisans of the emperor sought to impress on the Northern princes the duty and necessity of

resisting, by armed force, Mansfeld and his devastating army. It was clear that the Northern Protestants could not remain passive. Halberstadt, of which Christian was the administrator, belonged to the Lower Saxon circle, whose members were legally united for mutual defence. The princes and cities of this circle were thus plainly between two fires. The troops of the League were approaching them from the South, while there were indications that Mansfeld might soon take up a strong position in the North. In February, 1623, the Lower Saxon circle resolved to raise troops, and get ready for the contingencies of war. While, as the year advanced, the circle had no occasion to increase their confidence in the emperor and the League, it would not listen to the demands of Christian, and gave proofs of wishing to be rid of his presence. This fiery, pugnacious bishop accused the authorities of the circle of abandoning the cause of the gospel, and again started for the Dutch territory, followed by the Bavarian army under Tilly, and on the 6th of August was overtaken at Stadtlohn, and badly beaten. Of his twenty thousand hastily recruited troops, only six thousand were left under his command to cross the frontier. Mansfeld still remained in East Friesland. The defeat of Christian made no change in the feelings and attitude of the North German Protestants, and the princes of Lower Saxony were not re-assured about the bishoprics. Christian of Brunswick had finally given in his resignation as the administrator of Halberstadt, and there was fear that that district might fall into Catholic control. Tilly remained in the Lower Saxon circle, and made himself master of the administrator's magazines at Lippstadt, on the pretence of watching the enemy, and preventing new inroads; and this had taken place after Mansfeld and Christian, for the want of means, had been obliged to disband their armies. Ferdinand and the League remained armed; distrust was increasing among the Prot-

estants; the elements of explosion were thickening in the air; and the unconcealed rejoicings of the Catholics and the busy feet of the Jesuits served to stir up the smouldering fires.

The spring of 1624 arrived with quiet on the surface, while the real facts and active causes were rapidly tending to extensive movements and important events. The eyes of James of England had finally been opened: it was a marvel to sensible men how they could have been closed so long. But his profound reverence for the dignity and hereditary rights of kings had made it difficult for him to espouse earnestly the cause of the husband of his daughter, when the Bohemians had chosen him their king. Besides, there was then fermenting in his brain the plan of marrying his son Charles to the daughter of the King of Spain. But now that the Spanish marriage had been abandoned by necessity, James seemed to be more seriously impressed with the rights and interests of his son-in-law, who had been despoiled of his electoral dignity and of his territorial rights by that emperor whom he was afraid to offend, while he was seeking the daughter of his relative and ally for the wife of the Prince of Wales, thus showing that often the dignity and the selfishness of kings are closely identified.

CHAPTER XI.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS PRECEDED IN GERMANY BY CHRISTIAN IV. OF DENMARK. — THE LATTER DEFEATED, AND COMPELLED TO MAKE PEACE WITH THE EMPEROR. — SIEGE OF STRALSUND. — WALLENSTEIN COMPELLED TO ABANDON THE SIEGE. — DISCUSSION OF THE KING OF SWEDEN WITH OXENSTIERNA AND THE SENATE ON THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN.

THE superior qualities and rising fame of the king of Sweden early in his career awakened interest and hope among the supporters of the Reformed religion in Germany. The negotiations between the German princes and Gustavus began as early as 1614, when the latter received at Narva an envoy from the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel instructed to pray him to be ready for an event. A league was formed between several of the electors and estates of Germany against the Catholics for the defence of the free exercise of worship. England, the Dutch Republic, and Switzerland made a part of this Protestant combination. They avowedly wished to call Gustavus to that alliance. Soon after, they extended to him the invitation by an envoy from Heilbronn, where they had an assemblage. The letter of invitation was dated Feb. 25, 1614, and signed by Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, by John II., Count Palatine of Deux Ponts, John Frederick, Duke of Wurtemburg, George Frederick, Margrave of Baden, Christian of Anhalt, and Joachim Ernest, Margrave of Brandenburg. The answer of the young Swedish king attests his good will, but clearly demonstrates the obstacles

which would oppose their wishes so long as he should be involved in a war with Russia and Poland. In an ordinance of May, 1615, Gustavus prescribed certain days of prayer to his people: he urged them to pray for their brothers of the same belief in Germany. What was specially wanting was harmony among those of like faith and interests. In the sketch already given in this volume of the principal facts and events in the Thirty Years' War prior to the participation in it of Christian of Denmark, have been indicated this want of union among the Protestant princes and cities, the course of John George of Saxony, his betrayal of his co-religionists, the disasters of the Bohemians and of Frederick of Palatine, and the general march of events among the various parties and interests of the great German controversy. Gustavus Adolphus, engaged as he was in hostile relations with his neighbors, early in his career showed his sympathy with the cause of Frederick V. and the Bohemian Protestants by sending them munitions of war, eight cannon and four thousand balls being his contribution.

The devastations and overturns operated in Germany by the united armies of Ferdinand of Spain and the Catholic League, the misfortunes of the Palatine house, and the dissolution of the Evangelical Union, caused all the hopes of the German Protestant princes and people to turn to the sovereigns of the North, especially as the two most powerful of the princes professedly Protestant — the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg — had assumed either a hostile or doubtful attitude: for the former took openly the side of the emperor; and the other, influenced by unfriendly counsellors, showed little interest for the Protestant cause. England, Holland, and France sought to induce both Sweden and Denmark to attack the house of Austria and the Catholic League. The long and bitter struggle which Holland had maintained against Spain, and the persecuting fanaticism of Philip II., largely on

account of the former's attachment to the Reformed faith, would make her desirous to engage the rising power of Sweden on the same side. The desire of the government of Louis XIII., inspired by Richelieu, to crush the combined power of Austria and Spain, was enough to render France equally desirous that Sweden should throw itself into the scale against Ferdinand in Germany. England was on the same side, not only because of her having adopted the Reformed religion, but because Frederick V., who had been driven so summarily from the Bohemian throne and his Palatine dominions, was the son-in-law of the English king, his wife being daughter of James I. In August, 1624, two English ambassadors, Robert Anstruther and James Spens, made visits to both the king of Denmark and the king of Sweden. The object of the visits of these diplomatic agents of England to Christian and Gustavus was to urge them to take prompt and vigorous part in the effort to recover the Palatinate, and restore the former condition of things in Germany. The Danish king hesitated only so far as to make sure that James would not again draw back, be cajoled by Spanish diplomatic promises, and leave his pledged allies in the lurch. One of these English envoys was instructed to communicate in person with the princes of Lower Saxony; and as soon as encouraging information was received from that quarter, and of military preparations in England, where troops were being enlisted under Mansfeld, Christian of Denmark decided to embark in the war, and entered into stipulations to do so. With clearer insight and more comprehensive estimate of the facts, the difficulties, and the magnitude of the undertaking, Gustavus Adolphus was not to be easily induced to engage himself by the arguments and offers of the English envoys. He understood the situation and the weight of the issues and dangers involved better than the men then controlling the government of King James. Knowing that the contemplated

warlike undertaking against Ferdinand, backed by Spain and the Catholic League, was one of enormous magnitude, he argued that it was necessary that all the opponents of the house of Austria from one end of Europe to the other should be enlisted with united resolution in the great enterprise. He had his own opinions as to how the war should be conducted. He knew the supreme importance of a thoroughly united direction of the war, and the uncertainties and dangers of a divided command. If he were then to embark in it, there must be a close alliance between all the interested powers; the command of the troops must be placed in his hands; there must be an army of thirty-six regiments of infantry and eight of cavalry, of which one-fourth would be raised by Sweden, one-fourth by England, and the remainder by the German States which were for the Protestant cause, and hostile to Ferdinand and his allies. He must have also an assurance of a monthly subsidy for the pay of the troops, the cession of two ports, the one on the Baltic, the other on the North Sea. He had conceived this draught of his terms before he had received the information that another chief had been thought of. The English envoys had conferred with equal freedom with the two Northern kings, and early in 1625 were able to inform their government at home on what terms Christian and Gustavus would embark in the war. The forty-four regiments demanded by the Swedish king would number fifty thousand soldiers, and the payment of four months for England's quota of these troops must be made in advance. Gustavus was resolved not to allow the cause he served to be injured by the pillage of his men to support themselves. The generals of Ferdinand and the League on the one side, as well as Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick on the other, had already been allowing this terrible scourge to be inflicted far too much on the poor German people. The terms of the Danish king showed a feebler comprehension of the

actual situation. He thought he could get along with thirty thousand men, of whom one-fifth should be raised and paid by England. The government of James and Charles was not then flush in funds, and on the eve of its troubles with the Commons as to the methods of raising money. Hampden, Pym, Eliot, and others had decided convictions on that subject, which were being extensively shared by large numbers of their countrymen, not at all in harmony with royal views as to the tax-raising power. The proposition of the Danish king was so much more economical than the terms exacted by Gustavus that the former was approved. But England thought the king of Sweden might co-operate. He was willing to take command of one of the two armies provided that the cash subsidy should be shared equally. He demanded at first but ten regiments of infantry and five of cavalry, and would procure at his own expense his artillery and munitions of war. He reserved the liberty of making enrolments in the States of the allied powers, and the pledge assured to him that no peace should be made with the emperor and the Catholics without his consent. He required, furthermore, that his interests should not be forgotten, though he claimed that his allies should not interfere with his special war in Poland. The king of England thought these terms "a little humiliating," and refused assent to them. The English ambassador had said to Gustavus that he required hard conditions. To this the latter responded, —

"If any one thinks it easy to make war upon the most powerful potentate in Europe, and upon one, too, who has the support of Spain and so many of the German princes, besides being supported, in a word, with the whole strength of the Roman-Catholic alliance; and if he thinks, also, it easy to bring into common action so many minds, each having in view their own separate object, and to regain for their own masters so many lands out of the hands of those who so tenaciously hold them, — we shall be quite willing to leave to him the glory of his achievements, and all its accompanying advantages."

The terms proposed by Gustavus, being made known to Christian, served to hasten the latter to complete his engagements with England. In March, 1624, while these war negotiations were going on, James I. died; and in May following, Charles agreed to furnish the king of Denmark thirty thousand pounds sterling per month; and troops which were then being raised in England for Mansfeld's intended campaign on the Rhine were to be diverted to the aid of Christian IV. Thus the necessitous economy of the English government and the jealousy of the Danish king tended to delay for some time to Gustavus Adolphus that leadership in Germany to which he had been repeatedly urged; and he was left free to continue his operations against Sigismund, which he thought contributed to the general cause, for it kept in Poland forces that otherwise would have been in the immediate service of the house of Austria. It did not take long for Christian of Denmark to find out to what extent he had underestimated the strength of the enemy against whom he had engaged to make war.

In the winter of 1625, there were opened in Brunswick negotiations for peace between the hostile parties in Germany; but there were too many obstacles and jealousies in the way, and no successful result was reached. To the alarmed Protestant princes, Ferdinand and the League would promise the Mülhausen agreement, and that was all. The emperor and his allies appreciated their advantage, and designed to make use of it to their own profit. They claimed that their consciences would not permit them to give a permanent guaranty to the Protestant administrators, and allow them the full privileges of princes of the empire. These terms of Ferdinand and his allies, the princes of Lower Saxony and the king of Denmark would not accept, and demanded that Protestant territories should have legal security of their permanent right to remain Protestant against all adverse claims. In view of the evi-

dent dangers of aggression from the imperialists and the League, it was impossible for them to assent to any thing less without such indications of weakness as would point to absolute surrender in the end. Thus the only arbiter left was the sword.

In the spring of 1626 the campaign opened; each of the belligerent parties being thoroughly in earnest, and resolved to strike the other, as soon as possible, the hardest blow. If Christian of Denmark could secure the effective co-operation of his German allies, and make good all the assurances he had received from abroad, the numbers and resources on the two sides were not so greatly unequal. The two imperial commanders, if their forces were united, had nearly seventy thousand men; and their opponents counted ten thousand less. It was the plan of the Danish king to prevent Wallenstein and Tilly from uniting, and becoming an irresistible force against him. He relied on Mansfeld to hold Wallenstein in check, while he hoped to be strong enough to deal with the army under the command of Tilly. Mansfeld first came in contact with the imperial troops. He was beyond the Elbe, and Wallenstein was in his front; and he must fight him, or allow him to unite with Tilly, and make certain the defeat of the king of Denmark. Wallenstein possessed himself of the bridge of Dessau, which crossed the Elbe, fortified it, and waited for Mansfeld to make the assault. The force of his antagonist was superior to his own; but this did not deter Mansfeld from approaching the bridge of Dessau, and intrenching himself in sight of the imperial lines. But, attacked in the rear by the whole force of Wallenstein, he was defeated, and compelled to abandon his position with a loss of three thousand men killed. Mansfeld recruited his army, increased it by re-enforcements, and marched into Silesia, with the view of passing into Hungary, and, in conjunction with Bethlem Gabor, carrying the war into the Austrian dominions, which were without

defence. This sudden movement of Mansfeld made it necessary for Wallenstein to withdraw his attention from the king of Denmark, and try to intercept Mansfeld in his march through Silesia. The latter had been welcomed by the Protestants of Silesia, and Wallenstein found the principal towns in possession of the enemy. When he reached Hungary, Mansfeld had already made his junction with the Prince of Transylvania, who had broken his truce with Ferdinand. True to his military rule of not attacking his enemy without a pressing necessity, Wallenstein took a strong position, and waited to see what events would compel his antagonists to do. The ardor of Bethlem Gabor soon began to cool; for he had calculated on assistance from the Turks, which failed him, and that the strength of the Danish king and his allies would hold the bulk of the imperial forces in Lower Saxony. Instead of the expected diversion of his enemy, and other favorable circumstances to his designs, Mansfeld had drawn upon him the whole strength of Wallenstein's army, and other encouragements had failed him. The Transylvanian prince did not deem it expedient to attack Wallenstein in his fortified position, and hastened to make peace again, one of the conditions of which was, that Mansfeld should withdraw from Hungary, though he had the secret resolution to break it on the first favorable opportunity. To carry out his stipulation with the imperial commander for the withdrawal of Mansfeld, and with an eye to future contingencies, he directed him to apply to Venice for assistance. Isolated from Germany, unable to support the troops which still remained to him, Mansfeld sold his munitions of war, disbanded the main body of his soldiers, and with a few followers took route through Bosnia and Dalmatia towards Venice. On this adventurous journey he was taken sick, and died in Dalmatia in 1626. Not long before the decease of Mansfeld, Christian of Brunswick had been taken away by a fatal disease; and thus these two dashing, intrepid military

chiefs, who had so often supported each other amid the warlike tempests of Germany, and so frequently challenged death on bloody fields, passed away by sickness, and not by the sword.

The diversion of the forces of Wallenstein, in pursuit of Mansfeld, into Silesia and Hungary, had enabled Christian of Denmark to make important movements favorable to his enterprise; but Tilly had been able to receive some re-enforcements from the troops of Wallenstein, so that he outnumbered his antagonist, and finally compelled the Danish king to accept battle, which took place Aug. 27, 1626, near the village of Lutter. At the beginning of the combat the Danes fought bravely, and three times did the king himself lead them against the Austrian lines; but the superior numbers and discipline of Tilly's army could not be overcome. The Danes suffered a severe defeat, had four thousand killed on the field, lost all of their artillery, ammunition, and sixty standards. The plans of King Christian had been disarranged or annihilated by the defeat of Mansfeld at Dessau, on whom he had reckoned to isolate and defeat Wallenstein, and prevent him giving any aid to Tilly. Richelieu, in his "Memoirs," indicates another cause of the defeat of the king of Denmark: —

"His soldiers were not paid, and every day abandoned his service because the English failed to their engagements, and fulfilled nothing of what they had promised."

Christian himself did not conceal his dissatisfaction with his English allies, and said with bitterness, that, "if their king had kept his promises, the battle would have had a different result."

The king escaped with his cavalry, soon gathered the fragments of his army, and placed himself on the defensive, determined to prevent the troops of the League from crossing the Elbe; but he was not able to make head against a victorious enemy. Tilly successfully passed the Elbe, and marched into Brandenburg; while Wallenstein,

having returned from pursuit of Mansfeld, entered Holstein to carry the war into the Danish territories. The Danes, having been outnumbered and beaten by Tilly's army alone, could have no hope of resisting the combined strength of the two imperial generals. They abandoned all their positions on the Weser and the Elbe, and now held no fortresses in Germany except Gluckstadt. The successes and rapid marches of his enemies had deprived King Christian of the assistance of his German allies. Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick were no more, their armies dispersed, Bethlem Gabor was in truce with Ferdinand, while the expected support from England had failed. No alternative was left the king of Denmark but peace on the best terms he could obtain. Obliged now to deal with Wallenstein, whose army and ambitions had reached large proportions, the Danish king found in him an enemy, who drove him, not only out of Germany, but out of his own provinces of Holstein and Jutland, and compelled him to sign terms of peace at Lubeck, June, 1629. His provinces were restored to him, but he was obliged to abandon his allies. Wallenstein occupied, on his own account, Mecklenburg, from which the dukes had been driven; and the emperor invested his successful and ambitious general with this duchy as hereditary fief. This territory adjoined the south shore of the Baltic, opposite the Danish coast, and was advantageous to the emperor's designs in that direction, and especially promotive of the ambitious schemes which were already fermenting in the brain of Wallenstein.

Flushed with his recent victories, and in command of a powerful army, Wallenstein now made siege to Stralsund, and had received by adjoining to his other titles, that of General of the Ocean and of the Baltic. Though he had not yet embarked in his German undertakings, Gustavus Adolphus was quick to resolve that no imperial force should seriously threaten ascendency on the Baltic. A

letter of his to the king of Denmark, not long before this date, enables it to be perceived what plans he had formed while watching the special interests of Sweden: —

"It is easy to divine that the Catholic League has designs on the Baltic; it will seek to realize them by direct or indirect means, sometimes by the conquest of Holland, sometimes by that of Sweden, and finally by that of Denmark. They will employ, not only force, but intrigues and secret plots. We learn that there has been offered you the command of the fleet, which may establish complete domination, and that they will pay all the expenses of the war if you will yield the Sound. They have proposed to us recently to unite our forces to the enemies of your Majesty. They wish to procure us peace with the king of Poland, also assent to our perpetual ownership of Livonia and Prussia, and at the same time they propose to us the throne of Denmark as a fief of the emperor, and many other things, in the hope of preventing our alliance. We plainly foresaw the consequences, knowing the power, the concord, the intelligence, and the constancy of our enemies, and the slowness, the imprudence, and the inconstancy of those who are interested for us. Thus the forces of the latter, if they had been united, would have been superior to those of our enemies; but, divided, they have become so feeble that any of them have not been able to defend themselves, and have been conquered and subdued, one after the other. We have recalled in vain to our friends that it is necessary to forget in some degree their private interests, to take resolutions conformably to the public welfare; but our good intentions have been badly judged, so that, to leave all aside, we should only think of prosecuting our war against Poland, and to occupy thus its forces to prevent them uniting to other Catholics. The embarrassments of your Majesty touch us very much. We desired to know sooner your intention of joining us to defend the Baltic. We wished you to write immediately after your return, to the end that there might be taken, during the winter, all the necessary arrangements for the defence of the two kingdoms and of the Baltic."

Gustavus wrote this letter in October, 1627, immediately after his return from his second campaign in the Prussian duchy. His attention was fixed on the maritime cities of Germany, and especially on Stralsund. He was resolved, at all cost, to prevent the forces of Ferdinand from occupying the cities of the Baltic. He was seen to abandon that determination but for a moment, and then to return

to it with renewed ardor. In the summer of 1627 he had sent Peter Baner into North Germany, with instructions which show his sagacity, his clear understanding of the character of the princes, and his thorough comprehension of the political relations of that country. So watchfully had his eye followed events in Germany, almost from the beginning of his occupancy of the Swedish throne; so carefully had he kept himself informed, through his envoys and agents, of what was there passing; and so well did he understand the chief men and parties to the strife there raging, and its bearing on the future of his own country, — that he knew clearly what commands with which to charge Baner on this important visit to the North German princes. The object of this mission was to obtain that Wismar and Rostock should be occupied, not by a Danish nor an imperial, but by a Swedish garrison, according to a demand which the dukes of Mecklenburg, in their embarrassments, had made, "though these dukes," said Gustavus, "were at the bottom of the heart partisans of the emperor, and jealous of each other; likewise the Duke of Holstein and the Archbishop of Bremen." He urged Baner to manifest great prudence in his words. The regiment to occupy Wismar had already received orders to put itself in march just at the time when Wallenstein, having swept the Danish king and his army from his path, had put an end to the plan of Gustavus by the conquest of Mecklenburg and its complete annexation to his ducal domains. It was at this period, that, for a moment, the Swedish king renounced taking part in the affairs of Germany. Baner was recalled, because the imperialists had triumphed. Gustavus ordered Gen. Duval to return with his regiment to Sweden, "because German affairs has greatly changed," wrote the king, "and one has no desire to mix himself up with them." This opinion of Gustavus was expressed in a letter which he wrote to John Casimir, his brother-in-law, September, 1627. But very soon he changed this ex-

pressed opinion, and early in November of the same year said in a letter to Oxenstierna, in regard to the losses which the Danes had suffered by the overwhelming forces of Tilly and Wallenstein, —

"It is true not only that our enemies have occupied Holstein and Jutland, but the Danes have fallen into disunion and despair. We can with difficulty avoid being drawn into this war, because that danger approaches every day."

It was this rapid and powerful advance of the imperialist forces to the gateways of the Baltic, almost in sight of the Swedish shores and harbors, that compelled Gustavus to change the resolution which less than three months earlier he had written to Count John Casimir. The dukes of Mecklenburg, relatives of Gustavus, had been driven from their territorial domains, and sought support in Sweden, where their sons had retired. The Swedish king gave asylum in his country to all persecuted persons of the Lutheran religion. In July, 1628, he wrote to the Swedish Senate, —

"We have the intention, seeing the sad state of the dukes of Mecklenburg, to provide for the maintenance of their sons, the young princes, who are in Sweden."

The Duke Bogislaus XIV. of Pomerania, the last of his race, was advanced in years, and would leave no heirs. Wallenstein wished to unite that conquest to Mecklenburg. He caused Pomerania, and the island of Rugen, off its coast, to be occupied, and had taken measures to arm a fleet. It had been announced to Wallenstein, that "there are twenty-eight ports in Pomerania;" and he wrote to Gen. Arnheim, then under his command, —

"They ought all to be occupied and fortified. Make your efforts, that you may be strong in springtime; for what remains to be done must be executed on the sea. The king of Spain will send the money to maintain twenty-five vessels of war. The emperor demands this assistance with urgency. I expect that we shall visit their isles, for I fear not at all the Swedes."

An affected disdain and a real fear of Gustavus Adolphus form the under-stratum of the letters of this great German commander at this period. The future is to show to what extent this disdain of the Swedish king was real, and to what degree his penetrating intellect had read from a distance the real character and strength of Gustavus. Judged by his orders, plans, and acts at this period, it would seem that Wallenstein did not greatly underestimate Gustavus and the forces which he might gather to his command. This seems also revealed by the bold projects and desperate expedients to which he then resorted. While the negotiations which he had commenced with Gustavus were going on, he ceased not to urge Arnheim to burn the Swedish fleet. He promised a large reward in money to bring about a plot in Sweden for some important step towards the accomplishment of his designs; precisely what and how, it is not perfectly clear. It was suspected, and has been sometimes asserted, that this secret plot contemplated violence, if not assassination, of which Gustavus was to be the victim, so that he might no more be an obstacle to the plans of Ferdinand and to the darker designs of Wallenstein. But on this point there is not conclusive evidence, and at most this charge may be considered doubtful. It is true that Wallenstein and the officials of the emperor had not received the right kind of teachings on the morality of assassination where the necessities of Church and State were in issue, for the influence of Jesuits as instructors was then widespread. What happened to William of Orange and Henry IV. of France could not fail often to pass through the mind of a person so audacious and unscrupulous as the emperor's commander, who was now pushing conquest and seeking domination in the North; but what cannot be proved should not be allowed to pass into history as a fact. Certain it is, however, Wallenstein was fully determined that nothing which he could remove should stand

in his way to carry out his designs in North Germany and on the Baltic.

The next decisive effort to accomplish this success was to secure the possession of Stralsund, either by negotiations or capture. This important seaport town occupied an advantageous position, where the sea projects into the land, forming a safe and important harbor, — a commercial gateway from the Baltic to Germany, or from Germany to Denmark and Sweden. By casting an eye on the map it can readily be seen how easily vessels and troops could pass from the harbor of Stralsund to the ports of Scandinavia, and how readily invasion could be reversed, and a fleet and soldiers pass from Copenhagen or Stockholm through Stralsund into Germany. It is, then, plainly seen how firmly and anxiously the eyes of Wallenstein, as well as of Gustavus and Christian, must have been fixed on this important gateway.

Gustavus could well say that Stralsund was the key to his future plans, which cover the security of the Baltic, the peace of his kingdom, and the liberty and welfare of the Protestant States of Germany. Wallenstein equally well comprehended its importance relative to the designs which he was resolved at all hazards to accomplish. Stralsund was one of the Hanse towns, of the famous league of commercial cities in North Germany, which had long maintained its dominant position; and though not at this date equal in this respect to what it formerly had been, yet still important. Nurtured by the free spirit of the ocean, and of that kind of independence which commerce inspires, its citizens were unwilling to be involved in the wars by which ambitious princes and military chiefs sought to increase their power and fortune, and secure their glory. Stralsund was not a free city of the empire: it was nominally subject to the Duke of Pomerania, but practically the arbiter of its own fortunes to the extent of its advantageous situation, and the strength of its means

and resolutions. Its citizens had no wish to make war on the empire. They had no desire to take ground with those who were in arms to dissolve or overthrow it. They wished to keep out of strife, to go on in their commercial and marine activity, and to be let alone. In the struggle which Denmark had maintained against the armies of Ferdinand they had taken no part. But the emperor had strong reasons for wishing to get these commercial cities under his full control, and to have them take a share of the dangers which his plans and policy required. He had sought to gain them actively to his cause by negotiations, which were continued for months. He held out to them what he thought decisive inducements. He would make with them a special arrangement, which would give them the control of trade between Germany and the Spanish dominions. But such a monopoly would bring them inevitably into collision with England and the Dutch Republic, which were pushing their trade in Northern and Southern seas, and denied the right of the emperor of Germany and the king of Spain to make and enforce any such agreement as the emissaries of Ferdinand had proposed to the Hanse cities; and not less did Denmark and Sweden scorn all such imperial plans. This the merchants and the magistrates of Hamburg, Lubeck, and their associates of the leagued cities, well understood. They were far too sagacious and practical to be caught by the show of favor and profit with which Ferdinand and his counsellors had sought to allure them.

But while the emperor and his emissaries had been busy with their negotiations and promises to the Hanse cities, and the audacious designs of Wallenstein were being formed, the brave and far-sighted king of the Swedes had not been idle. He had taken care to give his counsels, and express his sympathies, in a substantial way to the magistrates and citizens of Stralsund. He made patient and persistent efforts to allay the jealousy of the king of

Denmark, so far as to be able finally to bring about an agreement, between the two crowns, that they would assist Stralsund in case of attack by the forces of Ferdinand. As early as 1625 he had given assurance to the city, that, in case of its falling into embarrassments, he was disposed to give it assistance. On the approach of danger he renewed that assurance, but at first was somewhat undecisive how to make his assistance effective. In March, 1628, he wrote to Oxenstierna in these terms:—

"We have sent Count Salm into Denmark, to demonstrate to the king of what importance it is to the two crowns that Stralsund should not be occupied by the imperialists. We cannot take upon ourselves alone that defence, though we have much desired to do so. But the means of the king of Denmark are very limited, and the thing is very essential; it is that which we have taken into consideration. We must so occupy the armies of Wallenstein that he cannot interfere with the affairs of Prussia. That operation will have also the advantage to transport far from us the theatre of war, and our country will be sure not to suffer by it. From Stralsund we can sustain Denmark, and there have a station for our fleet in case any danger should menace us on the coast of the North Sea, where it is learned that the enemy makes armaments. He has possessed himself of more than thirty merchant vessels, which will be armed; and we ought to expect them to arrive in the autumn. We can also put this time to profit, while the free cities are yet uncertain in their resolutions, and before despair drives them into the arms of the emperor. Nevertheless, we should not dissimulate to ourselves that a large army is necessary, the maintenance of which will demand large sums of money, because the war has absorbed every thing in that country, and we lack means. It is not wise to confide in other States; for, if they resist the emperor, it is precisely to pay him nothing. It is doubtful, also, if the cities like to see a foreigner come to their assistance, so much the more as no one has demanded ours. It is for all these reasons that we are resolved to wait a little."

In the mean time the writer of this letter lost not, for a moment, sight of the affairs of Germany. At last the press of danger and the earnest efforts of Gustavus Adolphus caused King Christian so far to put aside his jealousy of the Swedish king as to make with him a treaty in 1628, at

Copenhagen, by which the two kingdoms agreed to defend Stralsund, and to oppose in common every foreign power which should appear in the Baltic with hostile designs. The Danes threw troops into Stralsund, and destroyed some ships-of-war which the king of Poland had sent to the aid of the imperialist general. When Stralsund solicited powder from the city of Dantzic, and experienced a refusal in consequence of the prohibition of King Sigismund, to whom that city was subject, Gustavus Adolphus improved the occasion to send a liberal supply of powder, six cannon, and one hundred beeves, accompanied by a friendly letter to the city authorities. His envoy, who had the mission to offer the assistance of Sweden, returned with the deputies of the city of Stralsund, who were received in audience by the king in the camp on the Vistula, the last day of May, 1628. Gustavus sent to the Swedish Senate an account of this interview in the following terms: —

"The envoys of Stralsund have communicated to us their complaints on the treatment which the city has experienced this winter from the imperialists, who have sought, by deception and menace, to gain possession of the city and port so as to be able to disquiet all the Baltic with their fleet, to impose on the neighboring States, to make dominate the preponderance of the Catholics, and to replace the old alliances by new. It has gone so far already that Col. Arnheim — become marshal, it is said — has besieged the city without declaration of war, and, in spite of the intervention of the Duke of Pomerania and of the cities of Hamburg and Lubeck, and proposed conditions worse than death. In this imminent danger Stralsund has had recourse to us; and we know not what resolution to take, seeing on one side danger of the occupation by the Catholics of a port so important, and the war certain which would occasion the conquest of Stralsund, and, on the other side, the war of Poland and the difficulties which occupy us here. Finally we have chosen the least of evils. We will not suffer that Stralsund may belong to the imperialists if we can there oppose; for thus Denmark and the Sound would be lost, and danger would be always at our ports, though we could avoid it for some time. How could our fleet defend all the coasts of Sweden, of Finland, and Livonia? The emperor last year excited the king of Poland against

us, prevented the conclusion of peace, and sought by all means to establish himself here. It is for that we have sent to Stralsund an assistance of six hundred men of foot and provisions, under the command of Col. Fritz Rosladin. Having learned that they lacked experienced chiefs and good officers, we have sent Vice-Admiral Charles Fleming to treat with the city and the town council."

The last of June, 1628, an alliance was signed between the city and Sweden. The citizens of Stralsund sent their wives into Sweden, and boldly defended themselves against the powerful forces sent against them. The chances and rigors of war in those days are strongly evinced in the well-attested fact, that, in returning to their homes, three hundred of these women lost their lives.

The Hanse league of cities, whose power had been formerly so great, was called for the last time to intervene in these critical affairs, and to show some of its ancient spirit and resolution. Gustavus, from whose penetrating regard nothing escaped, attempted to re-animate the league in order to present himself in Germany as the protector of the Hanseatic cities and their imperilled interests. He had already resolved, if danger demanded it, to come from the farther portion of Prussia to the assistance of Stralsund. Denmark having sent troops, he was excused from there marching his own. He charged Oxenstierna to confirm the alliance newly made, and to send re-enforcements commanded by Cols. Leslie and Brahe. The last-specified troops remained even after the evacuation of the country by the enemy, and the arrival of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany.

The historic evidence seems to be conclusive, that it was in 1628 that the Swedish king fully decided to take part in the war of Germany. In December, 1627, he had demanded of the estates assembled in Stockholm to name a committee composed of the four estates, to treat with him regarding some important and secret affairs. Jan. 12, 1628, the committee, in its report, expressed itself in these terms :—

"As your Majesty has informed us of the danger to which the Protestants of Germany are exposed, and of the invasions of the emperor and the Catholic League, who have subjugated successively the princes and the cities, and have taken possession of the provinces on the Baltic waters, and of the unfortunate position of Denmark, our neighbor, so that, if God arrests not the ambition of the enemy, we must meet the perilous chances of an interminable and ruinous war, permit us, in the name of our constituents and the country, to sacrifice all for its defence and for your service."

Better than any one else, the Swedish king judged the dangers of the war and the uncertainty of its results. He wrote Oxenstierna the 1st of April, 1628, —

"Things are to the point, that the wars which are made in Europe are complicated, and nearly always have become general."

He felt called to play a *rôle* in this great struggle, but had not yet fixed on the means. Two circumstances divided his attention, — the Polish war, and the less assuring relations with Denmark. Before danger called him, he had the design, coming from Poland, to attack, by the flank, the League and the emperor. He said, —

"Poland is well situated for such an attack: it is an extensive country, fertile, and everywhere open; too feeble to resist us; very hostile, though it offers us peace. It is attached to the Pope, and receives his impulsion. It is remote, consequently the imperialists would disperse with difficulty the forces which we could there concentrate."

He did not hesitate as to means, if this plan should be adopted.

"That country [he said] is covered with cities and villages nearly without defence, therefore an army could there be gathered in the manner of Wallenstein to resist them. It is well to reflect on this course sooner or later."

These words are transparent and bold in their meaning. They throw clear rays of light on the future of the tremendous undertaking to which he was about to commit himself and his people. They are valuable as showing his boldness of character and the severe tension of his mind at this time.

The danger to which Stralsund was exposed demanded greater attention; and at that very time there was a question between the king and Oxenstierna as to whether they should maintain themselves on the defensive in Germany and the offensive in Prussia, or should take the offensive in Germany, and maintain the defensive in Prussia. Oxenstierna adopted the first resolution. Gustavus tended towards an offensive war in Germany as safest and in the end most likely to secure important and permanent results. The following presents the facts and arguments on which he bases his conclusions for an offensive campaign in the territories which Ferdinand claimed to dominate as his own. Writing, March 5, 1628, to Oxenstierna, Gustavus remarks, —

"You are of the opinion that it is necessary to continue offensive war in the Prussian duchy, and to defend ourselves solely against Wallenstein by putting a garrison in Stralsund, opposing to him our fleet, and destroying his vessels in the ports. I do not share this opinion: for, as I see by your letters, there is not a sufficiency of food in Prussia for the troops; and if one took there an army, he would have to combat, in the midst of scarcity, a formidable enemy. But to make an offensive war in Prussia, my presence is necessary; and circumstances do not permit me to plunge myself in that country, and remove myself from the Baltic and from my fleet. We will, then, make only a defensive war the approaching year in that country; and I expect to gain the means, especially if the Pillau customs duties are well paid. You believe it would be better to make defensive war in Germany; and, as our ancestors destroyed the power of Russia in Livonia by the capture of Revel, you suppose that we could strike down that of the emperor through the city of Stralsund. It is true that comparison is very just; but the circumstances are not the same, for the Russians had not a boat nor a sailor to injure us on the sea, whilst the enemy who is before us has every kind of resources with which to equip a fleet, the preparations are completed, there is wanting to him only the men who know the sea, so that we know not if we are in advance or behind him as to time. What advantages should we gain by the occupation of Stralsund if the enemy were master on the sea? It is also impossible to destroy his vessels in the ports, for, according to what the king of Denmark sends me, he has fortified them in such a manner that we cannot there attack him.

If one tries not to take his ports by land forces, I see not the means of long defending the kingdom. It would not be well to transport into Sweden the seat of war, for we are never more feeble than in our own country. You know the extent of our coasts and the number of ports we have to defend. I am in accord with you, that it is scarcely possible to make war in Germany; nevertheless, if we gain the advantage, I do not believe we shall be so poor that we cannot have some resource. Spens,[1] besides, makes me hope that I could draw something from England. Camerius[2] announces to us that the States-general asks the renewal of our alliance. The Hanseatic cities are undecisive: assistance will come from that source if we should succeed. It is this which has determined me to attempt every thing to form an army. We cannot take away a strong army, because it is necessary to keep many infantry in Sweden to observe Denmark. It will be necessary, then, to employ especially foreigners. We think, however, to put in campaign fifteen thousand foot and nine thousand horse. And though you object to the feebleness of our army and the force of the two armies of the enemy, it is well that you should consider that he has an extensive country to occupy, and many cities to guard, which requires a large number of soldiers. It is not well to lose sight that the power of the enemy is more in fame than in the reality, and that the loss of a single battle would render his position very critical. To this it is well to add that the army of Tilly is very distant, and that the fortune of war may be decided in Pomerania before he can come to the assistance of Wallenstein. But God alone knows what we can or can not do. It is he who gives the will to commence it well, the force with which to prosecute it, and the success which crowns the efforts, if the undertaking has for its object the glory of his holy name and the salvation of our soul. It is easier for you, when discussing, to make appear the difficulties and troubles, than it is for me to demonstrate the probabilities of success Therefore I prefer to prove by deeds, rather than by the pen, what I hope to be able to accomplish."

It can be seen, by the closing words of this letter of Gustavus to the great chancellor, that he had the presentiment of victory. Oxenstierna, who never changed his views as to the war, called the resolution of the king a destiny, a divine impulsion, an inspiration of genius, — an inspiration, however, which prevented him becoming the arbiter of the North. Again, in December, 1628, the king expressed

[1] James Spens, the English envoy. [2] Dutch envoy.

his strong confidence in the success of the enterprise in which he was soon to embark, in a letter addressed to Oxenstierna: —

"We send you the project which will demonstrate to you the possibility of execution. Though our means appear not to be sufficient to conduct us beyond four months, if we commence, God and time will counsel the manner of terminating."

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Stralsund, strengthened by the assistance they had received from the Danes and Swedes, were making a stout resistance to the assaults of the enemy. Parleying, negotiations, imperialist intrigues and devices, had come to an end; and the hot work of siege, assault, and defence now taxed the belligerents to the utmost. Wallenstein, whose imperious will had not yet encountered defeat, who scorned whatever obstacles stood in the path of his ambition, was resolved to possess the city and its harbor regardless of cost. He is said to have declared, "I will have this town though it were fastened by a chain to the heavens." Hostilities commenced in February, 1628. Arnheim, the wily, slippery Saxon, was the general to whom Wallenstein had intrusted the military task of subduing Stralsund. Already in possession of Rugen, a considerable island occupying a commanding position at the north, the imperialists had seized Dänholm, a smaller island directly in front of the harbor. The defenders of the city, fully comprehending the importance of Dänholm to their security, resolved to wrest it from the enemy, and hold it firmly in their grasp. In March they attacked the imperialists, and drove them from the island despite the efforts of Arnheim. This was an unexpected check to Wallenstein, and he came to the assistance of his general only the more resolved to force to submission the insolent burghers of the town that dared resist his demands and his arms. To capture a city well fortified, and open to the sea, on which its citizens and allies have freedom of navigation, without first closing its harbor by blockade,

was a bold as well as adventurous undertaking. But Wallenstein counted to conquer by audacity and the greatly numerical superiority of his forces. To a deputation from the citizens, who would not yield to his demands, drawing his hand over the surface of the table before him, he said, "Your town shall be made flat as this." On the landward side the imperialists were in complete control, and had no enemies in their rear to embarrass their movements or to menace their ascendency. Wallenstein himself had been made reigning duke of Mecklenburg. With the elector of Brandenburg he maintained pacific relations, and the Prince of Pomerania had assented to the imperial demands on the town. With a formidable army, led by a chief of such commanding prestige as Wallenstein, and in the possession of these advantages, could the city, not numerous in defenders, expect to weary out the besiegers, and repel them from its walls? But the citizens of Stralsund were not unaware what evils would befall them should they yield to such foes as threatened them. German cities and towns knew but too well the treatment which victorious imperialist soldiers inflicted on those whom they subdued. Assisting the Stralsund burghers in their defence were those who had fled from the violence and rapacity of Wallenstein's army. The few hundreds of Swedish troops, and the brave officers who had been sent to their aid, understood their duty, and knew what their king expected of them. The siege went on. In communication with the sea, the brave defenders could not be driven to surrender for the want of food. Though it was of great importance to both of the Scandinavian kingdoms that Stralsund should not come under imperial domination, the King of Denmark finally ceased to render effective aid to the besieged, while Gustavus Adolphus but the more surely made good his promises of assistance. Weeks, months, passed, and Stralsund made no signs of surrender. Wallenstein now sought to gain his ends by circumlocution,

by suppleness and moderation of terms, rather than by threats and assaults. He no longer demanded that his troops should march into the town, and furnish its garrison. He only asked that the burghers should receive the soldiers of the old Duke of Pomerania, to whom they acknowledged allegiance, and to break off all relations of alliance with those who were hostile to the emperor, though the Pomeranian prince was obviously at the mercy of Wallenstein and his army. The town magistracy was inclined to accept this seductive proposition; but the citizens would not listen to it, and they could not fail to know the opinion and the undaunted resolution of the Swedish commander and soldiers in their midst. Threats, vastly superior numbers, intrigue, dissimulation, — all failed. From February to August the siege had continued, when Wallenstein was forced to the humiliation of withdrawing his army with the loss of twelve thousand men. He had not only incurred a signal repulse of his arms at a heavy sacrifice of men and precious time, and failed to secure this important outpost on the Baltic, but had also forced the city under the protection of the king of Sweden, who not only knew how to make good its defence, but to render it an important auxiliary to his contemplated undertaking against the hostile designs of the emperor. Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein alike understood the value of the stakes involved in the siege of Stralsund, and the failure of the latter was an event whose signal importance to Germany the near future was to demonstrate.

The armistice with Poland disembarrassed Gustavus of an enemy, but at the same time the peace made between Denmark and the emperor rendered uncertain his relations with Christian IV. In April, 1628, Sweden and Denmark had made an alliance, by which Gustavus engaged himself to re-enforce the Danish fleet in the war of that power with the emperor. The Swedish vessels were employed in the defence of Stralsund; and the expenses were at the

charge of the two crowns, but the defence of that important position was abandoned to the Swedes alone. The special peace made by Denmark, at Lubeck, with the emperor, disturbed the good understanding of the two Scandinavian kingdoms, though they preserved the appearance of intimacy and good faith. Afterwards it was made a matter of reproach to Denmark that the Swedish ministers were not received at the Lubeck congress, though the imperialists were the cause of that exclusion; and it appeared that the king of Sweden did not expect that measure, yet saw it with pleasure. Wallenstein seems to have been the inspiring force of the Lubeck negotiations on the side of the imperialists, and he was not wanting in the astuteness to seek to separate Denmark from Sweden. Knowing how completely Christian had been beaten and driven back to his islands by the armies of Tilly and himself, he saw the advantage of securing a peace with the Danish king, and making profit of the jealousy which he could not fail to know Christian cherished in respect of Gustavus Adolphus. Though the Swedes thus sent commissioners to take part in the Lubeck conference and negotiations, they were not allowed to participate. On the other hand, the king of Denmark could not dissimulate his sentiments when he saw Gustavus arming himself for a cause which he himself had been forced to abandon with loss of military power and prestige.

In February, 1629, the Swedish king wrote to his ministers, —

"The king of Denmark has said to me twice in the past two years that an interview would be very useful to the interests of the two countries. Not to offend him by the persistence of my refusal, I announced that I would meet the king on the 20th of this month. We saw each other in a house of the pastor of Ulfsback, near the frontiers of Scania. I did the honors of the house, and the king of Denmark was my host. We ate little, and drank more poor wine. He made me no proposition, except to re-enforce his fleet with two or three vessels. I proposed four points: first, that we should be in

accord in the peace-congress at Lubeck; second, and in the general negotiations; third, an alliance between the two kingdoms; and, fourth, as he spoke of the lack of money, I asked him the manner of making war in Germany. His response was, 'What have you to do with the emperor? Why do you wish to interfere with the affairs of Germany?' When I saw he avoided all discussion, I was silent."

Some months, however, before his departure on his undertaking in Germany, Gustavus feared a rupture with the king of Denmark. His eagle glance enabled him to see that he was to leave an enemy behind him. He wrote to Oxenstierna, —

"We know not yet where to commence, because the king of Denmark secretly enrolls soldiers, fortifies Ruden, and negotiates with the estates of Pomerania for the purchase of the isle of Rugen."

Ruden is a small island on the coasts of Pomerania, and not distant from the larger island of Rugen. The Swedish general in command of the troops at Stralsund received orders to occupy that isle without delay, and drive out the imperialists; and that order was executed. Gustavus offered his mediation in the differences between Denmark and the city of Hamburg. The care with which he watched the movements of the Danish king is strongly evinced by the fact, well authenticated, that, as he was about to land, with his army, in Germany, he was informed that the Danish fleet was preparing to enter the Baltic; when he gave precise and repeated orders to the Swedish Senate to adopt effective measures, which he definitely pointed out, for the defence of Stockholm and other important points in Sweden. In the proposition made to the committee of the Swedish estates in 1631, he foresaw a rupture with Denmark; and the orders which he gave in the autumn of that year indicate that he regarded it near.

The estates, assembled in general Diet, approved of the opinion of the committee on the war of Germany. They expressed "the wish that the king shall make war as far

as possible from the frontiers of the kingdom, and cause all its weight to press on the country of the enemy." After this resolution of the estates, adopted June 29, 1629, in absence of the king, the part which Sweden would take in the great German struggle may be regarded as decided. In the mean time Gustavus occupied himself much to convince the Senate; and the brief notes of his consultation with that body, Oct. 27 and Nov. 3, 1629, — "Ought one to take the offensive, or defensive, in the war?" — are very remarkable, as showing the mental capacity and character of Gustavus Adolphus. They bring out also, in sharp contrast, the two men who may be justly regarded as having more influence on his judgment than any others; while they serve to indicate, that, in a remarkable degree, he was self-reliant, as high intellectual capacity is wont to be, and knew how to arrive at independent decisions. Oxenstierna was then in the Prussian duchy, where the king had left him in the chief command of affairs, and he was known to be adverse to the king's proposed advance into Germany; and others in the Swedish councils were of the same opinion. John Skytte, then a member of the Senate, and a political opponent of Oxenstierna, supported the view taken by Gustavus, — that it was expedient to make an offensive campaign in Germany, and maintain the defensive in Poland, in Prussia, or wherever else hostility might manifest itself in those quarters. In the record of Gustavus's expressed reasonings and views of this period are found the clear testimonies of his genius and hopes as a leader and conqueror. They indicate that the Swedish king was keenly alive to the magnitude of the events then passing in Europe, and the grave responsibilities which he was called to assume, in virtue of his high capacities and great opportunities. The horizon before his vision was darkened by storms, the extent of whose force he could not certainly measure, and which were charged with grave perils and sufferings

to his people and those whose cause he had espoused at such cost. Thus in the presence of a great future he had the self-reliance of genius, of faith, and of lofty heroism, yet was not unmindful that the inspiration which bore him forward might bring him to defeat and certain death, though he had a presentiment of victory. Without rashness, void of arrogance, yet with a design determined so strongly that there is manifested by his words an interior joy and confidence, which the possibilities of an unfortunate issue cannot trouble, his words and their implications at this time show him guided by a high ideal of moral responsibility, which places him in marked contrast to Alexander and Napoleon at crucial tests in their careers. On the remark of John Skytte, that war put his monarchy at stake, he responded, "All monarchies have passed from one family to another. That which constitutes a monarchy is not men, it is the law." He clearly foresaw that the war would be long and painful. On board of the fleet, he wrote Oxenstierna, June 2, 1630, "It appears to me that this whole war will be long drawn out, and be ended rather by the delay and weariness of it than by impulse of force." Nov. 3, 1629, when the Senate adopted the opinion of the king, he terminated by these words, "I expect you to persevere in this great work, of which you and your children will see the happy issue, such as God, I hope, will accord to your prayers. For myself, I look henceforth for no more tranquillity before entering into eternal felicity."

His confidence in victory is revealed also in two other circumstances. After the peace which Denmark had made for itself, that government had at the same time as Brandenburg offered its mediation between Gustavus and the emperor; and Dantzic had been indicated as the seat of a congress for that purpose. An imperial commissioner, clothed with the full powers, there made his appearance; but he refused the title of king to Gustavus. The Swedish

ministers delayed their arrival. Gustavus instructed Oxenstierna to communicate his pretensions in writing. The private opinion of the Swedish king was expressed by the committee of the Swedish estates in their advice in respect to that congress:—

"As the intentions of our adversary are not clear, and the issue uncertain, we think it better that the king should present himself immediately with his army, and make the treaty sword in hand."

The publicity given to the conditions on which Gustavus would lay down arms, demonstrates what importance he attached to the offers which had been made him. As these conditions, after the war had imposed on Germany the imperial yoke, implied nothing less than the re-establishment of Protestant Germany in the state in which it was before the war, the imperial commissioner, Baron Dolma, had some reason to declare, "Could the king of Sweden demand more if he were a conqueror in the midst of Germany?" It was with such pretensions that the defender of Protestantism presented himself, of whom the emperor is reported to have said with disdain, "We have one little enemy more." From another side, though the alliance of France was for Gustavus of high importance, he nevertheless undertook the war without its assistance, not only that he might be independent, but also to show himself able to act alone in that great undertaking. While his large plans for the future made it necessary for him to secure the co-operation of that powerful government, it was equally requisite that this alliance should be so framed as not to bind or force his hand as to his future action relative to questions and interests to which France might be indifferent or hostile.

Richelieu demanded nothing better than to engage the Swedish king in the German war. It was to this end that the cardinal statesman had sent the French envoy Charnacé twice to visit Sweden, the second time in March, 1630, when he saw the king at Vesterås. According to

his instructions, Charnacé would induce Gustavus to seek the alliance of France. He did not spare flatteries, persuaded if they had any influence, the difficulties of the undertaking, in any event, would elicit the desired solicitation prescribed in his instruction. "Gustavus Adolphus," he said, "was expected in Germany as a messiah. The people would give their hearts to nourish his soldiers. All the advantages and the glory of the war would remain to the Swedish king. The king of France only wished to see his friend admired by Europe and the entire world, and to aid him to become the emperor of the Orient, if that was the object of his ambition." It is thus seen what kind of flattery it was thought could influence the hero. Gustavus was not to be caught by fine words. He responded that he had "much other information as to the dispositions of the German princes. The elector of Saxony had said, that, if the king of Sweden transported himself into Germany, he would unite with the emperor. The Saxon prince had refused to receive the letter which Gustavus had written to the electors. The king of Sweden had it from a good source," he added, smiling, "that the first who would take up arms against him were the elector of Bavaria, and the Catholic League, of whom the king of France had declared himself the protector; and it was doubtless in that quality that he claimed to enter into an alliance with Sweden." Besides, Gustavus made known his conditions; but, when he encountered difficulties, he did not await the answer of France, but decided, as Richelieu said, without being assured of the friendship of that power. Gustavus, however, with his clear insight into the affairs of his time, could not fail to understand the logic of France's necessities and ambitions in respect to the house of Austria and its allies, and that his armed support of the German Protestant princes and cities could scarcely fail to bring the co-operation of the government represented by so

clear-headed a man as Richelieu. March 17, 1630, the king writes to Oxenstierna, —

"The cause for which we have not been able to agree this time with Charnacé, at Vesterås, is, that we have not found it good, in this condition of things, to tie ourselves so closely to the nod and will of the king of France only for three tuns of gold."[1]

[1] A Swedish tun of gold was one hundred thousand rix-dollars.

CHAPTER XII.

GUSTAVUS ASSEMBLES HIS ARMY FOR HIS GERMAN EXPEDITION. — TAKES LEAVE OF THE SWEDISH ESTATES. — DISEMBARKS IN GERMANY. — ADVANCES INTO POMERANIA. — STETTIN SURRENDERS. — HIS ENCOUNTER WITH THE IMPERIALISTS. — AN ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE KING OF SWEDEN.

In the mean while the Swedish armaments were continued with all the activity which characterized Gustavus Adolphus, who employed even rigorous measures when deemed necessary. The cities of Sweden, which at the Diet of 1629 had pledged themselves to arm sixteen good ships before the end of the year, had not fulfilled their promise within the stipulated time. Their deputies were brought before the Senate by the procurer of the royal court, who sustained the accusation. They demanded pardon of the king, promising that in the following May the vessels should be in the port of Stockholm. The division of the fleet destined to transport the army into Germany assembled in the port of Elfsnabben. It formed a squadron of twenty-eight vessels of transport for the cavalry, and some flatboats destined to the debarkation of troops and to the navigation of rivers. They were each armed with three cannon, and could carry one hundred men. The effective of the forces which the king took to Germany cannot be estimated exactly. He did not wish to make it known in the negotiations commenced with France, probably so as not to reveal the small number of his troops. He was about to undertake an enter-

prise of great magnitude, and in communication with a power of large resources and ambitious designs, and cared not to make known that the force actually in his hands might seem greatly inadequate to his pretensions and indicated designs. It must be regarded as a measure of security, that, in the spring of 1630, he published a prohibition of any one departing from the kingdom without passport. According to the most reliable authority, the army he was to take with him into Germany was composed of ninety-two companies of infantry and sixteen companies of cavalry, numbering in all fifteen thousand combatants. The cavalry, amounting to three thousand, was formed of Swedes alone; but foreigners, especially Germans, composed half the infantry. There was one regiment of eight companies of Scotch, under the command of Col. Mackay. Besides, the king took with him a good supply of war-munitions, and artillery completely organized. His artillery was of large and small pieces, among which was a superior kind of small regimental guns, which could be discharged so rapidly that he fired eight times ere an expert musketeer could manage to fire six. Torstenson, who was to make a brilliant record as a soldier, and go down in history as one of the real heroes of the War of Thirty Years, was a colonel of this body of artillery soldiers at the time of the arrival of Gustavus on German territory. As the reward of his bravery, and the estimation of his high capacity, he was subsequently made the chief of this branch of the service. The troops were provided with shovels, spades, and palisades, with which to fortify themselves in case of need.

Gustavus provided for the government of Sweden, in his absence on his German undertaking, by confiding it to the Senate, and especially to ten members of that body, who were always to remain in the capital unless urgent circumstances required their presence in the provinces. The ten senators selected for this special responsibility were

Magnus Brahe, James de la Gardia, Admiral Charles Carlson Gyllenhielm, Baron Gabriel Oxenstierna Bengisson, Claes Horn, Baron Gabriel Oxenstierna Gustafsson, Peter Baner, John Sparre, Claes Fleming, and Herman Wrangel. Affairs in contention on appeal before the king must be judged by the Senate, according to the Swedish laws. That administration, as to activity, did not respond to the wishes of Gustavus. This he had to some degree foreseen, and it was for this reason that he confided all that related to the army to his brother-in-law, John Casimir, an active and enterprising prince fully imbued with the spirit of his royal relative. The following year the king gave Casimir also the administration of the finances. The king's large degree of confidence in his brother-in-law did not please the Senate. A sufficient force was to be maintained in Sweden to watch whatever course Denmark might be moved to take in the absence of the king; and ten thousand men were left in Prussia, under the orders of Oxenstierna and Gustavus Horn. A smaller division, commanded by Leslie, Nils Brahe, and Taupadel, was at Stralsund, and had repeated skirmishes with the imperial troops stationed in the island of Rugen. A declaration of war seemed less necessary to Gustavus Adolphus, as hostilities were already commenced by the emperor, who had sent troops to the aid of the enemy at Poland, and by the presence of the Swedish soldiers in Stralsund. But to the end of justifying the undertaking on which he was about to embark, he published a manifesto, addressed to the sovereigns and nations of Europe, giving the reasons which caused him to engage in this war; and these were not lacking in numbers and force:—

"The emperor has taken and opened the letter addressed by the king of Sweden to Bethlem Gabor, the Prince of Transylvania. He has excited Sigismund to war by promises and sending him re-enforcements, under the orders of the Duke of Holstein in 1627, and in 1629 under Arnheim. He has arrogated to himself authority over the Bal-

tic, has disturbed the Swedish commerce, and, contrary to all laws, has despoiled of their kingdoms the dukes of Mecklenburg, relatives of the royal house of Sweden. Finally he has driven away in an insulting manner the Swedish envoys who have gone to the conferences at Lubeck, and has refused to give the title of king to Gustavus Adolphus."

There were important additions which the king could have made to his indictment against the emperor, but these were withheld for politic considerations. He was expecting the alliance of Catholic France, and did not deem it wise, in his manifesto to entire Europe, to expose the aggressive and menacing steps which Ferdinand had recently taken in Germany against the Protestant faith and rights; for, instead of learning moderation by experience, and making some approximation to toleration by the teachings of time, the emperor had become more despotic and grasping in proportion as he felt his power increasing and the strength of his adversaries giving way. Laid waste by the devastating bands of Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, and the desolating and cruel hordes of Tilly and Wallenstein, all Germany sighed for peace. But the Catholics were willing to terminate the war only to their own advantage; and the emperor conformed his actions to their demands, instead of adopting a policy conducive to the welfare of all his subjects. Immediately after his success in dethroning the lawful king of Bohemia, he had continued his intolerant crusade of suppressing all Protestant faith and tendencies in his hereditary territories; and, after the success of his armies in Lower Germany, he had gone even to the extent of deciding that all the Protestants of these territories must surrender their religion, or abandon the homes of their fathers and the country of their birth, — a bitter alternative, that caused great commotion among his Austrian subjects, which his servile minions knew how to suppress with pitiless completeness. This was but the prelude to other re-actionary violence and injustice. The Catholics demanded of the emperor that all

the archbishoprics, bishoprics, abbacies, and monasteries which had been suppressed and secularized by the Protestants since the Diet of Augsburg, a period covered by three-fourths of a century, should now be restored to the Roman Church, in order to compensate the Catholics for their expenses and losses in the war. To carry out this requisition, every Protestant prince would be deprived of a portion of his lands and revenues; thus taking from them possessions which had been held under four preceding emperors and through several generations. Though at first affecting signs of moderation, and seeking to conceal the full extent of his designs, he was showing conclusive proofs of his intention to respond fully to the extreme Catholic claims. The bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, where the Protestants had elected bishops of their own faith, were overrun by the imperial troops, and Catholic bishops installed. The shameful terms of peace to which the king of Denmark had been forced to assent after his overwhelming defeat, by which the German Protestants appeared to be rendered utterly powerless, encouraged Ferdinand to grant the full sweep of the Catholic demands; and in 1629 he signed what is known as the Edict of Restitution, so historic for its diabolical and disastrous consequences to the peace and best interests of Germany. In virtue of this bald usurpation, the emperor decided that "all secularization of religious foundations by the Protestants subsequent to the treaty of Augsburg is contrary to its spirit, and must be revoked as a breach of it." His decision went farther, and said, that, "by the religious peace, Catholic proprietors of estates were no further bound to their Protestant subjects than to allow them full liberty to quit their territories." This was in spirit, and almost in form, going to the extent of the violence and injustice of the extraordinary measures which years before he had so cruelly meted out to the Bohemian Protestants. In conformity to this imperial decision the Protestant pos-

sessors of benefices were ordered to surrender immediately their possessions to the imperial agents. This despotic decree applied to two archbishoprics, twelve bishoprics, and numerous abbacies. The Edict of Restitution spread terror among all the Protestants of Germany, not only by what it expressly declared, but by what it plainly indicated beyond. It seemed conclusive evidence to the Protestants that their religion was to be entirely suppressed, and that the complete overthrow of German liberty was near at hand. All remonstrance was disregarded: the agents to carry out the edict were named, and the army was assembled to make sure its enforcement. This work of re-actionary usurpation and violence began in Augsburg, where the treaty of pacification had been concluded. The city was placed under the government of a Catholic bishop, and its Protestant churches were closed. Other similar outrages followed, indicating clearly that the Edict of Restitution was something more than an imperial menace, and was to be made a reality as fast as circumstances, events, and overwhelming military force could accomplish that result.

These new alarming imperial demonstrations in Germany, added to the wrongs which the Protestants had suffered in previous decades, were known to Gustavus Adolphus, and, quite as much as the facts cited in his manifesto, justified the course he was about to take against the emperor and the League, and served to nerve and stimulate him in his bold determination to go to the rescue of his oppressed co-religionaries. He knew the dangers and the magnitude of his undertaking, but he believed it offered the surest alternative of safety to the Protestants of Germany and to the Protestant kingdoms of Scandinavia. All his reasonings, his warlike preparations, the serious cares he was devoting to the internal affairs of his kingdom, his interviews with his estates and counsellors, show how solemnly he viewed the undertaking on which he

was about to embark. Late in May, 1630, the estates of Sweden were assembled at Stockholm, and the difficult question of the war was laid before them. Each could foresee without difficulty the great embarrassments and trials which the war would occasion at a later day, but there was not a voice raised against it. Though the chancellor had previously made known his objections and doubts as to this great warlike undertaking, and had repeatedly recalled the poverty of Sweden, the vast superiority of the emperor's forces, and the probabilities of a disastrous result, he had finally yielded all objections, saying that "the king is moved by a powerful spirit which no one may resist." That which there was of the noble and the grand in the proposed enterprise captivated all minds; and the people readily offered their property for the sacred cause, in behalf of which the king showed himself disposed to sacrifice his own life. Consent was given to the war by the assembled estates, and to carry it on, the necessary subsidies were voted. May 20 the estates assembled in the hall of the Diet; and Gustavus presented himself, which was to prove his last meeting with these representatives of his subjects, to bid them farewell, bearing with him his little daughter, scarcely four years of age. First was read the act which assured to the young princess the right to succeed her father, and the estates renewed their oath of fidelity. Afterwards was read the ordinance which regulated the interior administration of the kingdom during the absence of the king. The queen, tenderly as Gustavus was attached to her, was excluded from all participation in the government, for which her limited capacity in that regard disqualified her. The king took his daughter Christine in his arms, and commended her to the care and love of the estates with so much warmth that tears came to his eyes, as well as to those of the entire assembly. He then continued his discourse, thanking the members of the Diet for the subsidies which they had granted for

the war, knowing well that the sum voted could not be paid without great efforts. In the mean while it was well to offer thanksgiving to God, who had preserved for many years the Swedish frontiers from the ravages of war, and permitted Sweden to gain victories and to make conquests. His farewell address to the estates, as taken down at the time by the reporters of the Diet, was substantially in these terms: —

"Now I am about to commence a more important struggle. Seeing that many, perhaps, may imagine that we charge ourselves with this war without cause given, so I take God the Most High, in whose presence I am, to witness that I have undertaken it, not out of my own pleasure, nor from lust for war, but for many years have had most pressing reasons therefor. The emperor has compelled me to resort to arms. He has insulted my person, assisted our enemies, persecuted our allies, our religious brethren, who sigh for deliverance. With the aid of God, they will not have sighed in vain.

"As to what concerns me, I am not unaware of the dangers to which I expose myself. Already many times my blood has flowed for Sweden, and my love for the country doubtless will cost my life some day; for it is by being often carried to the well that the pitcher is finally broken. This is why, before leaving the country this time, I recommend you all, inhabitants of Sweden, present or absent, to Almighty God, to the end that he may protect your soul and body, and unite us all together in the home of eternal joys.

"Members of the Senate, I wish for you intelligence and energy to discharge your functions to the glory of God, to preserve the purity of his word, the peace, union, and prosperity of the fatherland. I desire also that each of you may enjoy the happiness of seeing grow up around you children formed by your example, and capable one day, like you, of being useful to the country.

"You, the nobles, I desire to revive, by your courage, the glory acquired by the ancient Goths, our ancestors, whose undying fame is known through the world. By imitating their example, you will enjoy a renown equal to theirs, the good will of your sovereign, and a consideration justly merited.

"Gentlemen of the clergy, I exhort you to concord and a sincere piety. Enlighten your auditors, not solely by your precepts, but even more by your examples, and all hearts will be yours. Direct them to union, faith, and obedience, to the end that the wicked cannot lead them astray, and that they may remain faithful to the fatherland.

"Representatives of the burgesses and the peasants, I wish for you every kind of prosperity and success. May your little cottages be transformed into solid houses of stone, your boats into vessels of large tonnage. May your fields and farms, in filling with abundance your barns and granaries, contribute to the riches of yourselves and the country.

"Yes, dear people of Sweden, I commend you to the protection of God, and bid you farewell, perhaps forever."

The king was in tears when he pronounced his last words, followed with silence, and only interrupted by the suppressed sobs of the deeply moved assembly. Gustavus again raised his voice, and pronounced the prayer of which he made use on such occasions:—

"Lord, turn thyself towards us, and be merciful to thy servants. Fill us early with thy grace, so that we may be happy during our life. Bring us joy after the many evils we have suffered. Reveal thy power to thy servants and thy glory to their children. God, our God, be kind and merciful unto us. Grant success to the work of our hands. May the work of our hand glorify the Lord. Amen."

All the members of the assembled Diet were invited to dine at the royal palace. The occasion could not be otherwise than one of thrilling interest and solemnity, both to the kingly host, and to the guests, his subjects, whose love for him was so devoted. At table Gustavus spoke to most of those present. Generally affable and pleasant, on this occasion he was more so than usual. The emotion caused by his adieus, his near departure, the presentiment of the dangers that awaited him, and his courage, offered in his words a mixture of gravity and gayety, blended with a touching sensibility. When every thing was ready for the king's departure, he went to Elfsnabben, followed by the court and a numerous crowd of the Swedish population. The army was again passed in review, and then went on board the vessels. The 30th of May, 1630, Gustavus embarked. His fleet was divided into four divisions. The king commanded the first. He

had under him the general of division, John Baner. The second division was conducted by the admiral of the kingdom, Charles Carlson Gyllenhielm; Major Bubbe was at the head of the third, and Erik Ryning commanded the fourth. If the fleet should be dispersed by storm, it would rally first at the northern promontory of Öland, and then under shelter of the island of Bornholm. But the direct route was traced from Elfsnabben to the coasts of Pomerania and the island of Gripswald. A multiplicity of administrative affairs absorbed the last moments of Gustavus, and his energy and direct action were engaged in matters the most slight as well as the most serious. There are instructions for the government and the Senate; important communications to Oxenstierna, then in Prussia; letters to the governors, to the bishops, and the people of each province, on the subject of conscription; relative to the confirmation of dotations to the University of Upsala; letters in regard to processes, to exemptions of the lands of sergeants of villages; pensions to old soldiers and their widows, in whom the king manifested a special interest. All this, and some other written instructions relative to home matters, were expedited by Gustavus, and dated on board his vessel, prior to sailing. A strong south-east wind prevented the departing of the fleet. June 14 the king wrote to the Senate at Stockholm, —

"We are in great embarrassment in consequence of the strong contrary wind, as our stores are mostly consumed. We cannot take to sea again, without danger of ruin, before we have provisioned ourselves for some time."

Finally a fresh north wind enabled the fleet to make sail. The whole voyage lasted five weeks, was very fatiguing, and so slow that the vessels were obliged to put into ports to procure provisions. Precisely one hundred years after the Confession of Augsburg was published, Gustavus Adolphus, now the heroic champion of Luther-

anism, was to make his landing in Germany. On St. John's Day, the day much regarded by Lutheran believers, he cast anchor under shelter of the island of Rugen, near the most western mouth of the Oder, during a violent storm. The coast was lighted by numerous fires during the darkness of the night. These were the signals of the enemy, who had retired to camp at Anklam. It was Gustavus himself who bore the news of this to his soldiers. He had thrown himself into a boat to reconnoitre the enemy, and on his return he ordered the landing of the troops. Having learned that Leslie was already in possession of Rugen, he had directed the fleet straight on Usedom. The landing of the troops was effected in flat-boats on the latter island. Accompanied by Nils and Joachim Brahe, the king was one of the first to descend from the vessel, and the first to put foot to land. As soon as he stepped on German soil, he knelt, and offered audibly the following prayer: —

"My Lord and my God, thou who rulest the winds and the sea, in the heavens and over the land, how can I praise thee, fittingly thank thee, for the protection which thou hast granted me during this dangerous voyage? I give thee thanks from the depths of my heart. Thou knowest it, I have undertaken this expedition, not for my own glory, but to sustain thy oppressed Church. Cease not to sustain us in the accomplishment of this sacred work until we have attained the object fixed by thyself."

He then raised himself; and, seeing tears in the eyes of those who surrounded him, he remarked, "Weep not, but rather pray to God with all your heart. To pray often is almost to conquer." Gustavus then seized a spade, and traced out the enclosure of a camp, the fortifications of which were at once commenced. While the landing of the troops was going on, a part of the soldiers worked, making intrenchments, and at the same time others were placed in order of battle, ready to combat if necessity required. Eleven regiments in this manner landed during

the night: the others followed. The artillery, the baggage, and the cavalry were put on shore the last. While the debarkation of the army had been thus successfully going on, there could be seen on shore, in different directions, the rising flame of the burning villages, which had been set on fire by the fleeing imperialists. At this time Pomerania was overrun by sixteen thousand men, who had constituted a part of the army of Wallenstein. They were commanded by an Italian, — Gen. Torquato de Conti, a hard and selfish man. These soldiers, accustomed to unrestrained license, overwhelmed the inhabitants of that country without defence. With the person of Wallenstein the last appearance of order and discipline had disappeared. Pomerania had suffered greatly by these devastating hosts; and a secret rumor, announcing the near approach of the Swedes, had been circulated in the country. More certain news had been recently transmitted by the garrison of Stralsund, which animated the hopes of those who wished for the coming of Gustavus and his troops to afford them relief from the imperialist hordes of the Italian commander. Without molestation from the enemy, the Swedes availed themselves of the fortifications which remained after the inroad of the Danes into Pomerania. In a short time the army was enclosed in an intrenched camp, defended by cannon; while the vessels which had brought it returned to Stockholm to bring re-enforcements. The king addressed his soldiers with the living voice full of serious and impassioned energy: —

"It is as much on your account as for your religious brethren in Germany that I have undertaken this war: you will there gather imimperishable glory. You have nothing to fear from the enemy: they are the same whom you have already conquered in Prussia. Your bravery has imposed on Poland an armistice of six years; if you continue to fight as valiantly, I hope to obtain an honorable peace for your country, and guaranties of security for the German Protestants. Old soldiers, it is not of yesterday you have known war, for you have shared

with me all the chances of fortune. You must not lose courage if you experience some wants. I will conduct you to an enemy who has enriched himself at the expense of that unhappy country. It is only with the enemy you can find money, abundance, and all which you desire."

It was by such appeals as these, directed to their religious sentiments, their courage, their patriotism, and to their personal necessities, that the king of Sweden inspired his soldiers, who had just crossed the sea, and staked life and fortune with him in a foreign land. His language breathes a spirit, and indicates a moral sentiment, which place him in favorable contrast to similar declarations of great commanders in ancient as well as in modern times.

The arrival of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany did not produce at the imperial court the sensation which, on sound military principles, it might well have caused. The uninterrupted success of Ferdinand thus far, inspired him with pride, and his friends with confidence. The conqueror of the kings of Bohemia and Denmark, of so many princes and celebrated generals, expected to disembarrass himself easily of a new enemy, little formidable. At Vienna they made sport of Gustavus and of his pretension to require himself to be called "your Majesty," like the other kings of Europe. "The snow-king will melt," they said, "as he approaches the southern sun." When the emperor, who was at Ratisbon, received the information of the landing of Gustavus in Germany, he said, with much indifference, to the princes and courtiers who surrounded him, "We have another little enemy before us." As the result of this slight estimate of the strength of the king of Sweden, the imperial armaments were made slow and without energy. The landing of the Swedish army had taken place near the time when the enemies of Wallenstein, in the League and among the imperialists, had been successful in influencing Ferdinand to dismiss this distinguished commander, as well as his army, from his service. Ferdinand and his counsellors

had no doubt that Tilly would be amply sufficient to deal with the new enemy from the North. Tilly himself having responsibilities in another direction, the Italian Conti was directed to give attention to Gustavus. The Italian general was presumptuous, remarked that "Gustavus has lost all his laurels in the forests of Prussia," remained immovable near Stettin, and made no efforts to oppose the landing of the Swedes. His officers, indolent and in abundance gained by their thefts and spoliations, spoke with contempt of the poverty of the Swedish army. But Conti, Tilly, and the emperor were soon to learn what those poorly clad Swedes were worth. Leslie, the Scotchman in command of the Swedish force at Stralsund, had received re-enforcements, and in April had occupied Rugen, and driven out the imperialists. He united his soldiers to those of the king, who had caused the troops of the League to evacuate Usedom and Wollin. After a siege of six days, Wolgast surrendered, and the cities of Kamin and Wollin also capitulated. Gustavus was now master of the mouths of the Oder, but the real key of that river was Stettin. At the same time that city was the only one in Pomerania which had not an imperial garrison. In two hours the vessels of the king passed Frische-Haff. It was important that the Swedes should make this rapid advance on Stettin to gain possession of it before the arrival of the imperialists. Bogislaus XIV., Duke of Pomerania, feeble and superannuated, had long been wearied by the violence and wrongs inflicted by the troops of Ferdinand on his territories, and was too weak to make any effective resistance to the oppressors of himself and his subjects. Instead of filling him with hope, and animating him with courage, the appearance of the Swedes increased his alarm and anxiety. Much as he had suffered from a lawless and rapacious soldiery, the fear of bringing upon himself the vengeance of the emperor prevented him from receiving Gustavus as his deliverer.

The aged duke, who had attempted opposition, through an embassy, to the approach of the Swedes, found them as by enchantment drawn up in order of battle before the gates of his capital. A brief negotiation followed, in which the strong dictated laws to the weak. Gustavus said to the aged Bogislaus,—

"I come to you, not as an enemy, but a friend. I wage no war against Pomerania nor against the German Empire, but against the enemies of both. In my hands this duchy shall be sacred, and be restored to you, at the conclusion of the campaign, by me with more certainty than by any other. Look at the traces of the imperial troops within your territories, and to mine in Usedom, and decide whether you will have the emperor, or me, as your friend. What have you to expect if the emperor should make himself master of your capital? Will he deal with you more leniently than I? Or is it your intention to stop my progress? The case is pressing: decide at once, and do not compel me to have recourse to more violent measures."

In the presence of a royal commander, who had at his back a victorious army, and who knew how so well to express his own mind, there was but one alternative to the Prince of Pomerania. The gates of Stettin were opened to Gustavus, the Swedes entered the city, and the old duke conducted the king in his carriage. Very soon were seen the hosts of the North following the impulsion of their chief, busy at the work of improving the fortifications. In the treaty which Bogislaus was obliged to sign, Gustavus reserved to himself the possession of Pomerania after the death of the duke, who had no children, until the payment of the expenses of the war. By the occupation of Stettin, the king of Sweden had obtained a firm footing in Pomerania, the command of the river Oder, and an important magazine for his army. The duke deemed it expedient to excuse, to the emperor, the surrender of his capital on the plea of necessity; but, knowing well the implacable character of the emperor, he did not hesitate to enter into a close alliance

with Gustavus. By this league with Pomerania, and a firm possession of its strongholds, the king had covered his rear, and secured his communication with Sweden. Fifteen days had passed since the landing of Gustavus in Germany, to July 10, the date of the opening of Stettin to his army.

While these events were occurring, Torquato Conti, the emperor's commander in Pomerania, had made little resistance, though his forces were superior in numbers to those of the king of Sweden. He seemed to be in those territories less to prevent the entrance of the Swedes than to oppose their ulterior progress. He assembled troops at Gartz and Anklam; while, following the orders of the emperor, he cut off the enemy by the occupation of Landsberg on the Warta, thus barring the road to Silesia and the dominions of Ferdinand. He had contemplated in vain to surprise Stettin before it should be occupied by the Swedes. The cruelties and excesses committed by that Italian general in Pomerania had attached to his name a greater horror than the generals of Wallenstein themselves had inspired among the people. The discharge of Wallenstein from the imperial service broke a bond which held together a hundred thousand men. Of these a large number passed to the ranks of the Swedes. Gustavus had chosen the opportune time to commence his German campaign. The capture of Stettin was followed by that of Damm and Stargard. The last city was surrendered by the burghers through a private agreement, and the Swedes were received as liberators. The severe discipline of the Swedish troops excited not less admiration than the personal virtue of their king. Says Richelieu in his memoirs, —

"As to the king of Sweden personally, there was seen in his actions but an inexorable severity towards the least excess of his soldiers, an extraordinary mildness towards the people, and an exact justice on all occasions."

His conduct was in striking contrast with the license of the imperialists, who, especially after the alliance concluded between Gustavus and the Duke of Pomerania, greatly increased the bad treatment of the unfortunate inhabitants. It was the army of Wallenstein which had been so much dreaded. The iron hand of the chief was no longer there to hold in check the monster who now for pleasure wallowed in vice and crime. To revenge himself on Bogislaus, Torquato Conti allowed his generals, on his retreat, to exercise great atrocities on the unfortunate inhabitants of the duchy. On the pretence of cutting off the resources of the Swedish army, the country was laid waste and plundered, and towns were given to the flames. These barbarities only served to place in more favorable light the conduct of the Swedes, and to win the hearts of the suffering people to the just and humane Gustavus. Consequently the Swedes were received with open arms, many of the Pomeranians entered the service of Sweden, and the estates voted to the cause of their liberators a contribution of one hundred thousand florins.

Conti, who had the reputation of being an able general, made an effort to obstruct the march of Gustavus; though he could not be induced to attack the king, whose troops were inferior in numbers to those of the imperialist general. Seizing an opportunity when the king of Sweden was absent from Stettin, Conti made a sudden attack on that city. The Swedes were not taken unprepared, and the imperialists were compelled to retire with great loss. His forces thinned by desertion and extensive mortality, and exposed to the piercing cold of a climate to which they were not accustomed, Conti was desirous of allowing them to go into winter quarters; but he had to do with an opponent for whom a German winter had no terrors. Gustavus had taken precaution to provide sheepskin clothing for his soldiers, thus enabling them to keep the field in defiance of

frost and snows. Amid these circumstances, so discouraging to the imperialist general, Torquato Conti resigned his command.

It was about this period in the career of the Swedish hero, but before the Italian general had given up the imperial command, that a plot had been concerted, and nearly executed, to remove him by assassination. It was a time when an elastic Jesuitical morality was not a little in vogue among the imperialist counsellors and officers. According to an understanding made with Conti, a lieutenant-colonel named Quinti del Ponte passed from the camp of the imperialists to the army of Gustavus, where he was received without distrust, and placed in the regiment of Falkenberg. He there found the chief of a squadron, John Baptista, who was likewise an Italian. The similarity of character of the two men led to a close intimacy between them; and they resolved to make use of the first opportunity to assassinate the king of Sweden, or to deliver him to Conti. It is related that Baptista had been repeatedly on the point of executing the murderous design, but had been prevented through fear of being seized by those who surrounded Gustavus. In the month of August the king was about to make an expedition to take possession of certain fortresses of Pomerania, among others Demmin, the city where Ponte had stored treasures he had gathered by his pillages. The fear of losing his stolen accumulations caused him to hasten the execution of his scheme of assassination, and to improve the first opportunity to accomplish it. One day Gustavus, preparing to go out to reconnoitre as near as possible the imperial camp, ordered seventy Finland cavaliers to accompany him. Del Ponte was informed of the order, and sneaked away secretly to take his measures. A little before leaving his quarters on his undertaking, the king had ordered three squadrons of cavalry and a company of infantry to follow him at a distance. Ponte had not known of the latter circumstance, for he had

proceeded in all haste to Gartz to ask from Conti fifteen hundred Neapolitan cuirassiers. He concealed them on both sides of the road which Gustavus was to pass, and ordered them, if possible, to take the king alive, and not to fire a shot, so as not to draw the attention of the Swedish foragers in the vicinity. Gustavus and his escort rode along quietly in the valley, when the imperial soldiers in ambuscade showed themselves on all sides. The Finland cavaliers closed around their brave king, and made a desperate resistance. Several times they repulsed their assailants, twenty times their superior in numbers; but they had the advantage, because they made use of firearms, while their adversaries fought only with the sabre. Del Ponte and his men grew impatient. The musket discharges had, perhaps, fixed the attention of the other Swedish troops in the rear; and the combat was longer and more bloody than had been expected. The loss of many of their comrades having maddened the imperial soldiers, they commenced to use their firearms; and their balls soon made slaughter among the little band of Swedes. The king's horse was killed, and it was not possible for a cavalier to replace it by giving up his own, so hot was the fight. The Finlanders fell one after another; and finally Gustavus was taken, after bravely defending himself. However, the imperialist cavalier who had captured the king did not know the value of his prisoner, and was about to take him to Ponte when the Swedish cavalry in the rear, informed by the sound of musketry, arrived with all speed to the support of their king and comrades. The fight was at once renewed with such determination that the imperialists, who had suffered already considerable losses, were thrown into disorder, and compelled to flee, abandoning their royal captive, and leaving behind them four hundred killed and two hundred prisoners. In the renewal of the fight on the arrival of the re-enforcements Gustavus had been able to recover his liberty, and rejoin his brave soldiers. He looked with

grief on the Finlanders who had fallen in his defence, and remarked, "How many exploits these heroes would have performed if my imprudence had not led them to a premature death!" Del Ponte returned to Gartz with the Neapolitan fugitives. His intimate relations with Baptista caused suspicion, and a spy was taken as he was about to put fire to the Swedish camp. He knew and confessed the conspiracy of Ponte and Baptista, and an examination of his papers proved his guilt. Gustavus received advice of numerous similar attempts of assassination imputed to the Jesuits. He wrote to Sweden that it was necessary to be severe against the envoys of these fathers, who had found means to introduce themselves into the kingdom. He had received this last information from Holland.

CHAPTER XIII.

TILLY CHOSEN BY THE EMPEROR TO CONFRONT THE KING OF SWEDEN. — PROTESTANT PRINCES JOIN GUSTAVUS. — CAPTURE OF GREIFFENHAGEN, GARTZ, DEMMIN, FRANKFORT-ON-THE-ODER, AND OTHER CITIES.

THUS far successful in his plans and efforts since he landed, from his fleet, on German soil, he was soon to meet with powerful resistance, and a general of tried experience and resounding fame. Tilly, since the recent dismissal of Wallenstein, was now the general-in-chief of the imperial armies. The conqueror of Mansfeld, of Christian of Brunswick, of the Margrave of Baden, and of the king of Denmark, he was now to meet in Gustavus Adolphus an adversary worthy of his high military renown. The descendant of a noble Walloon family in Liege, Tilly had received his military discipline in the war of the Netherlands, which was then regarded the great school of successful soldiers. He early found opportunity to distinguish himself, and received promotion under Rudolph II. in Hungary, and afterwards entered the service of Maximilian of Bavaria, who made him his principal general, with extensive powers. By his superior military abilities and energetic efforts, he became largely instrumental in the successful formation and discipline of the Bavarian army, by which Maximilian had been able to become so important a support to the house of Austria, and to extend his own dominions and prestige. Appointed commander of the troops of the Catholic League after he had successfully aided Ferdinand to subdue the Bohemians

with fire and sword, he was now to take the place of his great rival in confronting this new enemy of the League and the house of Austria from the North. Stern to his soldiers, and severe to his enemies, he had made himself the terror of the Protestants by his bigoted zeal for the old religion, and his fierce spirit of persecution to the new faith. His forbidding physiognomy bespoke his character. More implacable even than Wallenstein to his enemies, he was much his superior in integrity, disinterestedness, and fidelity to his friends; while his devotion to his church and religion was sincere. His military insight and experience had taught him not to despise the antagonist whom he was now called to encounter. His language tersely expresses his opinions in this regard: —

"The king of Sweden is an enemy both prudent and brave, inured to war, and in the flower of his age. His plans are excellent, his resources considerable, his subjects enthusiastically attached to him. His army, composed of Swedes, Germans, Livonians, Finlanders, Scots, and English, by its devoted obedience to their leader is blended into one nation: he is a gamester, in playing with whom not to have lost is to have won a great deal."

Tilly was still distant from the front of the Swedish army, but was approaching it from Lower Germany. He found Magdeburg on his road. The proscribed administrator of that diocese, Margrave Christian William of Brandenburg, who had already visited Gustavus in Sweden, at the news of his landing in Germany, threw himself into Magdeburg, where the burghers took up arms, and openly declared themselves for the Swedish hero, who, in spite of the fact that he had advised more prudence, promised assistance, and sent money to raise recruits, with a Swedish officer for commander. The administrator of that Protestant city and domain was not the only German prince who had voluntarily embraced the cause of Gustavus. The youngest sons of the Protestant princely houses of Germany without hesitation declared for the brave leader who

had just arrived from the other side of the Baltic for the defence of the Reformed faith, whilst the elder sons of the same princely families adhered to the interests of the emperor. Thus did Duke Francis Charles de Saxe-Lauenburg, and later his brother Francis Albert, who, after having tried his fortune in the service of Denmark and the emperor, then offered his sword to Gustavus Adolphus. Among the reigning families, the house of Hesse-Cassel, after that of Pomerania, was the first, and in the sequel the most faithful, ally of Sweden. The banished dukes of Mecklenburg, relatives of Gustavus Adolphus, who had given them asylum in Sweden, sought first their security rather in the pardon of the emperor than in alliance with the Swedish king; though the restoration of the princes to their possessions was the particular object of his efforts. It was necessary for Gustavus to assure himself of the shores of the Baltic before advancing farther into Germany. All his measures were marked with the greatest prudence. It was said that he attached more value to that quality, in appreciating events, than to bravery, often rash. Notwithstanding that his first plan was so bold, he astonished whoever knew the pecuniary embarrassments against which he had to struggle. In a few weeks after he had landed his army, and begun his campaign, he was obliged to write to the Swedish Senate the most pressing demands for money and supplies. John Skytte and Oxenstierna showed great activity and resolution in responding to the urgent needs of the army, inspired as they were by the heroic spirit of their sovereign, and borne up by their own lofty devotion to a great cause. At this time the latter had special opportunity to bring out the great organizing and executive capacities which he was afterwards even more signally to manifest on a broader field. That indefatigable activity which never found any thing impossible affirmed the friendship of these two men, of character very dissimilar. It was during this year that Gustavus

sent to Oxenstierna a remarkable letter. It was written from Golnow, and dated Dec. 4, 1630: —

"I have received your counsels for the approaching campaign. They demonstrate your fidelity to me and the fatherland. He who shall survive will celebrate your eulogies. Act well, and weary not in laboring for my service, or rather for that of the kingdom. I hope God will aid us to pass the winter, and that your efforts will render the summer less painful to us. The enemy is feeble in infantry and cavalry, but has great advantage by his quarters, for all Germany is in subjection to him as prey. I am concentrating my troops here on the Oder with the design of attacking him. Though our cause may be good, the issue is not less uncertain because of our sins. Uncertain also is the life of man. So I pray you, if every thing goes not to our wish, not to lose courage. I commit to you my memory, and the safety and welfare of my family. Conduct yourself towards them as I would in a similar case behave towards yours. Consider me as one that for twenty years, with much toil, but, praise be to God! with much honor, have stood for the fatherland, have loved my country and all its true inhabitants, honored it, and for its renown have set at naught life, property, and good days; having sought no other treasure in this world than to do fully the duties of my place For my sake, and if aught should happen to me, my family are in many respects worthy to be pitied, — of the weaker sex, the mother without counsel, the daughter a tender girl; unhappy if they themselves should rule, and in danger if others rule over them. Natural affection causes me to write these lines to you, who are an instrument given me from God to accomplish many difficult things. Yet this, and life and soul, and all that he has granted, I commend to his holy power; hoping undoubtingly the best in this world, and after this life peace, joy, and salvation. The same I wish to you likewise in his good time."

Gustavus Horn had brought him large re-enforcements from Finland and Livonia. In his letters to Oxenstierna, who still commanded in Prussia, he demanded, without ceasing, the forwarding of the troops which he expected from those countries; which could not be effected, however, until autumn. He left Horn in Stettin, with eight thousand men, to watch the imperialist commander, who had assembled his troops at Gartz and at Greiffenhagen, and from that position undertook, during the absence of

the king, an attack on the Swedish camp, which failed. Gustavus went in person to the coast, where Wolgast, recaptured by the enemy, was taken again by the Swedes. The king attacked Rostock and Wismar by sea, and made an invasion in Mecklenburg. But the Swedish fleet was driven back by adverse winds. In coming from Stralsund, Gustavus took possession of Damgarten and Ribnitz, and entered Mecklenburg. But he abandoned his designs on that country, the enemy having been re-enforced, where the old princes could not or dared not undertake any thing against the imperialists, where, finally, Duke Francis Charles of Saxe-Lauenburg, who had taken up arms, had been beaten and made prisoner by Pappenheim, a brave and dashing imperialist general, who had begun to win fame as a brilliant and successful commander. The delay of the arrival of troops from the Prussian duchy caused Gustavus to lose the hope of bringing the enemy to meet him in battle. He saw himself reduced, for the whole winter, to the resources of devastated Pomerania. It was then that he wrote to Oxenstierna and the Senate, —

"It would appear that the emperor is disposed to treat with us, but without other condition than our retiring, and leaving things in the condition in which they were before the campaign. Our opinion is, that any reconciliation cannot be accepted, unless a general peace, and one relative to religion, shall be signed for all Germany, and our neighbors re-instated in their possessions, so that we can live in security, because their independence shall have been secured to them. To accomplish this result we have no other means than to attack the emperor in his dominions, as well as the Catholic clergy, who hold to him; for, if we can enter into his hereditary territories to possess ourselves of his resources, and take from him the contributions which he draws from the Protestants, so that all the burden of the war shall fall on the Catholic clergy, then we can dictate the terms of a glorious peace for ourselves and our brethren. We think to put on foot, the approaching year, several armies. With one I will maintain the coast of the Baltic; whilst Gustavus Horn and Teufel, with two armies, will assure our dominion on the Oder, on one side holding Brandenburg in check, on the other penetrating into Silesia.

In the same time a fourth army will occupy Magdeburg, where the administrator has already three thousand men and several hundred cavalry, which I hope will render us masters of the Elbe; and, joining these forces to those we have, we will give Brandenburg and Saxony occasion to act with us. The Archbishop of Bremen, and the cities of Brunswick and Hildesheim, which declare themselves for us, and correspond secretly with Salvius,[1] should furnish the fifth army, which will guard the Weser. You will see by the following calculations what is necessary to execute this plan. We wish to reserve to ourselves, for the expenses of the war, the chief customs duties, the salt-tax, eight thousand skiffunds of copper, and one hundred thousand thalers of farm rents and cattle contributions. All the other revenues will be devoted to the expenses of the government of Sweden."

In his letter to Oxenstierna, Gustavus adds, —

"The greatest difficulty is to know how these armies shall be put on foot and maintained. However, if we find that number of soldiers, and each army unites the forces mentioned for the project, we are of the opinion to leave to each commander of these corps the care of procuring themselves the means of subsisting in the places where he must act."

The blockade of Colberg, and the operations which grew out of this undertaking, were the events of the autumn. Colberg was regarded one of the strongest places in this part of Germany, and the imperialist commander had made careful preparations to hold it secure against hostile attack. The garrison was composed of seventeen hundred infantry and a small body of cavalry. The fortress held out until March, when the soldiers who had been its defenders surrendered. The winter came on rigorously; but, to the astonishment of the enemy, he was not allowed relaxation. The troops of Gustavus Adolphus were habituated to make campaigns in that season. The imperialists had gathered their forces near Gartz and Greiffenhagen, on both sides of the Oder. On Christmas evening the latter place was taken by assault. The king

[1] One of the king of Sweden's chief diplomatic agents.

commanded the Swedes in person. The garrison, which numbered twenty-five hundred men, defended themselves bravely; and nearly all perished. A panic-terror seized Schaumburg, who had replaced Conti in command of the troops of Ferdinand. He abandoned Gartz during the night, blew up his powder-magazine, threw his cannon into the river, and escaped through Kustrin, whose gates were opened to their fugitive comrades, and immediately closed against the pursuing Swedes. Schaumburg wished to await the arrival of Tilly, with the remainder of his army, at Frankfort-on-the-Oder. He was an officer of valor and military capacity, who had, by his services, arisen to the position of field-marshal. As the successor of Torquato Conti to the command of troops which had formerly been in the service of Wallenstein, he found them in a condition ill suited to win victories. Soldiers and officers were a veritable band of plunderers and thieves; and their new general had too many instincts of honesty remaining to be fitted to give them discipline, and obtain from them successful service against the enemy. He wrote to the council of war at Vienna, asking regular pay for his soldiers, or permission to retire from the army; his German heart not being able longer to endure the sight of horrors which were committed to the detriment of the common country. In a letter to Tilly, Schaumburg attributed to the demoralization of the old troops of Wallenstein all the misfortunes of the imperialists. With the capture of the important positions of Greiffenhagen and Gartz by the Swedes terminated the year 1630, in which they had shown remarkable activity, gained important successes, and strongly established themselves in Germany. Much of the territory thus acquired was destined to remain under Swedish rule for the subsequent period of one hundred and fifty years.

The repeatedly considered plan of an alliance between France and Sweden for some time had failed to reach a

conclusion in consequence of the pride and distrust of the two parties. Richelieu wished the undertaking of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany should depend as much as possible on France, while the king of Sweden desired it to be as much as possible under his own direction. France, in order to finish advantageously the war in Italy against Spain and Austria, renewed the offer of its alliance after the commencement of Gustavus Adolphus's campaign in Germany, testified to the success of the Swedes, and opened negotiations on that subject. Relative to this re-opening of negotiations with the proposed ally, Gustavus wrote from Stettin, July 23, 1630, to Oxenstierna, —

"The French minister has just left us. He has offered us one hundred and twenty thousand thalers per year so long as his master is occupied in the war of Italy, and four hundred thousand thalers per year afterwards. We have need of money, but we have need also of your advice."

After some difficulties relative to ceremonial, in which Gustavus laid down and made good the equality of all kings, the treaty of subsidies was concluded with France at Beerswald, Jan. 13, 1631, for six years; to date from the first proposal, made at Vesterås, March 5, 1630. Gustavus was to receive for the year past one hundred and twenty thousand thalers, and four hundred thousand each year following. On his side the Swedish king obligated himself to put in campaign at least thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, to leave to the Catholics the free exercise of their worship in the territories which should be compelled to submit to his arms, and to the League neutrality if its members asked it, and maintained it on their part. This agreement shows a wise tolerance on the part of Gustavus in respect of religion, and also the care of Richelieu not to sacrifice the interests of his church while seeking to strengthen his country in the war againt the powerful Catholic thrones of Austria and Spain. Gustavus advanced into Brandenburg,

following the course of the Oder. He marched first on Landsberg; and when Tilly hastened to the assistance of that place, he changed the siege into a blockade, and adjourned this time the attack against Frankfort, where Tilly was in camp with thirty-four thousand men. Gustavus left Horn in the environs of Landsberg to watch Tilly, retired himself to Stettin, and in the midst of snow and ice made invasion in Mecklenburg and Pomerania, where New Brandenburg, Loitz, Malchin, and Demmin were soon in his power.

The last-named city was regarded important and very strong by its position, being surrounded by streams and unapproachable marshes. The imperialists had there enclosed a large supply of provisions, and the garrison numbered seventeen hundred men, under the command of Duke Savelli, who had been ordered to defend the place three weeks, when Tilly had promised to arrive to his assistance. Savelli was an able and brave soldier, but, like most of the Italian officers then in the imperial service in Germany, his chief object was to accumulate wealth by pillage, and afterwards return to live in his own beautiful country. It is related, that, on the near approach of Gustavus, this Italian general gathered up all the horses in the vicinity, and announced them for sale on his own account. But most of these animals proved to be so poor and worn out, and the people lacking money, that no purchasers presented themselves. Savelli, instead of restoring the horses to their owners, arranged to have them killed, and sold for the value of their skins, six shillings each. Among his companions in arms at Demmin was Del Ponte, the man who had been deep in the conspiracy to assassinate the king of Sweden, which had come so near success. As he feared the vengeance of the king whose life he had perfidiously sought, he left the fortress secretly, without being able to carry away his baggage and the wealth he had amassed by his rapacities. The Swedes approached,

Demmin, Feb. 3, 1631, and soon planted their artillery where they could use it with advantage. The severe cold had frozen the streams and marshes, which allowed the troops of Gustavus freedom of action around the city. The Swedish cannon having beaten down one part of the wall, the besieged garrison awaited every day the assault. This state of things was especially disagreeable to Savelli, who feared he was about to lose the fruits of various campaigns and his hopes of the future. He offered to capitulate on condition that he might pass out with arms and baggage. Just at this time having his eye on the approach of the main imperial army under Tilly, and not willing to risk the prolongation of the siege, Gustavus Adolphus accepted the proposal of the Italian commander. The entire garrison marched out with ensigns flying, followed by the baggage-train. Gustavus saw the *cortége* pass, at the rear of which appeared Savelli carefully and brilliantly dressed. The king addressed him, —

"Tell the emperor I make war for civil and religious liberty. As to you, duke, I thank you for having taken the trouble to quit the splendid feasts of Rome to combat against me, for your person seems to me more in its place at courts than in camps."

After the Italian general had passed, Gustavus remarked to his officers near him, "That man reckons much on the good nature of the emperor: if he was in my service he would lose his head for his cowardice." Among the baggage of the retiring imperialists was noticed the carriage of Del Ponte. Some of the Swedish officers remarked that it would be well to retain what belonged to that traitor. "I have given my word," responded Gustavus; "and no one shall have the right to reproach me for having broken it." The Swedes entered the city, where they found thirty-six pieces of cannon, and a large amount of grain, and munitions of war. Tilly was greatly incensed by the conduct of the brave but more mercenary Italian general, removed him from his command, and accused him

in a formal manner to the emperor. But the wily Italian was able so to play his part at Vienna that he was acquitted of the charge made against him by Tilly, and afterwards employed by the emperor as an ambassador and general.

Said the Scotch officer Monro, then in the service of Gustavus Adolphus, —

"I serve with great pleasure such a general, and I could find with difficulty a similar man, who was accustomed to be the first and the last where there is danger; who gained the love of his officers by the part he took in their troubles and fatigues; who knew so well how to trace the rules of conduct for his warriors according to times and circumstances; who cared for their health, their honor; who was always ready to aid them; who divined the projects, and knew the resources, of his enemies, their plans, their forces, their discipline, likewise the nature and the position of the places which they occupied. He never hesitated to execute what he had ordered. He did not like the officers who lacked intelligence, and he never left one without being assured that his orders were understood. He did not know difficulties. He arrested an officer, who, while the fortifications of Stettin were being repaired, stated that the earth was frozen. In affairs which had relation to the needs of the war he did not admit of excuses."

As to the bravery of Gustavus, and his disregard of personal danger, which would cost him his life too early in his career, the same Scotch officer remarks, —

"The lack of good charts, and the great importance which he attached to knowledge of the ground, caused him to go *en reconnaissance* in person, and expose himself very near to danger, for he was short-sighted. At the siege of Demmin he had gone to reconnoitre, and held a spy-glass in hand, when he plunged half-leg deep in the marsh, in consequence of the breaking of the ice. Capt. Dumaine, a Scotchman, the officer nearest to him, prepared to come to his aid. Gustavus made sign to him to remain tranquil so as not to draw the attention of the enemy, who, not less, directed his fire upon him. The king raised himself up in the midst of a shower of projectiles, and went to dry himself at the bivouac fire of the officer, who reproached him for having thus exposed his precious life. The king listened to the Scotchman with kindness, and acknowledged his

imprudence. But he added, 'It is my nature not to believe well done except what I do myself: it is also necessary that I see every thing by my own eyes.' "

After the capture of Colberg, there remained in Pomerania only Gripswald. That city did not capitulate until after the death of its brave commander, in June. Tilly, excited to vengeance by most of the commanders, invaded Mecklenburg after the departure of the king of Sweden, and took possession of New Brandenburg. His manner of making war was revealed by the exploit which he did in putting to the sword two thousand Swedes to whom the order to retire had not arrived. One hundred and fifty of these brave warriors preferred to be massacred in the little town of Feldberg rather than surrender. After these deeds of arms Tilly returned to the siege of Magdeburg.

The king of Sweden, now that the imperial commander gave him more liberty of action, resolved to attack Frankfort-on-the-Oder. He left a sufficient garrison in Schwedt, and then advanced along the left bank of the river, with ten thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry, and directed Gustavus Horn to march in the same direction on the opposite bank with three thousand infantry and cavalry, while the artillery, numbering two hundred pieces, moved up the Oder by navigation, under the command of John Baner. The city of Frankfort was strongly fortified and garrisoned by eight thousand men under Tieffenbach, who had just superseded Schaumburg by the order of Tilly. On the approach of the Swedes, Tieffenbach burned the suburbs and vineyards surrounding the city, so as to remove every thing that might be of service to his enemy. On his march, Gustavus Adolphus, took possession of Furstenwalde and Tedenwick, destroyed several bands of Croats, some of whom were killed, the rest being taken prisoners, and subsequently sent to the mines of Sweden. April 1, 1631, he arrived before Frankfort;

the last of his march being in order of battle, expecting the enemy would come out to attack him, but in this his anticipations were not realized. The following day he approached still nearer the city. Accompanied by Teufel, one of his trusted officers, he approached near the line of fortifications to reconnoitre, when a ball passed through the arm of Teufel. That officer being carried wounded to the camp, the king himself performed the duty of arranging the troops. The white regiment under Damitz was placed at the north, next to the river; the blue and yellow regiments in front of Lebus Gate; and Hepburn, Monro, and Lumsdel, with their men, were ordered in front of Guben Gate. The king remarked to this last body of soldiers, "Remember, brave Scotchmen, your countrymen slain by the imperialists at New Brandenburg." Tieffenbach ordered a *sortie* of the imperialists, who were completely repulsed. A deadly fire was now launched from the fortress on all sides. The labors of the Swedes were pushed so rapidly during the following night that their intrenchments reached the foot of the walls. The next day, the sabbath, the Swedish army passed the morning in divine service, which caused the imperialists to suppose the general quiet of the enemy indicated that he had not sufficient cannon, was too feeble to attack, and disposed to retire.

In the mean time the Swedes had raised, in front of Gate Guben, a battery of twelve guns, which were pointed by the king himself; and in the afternoon a vigorous fire was opened. The officers of the garrison were then at dinner, but the sound of the cannon did not alarm them sufficiently to prevent them completing their repast at table. This negligence and contempt of their foe cost them dearly. Baner was ordered by the king to attack Gate Guben with the Scotch soldiers, who met with bitter and determined resistance. Hepburn was wounded, and borne out of the fight. His major took his place, and

was killed immediately. The brave Scotch troops hesitated a moment, but Baner ordered Monro and Lumsdel to advance at the head of their pikemen. Pressing themselves solidly together, they forced their way like a mass of iron, made an opening, and took possession of the outward gate. The alarmed imperialists at once threw themselves to that side, and prepared another *sortie* under the orders of Schaumburg, with the design of retaking the captured gate, but were prevented. A lieutenant in the Swedish service named Andrew Auer, a Saxon by birth, saw that the wall was not well guarded in several places, and requested the aid of some soldiers whose bravery was to him well known, that he might make an attempt against the ramparts. Without awaiting any order, Auer and his companions brought two ladders, and escaladed the wall, and there secured a firm footing. The king, seeing these brave men so far successful, sent them re-enforcements, and at the same time ordered all his troops to a general assault. Then at all points took place a severe and determined combat. Strong masses of the Swedes penetrated the city by the road which Auer had cut out, and ran to open Gate Guben to the Scotch troops, who precipitated themselves forward, followed by other regiments. Schaumburg again massed a body of imperialists to attempt another *sortie;* but they were met at once by the Swedish cavalry, and put to flight. The fight was even more severe and deadly at Gate Lebus. At this point the defence was made with great energy by a force of Irish in the imperial service, under Col. Walter Butler. Thus the Scotch Protestants were bravely serving in this struggle under the king of Sweden, and the Irish Catholics against them in the ranks of Ferdinand and the League. The blue and yellow regiments of the Swedes attacked the Irish with great resolution, but were twice repulsed, leaving five hundred of their number dead. Their third assault swept away all resist-

ance, few of the Irish taking flight, the most of them falling dead inside the rampart, where they had fought, while outside, the ground was covered with the slain Swedes. The disorder among the imperialists was now extreme; and their only way of escape was by a bridge across the Oder, to the east of the city. Their cavalry, infantry, and baggage-train all rushed to that only remaining exit. The carriages became entangled in the flight, and completely blocked the passage. Many of the imperialists who were at the head of the retreating mass were thrown into the river by those who followed them, and the last were sabred by the pursuing Swedes. The loss of the imperialists was nearly three thousand killed and eight hundred taken prisoners. Eighty pieces of cannon and a large amount of war-munitions fell into the hands of the victors, and the city was given to pillage for the space of three hours. Gustavus Adolphus sought as much as possible to prevent violence. Not a woman was insulted, and only one of the citizens killed. The Swedish army was lodged in the city, and grain was furnished by the conquerors to the inhabitants, with which to afford themselves bread, of which they were in want. The Saxon lieutenant, Andrew Auer, who first mounted the wall, received, as reward of his bravery, one thousand rix-dollars, and the commission of captain in the regiment of life-guards.

Soon after this important success, the king gave to Oxenstierna the following account of it: —

"As we were entirely unaware where Tilly would direct his march on leaving New Brandenburg, we went to Schwedt to obtain information. There we learned that he had gone to besiege Magdeburg. Then we marched on Frankfort, to be nearer the conference at Leipsic, and to offer Tilly battle. We sent Marshal Horn to besiege Gripswald, and, if it was possible, to make a diversion in Mecklenburg. We arrived at Frankfort April 2. The enemy set fire to the suburbs. On the 3d we placed some batteries, and ordered an attack of the gates by troops protected by the fire of our cannon, never

thinking in this way to take the city. But our troops, not content to drive the enemy from all his advanced works, pursued him under the walls; and some, provided with scaling-ladders, entered the city, and fought until they had blown up the gates. They drove out the enemy: many of his officers were made prisoners, and others killed. Those who were able to save themselves retired on the other side of the Oder into Silesia. All their munitions and twenty standards fell into our hands. Tilly hastened to the assistance of Frankfort; but, having arrived at Alt Brandenburg, and learned that we were masters of the city, came no farther. We have slain the greater part of this hostile army, and everywhere beaten their hussars. With the cavalry and some musketeers, we have now gone to Landsberg, and likewise sent for the field-marshal on the other side. We are about to throw bridges over the Warta, and propose to besiege Landsberg with furor."

April 16 Landsberg was taken, and its commander slain. The garrison, according to the Swedish estimates, numbered five thousand men. When it quit the fortress, it was followed by a great amount of baggage, and abandoned women to the number of twenty-five hundred. After the capture of the place, the king allowed Baner, Baudissin, and others of his officers, to make themselves merry over a glass of wine in his presence, "but drank nothing himself; for his custom was never to drink much, and very seldom," according to the language of Monro, in the "Swedish Intelligencer." [1]

[1] This book, by Monro, the Scotch officer, who served under Gustavus Adolphus, was published in London in 1633.

CHAPTER XIV.

ADVANCE OF GUSTAVUS. — SIEGE AND DESTRUCTION OF MAGDEBURG BY THE IMPERIALISTS. — THE ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG AND SAXONY. — BATTLE OF BREITENFELD, AND DEFEAT OF TILLY.

WHILE the king of Sweden was making one conquest after another, thus encouraging the Protestants of Germany to active resistance to the designs of Ferdinand and the League, the emperor, by his exorbitant pretensions, continued to exhaust the patience, and alarm the fears, of those who had previously stood aloof. The steps openly taken against the Lutheran Church had finally removed the veil from the eyes of the elector of Saxony, who, by his selfish devotion to his own special interests, had allowed himself to be made the dupe of the imperial policy and designs. Arnheim, formerly a general of Wallenstein, now the favorite minister of the Saxon prince, did his utmost to avenge on the emperor the injury recently committed against his former chief in his removal from command, by seeking to detach his new master from the Austrian cause. He urged John George to terrify Ferdinand by a threat to ally himself with Gustavus Adolphus, for the purpose of extorting certain advantages from the emperor, yet in the secret design that the Saxon prince should maintain his independent position between the two contending parties. This plan was to draw every possible advantage to the Saxon elector by the advance of the king of Sweden, without any committal to the designs of the latter. In the spirit

of this artful policy John George consulted the elector of Brandenburg, who was also ready to act against Ferdinand, yet was jealous of Gustavus Adolphus. Having, in a Diet of his subjects, secured the support of his estates, John George invited a general congress of the Protestants, which met at Leipsic, Feb. 6, 1631. At this conference were present the elector of Brandenburg, the Duke of Hesse-Cassel, and several other princes, counts, and Protestant bishops. This assemblage was emboldened by the successful march of the king of Sweden, and, after a session of two months, closed by adopting a resolution to demand of the emperor the revocation of the Edict of Restitution, the withdrawal of the imperial troops from their fortresses, and the abolition of abuses, to which was added the expressed determination to raise an army of forty thousand men to redress their grievances if the unjust and violent proceedings against them did not speedily cease. It was this congress on which Gustavus had his eye when passing up the Oder, and capturing Frankfort and Landsberg. He was not unacquainted with the doubtful feelings of the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony towards him and his army. He knew that they wished to profit by his aid, to pull their own chestnuts out of the fire, but did not mean to burn their own fingers. He fully realized the necessity of bringing them to a decisive policy, and was resolved, that, if they saved their chestnuts from burning, they should aid in the effort, and assist the common cause. The future was soon to show whether a square-dealing or a double-dealing policy was the wisest for the Brandenburger and Saxon George. In the mean while an important and tragic event was about to horrify Germany and Europe, for which these two princes were more or less negatively responsible.

The anxious eyes of German Protestants were now upon Magdeburg. Gustavus wished to occupy Kustrin and Span-

dau, so as to be able to render assistance to that imperilled city. This demand was of a nature to render necessary his visit to Berlin at the head of his army. In regard to this necessity of his position he said, —

"I cannot blame the elector, my brother-in-law, for being sorrowful; for I require delicate and dangerous things. But it is not for myself that I demand them: it is for the salvation of the elector himself, of his country, and of christendom. My road leads to Magdeburg."

The elector of Brandenburg did not dare to refuse what Gustavus demanded. But, to arrest the work which Tilly had in hand, the Swedish king required also the assistance of the elector of Saxony. The preservation of Magdeburg, so important to the Protestant cause, which had resisted heroically all the forces of Wallenstein, was for no one of so great value as for the elector of Brandenburg. That imperial city, with its bishop, was to be in North Germany the first great victim of the imperial Edict of Restitution, which reinstated the Catholic Church in all the possessions which it had lost in the space of seventy years from the religious peace at Augsburg; and it was against that edict that the Protestant princes, assembled at Leipsic, had declared they would take up arms. He who was to lose the most by the capture of Magdeburg was the son of the Elector John George, the Prince Augustus of Saxony, whom the Chapter had named archbishop of that city. The emperor, in virtue of the Edict of Restitution, declared this election invalid, and nominated to the place his own son, Leopold William. By the taking of Magdeburg, Tilly would render himself very formidable to the whole electorate; nevertheless, it was in vain that Gustavus Adolphus asked the assistance of Saxony. John George refused him even the passage of the Elbe. Very soon circulated throughout Germany the report that Magdeburg had been pillaged and reduced to ashes by the soldiers of Tilly. Magdeburg, situated in the circle of Lower Saxony, was a city founded in the old Roman times. Its position and

its fortifications rendered it for a long time impregnable. Commerce and industry had rendered it rich and powerful. It counted within its walls ninety thousand inhabitants. It was the chief place of a small archbishopric, where the doctrines of Luther prevailed, so that the regent of the city took the title of admistrator instead of that of archbishop. Christian William, uncle of Marie Eleonore, wife of Gustavus Adolphus, possessed that dignity when the War of Thirty Years came on. He was a hot-brained, unreflecting prince. In declaring himself for the king of Denmark in the war against the emperor, he was drawn into his misfortunes, and driven from his estates. The election of Augustus of Saxony having been disapproved by Ferdinand II. and the Pope, the Arch-duke Leopold William was invested with the episcopacy. The first effect which resulted from it was, that Ferdinand sought to exterminate the Protestant religion; and the inhabitants were exposed to the vexations of the soldiers of Wallenstein. The exasperated people only awaited a signal to raise the standard of revolt, and to cast off the irons which weighed on them so heavily. Christian William found an aslyum with Gustavus Adolphus in Sweden, and returned with him into Germany. He arrived in Magdeburg by the protection of disguise. Appearing at the council-hall of the city, he reminded the magistrates of the ravages which the town and country had experienced from the imperial soldiers, of the pernicious designs of Ferdinand and his allies, of the wrongs and perils of the Protestant Church. He then informed them of the near approach of deliverance, and that the king of Sweden offered them his alliance and support. The people took up arms, and drove out the feeble troops which occupied the district. What Christian William had done was premature. Gustavus was still too distant to be able to effectively assist the city in case of attack. He sent to its aid a brave officer, Diedrich Falkenberg, who was named

commander of the garrison of twenty-three hundred men, — feeble means to defend works so extended as those of Magdeburg. In the autumn of 1630 the troops of Pappenheim appeared before the city. The inhabitants were very soon driven within their walls, and all the bands of Tilly approached during the winter. These troops signalized their march by the burning of cities and towns, and vexations of every kind. But the actual siege of Magdeburg did not begin until March, 1631, because the imperialist general had been called to the assistance of Demmin and Frankfort-on-the-Oder. The enemy sought to gain by secret intrigues what he could not obtain by open force. He knew the feebleness of the garrison, and the divisions which defeated the best plans of Falkenberg for defence. April 14 the imperialists opened trenches, and began to fire on the city; but all the efforts failed against its brave defenders. Vague reports circulated in the camp and in the city that Gustavus Adolphus was on the march to deliver Magdeburg. These hopes of the besieged and suffering Protestants certainly had much to support them. They knew that the representatives of the Leipsic congress were arming, and that the king of Sweden was surely a friend and ally, who would not allow the grass to grow under his feet. Tilly was well informed as to the expectations of his enemies, and the imperative necessity of acting promptly against the beleagured city before it should receive its anticipated relief: therefore he had sent his messenger with letters to the magistrates and commander of Magdeburg, offering terms of surrender. He received reply from these brave men that they would die rather than capitulate. Soon after, a vigorous *sortie* of the citizens convinced him that they were resolved to make good their words by deeds; while news of the nearer approach of the Swedes stimulated the hopes of the garrison, and filled Tilly with uneasiness. A second message was now sent by him to the besieged, which received an

answer similar in spirit to the first. The imperialists had now advanced their approaches as far as the ditch, and vigorously cannonaded the fortifications. But the walls did not receive much injury from the bombardment, and the fireballs sent by the imperialists to set the buildings of the town in flames were rendered harmless by careful precautions taken against them. Tilly finally abandoned the hope of taking the city, before the arrival of the king of Sweden, by the means he had thus far adopted. He came to the decision to give up the siege, but first to make the trial of a general assault; and in this resolution he was sustained by a council of war. The attack was to be made simultaneously at four points. All the preparations were completed, awaiting the signal, which was to be given at five in the morning. The time was postponed for two hours, to allow the imperialist commander to hold another council of war, as he still had some doubts of success. It was at seven in the morning of the 10th of May that the signal of assault was given by the firing of cannon, which was commenced by the brave and dashing Pappenheim at the head of the Walloons. Every thing on the part of the assaulting columns of the imperialists was successful. The burghers, drowsy, and dulled by fatigues, were awakened by the cries of their enemies, who were already within the city. Falkenberg, roused by the report of musketry, hastened, with all the force he could gather, toward one of the most important gates, already in possession of the besiegers. Driven back, this intrepid officer flew to another exposed point, where he thought there was some chance of effective resistance, and was soon slain in combat against vastly superior force. Before noon the city was taken, and abandoned to the pillage of the soldiers. Their brutality and the despair of the inhabitants caused scenes of horror which are too revolting for full description. The historian Schiller says, —

"Even a more humane general would have in vain recommended mercy to such soldiers, but Tilly never made the attempt. Left, by their general's silence, masters of the lives of all the citizens, the soldiers broke into the houses to satiate their most brutal appetites. The prayers of innocence excited some compassion in the hearts of Germans, but none in the rude breasts of Pappenheim's Walloons. Scarcely had the savage cruelty commenced, when the other gates were thrown open, and the cavalry, with the fearful hordes of the Croats, poured in upon the devoted inhabitants. Here commenced a scene of horrors for which history has no language, poetry no pencil. Neither innocent childhood nor helpless old age, neither youth, sex, rank, nor beauty, could disarm the fury of the conquerors. Wives were abused in the arms of their husbands, daughters at the feet of their parents, and the defenceless sex exposed to the double sacrifice of virtue and life. No situation, however secure or however sacred, escaped the rapacity of the enemy. In a single church fifty-three women were found beheaded. The Croats amused themselves with throwing children into the flames, Pappenheim's Walloons with stabbing infants at the mother's breast."

Very soon fire added its ravages to those of pillage, and at ten o'clock in the evening the city no more existed. May 13 Tilly made his solemn entry into the place. It was silent and sombre. The picture of desolation which presented itself to his eyes raised in his soul sad thoughts and bitter reflections on the fragility of all earthly grandeur and power. He repeated the words of Virgil, embodying the saddest reflections of the Roman poet on the destruction of the city of Priam. He announced his success to the emperor in these terms: "Since the sack of Troy and of Jerusalem never has history seen such a day." Salvius, the faithful secretary of the king of Sweden, writing at the period of the terrible catastrophe to this important German city, says, —

"Magdeburg fell May 10 into the hands of the imperialists. That flourishing city is in ashes. There remains only the cathedral, three or four houses which surround it, and some fishermen's huts on the banks of the Elbe. Falkenberg defended at first with much valor the advanced works; and the enemy, to take them, was obliged to make many assaults, and lose a great number of soldiers. Under his command Falkenberg had only two thousand men, and the imperialists

twenty-four thousand. I have it from a cavalier who aided at the siege, that they proposed to Falkenberg to surrender with the honors of war, but that he and his army refused because the imperialists put as a condition that the surrendering troops should embrace Catholicism. The imperialists had gained over three hundred of the burghers of Magdeburg. The most of these saved themselves in the cathedral. Two days afterwards these received their pardon. Those who had saved themselves in the other churches all perished. They ill treated especially the priests. They killed them first amidst their books, and then set fire to them together. The married women and daughters were attached to the tails of the horses, drawn to the camp, and delivered to the brutality of the soldiers. The Church St. John was full of women. It is said they nailed the doors on the outside, and burned them. The Croats and Walloons especially distinguished themselves by their cruelty, throwing the children into the flames. They tied the most eminent and beautiful women of the burgher class to their stirrups, making them run along, and thus follow them out of town. They stuck their lances through the bodies of little children, lifting them up, and swinging them several times round at the spear's point. Some malevolent persons reproach our king for not having come to the aid of the city, as he had promised; others throw the fault of this misfortune on the elector of Brandenburg; but nearly all agree in saying that the elector of Saxony is the principal cause. He not only refused to unite with the king of Sweden, and undertake any thing for the besieged, but he stopped the munitions which the city had purchased. However it may have been, the king was in march to carry assistance to the besieged when he learned there was no longer time."

To what degree Tilly was responsible for the atrocities of Magdeburg cannot be determined with absolute precision. Modern investigation and criticism, more impartial than that of an earlier period, incriminate him less than his contemporaries, and even go to the extent of saying that he was not personally responsible, and would have prevented the sack and destruction if he could. This may be a verdict a little too favorable to the old Walloon general, but is probably nearer the truth than the estimate of his conduct held by the German Protestants of the seventeenth century. That the king of Sweden was not, by military or moral principles, in fault for not arriving with his army to the relief of the unfortunate city before its fall, is made

obvious by the facts clear and unmistakable. His position at this time was certainly a trying one, and he exerted himself vigorously to extricate himself from embarrassments the most pressing he had experienced in Germany. Blamed for what had happened, he judged it necessary to justify himself in a manifesto, which he published. The conduct of the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony had been such that he knew not whether he ought to regard them as friends or enemies. In July, 1631, he wrote the Swedish Senate, —

"We see that the evangelical princes are attached to us only because they wish to maintain themselves, by our aid, with the emperor, and afterwards drive us from Germany."

The position which Gustavus and his army held in the country made it imperatively necessary that he should secure his rear before advancing farther. While the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony had their grievances against Ferdinand, their jealousy of Gustavus Adolphus was such that they did not wish to unite with him at this time, especially as, in case of his defeat, their identification with him would bring upon them at once all the force and animosity of the emperor. The Brandenburg prince was very desirous not to break with Ferdinand, and in the fate of Magdeburg he was reminded of his own danger. To this hesitation and anxiety he was stimulated by his minister Schwartzenburg, who was secretly in the pay of Ferdinand. Gustavus resolved to put an end at once to this vacillating and two-faced policy, of which his brother-in-law seemed both the instrument and the victim. He demanded of the elector the right to occupy the two fortresses of Kustrin and Spandau. Hopes were given him that he might have the former, but was informed that the latter would never be placed in his hands. With a select body of troops Gustavus marched direct to Berlin, and pointed his cannon against the city. He held a long conference

with the Brandenburg prince outside of the city gates on the 13th of May, but his reasonings were all in vain. To one of the dukes of Mecklenburg who had accompanied him, he remarked, with words of cutting energy, —

"I am marching upon Magdeburg to deliver the city. If no one will assist me, I will retreat at once, I will offer peace to the emperor, and go home to Sweden. I know that the emperor will agree to my terms. But you Protestants will have to answer at the day of judgment that you would do nothing for the cause of God. In this world, too, you will be punished. Magdeburg will be taken; and, if I retire, you will have to look to yourselves."

The conference was renewed next morning, and continued until late in the evening; the Brandenburg prince still refusing to yield to the necessities of the common cause. But at last the king of Sweden had his way, mainly by the pressure of the military force which he had immediately at hand. On the 15th of May his troops passed to the possession of Spandau, but the decision of the Brandenburg prince had been accomplished too late to have any favorable result on the fate of the city which Gustavus Adolphus was so anxious to save.

At the same time that he was acting thus decisively with his brother-in-law, he was trying, by earnest negotiations, to come to a satisfactory understanding with the elector of Saxony. Two roads led from Berlin to Magdeburg. One, passing through Alt Brandenburg, was direct, but difficult and dangerous, through a country completely devastated, rendering necessary the transportation by trains of a large supply of provisions for men and horses, and then would oblige the passage of the Elbe in the presence of the enemy. The other road passed through Wittenberg, along the banks of the Elbe, where there were good roads, bridges, and an abundance of food. Gustavus chose the latter. But this road passed through Saxony and by the fortress of Wittenberg. Fifteen days before, he had written the Saxon prince, proposing an alliance, at

least to obtain the city of Wittenberg, with the condition of giving it up when Magdeburg should have been delivered from the army of Tilly. John George answered in the negative, saying he could not overlook his duty to the emperor. "Your Highness," responded Gustavus, "should not more forget his duty to the evangelical doctrine and the subjects whom God has confided to him. He ought to assure them liberty of conscience and eternal salvation." Several messages were addressed to the Saxon elector, but in vain, the last not being even answered. The crafty Ferdinand showed himself disposed to a pacific accommodation, and manifested the intention of selecting John George for mediator, he being the most powerful among the Protestant princes of Germany. That was to take the Saxon elector in the weakest place. Flattered by this semblance of the emperor's confidence, he refused to listen to the propositions of the king of Sweden. In the mean while the news from Magdeburg became daily more alarming. Gustavus now sought a personal interview with John George, as he had done with the elector of Brandenburg, adding some menacing words in case of refusal. The Saxon elector answered abruptly, "I cannot go to the proposed conference; for I am engaged in reviewing the army, with which I will give repose to my States, and I will cause their neutrality to be respected." These negotiations lasted four days, and on the fifth the terrible news of the fall of Magdeburg was received.

The king of Sweden now returned into Pomerania, and after the surrender of Gripswald to his arms employed his forces to restore the dukes of Mecklenburg to their possessions, while with his principal army he had his eye fixed on Brandenburg, the elector of Saxony, and Tilly. The Swedish army had weakened itself by being divided, and he was not certain that he could re-enforce it sufficiently by enrolment. He wrote to the Senate at Stockholm, —

"The German nation has become so inconstant that the soldiers take to-day a master, to change to-morrow. It is difficult to replace all those who desert, so much the more that since a long time we have not had the means."

Almost all the letters of Gustavus at this period reveal a pressing need of financial resources. He is firmly resolved, as he had been from the beginning of his German enterprise, not to support his army by the methods of Mansfeld and Wallenstein. In February he addressed severe reproaches to the Senate of Sweden for having sent him arguments instead of money, and for not having remembered that the cattle contribution was granted to the king for another year. He adds, —

"Nevertheless, our love for the country and our subjects is so strong that we prefer to deprive ourselves of that assistance than to give occasion to evil-intentioned persons to calumniate our intentions, and to unjust stewards to enrich themselves at the expense of the poor people. They pay us by words and remonstrances, but other means are necessary to conduct the war to a good end."

The other means in the king's thought at this time were not to prove equal to the necessities of his position and plans. The tried and trusted ability of Oxenstierna himself could not obtain from the grain-monopoly what was expected, and it was soon suppressed. Gustavus wrote the chancellor, —

"We have often made known to you our position. We have done the best we could in the midst of the greatest poverty, of troubles, and disorders. All our servants seem to have abandoned us; and we have been obliged to carry on the war *ex rapto*, with great injury and damage to our neighbors, which we are still forced to do. We have nothing to satisfy the soldiers except what we take by pillage and brigandage. We have founded on you our hopes, but they vanish also, and we are compelled to put ourselves in an intrenched camp when the enemy advances."

It was in the middle of July, and the king of Sweden had just taken the most advantageous position in the celebrated camp of Werben, where the river Havel unites

with the Elbe. The camp was situated on the left bank of the latter river. Monro, the Scotch officer, describes it minutely, and says of Gustavus Adolphus, —

"When he was the weakest, he digged the most in the ground; and this he did, not only to secure his soldiers from the enemy, but also to keep them from idleness."

In another letter Gustavus describes his embarrassments, and the attacks of Tilly on his camp, —

"Though you have promised us, my lord chancellor, to send us certain sums, yet we have received only one hundred thousand thalers; and we now learn, to our disappointment, by your letter from Elbing of July 11, that, against our expectations, nothing more is in hand. For sixteen weeks the army has not received a sou. It knew that we expected money from you: soldiers and officers calculated on it. Biscuit, which we have taken in the cities, has been our only nourishment. That resource has failed us also. We have not been able to maintain order among the cavaliers: they have lived only from pillage. Every thing is ruined, so that there is nothing more to be taken either for them or the soldiers in the town or the country. If we had received what you ought to have furnished, we should have had hope of defending the Elbe and the Oder, and of being masters in the Baltic, if we had not been able to do more this year; but now we fear retreat with loss. Two weeks since, we made an excursion with our cavalry, and completely defeated three regiments of the enemy at Wollmirstadt. Since we retired to Stendal, Tilly has rejoined Pappenheim, and returned on us. There have been some skirmishes. He followed us slowly in our retreat, and was in camp a quarter of a league from here. He has turned on his steps, and we have annoyed him as much as possible in his retreat."

It is with this modesty and reservation that Gustavus Adolphus expresses himself on the attempts of the imperial commander against the camp of Werben, which had cost Tilly six thousand men in all. The king had twelve thousand men at Werben, while his opponent was at the head of twenty-six thousand imperial troops. The pest ravaged the camp of the two armies with great severity. Six thousand Scotch and English had been enrolled by Marquis Hamilton for the king of Sweden, who wished to

employ them on the Weser. They landed in Pomerania, where Hamilton brought the train of a prince. He received orders to ascend the Oder and guard Frankfort. Before the close of summer his corps was reduced to fifteen hundred men, and very soon there remained of it but five hundred. The pest was severe at Werben, but ceased very much during the warmest weeks of summer. In the preceding year it had visited Sweden, and prevailed in some of the chief cities; and the Senate and court retired to Upsala, a distance of nearly fifty English miles from Stockholm. Gustavus received re-enforcements from Sweden, and his wife accompanied them. In January, 1631, he wrote to his sister Catharine, —

"I intend, in the spring, to bring hither my dear and loving wife; but I desire that my daughter may remain in Sweden. I beg your lovingness will do me the sisterly kindness to take the child with you, and watch carefully over those who have the care of her."

Of these freshly received troops, a part was employed for the conquest of Mecklenburg. Four thousand men, with artillery, were united to the force which Horn brought from the Oder to increase the army under the immediate command of the king, who in the middle of August quit his camp at Werben, and approached Saxony. When he arrived at the bridge over the Elbe at Wittenberg, his army was composed of thirteen thousand infantry and nearly nine thousand cavalry. Tilly had now united to his army the strong re-enforcements which had arrived from Italy, and menaced Saxony with forty thousand men. John George was about to learn what his assumed middle course and the flatteries of the emperor were worth to him and his subjects. Panic-stricken with fear, he was about to throw himself into the arms of Gustavus, and seek safety behind the shield of Swedish discipline and valor.

What had changed so suddenly the relations of the emperor and the elector of Saxony? Why was Tilly advancing through the territories of the latter, marking

his way with fire and blood? Because the attitude of the elector and the emperor towards each other had been essentially a false one, which could not be maintained amid the clash of passing events. Back of the existing facts and occurring incidents were antagonistic ideas and issues, which did not admit of superficial compromises and temporizing expedients, nor allow of neutrality, nor furnish firm foothold for a third party. Of these hostile ideas, sentiments, and passions, Gustavus Adolphus and his trusted allies were the representatives on one side, and Ferdinand and the League were the exponents and guiding force on the other. John George, materialistic and gross, could not see that it was impossible for him to play at his will between the two hostile camps. His minister, who had largely influenced his course, — a supple schemer, not a statesman, a former general of Wallenstein, and still believing in the future fortunes of his former master, — was a Lutheran whose faith had as little influence on his conduct as Catholicism had on the Duke of Friedland. Hostile to the leadership and success of the king of Sweden in Germany, Arnheim had so far been able to hold the Prince of Saxony to his own views and policy. But the triumph of Tilly at Magdeburg only served to stimulate the emperor to other severe measures towards the Protestant cities and princes, instead of impressing on him the wisdom of moderation, as it should have done; and the turn of events in Italy had increased his army for effective service in Germany. It was not satisfactory to the emperor and his partisans that the elector of Saxony adhered to the confederation of Leipsic, and continued his military armaments. In accord with his freshly invigorated policy, the emperor decided that he could not longer endure the equivocal conduct of the elector, and, should mild measures fail, to constrain him by force to submission. Tilly, at the head of his army, now demanded categorically of the Saxon prince to cease

in the future all enrolment of troops, and to join his forces to those of the emperor, to drive the Swedes out of the empire; to renounce the Leipsic league, and to use his influence with the other Protestant princes to follow his example; and to deliver up to him all the provisions he had gathered for the support of his troops. The imperial general sent his demands by special messengers, who were received by John George with all the exterior marks of politeness, but really with great displeasure. He occupied himself all night and part of the following day with his counsellors. Some of them pronounced in favor of submission to the imperial orders. The misfortunes of the kings of Bohemia and Denmark ought to serve as a warning. The king of Sweden was a foreigner, and would demand, perhaps, as great sacrifices as the emperor, and offered less security, being poor and feeble in his own strength, possessing only the revenues of some copper-mines: the power of the emperor, on the other hand, was deeply rooted, and had extended branches which a copper hatchet could not cut down. Those of the other view, who were now inclined to an alliance with the successful king from the North, spoke of the continually increasing power of the emperor, the pride of the Catholics, and the imminent ruin of the Protestants. The latter course of arguments prevailed; and in his response to Tilly the elector thanked him for his efforts for peace, and added that he was, as ever, disposed to reconciliation, yet he could not submit to the proposed conditions, for the reasons he had repeatedly presented. It had come to him in various ways that the emperor had the design of attacking Saxony on two opposite points; but he could not believe such rumors, such forgetfulness of services rendered, more especially as the emperor had sufficient reasons to turn his arms against a foreign king, instead of overwhelming one of the most faithful and pacific princes of the empire. Tilly saw, by that response, that he had not

much to hope from the elector in existing contingencies; and he learned through various channels that already he had commenced negotiations with Gustavus Adolphus. The imperial general resolved to make one more effort. Sept. 1 he again summoned the elector to submit to the orders of the emperor, but received a dignified refusal. To give more weight to his representations, Tilly had passed the Saxon frontiers on the night of the 21st of August, and now rapidly followed the pillage of Merseburg, Weissenfels, Jena, and Leitz; and the smoke of two hundred villages in flames indicated to the peasants the form of chastisement which the emperor was inflicting on Saxony for its non-submission to his commands. Leipsic capitulated almost without resistance.

Driven thus to immediate decision by the imperious demands of Ferdinand and the rapid advance of the devastating legions of Tilly, John George had no alternative but to seek the protective alliance of Sweden, though it was to him a humiliating resolution to adopt. Before his negotiations with the imperial commander had fully terminated, he had sent his field-marshal to the camp of Gustavus Adolphus, asking his prompt assistance in his dire extremity of peril. The king of Sweden concealed his satisfaction at the reception of this desired communication from him who only a few months before had so decisively given the cold shoulder to the advance of the Swedish army to save Magdeburg from its impending doom, and had even threatened to join the emperor in driving it out of Germany.

"I am sorry for the elector," said Gustavus to the ambassador of the Saxon prince: "had he regarded my repeated remonstrances, his country would never have seen the face of an enemy, and Magdeburg would not have fallen. Now, when necessity leaves him no alternative, he comes to demand my assistance. But tell him that I cannot, for the sake of the elector of Saxony, ruin

my own cause and that of my friends and allies. What pledge have I for the sincerity of a prince whose minister is in the pay of Austria, and who will abandon me as soon as the emperor flatters him, and withdraws his troops from his frontiers? It is true Tilly has received a strong re-enforcement, but this shall not prevent me from meeting him with confidence as soon as I have made secure my rear." The Saxon ambassador who had borne the supplicating message to the king of Sweden, and listened to the plain and comprehensive words of reply, was none other than Arnheim, the former general and continuing friend of Wallenstein. The minister of John George could only rejoin, "The only observation to make is, that one cannot change the past, but only forget it. The prudence of his Majesty is worthy of eulogy: it accords with his known sagacity. May his Majesty deign to make known to me the conditions of his alliance. I am sure the elector will accept all that can be reasonably demanded of him." — "I require," said the king of Sweden, "that the elector shall cede to me the fortress of Wittenberg, deliver to me his eldest sons as hostages, furnish my troops with three months' pay, and place in my hands the traitors among his ministry." Arnheim returned in haste to John George, who, surrounded by distressed fugitives from the scenes of the desolating ravages of the imperial troops, awaited with impatience the message his ambassador would bring. "Not Wittenberg alone," said the elector when Arnheim delivered him the answer of Gustavus, "not Wittenberg alone, but Torgau and all Saxony, shall be open to him: my whole family shall be his hostages; and, if that is not enough, I will place myself in his hands. Return, and inform him I am ready to surrender to him any traitors he shall name, to supply his army with the money he requires, and to risk my life and fortune in the good cause." The complete and unconditional terms with

which the elector of Saxony had placed himself, his army, and resources at the disposition of the king of Sweden, convinced him of the sincerity of the former's change of sentiments and plans, and caused him to modify his first demands on the Saxon prince as the conditions of alliance. "The distrust," said Gustavus, "which was shown to myself when advancing to the relief of Magdeburg, had naturally excited mine: the elector's present confidence demands a return. I am satisfied provided he grants my army one month's pay, and even for this advance I hope to indemnify him."

The treaty of alliance between Sweden and Saxony was concluded on the following conditions: The entire Saxon army shall be united with the Swedes, and placed under the immediate orders of Gustavus Adolphus; all the fortified places on the Elbe shall be open to the king; so long as the Swedish army remains on Saxon territory, the elector shall provide for all its needs. On his part, Gustavus pledges himself not to lay down arms until the enemy shall have been driven from Saxony.

The alliance having been thus definitively concluded on the first day of September, on the third the Swedish army crossed the Elbe to Wittenberg, and on the fourth continued their march to Duben, where the Saxon army arrived on the following day.

Instead of making a bold and rapid movement to prevent the junction of the Swedish and Saxon armies, Tilly advanced against Leipsic to secure its capture before it could gain relief from his enemies, and summoned the city to receive an imperial garrison. The fortifications not being adequate to resist a formidable attack, the Saxon commander was obliged to surrender. Tilly fixed his headquarters at a small house in the suburb of Halle. On the part of his opponents no time had been lost. A council of war was held at Torgau between the king of Sweden and the elector of Saxony, the elector of Bran-

denburg also being present. The question to be decided was, whether Tilly should be attacked in his intrenchments at Leipsic, or it would be better to drive him from the country by obstructing his supplies, and annoying and enfeebling him by continual skirmishes. Gustavus Adolphus was inclined to the general attack; but he did not wish any thing should take place by which, in case of defeat, his allies could accuse him of having sacrificed their country by rashness or presumption. He therefore represented, that, according to all probabilities, Tilly could not be driven from his intrenched camp before Altringer would arrive with imperial re-enforcements. To attack him in that position not being practicable, to march on Leipsic would no more have an object, and might be dangerous for retreat. Tilly and his army were not enemies to be attacked except for pressing reasons. But with the elector of Saxony, there was no longer any doubt or hesitation. He wished to free his territories as soon as possible from the enemy, and urged that a prompt advance be made before the imperialist re-enforcements arrived; that it would not be well to prolong the war; that his country was not in a condition to sustain so many armies, especially as Tilly held in his possession the best part of it. The king of Sweden urged him to reflect once more on this determination, which, he declared, "exposes to the hazards of war the common welfare, a crown, and two electorates. Fortune is changeable; and the inscrutable decrees of Heaven may, for our sins, give the victory to our enemies. My kingdom, it is true, even after the loss of my life and my army, would still have a hope left. Far removed from the scene of action, defended by a powerful fleet and a well-guarded frontier and a warlike population, it would at least be safe from the worst consequences of a defeat. But what would happen to you with the enemy at your gates?"

John George, still impatient and full of confidence,

declared, even though the king should abandon him, he and his army were decided to risk all for the delivery of their unfortunate country, even a combat against Tilly, so formidable and so feared. "You will not march alone," answered Gustavus Adolphus. "I am rejoiced to see you take a resolution worthy of your elevated rank. My soldiers and myself will not abandon an ally at the hour of danger." It was then resolved that the attack on the army of Tilly should be made at once. The following day, Sept. 6, the united Swedish and Saxon armies crossed the Mulde on their march towards Leipsic. The Saxons numbered twenty thousand, well clothed, showing robust forms and fresh cheeks, with well-fed horses. The aspect of the Swedish army in these regards was quite different. Its clothes were worn, the soldiers thin and of small figure, as were also their horses. It numbered thirteen thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry, which made the united force on the march to encounter the imperialists about forty-two thousand men. The army arrived in the dusk of evening at a small village near Breitenfeld, in the order given on the preceding day. The king rode through the lines, speaking in an affable manner to the officers and soldiers. Soon was heard the singing of psalms in all the regiments ranged in line of battle, and then silence was no more interrupted for the night except by the distant voices of the advanced sentinels. During the night Gustavus called to him his principal officers and tried friends. In a few words he explained the plan of the approaching battle, and closed the interview in nearly these words: —

"My comrades, if I had to do with men whose sentiments were less known, whose courage was less tried, I might think myself obliged to excite it by words; but I see by your look that it would be at this time superfluous. In reality it is a sword that is necessary to our cause. I ought not and wish not to despise our adversary, nor to represent the struggle with him more easy than it really is. Such a subterfuge would be out of place towards you who have never fled from danger. I avow, then, frankly that we are in front of an enemy very

powerful, exercised in deeds of blood, and so accustomed to victory, that, during long wars, he has seldom experienced a reverse. But the more our enemy is covered with glory, so much the more will be the renown to conquer him, and gain by a single blow the laurels he has won. All his conquests, all the booty taken by him in so many successful campaigns, will fall at once into our power. You and your soldiers have often said to me in badinage that one can secure his salvation in my service, but not his fortune. It has been thus, because that, passing through devastated countries, and finding ourselves among oppressed allies, it would have been unjust on our part to have thought of amassing riches. Now you have in front of you, for the first time, a camp filled with precious booty, afterwards a road which passes the sumptuous villages and fertile lands of the Catholics. All that is the price of a single victory. That victory can be gained, and will be, with the aid of God. Our enemy is known to us; and we have tried our swords against a good many of his soldiers at Gartz, Demmin, Frankfort, and Werben, and we know we can conquer them in spite of the arrogance which they affect. I am convinced that you will perform your duty as loyal Swedes. The Saxons, I hope, will defend with courage their country, whose prosperity is principally at stake. But I count on the justice of our cause more even than on our arms and our allies; for we combat, not only for men and human interests, but also for the glory of God, the true evangelical faith, oppressed and almost annihilated by the Papists. The God of all goodness, who has conducted us in so miraculous a manner across seas and rivers, through fortresses and enemies, will give us the necessary force to conquer our powerful adversary. Think of Pasewalk: it is a year to-day since it was destroyed; of Madgeburg, whose bloody ruins still smoke, and cry vengeance; think of the thousands of innocent individuals who have been assassinated, and whose blood has gushed out to heaven. The justice of God will chastise these frightful murders, these coarse vices, these hideous crimes. This is why we will attack with courage. *God is with us.* May these words be our rallying cry; and, with the help of the Almighty, victory will be ours."

The king and his officers then separated, with a mutual grasping of hands; the latter going to their posts, and Gustavus to his carriage, where he passed the night with Horn, Baner, and Teufel.

In the mean while, on the part of the imperialists, there were deliberations and preparations for the approaching struggle. Immediately after the union of the Swedes

and Saxons John George had sent an order to his commander at Leipsic, to hold firm until the allied armies should have time to arrive to his support. This order fell into the hands of Tilly; and thus he learned of the union of the armies of Gustavus and the elector, and their near approach to his lines; and this information was fully confirmed by the vigilance of his own spies. The imperialists were at the north of Leipsic, in a strongly intrenched camp. The question for Tilly and his generals to decide was, whether it were well to await in his intrenchments the approach of the enemy, or meet him in the open field. Very early in the morning of Sept. 7 Tilly assembled his principal officers for consultation. The character of mind, experience, and advanced years of the imperial commander-in-chief qualified him to guide his military conduct by good judgment and prudence. He was now of the opinion that it were best for his army to remain within the enclosure of its fortified camp, defended on two sides by rivers, the Elbe and the Parde, having in its rear Leipsic and an abundance of food near at hand. He could here await the arrival of re-enforcements then advancing from Thuringia under Altringer, and from Silesia under Tieffenbach, which would render their united forces much stronger than their opponents. Besides, it was nearly impossible for Gustavus and his allies to attack the imperialists in their present position; and they would be compelled to make a dangerous retreat through an exhausted country. A majority of the officers were of the opinion of Tilly; but Pappenheim, with his usual impetuosity and eagerness for fight, urged that it were well to act at once decisively by leaving camp and offering battle. The issue could not be doubtful to whoever knew the imperialists and the glory they had acquired. A long time the war had dragged along, and the king of Sweden in his fortified camps had defied the troops of the emperor. Now he had dared to show himself and offer battle. It would be inexcusable to

God, to the emperor, and the elector of Bavaria, if prudence, not to call it cowardice, allowed to escape so favorable an occasion to destroy, in a single battle, the common enemy. This opinion was sustained by many of the officers, especially by the young men. A majority, however, adhered to the view of their commander-in-chief. But the discussion became so earnest, and Pappenheim and his partisans so determined, that they finally succeeded in causing Tilly to yield. He knew that his prudence was often regarded cowardice, and that those envious of him at the courts of Ferdinand and Maximilian attributed it to his age. The vexation of being so unjustly misunderstood, and the desire of repulsing such an accusation, as well as the confidence he had in his good fortune, with a well-tried army, finally decided him to adopt the opinion of Pappenheim and the younger officers, and to march against the enemy. The rallying cry was to be Jesus and Mary, and, for a sign of recognition, a white ribbon on the cap, — the same as at the assault and destruction of Magdeburg. Early in the morning, conducted by Tilly, then seventy-two years of age, riding on a small gray horse, the imperialists marched in the direction where the united Swedes and Saxons were expected.

To the north of Leipsic is an extensive plain covered with villages and cultivated fields, with some moderate elevations breaking the uniformity. One of these hills, running from west to east, gradually inclined to the north, is between the villages of Breitenfeld and Seehausen; and at its base are situated the villages of Podelwitz and Schelkau, past which runs the small muddy River Loberbach. Here arrived, at eight in the morning, Tilly and his army. He placed his artillery on the summit of the high ground, and thus the balls could pass over the imperialist troops drawn out in line at the base of the hill. Their backs were to the sun and a strong wind, while their opponents must face both. Tilly adhered to the old method of ar-

ranging his army, forming cavalry and infantry into large, full squares. Heavily armed and massed solid, they could not be readily handled; but in the mind of their general and in the hearts of those imperial veterans was the indomitable resolution to make those squares like bodies of solid iron, which no military innovation or light squadrons of hostile infantry and cavalry could penetrate or shake. Seventeen of these compact infantry squares formed the centre of the imperial line. The cavalry, of which there were seventeen regiments in all, was on both wings. Ten of these were at the right under Furstenberg; and in front of these were several bands of Croats, at whose head was Isolani, of whom the future was to hear. Tilly was at the centre, and Pappenheim at the left wing, in the hope of meeting Gustavus Adolphus, who, it was supposed, would be at the right of the Swedes; and the imperial commander had under him, among others, Piccolomini of the veteran Walloon cavalry, hardened by many campaigns and combats, and clad in iron mail. At nine in the morning, having given the orders to be observed in the hot work near at hand, Tilly addressed the following words to his army: —

"At last, my children, the desired occasion, so long ardently sought, so impatiently expected, is presented. Our enemy, after having until this time retired into his hiding places and dens, dares to show himself in the open field. He has no longer in front of him deep rivers, as when he concealed himself behind the Peene and the Trebel, at the time when he bravely took possession of New Brandenburg; he is no more behind formidable intrenchments like those he raised at Schwedt and Werben; he can no more surprise us, as he did at Angern. We are about to meet him on the field of battle, face to face, sword against sword. To this object has tended all my efforts. I have attacked the heretical elector John George, to the end of drawing into the open field the heretical king of the North, Gustavus Adolphus; and I have succeeded. I have, besides, taken a favorable position. What depended on me has been done; and I now abandon the rest with confidence to your courage, to your tried bravery. Can we doubt of success, remembering the numerous

victories you have gained over the enemies of the country, of the emperor, and of our holy religion? Your swords have chastised the Bohemians, the Austrians, the Hungarians, the rebels of the Palatinate; you have driven the margrave of Baden, Count Mansfeld, and the Duke of Brunswick; it has been the same for two kings, those of Bohemia and Denmark. A like fate awaits Gustavus Adolphus, after which, my children, the religion of our fathers will flourish in our country, and the emperor will divide among us the cities of these heretics. Look at those Saxons shining so brilliantly; they are young soldiers, newly enrolled, and little adapted to bloody games: your first attack will disperse them like feeble straws. Observe the Swedes, naked, hungered, exhausted; their horses are inferior to the meanest of those who drag our baggages. Go straight at them: horse and cavalier will fall from weakness under the irons of your fiery coursers. If I had the least doubt of your bravery, I would have awaited in our intrenched camp the arrival of our comrades from Thuringia and Silesia. But it would have been unjust to the imperial conquerors if I had condemned them to defend themselves, like the Swedes, with pick-axes instead of swords, and if the booty, which belongs of right entirely to us, had been shared with others. This is why, my children, forward! Until now the heretics have always been conquered in regular battles against faithful Catholics. It will be the same again this time. As Jesus and Mary is our rallying cry, they will protect us, and we are certain of victory."

Again Tilly rode through his ranks encouraging them to the combat, after which they awaited the approach of the enemy. Early in the morning the combined Swedish and Saxon army marched towards Breitenfeld, and saw at a distance the imperialists occupying the highlands. To attack Tilly in the position where he had arranged his army, it was necessary for Gustavus Adolphus to move his forces across the Loberbach, a marshy stream difficult to pass. To effect this object, the Saxons directed their course on the left over a small bridge, and the Swedes to the village of Podelwitz. Then it would seem to have been the opportunity for the imperialists to have made a bold and vigorous assault on their enemies, and so many of their officers thought; but Tilly deemed it more expedient to remain firmly in his advantageous position. To

envelop the Swedes in smoke, and render it difficult for them to make their movements, he caused Podelwitz to be set on fire. But they were successful in passing the muddy rivulet; the three Scotch regiments crossing first, and then halting to protect the rest of the army in their passage. In perfect order the Swedes advanced, and took their positions in front of the enemy, as it had been previously determined by their heroic leader. The Saxons were formed on the left, at considerable distance from their allies, by an assent to an arrangement previously made by the elector, and Arnheim, his chief general. The Saxons had in their front Furstenberg with his ten veteran regiments; and the Swedes were confronted by Tilly and Pappenheim, the latter being at the imperial left, thus making good his ardent desire to have the king of Sweden for his immediate antagonist. The army of Tilly was in one line, more extended than their opponents. The Saxons, by themselves, as in a separate army, were formed in two lines, the infantry at the centre and the cavalry at the two wings, and made a splendid appearance with their new clothes and new arms.

The Swedes were formed under the direct orders of their king; and his newly improved tactics were made use of to great advantage, as the result was speedily to show. The infantry was divided into brigades, and the cavalry into small squadrons, with musketeers intermixed between their ranks, and the whole placed in two lines. Gustavus Adolphus was at the right, and had specially under his command five regiments of cavalry. The left wing was conducted by Gustavus Horn; and in front of the centre was a large number of field-guns under the direction of Torstenson, who had already won distinction as an artillerist. The king rode from point to point to see that his plan of battle was carried out in its completeness, at the same time speaking to as many of his soldiers as possible, encouraging them, and telling them "not to

fire until seeing the white of the enemies' eyes." Then there was impressive and significant silence. Gustavus Adolphus rode to the centre of his line, halted, removed his cap with one hand, and lowered his sword with the other; and his example was followed by all around him. He then raised his powerful voice so as to be heard by a large number of the army, and offered this brief prayer:—

"Good God, thou who holdest in thy hand victory and defeat, turn thy merciful face to us, thy servants. We have come far, we have left our peaceful homes, to combat in this country for liberty, for the truth, and for thy gospel. Glorify thy holy name in granting us victory."

Conforming to an old custom, the king sent a trumpeter to challenge his adversary and his army. Tilly responded, "I have never avoided battle, and the king knows where to find me." About noon the Swedes and Saxons moved forward to the attack. A cannonade of nearly two hours was the commencement of the battle. In number of guns the Swedes were the stronger, having more than a hundred; but the thirty-six pieces of Tilly, of much heavier caliber, did more execution from the commanding position they occupied. The tread of so many thousands, in their varied movements, on parched fields recently ploughed, raised thick clouds of dust, which, joined to the smoke of powder and of the burning village, enveloped the Swedes almost in complete night, the course of the wind being such as to remove the cause of darkness from the imperialists, and accumulate it on their foes. This compelled the king to swing his army to the right, so as to have the wind at the side instead of in front; and the skill and rapidity with which this was effected left the enemy no time to prevent it. Tilly and Pappenheim immediately saw the object of this movement, and the latter urged and received permission from his chief to assault the Swedes with the troops under his command. With his wonderful dash and celerity he threw himself, with his

whole force of cavalry, on the right wing of the Swedes, commanded by the king in person, aided by Gen. Baner, but without being able to make it waver. His veteran Walloons, hardened by successive campaigns, hitherto nearly always victorious, but a few months before the conquerors amid the horrors of Magdeburg, now precipitated themselves with blind fury on the lines of the Swedes, who received them with equal courage and resolution. The freer movements of the cavalry of the latter, with those skilled infantry marksmen between their ranks, told with terrible effect on the compact masses of their foes. Everywhere among them were Gustavus and Baner, maintaining order, and encouraging them to their duty. Pappenheim was nerved by desperation, and seven times renewed the assault, and was as often driven back with shattered ranks, covering the ground with his dead, but at last was compelled to fly, and abandon the field to the victor whom the night before in council of war he had so passionately desired to encounter. Tilly, seeing a decisive battle inevitable, finally decided to leave his position on the highlands, and advanced, with sixteen of his full squares, towards the centre of the Swedes; his really objective point first, probably, being the Saxons on the left. As he approached the Swedish centre, he found its fire more destructive. Torstenson handled his artillery with rapidity, and behind were the famous blue and yellow regiments of Swedish infantry. Instead of advancing farther against this deluge of balls and undaunted front of his enemy, Tilly swung quickly to his right, and threw the united force of the imperial centre and right on the Saxons, and scattered and drove them back as do the blasts of autumn the forest leaves. Among those who first took flight was John George himself, who regarded the battle hopelessly lost, and did not stop until he reached Eulenberg, several miles from the theatre of combat, where, drinking heavily of beer, he awaited news

from the battle. A few Saxon regiments under Arnheim attempted to withstand the onset of the imperialists, and briefly held their ground, but were soon compelled to follow their associates in flight.

Tilly now moved his victorious brigades against the left of the Swedes, commanded by Horn, making use also of the cannon he had just taken from the Saxons. Outnumbered and assailed by victorious troops, Horn showed great coolness and capacity in handling the forces under his command, and with dogged pertinacity, supported by his soldiers, held his ground with no wavering in his lines until re-enforcements came to his aid. When the Saxon army fled, Arnheim rode with all speed to give Gustavus Adolphus the disastrous intelligence, and at the same time Teufel arrived to inform the king that the whole remaining force of the imperialists had turned upon Horn. The imperialist left being completely beaten, and driven far into the rear, the king left the Swedish right in charge of Baner, and rode with the speed of lightning to his left, where Horn was struggling with the hosts of Tilly. The king ordered Teufel to go with all speed to bring up some regiments from the second line. No sooner had that officer received the order than he was struck down by a ball. The king then executed his own order, and brought regiments from where they could be best spared, chiefly from his victorious right. The troops of Horn, thus strengthened by their victorious comrades and the presence of their heroic king, soon were more than a match for their antagonists. Wheeling his right wing and the main body of his troops to the left, Gustavus now assaulted the highlands where Tilly had planted his artillery, gained possession, and turned upon the imperialists the full fire of their own guns. By the loss of their artillery, and its being turned effectively upon themselves, with the terrible onslaught of the Swedes on the close-packed, stiff columns of Tilly, the imperialists were thrown into confusion; and

the superiority of the new tactics and military formations of the hero of the North had a triumphant vindication over the methods and maxims of the old Spanish school, of which Tilly had long been one of the most successful representatives. The imperialists were now in disorder; and the only course left was retreat, and this could be effected only through the midst of their enemies. In despair and anger, Tilly was almost beside himself when he saw victory torn from him. His famous dapple-gray old horse was slain; and on another he wished to lead his troops again to the fiery storm, but they would no longer obey him. He prayed, menaced, and wept with anger, but in vain. His troops fled into the plains, and the old general was compelled to follow them. Protected by dust and smoke, several thousands of the oldest imperial infantry regiments closed up solidly their ranks, cut their way through the Swedish lines, and gained a small thicket, where they opposed a new front to their enemies. They were resolved not to lose the glory which had cost them so dearly. Gustavus Adolphus, with his cavalry of the Swedish left, attacked them. They fought with the greatest obstinacy, and would neither give nor take quarter. They maintained their resistance until their numbers were reduced to six hundred, and night came to their protection, when they retired on the Leipsic road. With them disappeared from the field the last remnant of the imperial army, so arrogant and defiant in the morning. The armies of the emperor and the Saxon elector had to endure the common shame of defeat; and to Gustavus and his troops, little more than one-fourth of the whole number engaged, fell the glory of victory. The battle won, amid the dead and wounded Gustavus fell upon his knees, and offered to Heaven, in fervent prayer, his joyful gratitude for victory. He ordered his cavalry to pursue the beaten imperialists until the darkness of night should no longer permit. With the remainder of his army he encamped between

the field of battle and Leipsic. The next morning, having received reliable information of the complete dispersion of the imperialists, he allowed his troops to pillage the camp, and pursue the enemy. To preserve as much order as possible, the camp was divided into portions, and each regiment had its own. The booty was composed of a large quantity of gold, silver, precious objects, rich clothing, horses, and tents. Not a hand remained empty, and a large number found in this pillage the wherewith to shelter them against need for life. Six thousand three hundred of the enemy were slain on the field, and five thousand were wounded or prisoners. The whole artillery, the camp, and more than a hundred flags and standards of the imperialists, fell into the hands of the victors. The Saxons lost nearly two thousand, and the Swedes seven hundred. The rout of the emperor's troops was so complete that Tilly, on his retreat to Halle and Halberstadt, could rally but six hundred, and the brave Pappenheim could find but fourteen hundred of his veteran regiments of the left wing, so famous for their valor, whom seven times he had hurled against the Swedish front. Tilly was severely wounded before the close of the battle, and came near being captured by a Swedish officer of cavalry, who demanded his surrender, but who was soon stricken to the ground by a pistol-shot. But far more bitter to him than the pain of wounds was the keen agony of witnessing the triumph of the enemies of his faith, and of losing in a day his military fame, the fruit of a long life of peril and hard service. Germany was ringing with the execration of his name for the atrocities and destruction of Magdeburg, for which he really was not responsible, and of which an impartial future was in the main to acquit him; and he had now suffered an inglorious defeat, which shrivelled and turned to ashes all his former honors. His cheerfulness was never again restored to him, and thereafter he seemed to seek the relief of death in the perils of combat. His

overwhelming defeat has been attributed to his planting his artillery on the hills in his rear, to his allowing the king of Sweden unmolested to form his troops in order of battle in his immediate presence, and to his premature abandonment of the highlands he had taken so much pains to occupy. A still greater error, certainly, was his yielding to the clamor of Pappenheim and the young officers to fight immediately, when his military judgment for sound and conclusive reasons was against it. But the chief cause of the sudden and unexpected overthrow of these war-hardened, iron-sinewed, and long-triumphant soldiers of the emperor was in the superior genius and military capacity of the innovating chieftain of the North, who comprehended the conquering force of new ideas, and had imbued his army of twenty thousand with his own invincible spirit and resolution.

Sept. 14, 1631, Gustavus wrote from Halle to his sister, —

"The 7th of this month we gave battle to Tilly and the imperialists. God combated with us and for us. We remained masters of the field of battle, and put the enemy completely to rout. Many thousands of his men were killed; his cannon of every caliber, seventy flags, and twenty-two standards are in our hands. The enemy has been so much destroyed that we could go unhindered where we wished."

His letter to Oxenstierna is more circumstantial in its details: —

"On the 4th we left for Duben, and there placed our camp, awaiting the elector of Saxony. On the 5th he arrived, with his army of about twenty thousand men, well equipped, and having the air of brave men. He formed his troops of several divisions, announcing to us that he wished to do us honors. Accompanied by numerous cavalry, we went to meet him, and found him with the elector of Brandenburg. After having inspected the Saxon army, we rode to our infantry, which was drawn up in battle order. After having passed in review the two armies, we brought the princes with us to our quarters. There we deliberated, especially with the elector of Saxony, whether

it would be better to fatigue the enemy by partial attacks, or deliver battle. We pushed many arguments *à priori;* and the elector responded *à posteriori*, believing the enemy could be driven from his country only by a combat. In the end we were in accord that it was necessary to march on Leipsic. We had already received the news that the city and the palace had surrendered to the enemy. The Croats, under our eyes, bore themselves on Duben. On the 6th, at daylight, we passed through that city. The army marched through its narrow passages by files, and we arrived very late at the hamlet of Wolche, a mile and a half[1] from Leipsic, where we passed the night. On the 7th, at daybreak, we sounded the march by trumpets. From Wolche to Leipsic we did not encounter woods, but broad and fertile plains, which allowed the army facility to advance towards the city in order of battle. We marched not more than an hour and a half before perceiving the advance-guard of the enemy, and his artillery, placed on high ground, and protecting all his forces. He was favored by the wind and sun. The drought had produced much dust. We tried to make him lose that advantage, but could not succeed, because it was necessary to cross a difficult pass in the presence of the enemy. For that reason we changed our order of battle. The Swedes, under my orders, were on the right. The Saxons, commanded by the elector, on the left; and we advanced against the enemy in the order of which we send you the plan. When we were in presence, the enemy commenced by playing his artillery, at first only three pieces, then all at once, so that we had to suffer two discharges before our guns were in condition to reply; but we did not delay sending him three balls for one. The artillery did not stop so long as the combat lasted, and caused many ravages on both sides. The Saxon cavalry and artillery first held themselves firm, but they gave way after the death of the gunners. The Saxon infantry behaved cowardly, and abandoned the fight by companies; saying we were beaten, and all was lost, which threw terror among those who guarded the baggage. The last, seeing the Saxons in complete rout, fled and gained Duben, towards evening, in such a state of confusion that many carriages of officers and of the elector were pillaged by the fugitives. The elector, who was with the rear-guard, took flight with his body-guard, and did not stop until reaching Eulenberg. Our German and Swedish soldiers — those at least who took part in the action, for in the infantry there were three brigades only who had that honor — conducted bravely. At the commencement the enemy was as unshaken as the rock. The fight was so determined that it was a

[1] This means Swedish mile, equal to more than six English miles.

long time uncertain who would obtain the victory. Finally, the enemy commencing to be shaken, we pushed him so vigorously that there remained to us, not only the artillery of the Saxons, but also his own. We remained thus masters of the ground. Darkness now came on, and we had fought without cessation since two in the afternoon. A great part of our cavalry pursued the enemy, while we rested on the field of battle."

The king then adds, —

"Tilly arrived the same night at Halle with Duke Rudolph de Saxe-Lauenburg, Pappenheim, Count Furstenberg, and Col. Cronberger. The surgeons relate that Tilly received three balls. The next day he moved from Halle to Aschersleben and Halberstadt very weak from his wounds. These had caused black-and-blue swellings, which the surgeons opened and bandaged. We cannot know the number of the enemy which covered the field of battle, but it is supposed there were several thousand. Among the superior officers whom Tilly has lost are named Schönberg, general of artillery, and Erwitt, major-general, who were both killed. The Duke of Holstein, wounded and made prisoner, died at Leuenburg on the 9th, as the result of his wounds. We have made enough prisoners to be able to complete our old regiments and form new. Of the superior officers, we have lost Teufel, Kallenbach, and Hall, Lieut.-Cols. Alderskas and Damitz, and a captain of cavalry, Long Fritz, who are all dead. Courville also was said at first to be dead, but we now hear he was taken prisoner. Although the loss of men so brave is deeply to be regretted, yet this victory, on which the result of affairs here so much depended, is so remarkable that we have all reason to thank God, who mercifully hath protected us in so evident a danger that we hardly ever before were in the like."

CHAPTER XV.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VICTORY OF BREITENFELD. — SEPARATION OF THE SWEDISH AND SAXON ARMIES. — REASONS FOR NOT ADVANCING ON VIENNA. — MARCHES INTO FRANCONIA. — FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAIN SURRENDERS. — SUCCESSES ON THE RHINE. — NEGOTIATIONS WITH BAVARIA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE. — RICHELIEU. — CONDITIONS OF PEACE PROPOSED BY GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

THE effect of the victory of Breitenfeld was immense. If less than eighty thousand men had taken part in the struggle, the issue tried and the interests at stake were as important as though a half-million soldiers had represented the belligerents on the bloody field. Those two armies, with the two most distinguished generals of the time at their head, represented the two parties in Europe inspired by hostile opinions and purposes, and possessed of a strong hold on the sentiments and passions of men. To the oppressed Protestants of Germany it was the bright dawning of a new era of liberty and security, and a source of profound joy and encouragement to their brethren of other countries. It produced a deep impression, not only at Vienna and Munich, but in all the courts of the Continent. The use the Protestant champion would make of his victory, and the next important step to be taken, were now to be determined. Amid the panic and alarm reigning among the imperialists, caused by the dispersion of their principal army and the shivering blow he had inflicted on the reputation and power of their great general, should

Gustavus Adolphus, with his increased prestige, and his army flushed with victory and daily increasing in numbers, march directly towards Vienna, and strike the emperor amidst his court and capital? Or should he keep to the right, with his eye to the inviting fields of the Rhine, and compel the rich Catholic bishoprics to experience some of the burthens of the war, which their ecclesiastical masters had done so much to render imperative? It was urged on his consideration that he would encounter little resistance in marching from Leipsic to Prague and Vienna, and that Bohemia, Moravia, the Austrian duchies, and Hungary had been stripped of their imperialist defenders, and that the persecuted and suffering Protestants of those countries were ready to receive him with open arms. The emperor, deprived of his territories and resources, his capital at the mercy of the conqueror, while his allies were to have all they could do to maintain themselves at home, would be certain to accede to such terms of peace as Gustavus could afford to grant. This view had strong arguments in its favor; and so prudent and sagacious an individual as Oxenstierna held it, and maintained it years after the death of his illustrious friend and sovereign. Oxenstierna was not with Gustavus at the battle of Breitenfeld; but when he first saw him afterwards at Frankfort-on-the-Main, he saluted him in these words, "I would felicitate you at Vienna on the victory which you have just gained," and eighteen years after the death of the king, said of him in the Senate of Sweden, "If, after the battle of Leipsic, he had penetrated into the hereditary States of the emperor, instead of marching on the Rhine, and had left the States of Germany to arrange among themselves, the emperor would have found it impossible to continue the war." The evidence is conclusive, that the elector of Saxony, whilst Gustavus waged war against the emperor at a distance, had hoped to form a third party in the empire, and accomplish, himself, the expedition to Franconia. That was probably

the reason why the king of Sweden was opposed to the elector's coveted march in that direction, of which he said nothing, except that he did not believe Saxony sufficiently strong in his rear. He distrusted decidedly Marshal Arnheim, the Saxon general, of whom Oxenstierna said, "He labored all his life to establish a third party in Germany. Gustavus esteemed him little as a general. He suspected the tortuous policy of John George; and it was said that the king wished the elector of Saxony, by the expedition of his army into Bohemia, to embroil him so with the emperor that he could not turn again to the support of the latter. Some attribute to Dukes William and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar an important influence on the resolution of the king of Sweden. They might have flattered him on great projects in his personal interests. What is of far more importance is, that, at the interview which took place at Frankfort-on-the-Main, the Protestant states in public assembly demanded his assistance. Gustavus himself said there were three reasons for marching on the Rhine: "He wished not to lose sight of Tilly; he wished to employ, to the maintenance of his army and the accomplishment of his designs, the resources of the Catholic dioceses; finally, he desired by that march to give to the Protestants of North Germany the occasion to repose, and to recuperate their strength." Those who insist on the wisdom of the course Gustavus adopted not only urge, in its support, the weight which justly attaches to his judgment in its favor, but also represent that a struggle so complicated and far-reaching in its consequences could not have been decided by any single blow, or a brief, brilliant campaign. They maintain that the interests of the great cause demanded the course which he adopted; that the small Protestant princes who had no jealousies of his rising power because of his being a foreign king, and the free nobles and free cities, who had keenly experienced the yoke of papal oppressions, afforded means and opportuni-

ties for a strong centre of Protestant power and resources. On the other hand, by marching towards Vienna and Bohemia, John George would have a better opportunity to adopt an equivocal course, or be unequal to cope with Tilly, who had already begun to recruit his army from the imperial garrisons within his reach, and was likely to be at the head of a strong force on the Weser; and it would be unsafe to leave such a general as Arnheim to deal with a commander like Tilly or Pappenheim. A successful march of the king of Sweden through Bohemia, Moravia, and the Austrian duchies could do little good if the army of Ferdinand triumphed in other parts of the empire, re-animating the courage of the Catholics; while, by advancing into the territories of the League, he would not only strike his enemies a paralyzing blow, but bring numerous devoted friends to his immediate support, and be near Frankfort-on-the-Main, where were then assembled the princes in Diet, deliberating on the Edict of Restitution, and where the emperor was employing his utmost art and efforts to induce the Protestants to come to a disadvantageous arrangement. Planted firmly on the Rhine, he would not only have a strong base and secure rear for his army, but would there be able to hold equal and more independent position in his relations with France, his powerful ally, inclined to restrict, if not to be jealous of, his increasing prestige and strength. His decision is made. He marches southward and to the right; and John George and Arnheim, with the Saxons and re-enforcements, take the route to the left towards Vienna and Prague.

Before separating, and departing to their respective fields of action, the king and the elector sealed their arrangement by a feast, in which Gustavus drank the health of John George, calling him his brother. Previous to the commencement of his march, the king gave orders to his generals at different points then occupied by his troops in Germany. Tott was to command in Mecklen-

burg, and march against Hamburg and Bremen; the Scotch Leslie and the English Hamilton should command in Brandenburg; whilst Count Thurn should accompany the elector of Saxony into Bohemia, to stir the zeal and strengthen the resolution of his friends in that country. Baner was placed in the vicinity of Magdeburg, and William of Weimar in Thuringia. A courier was sent to Oxenstierna, in Prussia, directing him to come into Germany to aid Gustavus Adolphus in the general direction of the operations. The first plan of the campaign of the king of Sweden, after the victory gained on the fields of Leipsic, was prudently defensive; which proves that he had not the design of pushing advantages so rapidly as he had done, and was more impressed with the breadth and magnitude of the work before him. The same day on which he raised his camp at Halle, he wrote to Oxenstierna, —

"We have desired your presence here, after the victory which we have gained, that we might deliberate with you on the means to give the Protestants the enjoyment of their rights. Come for some time, and do not delay because you do not bring money. Charles Baner will be in the mean time vice-governor of Prussia. This is the plan of campaign which we have marked out for ourselves: We will go in person into Thuringia to take possession of what remains there, and so act that we may there take our winter quarters. From there, in the midst of Hesse, of Saxony, and of Meissen, we propose to attack some bishoprics in Franconia, and there to raise contributions, so re-enforcing ourselves that we might in springtime be in strength to combat the enemy so much the more as Saxony is with us. The elector is charged with the defence of the Oder. That is why we have ordered John Baner, at Frankfort, to cause our garrisons to march out as soon as the troops of the elector shall have arrived. Baner, after having left at Landsberg sufficient troops, will march with the rest on Kalbe, between the rivers Saale and Mulde, and there form a camp to guard the Elbe, and try to gain possession of Magdeburg. We have given order to Salvius to enroll some troops which were camped in the environs of Hamburg. United to those of the dukes of Mecklenburg, they would number fifteen thousand combatants; so that these two corps, one remaining near

Magdeburg under Baner, the other near the mouth of the Elbe, ought to control the course of that river. We have thought by the garrisons which we possess in Pomerania to assure to us Mecklenburg. But we have need to replace them by soldiers from Prussia, for we cannot leave that province entirely unprovided with troops."

But Gustavus stopped not at the first object he had proposed to himself. The force of his enthusiasm, which seemed to him more and more a sacred inspiration, and the wings of victory, bore him rapidly into the heart of Germany. The inhabitants of Erfurt feared a siege. He took that place by surprise, crossed the Thuringian forest during the night by the light of torches, and made his appearance in Upper Germany. Koenigshofen, regarded a strong place, capitulated; Wurtzburg, until then reputed impregnable, was carried by storm; he gained possession of Hanau by surprise; Frankfort-on-the-Main opened its gates. Gustavus crossed the city, and marched against Höchst, which surrendered. It was from there he wrote Baner, —

"We hope our success will permit us to concentrate between the great rivers of the Rhine and the Main, to interdict the enemy from the circle of Westphalia and all the other territories this side of the Rhine. Have care solely to secure the positions behind us."

The expedition through Franconia was but a continuation of triumphs. For the necessities and convenience of his army the king established large warehouses. After the capture of Wurtzburg, there was not a soldier who had not a suit of new clothes. In the camp a cow could be bought for a thaler, and a sheep cost only a sou. The hosts of the North had come into a country of abundance. Salvius wrote, —

"The king occupies all of Franconia, and the States have given him the oath as the duke of that country. Our Finland boys, accustomed to the wine of these districts, are less in haste to regain their own rugged country. In the wars of Livonia they were reduced to water and poor biscuit: to-day they drink good wine, and fill their casks with it."

Monro, the grave and reflective Scotchman, speaks with transport of the march along the beautiful banks of the Main. His words are, "The delightful march along the pleasant and beautiful river of the Main, which runs through fair Franconia."

Successes so brilliant, with means so limited, were accompanied with great dangers. Tilly, after his terrible disaster on the plains of Leipsic, had first taken the road of Hesse, had collected on the Weser the broken fragments of his army, re-enforced his strength from the garrisons of Lower Saxony, and united his forces to those of Fugger and Altringer, who commanded under him, supported also by the Duke of Lorraine and his troops. With this imposing army, the old Walloon general burned with impatience to restore his prestige by gaining a splendid victory over his recent successful antagonist. He menaced the rear-guard of Gustavus Adolphus, and marched to the aid of Wurtzburg, but arrived too late. From his camp at Fulda, Tilly earnestly urged permission from the Duke of Bavaria, the head of the League, to give battle to the king of Sweden. Maximilian, the most sagacious and prudent of all the emperor's supporters, did not dare again risk the fate of the Catholic party and the safety of his territories on a single battle. The bitterness of disappointment moved Tilly to tears when he received the order of his superior, which compelled him to abandon the hope of wiping out the stain of defeat, the thought of which made life painful to him. The king of Sweden, after having sent Horn against Bamberg, had, in going from Wurtzburg to Hanau, but seven thousand five hundred infantry and four thousand cavalry. The infantry was composed of five brigades of fifteen hundred men each, but they were not entirely complete. Each brigade was distinguished by the colors of the colonel's standard. It is authentically stated that never was Gustavus Adolphus seen so agitated as at this approach and near neighborhood of Tilly, which would

seem to imply a consciousness of some lack of prudence on his own part. For the first time he was seen to hesitate, to revoke orders which he had given. He wrote Baner, —

"The enemy is so much re-enforced in these territories that we dare not accept battle. He extends towards Schweinfurt, appears to wish to separate us from the Thuringian forest, and to cut the communications between you and Saxony. Take care! Correspond with the Duke William of Weimar, who is at Erfurt, and send him assistance if he is not sufficiently strong to sustain a siege. Seek, if possible, to gain possession of Magdeburg; and, to be able to guard your position on the Havel and the Elbe, distribute many powers of enrolment, and fix the places which the recruits should occupy. Friends or enemies, take all, provided you have soldiers. If the enemy attacks you, which is not probable in this advanced season, seek to sustain yourself on the banks of the Saale and the Elbe. If you are too feeble, retire on Werben, and camp in a good position between the Havel and the Elbe. Construct bridge-heads, and defend yourself until assistance arrives. Correspond without delay with Tott in Mecklenburg. Do not allow yourself to be drawn by any movement of jealousy which might prevent you serving us faithfully; and have not, in acting, other view than the service of your country. Correct yourself of the negligence as to giving us your news, and send us an under officer once or twice a week."

This was written near the close of 1631. A similar letter was sent to Marshal Tott, a brave warrior, but of passionate character, a grandson of King Erik, uncle of Gustavus Adolphus, who, after his dethronement, was murdered in the castle of his confinement by the order of his brother, King John.

The imperialists approaching Wurtzburg came in collision with the troops of Gustavus, and the Swedes cut in pieces three regiments of their cavalry. Tilly passed Wurtzburg, expressing his bitter disappointment that the elector of Bavaria, under whom he held his command, had forbidden him to risk battle, and marched towards Nuremberg. But the continual assaults of the enemy, and his military anxieties and cares, were not the only difficulties and trials with which the king of Sweden had to contend

in this expedition so glorious to his arms. Though the booty gathered from the rich bishoprics and priestly accumulations was considerable, the lack of money always prevented the regular payment of his troops. He was obliged to alter the value of money, and employed forced means to maintain the value of copper coins in Sweden. To John Casimir, his chief representative in the home government, specially charged with its financial affairs, he wrote, —

"We have dealt with one named Zwirner, who, with some of his associates, will strike us a quantity of bad money."

To the same person is also committed the coinage of Sweden, and Casimir is directed to look carefully to his proceedings. The king then continues, —

"We must bring the matter to this point: that no other coins shall pass in Sweden but rix-dollars in specie and copper money. We therefore desire that your Highness, with the Senate, shall publicly prohibit all coins, excepting the aforesaid, in all the provinces subject to our authority, whereby we expect that the copper coins shall be in demand, and be sought for again out of Holland, and thereby copper will be made valuable."

With his present opportunities of gathering spoils from the rich members of the Catholic League, whose territories and cities he has in his possession, nothing better than this language of the king and his pressing expedients show his methods of supporting war, in striking contrast with those practised by Mansfeld, Brunswick, and Wallenstein. He is much dissatisfied with Erik Persson, his agent in Holland, to whom he had confided the regulation of the subsidies with that country. He replaced him by Henry Falkenberg, "who is less able to make false accounts and to deceive in revenue calculations." The king spares fifteen hundred skiffunds[1] of copper for the war, which may bring sixty thousand rix-dollars, and assigns capital for carrying on the copper-mines. Nov. 1, 1631, he writes Casimir, —

[1] A skiffund is four hundred Swedish pounds.

"We would gladly wish, if the safety of the country permitted it, to be again strengthened with six regiments, besides with one thousand Swedish and five hundred Finland cavaliers; and that these troops should not be sent to us unprovided with every thing, as hitherto has been done."

Nuremberg now excited his special concern. That important city with enthusiastic satisfaction received the advance of the victorious Swedes, and committed its fortunes and safety to the protection of the Protestant champion; and the nobles of the surrounding country had been won to his cause by the terms of his proclamations and his manner of justifying his hostile appearance in their midst. Nuremberg was now threatened by Tilly and his numerously increased army. Gustavus Adolphus was thoroughly resolved that this important hold and centre of his friends should not share the fate of Magdeburg. He decided to promptly return to Franconia, and make sure of its relief. Nov. 29, 1631, he wrote from Höchst to John Casimir, —

"The old devil, with all his disciples, — the Duke of Lorraine, Pappenheim, Furstenberg, Gallas, and Ossa, — to day besieged Nuremberg. I march, if God will, to-morrow to its assistance. The enemy is strong; but God has granted us considerable means, and we hope, with the troops of the Landgrave and Duke of Weimar, to have seventeen thousand foot and nine thousand horse."

But he soon received the intelligence that Tilly had abandoned his attempt on the city. The same day the king writes to Horn, —

"We have received tidings that the enemy has abandoned Nuremberg, and divided his force into three bodies. One remains in this neighborhood, another goes to Bohemia, a third to Bavaria. We have therefore decided to carry out our intention on the Rhine."

The increasing strength and bold resolution of Gustavus had caused Tilly to raise the siege of Nuremberg; and the former pursued the course of his victories through attractive and productive districts, which enabled him

more easily to supply his army, and to maintain a strong position against future contingencies. He now came in collision with the Spaniards, and inspired the fears of France. "We have come all at once against the Spaniards," the king wrote to the Senate at Stockholm. "When we sent secretly the colonel of our horse-guard, Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, to the Spanish general Silva, commander at Mayence, Silva declared he had been ordered to defend the archbishopric of Mayence against us. On leaving Frankfort we went into the Palatinate, where we took possession of Germersheim. The Spaniards had thrown a bridge across the river, which they had fortified on the side of Darmstadt. We could not leave this fortification behind us without violating the rules of war. We informed them that the head of the bridge would obstruct us; and as they fired on us, instead of evacuating it, though that position was not tenable, we resolved to pass the Rhine at Oppenheim to cut off the retreat of those who defended the bridge. Scarcely had we reached the other side of the river when Don Philip de Silva charged us with his cavalry; but he was repulsed, and his garrison surrendered Dec. 7. On the 8th we entered without resistance the city of Oppenheim, but we were obliged to take the castle by assault. Should we regard this a rupture? or should we attempt a reconciliation with Spain in order to have the hands free with France, whose king, with imposing forces, approaches, and has already arrived at Metz to put an obstacle to our peace with the emperor? On the other side, Spain will not willingly abandon what it possesses in the Palatinate; and we cannot expect a durable peace so long as the elector shall not have been restored to the possession of his States. England and Holland would be ready to assist us against Spain. In any case our west coasts should be assured by the fortification of Gothenburg."

It was on the 8th of December, 1631, that the strong-

hold of Oppenheim had been carried by storm, after a brave resistance. Five hundred Spanish soldiers, the chief defenders of the place, met the pitiless fate of the sword at the hands of the victorious Swedes. The passage of the Rhine by the conqueror had struck terror to the enemy, who had regarded the river a sure protection against the vengeance of the Swedes. Rapid flight was now deemed the only method of safety, and all the places not admitting of an effective defence were at once abandoned. They were the Spaniards and the troops of the Duke of Lorraine who were now fleeing before the Swedes. After a series of outrages and wanton cruelties on its defenceless inhabitants, the Lorraine troops evacuated the city of Worms. The Spaniards shut themselves in the strongly fortified position of Frankenthal, where they hoped to make a successful defence against the pursuing victors. From Oppenheim, Gustavus marched directly on Mayence, from which the elector himself had retired, leaving two thousand men, under the command of Silva, to defend it, the city being strongly fortified. He had previously asked his commander if this number of soldiers was sufficient. "That interrogatory, my lord," responded Silva, "proves that you are not a soldier. I charge myself, with these two thousand men, to defend Mayence should it be even against three kings of Sweden." They were the picked men of the Spanish troops who formed the garrison. Gustavus lost no time in pushing his designs against this important city, the capital of a rich bishopric. He advanced along the left bank of the Rhine, while the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who captured several strong places in his march, moved on the other side of the river. The Spaniards at first displayed courage and resolution, and for several days threw a shower of bombs into the camp of the besiegers, which cost the lives of many of the brave soldiers of Gustavus. But the vigor of the defence did not repel the Swedes,

who continued to make progress, and finally reached so near the ditch that they were preparing to carry the city by storm, when the courage of the Spanish defenders began to weaken.

Recent events had brought to their knowledge the furious impetuosity of the Swedish soldiers, of which Marienburg, Wartsburg, and Oppenheim had furnished fearful examples. If taken by storm, the same fate might be that of Mayence and its garrison. The archbishop and his confidants might fear the enemy would be tempted to revenge on his magnificent residence the fate of Magdeburg. To save the town, the Spanish garrison surrendered on the fourth day of the siege, a decision caused quite as much by the fears of the Catholic prelates for their wealth as the anxiety of the soldiers for their lives. They obtained favorable terms from Gustavus, who provided them a safe-conduct to Luxemburg. The greater part of them, influenced by the generous treatment of their conqueror, enlisted in his service. In gaining possession of the city, the king exposed himself like his soldiers. A ball carried away a page at his side. The envoy of Holland, who chanced to be at hand, reminded Gustavus of the necessity of taking more care of his precious life. It would suffice to trace the plan, and cause it to be executed by his generals. "Mr. Ambassador," responded the king, "one cannot take cities by marking circles on a table in his chamber. When the schoolmaster is absent, the scholars put aside their books." Gustavus Adolphus made his formal entrance into the city Dec. 13, 1631, and established his headquarters at the palace of the elector. There fell into his hands eighty cannon and a large amount of powder, and seventy thousand florins were imposed as a contribution. Besides, the Jews and clergy were obliged to make large contributions separately, and in addition to the amount required of the city. The large and valuable library of the ecclesiastical prince was seized,

and shipped to Sweden for the academy at Vesterås, but was lost in transit at sea. The Spaniards continued to be unfortunate, and lost nearly all their positions on the Rhine, and retained few places of importance in the Palatinate.

The Swedish troops now required rest after their rapid and laborious campaign, which had been prolonged into the depth of winter; and the king needed opportunity for important affairs of administration, as well as for pressing questions of diplomacy. He placed his army in winter quarters in the immediate vicinity of Mayence, where abundant supplies were available for the wants of the soldiers, and where the attractive surroundings and the products of the vineyards for the time tended to alleviate the hardships of war. He seemed to take a lively interest in this city: he strengthened its fortifications, and erected a new citadel at the opposite angle which the Main forms with the Rhine, which was called Gustavusburg. The presence of the king of Sweden at the capital of the rich and proud Catholic elector, one of the chief members of the League, at the beginning of 1632, presents a brilliant and interesting spectacle. His queen was with him in this brief respite from his warlike labors. Oxenstierna had brought him re-enforcements from Prussia, and was now at hand to share his counsels, and aid him in his vast responsibilities and unceasing cares. He was surrounded by high personages and foreign ministers, and counted in his staff more princes than Oxenstierna wished; for this illustrious man, having afterwards to defend the Rhine, complained that these princes would not yield him the necessary obedience. For a brief season arms were laid down to afford opportunity for negotiations, and to demonstrate the impracticability of a treaty of neutrality with the Catholic League; some of its members merely wishing to gain time, others being to a certain extent sincere, and thoroughly alarmed by the successful advance and prepon-

derating power of Gustavus and his allies. In fact, the League might be considered dissolved; its members throwing themselves into the arms of France, as did Treves, or were obliged to unite for the time more closely with the emperor, as did Bavaria, or were dispossessed by the king of Sweden, who from his commanding position was the recognized chief of Protestant Germany. Most of the remaining portion of the winter was passed by Gustavus at Mayence and Frankfort. In both cities he made a profound impression on all who came into his presence, or consulted him on important affairs. The inhabitants observed with deep satisfaction and gratitude the severe discipline which he maintained in his army, especially when compared with the license allowed to the imperial troops. Even the Catholics did not withhold their commendation. Yet, surrounded with all these flattering auspices, he was moving amid ticklish wires and dangerous currents. None but a master could safely pass the trying ordeal, and find solution of the perilous problems. His chief source of safety was in himself, — in his unquestioned genius, in his lofty purposes, in his ability to successfully lead and organize the elements around him, which could only become powerful as they were guided by a heroic will and a master-hand. If his great victory at Breitenfeld and his successful career on the Rhine — by which terror had been carried to Vienna and Munich, and disaster among the members of the League — were advantageous to his cause, and had brought him powerful supporters among the German princes and cities, alarm and distrust had found their way to Paris. His enemies were successful in gaining the ear of the French court; and Louis XIII., an earnest Catholic, had for some time observed with anxiety the progress of the Swedish king towards the frontiers of France, and remarked that it was "time to put a stop to this Goth." The Catholic princes successively sent their complaints to the French king that he should

render assistance to the king of Sweden, a heretic and a dangerous man. The bishop of Wurtzburg, anxious to avenge the loss of his dominions, the Bavarian minister in Paris, and the Jesuits, were especially active in stirring up French jealousies, and filling the timid mind of the French king with alarming fears. Louis and his government were then engaged in a civil war against their Protestant subjects; and it had been only by prodigious efforts and expense that they had succeeded at the memorable siege of La Rochelle, the stronghold of the French Protestants on the ocean. Amid the prejudices of religion, the flow of heated passions, and the clashing interests, with the Protestant champion of the North becoming daily more powerful and advancing southward, it was not difficult to propagate the belief at the French court that Gustavus Adolphus had formed an alliance with the Huguenots, and was on the eve of marching into France to aid in overturning the Catholic religion of that kingdom. Richelieu himself may have really become uneasy at the rapid growth of the power of the king of Sweden and the breadth and significance of his conquests on the Rhine, though the cool logic of his policy more than his fears in this regard undoubtedly now dictated his course. Historians have accused him of perfidy, duplicity, and inconsistency for his expedients and methods at this time, and especially that he should have a secret treaty with Bavaria when he was at the same time a powerful supporter of Gustavus, and had induced his Catholic king to give his alliance and subsidies to the champion of heresy from the North. Richelieu was certainly never troubled with scruples when State reasons seemed to confront them, but inconsistent he was not. He was a Frenchman before being a Catholic. With Henry IV. before him, whose national ideas and policies he had adopted, his leading aim was to permanently weaken and limit the house of Austria: therefore he had been and continued to be the supporter

of those German princes who were hostile to the emperor. The cardinal statesman now wished to negotiate with Gustavus Adolphus to secure the Catholic electors from destruction, not only for the purpose of quieting Catholic clamors and the anxiety of the French king, but to detach them from the support of the emperor by engaging them to neutrality. In the preceding May he had negotiated a secret treaty with the Duke of Bavaria, who had become somewhat distrustful and jealous of the emperor at the indications that he might not receive the full compensation he thought his due for all the services he and his army had rendered to Ferdinand and his cause; and Maximilian also hoped to profit from this understanding with France in contingencies of danger from the advance of the king of Sweden towards his territories, or in the plans he might have for the restoration of Frederick to the Palatinate, which Maximilian so much desired to spoliate for the increase of his own dominions. Familiar with all the elements and contingencies with which he had to deal, Richelieu could not fail to play a successful game. If he could induce Maximilian and the other chief members of the League to pledge themselves to neutrality towards Gustavus Adolphus, he would take from the emperor some of the strongest props of his power, secure their territories from further invasions, guard the interests of Catholicism, then in peril, and at the same time render effective service to the king of Sweden by reducing the number of his enemies, and making it practicable for him to turn all his power against the emperor, the real objective of Gustavus, as well as the chief antagonist whom Richelieu and the French king wished to humble and reduce; and in this line of consequences no permanent injury could result to the Catholic Church. But if Richelieu should not be able to effect such an arrangement with the princes of the League, and they continued to support the emperor, France would have plainly shown her fidelity to

the Catholic cause; while Maximilian and the other members of the League would be made to appear the authors of their own misfortunes, and unwise and dangerous friends of the Roman Church. Richelieu was indefatigable in pushing his plans, while Gustavus had an attentive eye and ear to all that was taking place. The closing weeks of 1631 and the early months of 1632 were employed in negotiations and efforts by the diplomatic agents and counsellors of the respective parties. Richelieu sent Marquis of Breze, his brother-in-law, as his plenipotentiary to the king of Sweden, to see if it were possible to arrange between him and the princes of the League suspension of arms and terms of neutrality. His instructions to Breze, who was aided by Charnacé, were in substance these: —

"The total restitution of what the king of Sweden and the princes of Germany, his confederates, have occupied belonging to the Catholic League; or they shall place in the hands of the king what they have occupied of said League until a Diet shall have resolved what ought to be restored."

Then he goes straight to the foundation of the question: —

"It is necessary, as much as possible, to induce the king of Sweden to promptly attack the emperor in Bohemia, Austria, and other hereditary countries. It is necessary, also, that the Palatinate this side of the Rhine should be cleared of the Spaniards. Now that the lightness and feebleness of the Palatine make one apprehend, that, if he had it at this time in possession, he would not keep it, or would not make a good use of it, it seems that it might suffice for the king of Sweden to promise the restitution, by the general accord which should be made in the Diet, and in the mean time keep it."

Clearly understanding the situation, his own objects, the inevitable tendencies of the Catholic princes, their invincible opposition to the Protestant religion, their strong attachment to the house of Austria, and their bitter aversion to the arms and power of Sweden, and think-

ing their open hostility less dangerous than a seeming neutrality which could not be real, Gustavus demanded terms which the opposite party would not accept; and thus the efforts of the French negotiators were defeated. In granting to Bavaria and the League a truce of fourteen days for negotiations, Gustavus put, for conditions, the evacuation of Westphalia, the archbishopric of Magdeburg, and of Bohemia. This proposition, though favored by Richelieu, was not acceptable to Maximilian, who was bound by various bonds of family, faith, and interests to the emperor. Richelieu is not wide of the mark, in his "Memoirs," in charging much on the obstinacy of Maximilian for the misfortunes which his territories had to endure by Swedish hostility; for at the very time when Gustavus Adolphus was receiving from the French diplomatic agents assurances of the favorable progress of the negotiations, a letter was intercepted from the Duke of Bavaria to Pappenheim, then imperial general in Westphalia, to the import that the only object of the truce and negotiation was to gain time for measures of defence. Instead of having sincere intention of any real understanding in good faith with the king of Sweden, Maximilian, with his perverted, Jesuitical conscience and sense of honor, was hastening his preparations for war.

Subsequently, but early in 1632, some negotiations were commenced, which, following recent military successes, tend to prove that Gustavus deemed himself justified in demanding strong terms as a basis of pacification. The elector of Mayence having obtained from the emperor permission to make to, and receive from, the king of Sweden propositions of peace, the latter submitted the following conditions: The revocation of the Edict of Restitution; the toleration of the Catholic and Lutheran religions; the re-establishment of Protestantism in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; the exiles to be recalled, and their property restored; the Elector Frederick to be

restored in the Palatinate, and the electoral dignity returned to him, of which he had been deprived to the aggrandizement of the Duke of Bavaria; the re-establishment at Augsburg of the exercise of the evangelical worship and the ancient liberties; the banishment of the Jesuits from the empire; the ecclesiastical dignities to be equally accessible to the members of the two religions; the reparation of the damages caused in the imperial cities and in the duchy of Würtemburg by the Edict of Restitution; the institution in equal numbers of Catholic and Lutheran canons in collegial churches. A contemporary Catholic historian,[1] whose statement has sometimes been repeated by subsequent writers, adds another condition: The election of Gustavus to the dignity of King of the Romans, which would indicate imperial aspirations. But this specification is not mentioned by Richelieu, which is strongly presumptive against it; while the plan then entertained by Gustavus for the formation of the Corpus Evangelicorum under his leadership and protection is a clear implication against it. What the pressure of future events and change of circumstances, had life and successful career been continued to him, might have led Gustavus Adolphus to have sought in the direction of the imperial crown, is not here the question. He was at this time the powerful defender of the Protestant faith and people of Germany; and, by the organization of the Protestant princes and cities into an evangelical body, he hoped to secure their religious liberties against imperial infraction and aggression, and to have himself recognized as its protector. The homages which the king received for himself and the Swedish crown in the midst of his conquests were limited by certain specified conditions. It was understood that they would be rendered only during the war, or in common for Sweden and her allies. But

[1] Khevenhüller.

sometimes these conditions were forgotten, as in case of the conquest of the Catholic dioceses, to the inhabitants of which Gustavus had granted liberty of conscience and guaranty of property. The reciprocal obligations contracted by him and the Protestant States, though they did not pledge equally all the contracting parties, imposed on them the necessity of acting in common in the war, gave Gustavus the absolute direction, and recognized him, in terms more or less explicit, in the quality and with the responsibilities of a protector. He was in reality and name the protector of a German Protestant League, the extent of whose powers and the scope of whose mission were contingent on future events. To the deputies of Nuremburg he said, —

"He demanded of his friends only gratitude. What he had taken from the enemy he thought to keep. The Protestant League should separate from the Catholics, and elect a chief, especially for the conduct of the war. He could not content himself with a few months' pay, like an enrolled soldier. He might demand a cession of territory according to the laws of nations, following the precept of Grotius, though he possessed enough. He would not abandon Pomerania because of the sea; and if he restored any thing, he demanded of them the right of superiority which the emperor had enjoyed. The old imperial constitution was of no further effect.

The inhabitants of Nuremberg assured him that they recognized no one who was more worthy to be elected chief than his Majesty himself. At the same time Gustavus demanded of the Senate of Sweden its opinion on the basis to be adopted for peace. The Senate proposed the following conditions: —

"Liberty of conscience, the abolition of the Inquisition, and the restoration of the evangelicals to their rights and possessions; indemnity of the expenses of the war to re-imburse Sweden, and guaranties of its payment; alliance between the Protestants and Gustavus, who shall have the supreme command in all their wars against the emperor and other enemies; the cession to Sweden of Pomerania and Wismar;

the giving-up of Silesia, Saxony, Lausace, and of the landgraviate of Hesse to Brandenburg; and an indemnity to be paid by Austria to the dukes of Weimar."

The distance and the vicissitudes of war opposed numerous obstacles to communication with Sweden. Entire months passed in which the king and those with him received not the least news from their own country and of affairs at home. From this there resulted mistakes and disorders. Aug. 30, 1631, Gustavus had sent the order from Wittenberg to convoke the committee of the Swedish estates, with which he wished to negotiate relative to the cattle contribution. Oct. 30 of the same year, at Wurtzburg, he had promised to send full powers for the assembling of the Diet, which did not reach their destination. But the Senate said it had received them, and convoked the Diet for Feb. 1, 1632. Nevertheless, after much delay there arrived at Stockholm a letter from the secretary of the king, which contained the formal prohibition to convoke any Diet, and ordered the governors, each in his own province, to negotiate with the people relative to the cattle-tax; but when this letter had reached Stockholm, the committee of the estates was already assembled, following the advice of the Senate, and the deputies had received information of the great exploits and triumphant success of their heroic king. The estates say, that, having learned that the war and its events had drawn the king far from the frontiers of the kingdom, they thanked him for the fatigues and pains which he had given for the salvation of the Protestants, and promised to pay the imposts two years more. Later the Senate asked the counsels of Oxenstierna, the chancellor of the kingdom, on the important affairs for which it had solicited the advice of the king. Some of the royal officials were dead; others were aged or in poor health, and unfit for service. The Senate asks for authority to name persons to the vacant places, and also to decide in high criminal cases on petitions for pardon. It likewise

expresses fear of a collision with Denmark, and complains that the prohibition to coin other copper money than kreutzers had caused to disappear from the kingdom nearly all the small coins. This communication of the Senate is of the date of May 5, 1632.

CHAPTER XVI.

MILITARY OPERATIONS RENEWED. — WELCOMED BY NUREMBERG. — BOLD PASSAGE OF THE LECH, AND BRILLIANT VICTORY OVER THE IMPERIALISTS. — RECEIVED JOYFULLY BY AUGSBURG, AND MARCHES TO INGOLSTADT. — ADVANCES INTO BAVARIA. — FRENCH MINISTER SEEKS TO SERVE MAXIMILIAN BY NEGOTIATIONS. — SURRENDER OF MUNICH TO THE SWEDES. — GUSTAVUS FORMS CLOSER UNION WITH NUREMBERG.

THE military operations of 1632, in which the numbers of the belligerents engaged were more numerous than in the preceding year, commenced after a full council of war, in which were manifested two opinions. Duke Bernhard wished to march directly against Austria, and not allow the imperialists time to recover from their recent disasters. Gustavus Adolphus preferred to strengthen and secure his position in the west of Germany, to prevent his enemies receiving re-enforcements from Flanders and from the Catholic electorates, and to watch France. In North Germany, Tott held a firm front against the imperialists, and completed the conquest of Mecklenburg by the capture of Rostock, Wismar, and Dömitz. The important bishopric of Bamberg became the object of severe struggle between the imperialists and the Swedes under Horn, to whom the king had given the command of eight thousand men to chastise the bishop, whose perfidy had excited the indignation of Gustavus Adolphus. In a short time Horn subdued the larger part of the bishopric; and the capital, abandoned by its imperial garrison, was

carried by storm. Duke Bernhard, the Palsgrave of Birkenfeld, and the Rhinegrave Otto Louis, carried the victorious arms of Gustavus on the Rhine; and Baner acquired possession of Magdeburg, abandoned by Pappenheim, who was unable longer to retain it. But the smaller German princes and the cities were the only sure and determined allies on whom the king of Sweden could rely, and who were willing to have him for their protector. Saxony and Brandenburg, uncertain and vacillating, had gravitated towards Gustavus Adolphus, partly by his pressure, not less than by the aggressive demands of the emperor and the fear of Tilly's army, but now kept themselves aloof as much as possible, and sought to follow the lines of their own special interests. The Saxon army had indeed advanced to Prague without resistance, but made very poor use of its successes and opportunities. Instead of pushing forward rapidly to other important points, where the enemy was unprepared to oppose him, John George stopped to repose his troops, greatly to their disadvantage. The Saxon soldiery oppressed the inhabitants of Prague to such a degree, that, in a short time, two thousand houses were deserted. Their license and intemperance caused a fatal sickness in the army, which made extensive ravages. Such conduct was little calculated to secure the good will and support of the country they came to rescue from imperial domination. There took place at Torgau an interview between the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg respecting an arrangement for peace, but they could not agree as to the measures to be adopted. John George expressed the wish that they should demand of Ferdinand the resignation of the imperial dignity in case he should refuse to accept the moderate conditions which they would propose to him. Such an opinion from a person like the elector of Saxony well indicates the political temperature of the hour. Besides, John George declared that his honor and dignity would not permit him

to place his troops under Swedish command; but he prayed Gustavus Adolphus to take for the account of the Saxons the contributions which the Protestants had promised him, as their chief, in the congress of Leipsic.

But in the mean while the emperor and his most devoted adherents had not been idle. Amid the darkness and trials of defeat, Ferdinand did not quail nor yield. He put forth his utmost efforts, made great curtailment in his court expenses, and sought contributions among the adherents of his cause at home and abroad. The rich and powerful bishop of Bamberg, who had been driven from his territories by Horn, urgently demanded assistance from the elector of Bavaria. Maximilian, the superior and patron of Tilly, whose military successes and renown had been largely the result of his having under his command the Bavarian army, now stimulated the old general to renewed activity, and to march to the assistance of the defeated and fugitive bishop. As speedily as possible Tilly concentrated his troops, which were scattered over the Upper Palatinate, and, with twenty thousand men, advanced on Bamberg, with full orders from Maximilian to restore the banished bishop to his seat. Horn was far outnumbered by his antagonist, but resolutely determined not to abandon his conquest, and awaited the enemy within the walls of Bamberg. But the approach to the city of the greatly superior forces of Tilly created a panic among the troops of Horn, which that capable and brave general was not able to overcome. Tilly gained possession of the city; and with difficulty the troops, artillery, and baggage of the Swedes were saved. By this victory the whole territory of the Bamberg bishopric was restored to the emperor and the League, but Tilly was unable to prevent the Swedish general from retiring safe and in good order beyond the Main.

Gustavus Adolphus now left Mayence, leaving there

for governor a Swedish senator, Sparre, with precise instructions for the considerate care of the Catholic belief and interests, which he wished to conciliate, and hastened to the assistance of Horn, with whom he effected a union near Kitzingen. The Swedish army now amounted to more than thirty thousand men; and a stop was quickly put to the victorious progress of Tilly, who was obliged to make a hasty retreat, and fell back on the Danube to cover Bavaria. The troops of Duke Bernhard and Baner, now united with those of the main army, brought its whole numbers under the immediate command of the king to nearly forty thousand men. He now made an uninterrupted march through Franconia, completely finishing its conquest. Bohemia and Bavaria were equally near the advancing army of the king, and both alike open to conquest. Maximilian could not know which direction Gustavus would take, and this baffled his immediate resolution. It was dangerous, at the approach of so formidable an enemy, to have his own territory undefended in order to protect Austria; yet it was not less perilous to have Tilly come to his defence, thus drawing thither the enemy, and rendering Bavaria the theatre of a devastating war. But Maximilian, when finally compelled to a decision by the approach of danger, resolved that loyalty to his home interests and immediate subjects must be maintained at all hazards, and gave orders to Tilly to do his utmost to protect the frontiers of Bavaria.

Gustavus Adolphus assured himself of Nuremberg. This important city, chiefly Protestant in its faith and sympathies, was worthy of the price which he attached to its alliance. It had long been endowed with large privileges. A newly elected emperor should there hold his first Diet. It had the keeping of the jewels of the empire, a bank of large importance, and a commerce extended to the Indies. The sagacity and success of its government were held in high estimation, and it was often considered

the first city in Germany. With enthusiastic demonstrations of joy, the numerous inhabitants of this city received the king of Sweden as the protector of the Protestant religion and the heroic champion of German freedom. Gustavus could not conceal his astonishment and satisfaction at the warmth of his reception in this large and central city. The striking appearance of his person, the affable and kindly manner of his interviews with the citizens, the remembrance of his exploits, and especially his sacrifices for the defence of his Protestant brethren, made a deep impression on all hearts. He improved the opportunity to confirm the alliance he had concluded with its agents many months before on the shores of the Baltic, and stirred the Nurembergers to renewed activity and union against the common enemy. The reception they gave him was said to have exceeded in magnificence those which had been made by that city in preceding times to various emperors. The entrance of Gustavus Adolphus was chanted in Latin and German verse, and his portrait painted and engraved in copper and wood. He received rich presents, among which were four battery-guns of an exquisite casting and peculiar artifice, with the necessary mounting fixtures and munitions; also two globes of silver, representing the terrestrial sphere and the celestial. They thus indicated by these vessels, adapted to serve as drinking-vases, that, "after possessing the earth, their possessor could reckon on the enjoyment of heaven." Gustavus, in his turn, gave certain property of the Teutonic order and of the Bishop of Bamberg to the city of Nuremberg, whose council he very much pleased by a religious discourse, in which he asserted his devotion to the evangelical cause and to German liberty.

After a brief stay in Nuremberg, the king of Sweden, in the pursuit of Tilly, directed his course towards the Danube, and to Donauwerth, a frontier town, which was defended by a numerous Bavarian garrison. But the place

soon surrendered, after serious losses under the destructive fire of the Swedish artillery, and was promptly re-established in its former condition of an imperial city with Protestant worship. The capture of Donauwerth opened to the Swedish army the other side of the Danube, and now only the small river Lech separated it from the Bavarian territory. The near approach of danger had aroused all the activity of Maximilian; and Tilly had intrenched himself near the small town of Rain, west of the confluence of the Lech and the Danube, and between the Lech and the Aicha. His strongly fortified camp was surrounded by three rivers, and he thought safely to bid defiance to successful attack. All the bridges over the Lech had been destroyed, and the course of the stream was defended by strong garrisons. Maximilian, with all the troops he could gather, came to the assistance of Tilly, and threw himself into his intrenched camp. It was now in March; and the river, augmented by frequent rains and the melting of snow in the Tyrol Mountains, flowed full and rapid between the steep banks. The boiling currents threatened destruction to whoever should attempt the passage, and the opposite side was swept by the cannon of the enemy. But, if the perilous crossing could be made, a defeat then suffered would be fatal; for the same dashing current which threatened the advance of the Swedes would cut off retreat in the panic and disorder of repulse. A council of war, composed of his brave and tried officers, was summoned by the king. Horn urged that the king should abandon Tilly and Bavaria, march to Bohemia to disperse the new troops enrolled by Wallenstein, and afterwards penetrate into Austria through Moravia as the surest way to bring the emperor to terms. The Lech was deep and rapid, and to make its passage in the presence of a powerful enemy would cost a large sacrifice of men, even should they succeed in the undertaking. In case of failure the entire Swedish army would be lost. In this view Horn

was sustained by most of the other officers. The king maintained the opposite opinion, and said they ought to profit by the terror with which the Swedes had already inspired the Bavarian army; and, in case of repulse, Donauwerth would be a sufficient refuge, but he expected to have no need of it. Horn, who spoke for the others sharing his opinions, continued in his view of the question in issue. "What!" exclaimed Gustavus Adolphus, "have we crossed the Baltic, the Oder, the Elbe, and the Rhine, to stop stupefied before this mere stream, the Lech? Remember that the undertakings the most difficult are often those which succeed best, because the adverse party regard them as impossible." The king's resolution was irrevocably fixed; and he had previously reconnoitred with great personal danger, and ascertained that his own side of the river was higher than the opposite bank, and thus would give the Swedish artillery the decided advantage. He threw over the Lech a bridge under the cross-fire of seventy-two pieces of cannon, which crushed the Bavarians on the opposite side, and turned against the covert of a piece of woods under which they had taken refuge, and which the Swedish artillery broke into falling tops of trees, flying limbs, and deadly splinters. Not only was the completion of the bridge secured by the tremendous cross-fire of artillery, but a thick smoke was kept up by the burning of wood and wet straw, concealing for some time the progress of the work. Gustavus stimulated his troops by his own example, making with his own hand more than sixty cannon discharges. The Bavarians did their utmost to destroy the works as they were proceeding; and Tilly was undaunted in his efforts to encourage his troops amid the great peril, when he was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball; and Altringer, who then took his place, was almost immediately wounded in the head. Deprived of the animating presence of these two brave generals, the Bavarians gave way, leaving two thousand dead on the field; and Maxi-

milian yielded to the dying persuasions of Tilly to abandon the position, and this decision was hastened by the discovery of a ford by the Swedes, where their cavalry, by making a *détour*, were about to effect a passage. The same night the Duke of Bavaria broke up his camp, and retreated in good order to Ingolstadt. The Swedes passed the night without leaving their positions, but early the next morning Nils Brahe was sent with a picked regiment to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. He found the camp empty, to which the king immediately hastened. Seeing the solid intrenchments which Tilly had raised, and the great advantage of ground held by the Bavarian troops, Gustavus exclaimed, —

"If I had been the elector of Bavaria, I would not have opened my territories to the enemy by abandoning such a position: no, I would not have quitted it, when even a ball had carried away my beard and a part of my chin."

This was the last fight of the old Walloon general. He was placed in the carriage of Maximilian, and carried to Ingolstadt. The motion of the carriage during the lengthy journey caused him great suffering. Arrived at Ingolstadt, an unskilful surgeon increased his intense pain while trying to extract from his wounds splinters of bone. He groaned especially that he had survived his terrible defeat at Breitenfeld, and had not been able to efface that disgrace. Maximilian passed hours with him at his couch of agony, and sought to console him, in spite of the chagrin he felt himself. Tilly in his last moments urged the duke not to separate himself from the imperial cause, and to make his utmost efforts to hold Ingolstadt and Ratisbon; and subsequent events proved the wisdom and value of this advice. He passed fifteen days of suffering, and died April 20, 1632, at the age of seventy-three, dividing his modest fortune between a beloved nephew and his old Walloon soldiers; thus affording the proof that he had not grown rich on the spoils of war, as had his bitter rival, who

was soon to be his successor, and as had too many of the imperial generals.

The passage of the Lech by the Swedes, and the retreat of Maximilian and his army to Ingolstadt, opened Bavaria to the successful advance of the conqueror. Though it had been for many years one of the chief supporters of the League and the emperor in destructive, warlike enterprises in other States, by the skilful management of its reigning duke, and the course of events, the fertile fields of Bavaria had escaped the ravages of hostile invasion. Now the tide of war began to beat against its frontiers; and it was to know the humiliation of defeat, and suffer the ravages of the enemy at its own doors. But before proceeding to the conquest of the territories of Maximilian, Gustavus resolved to deliver Augsburg from the domination which the Bavarian duke had exercised over that Protestant city. With the larger portion of his army, he appeared before Augsburg a few days after his triumphant encounter with Tilly; and before the expiration of the second day of its investment the hostile garrison surrendered the city, and the king entered, accompanied by the unfortunate Frederick of the Palatinate, and a numerous company of German princes, counts, barons, and generals. Gustavus went directly to one of the principal churches; and, after the singing of the One Hundred and Third Psalm, his chaplain preached a sermon in commemoration of the restoration of the oppressed through divine mercy, which was followed by a hymn and the charm of music. From the church the assemblage moved to the public square, where, entering a house, the king appeared on a balcony, and received the oath of fidelity from the city burghers. Augsburg, like Nuremberg, was one of the largest and richest cities of Germany, and had acquired theological celebrity in consequence of the Confession of Augsburg, presented a hundred years before to Charles V., which afterwards became the basis of faith of the Protestant churches of Germany, as well

as of the Lutheran churches of Sweden. The most of its inhabitants had embraced the Protestant doctrine, and acquired churches and important privileges. But the effect of the Edict of Restitution, enforced by imperial arms, had been to close these churches, and to place Catholic administration at the head of the city, which had been occupied by a Bavarian garrison. This oppression of the city, which Protestant Germany regarded as the natal home of its cherished faith, had excited keen indignation among the supporters of the new religion throughout the empire. The king of Sweden, as the Protestant champion and the earnest supporter of the Augsburg Confession in his own kingdom, considered it a duty and a pleasure to put an end to the Catholic and imperial yoke imposed on the city. He concluded with Augsburg an arrangement of accord and common defence, the original instrument being still found in the archives of Sweden. This restoration of its religious rights to Augsburg by Gustavus was one of his triumphs which he especially appreciated, and appears to have made a deep impression on public opinion.

Leaving a garrison in the city which had received him as a deliverer, he advanced towards Ingolstadt. Maximilian, following the advice of his dying general, had left in that city a strong force for its defence, and retired to Ratisbon, of which he took possession in order to assure his communications with the emperor. Ingolstadt and Ratisbon now remained the chief defences of Bavaria. The king of Sweden made a vigorous assault on Ingolstadt, expecting to capture the place by the boldness and energy of his first attack. Besides, he had been stimulated to the hope of gaining speedy possession of the town by the connivance of Farenbach, one of the officers of the garrison. But the chief had his suspicions aroused in regard to Farenbach, and had taken the precaution to place him and his regiment where he could not carry out his treasonous design. The result of the king's vigorous attack was a failure. The

strength of the fortifications was so great, the natural position so strong, and the defence of the garrison so brave, that the king deemed it wise not to persevere in his effort, which might prove too costly, especially as more important work called for his services in another direction. He had come near losing his life; for, while reconnoitring the fortifications, a twenty-four pound ball killed his horse under him, and another struck down at his side the young margrave of Baden, a brave officer whom Gustavus much esteemed. The king suddenly raised the siege, and marched rapidly towards Munich, the Bavarian capital, not deeming it wise longer to follow the course of the Danube, having learned that Maximilian had been successful in gaining possession of Ratisbon. He judged it more expedient to penetrate to the interior of Bavaria, so as to draw the duke into that quarter for the security of his territories, and thus compel him to remove from the Danube its defenders. There were no longer hostile troops of any importance to impede the advance of Gustavus to Munich. Bavaria being now at the mercy of the king of Sweden, the secret treaty which Maximilian had made with France was sought to be used to obstruct the triumphant march of Gustavus. Before leaving Ingolstadt he received the French envoy residing at the Bavarian capital, who came to solicit neutrality in behalf of Maximilian. The king evaded this demand in terms of marked severity. The position of France at this time was embarrassing in regard to Bavaria. In order to detach Maximilian from the emperor, Richelieu had made him promises which could be construed to require French protection against the Swedish army. The duke demanded that this promise should be made good. But Richelieu did not wish to irritate Gustavus in the plenitude of his victorious career. Yet, to save appearances, if no more was intended, he had sent the French envoy to Gustavus to ask for Bavaria complete neutrality, who supported this demand with such reasons

as were at command. It was represented that the attack of Tilly on Horn and his army at Bamberg had been made against the orders of Maximilian, who always expressed his admiration of the king of Sweden. Gustavus responded, —

"I know the duke thoroughly and his monachal deceptions. His coat is of two colors, sometimes blue, and at other times red, according to circumstances; but he will not deceive the king of Sweden."

St. Etienne, the French envoy, raising his voice, and urging the dignity and demands of his sovereign in terms which gave offence to Gustavus, the latter interrupted him, and said, —

"Your volubility carries you too far, and obliges me to say that I will not listen to such observations. I excuse your ignorance. As to the sentiments of the king of France, I know better than you what he thinks in regard to this affair. He has not sent you to me, for you do not show me any power to that effect. I regard you, therefore, as sent by the elector of Bavaria."

St. Etienne demanding the conditions on which Gustavus would grant neutrality to Maximilian, received from the king the following: —

"He shall restore, first, all he has taken from my allies; dismiss his troops, forbidding them to enter the service of the emperor; he shall not give any kind of assistance to my enemies; he must exercise no hostility against the Swedish crown for the term of three years, and give pledges of the accomplishment of his promises. It is necessary for me to have a decisive answer in twenty-four hours: otherwise I shall enter his territories as an enemy."

The German and Swedish historians do not entirely agree as to what passed in this interview between the French envoy and the king of Sweden. Whatever may have been the temper of the language used, and the propositions submitted, on either side, Gustavus was not diverted from his purpose. Soon after, Richelieu is represented as demanding of the king how far he intended to carry his

conquests. "As far as my interests require," was the response.

Gustavus continued his march towards Munich. In advancing through Bavaria, though he encountered no regular hostile force, he had to contend against an implacable enemy in the heart of every Bavarian, who had been taught to believe in the Pope, and that the Protestant soldiers who had come into their midst were monsters, deserving no divine or human mercy. They believed themselves released from all the ties of nature towards these children of Satan, on whom they were justified to commit every form of atrocity and cruelty. The murders and outrages which his troops had suffered from this terrible fanaticism of their enemies finally aroused the indignation of Gustavus; and he resolved to burn Landshut, which was on his road. He said to the inhabitants, "You deserve to be annihilated by fire and sword." A voice was raised in the midst of the multitude to ask if the king of Sweden, admired for his clemency, was to enter the bloody path of vengeance. The king, who at this moment passed under the vault of the gate, did not respond, but moved through the city with a severe aspect, maintaining a menacing silence. Entering the castle, he gave way under his emotions and the intense heat of the day. Seating himself almost in a fainting condition, he called for a glass of water to refresh himself. Very soon he mounted his horse, silent and gloomy. Just as he rode out of the city a flash of lightning broke from the dark clouds above, followed by a heavy crash of thunder. The king continued his course to the camp. Soon after, Horn returned to the city with promises of clemency; and Landshut was required to pay a contribution of one hundred thousand thalers. The second and better thought of Gustavus had triumphed over his anger, caused by the fearful outrages inflicted on his brave soldiers; and he firmly adhered to his resolution not to abandon the obligations of humanity

towards the Bavarian population, but to honor his religion by moderation and mercy.

The approach of the king of Sweden and his army to Munich spread consternation among its inhabitants. Abandoned by its defenders, it placed all its hopes in the magnanimity and moderation of Gustavus Augustus. By an unconditional and voluntary surrender it hoped to secure his forbearing consideration, and days in advance of his arrival at its gates the authorities had sent him the keys of the city. Maximilian in season had taken measures of prudence. His numerous artillery had been conccaled, most of his treasures and precious objects had been transported to the strong castle of Werffen near the frontier of the Tyrol, and he had moved his wife and children to Salzburg. The larger part of the more wealthy inhabitants had followed the example of the elector, and sought security in the inaccessible valleys of the Alps. To the delegates from Munich, who had met the king at Landshut, asking favorable terms, he gave an affirmative response, but required a contribution of three hundred thousand thalers. The burghers expressed their inability to pay so large a sum, and asked permission to consult their fellow-citizens, at the same time requesting him to suspend his march. Seeing that they wished to gain time and perhaps assistance, Gustavus told them firmly that his time was precious, and Munich must decide to pay the required contribution, or prepare for defence. On the same day he renewed his march with his whole army. When near Munich he was again met by the burghers of the city, who declared they were ready to pay the required sum, and at the same time requested to be leniently treated. This Gustavus promised, and camped his army outside the city, giving to each soldier two florins to indemnify them for the pillage which he would not permit.

On the 7th of May, old style, the king of Sweden,

accompanied by the unfortunate Frederick Palatine,[1] entered the capital of Maximilian, who had been so largely instrumental in the misfortunes of the dethroned king of Bohemia, his relative, and whose electoral title he had appropriated to his own use. Gustavus established himself in the ducal palace, and maintained a rigid discipline among the troops which occupied the city. He was much struck with the beauty and richness of the electoral edifice, which had been recently erected, and furnished with magnificence. He passed through the various apartments, and caused all the pictures, statues, medals, and curiosities to be shown him by the intendant, often expressing his admiration. He asked that official who had been the architect of the palace. "The elector himself," replied the intendant. "I would be pleased," said the king, "to have the possession of that architect. I would send him to Stockholm to build a palace similar to this." — "He will take good care to guard himself from that," responded the intendant, which caused the king to laugh at the frankness of the faithful servant of Maximilian. When Gustavus passed from the palace to the arsenal nothing was found but carriages, with no signs of the guns to which these belonged. The cannon had been carefully concealed beneath the floor, and but for the treachery of a workman would not have been discovered. The floor was pulled up by order of the king; and one hundred and forty pieces of artillery were found, some of them of very large caliber, which the Bavarian troops had captured in the Palatinate and Bohemia. Thirty thousand ducats were discovered concealed in one of the largest guns. Of the cannon found by the Swedes in Munich, the best, among them those called the "twelve apostles," were sent to Augsburg. The following day he visited the convent of the Jesuits; and their superior made him an address in Latin, to which

[1] This prince died on the banks of the Rhine a few days after the battle of Lutzen.

the king responded in the same language. Then followed an earnest conversation on the religious quarrels of the time, which lasted nearly an hour, to the great discontent of the officers who accompanied the king, and who said among themselves the king would do better to drive out the Jesuits than to discuss with them. Gustavus, knowing this opinion of his officers, remarked to them as he passed out of the convent, "Why would you persecute these men? Do you not see how much they injure the cause which they defend, and profit that which they combat?" Certainly this was a marked change from his former attitude towards a class of persons he had been accustomed to regard the least deserving of forbearance, and especially dangerous to the State. But Gustavus was growing tolerant with time; and, now he was in a country whose population was entirely Catholic, he showed moderation and a manifest desire to leave a favorable impression on those to whose observation he made himself known. For governor of the city he appointed the Scotch colonel Hepburn, an officer Catholic in his sympathies, who, after the death of the king of Sweden, entered the service of France.[1] The king left the inhabitants of Munich agreeably impressed by his kindness towards them, the charm of his manners, and the respectful consideration he had shown for their churches and their religious susceptibilities.

Leaving the Bavarian capital, Gustavus made a brief visit to Augsburg, and May 26 entered Memmingen, on the Iller, nearly midway between Lake Constance and the Danube; and this was the limit of his advance south. Soon after, he was at Nuremberg, seeking to complete his arrangements, and to consolidate his alliance with that important city, finding the German burghers somewhat pragmatical, and difficult to be induced to assent to his views as to terms of agreement beyond the necessities and the termination of the war. What he specially de-

sired was a definite and permanent understanding with the free cities. It imported little to him what the emperor undertook with the electors; and if seven were not enough, he might have seventeen, provided Gustavus had the free cities with him. And he wanted particularly to secure the permanent adherence of Strasburg, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Ulm, Frankfort-on-the-Main, and Erfurt. It was while absorbed in his plans and deliberations with the representatives of Nuremberg and some of the other free cities that the news of the march of the Duke of Bavaria to join Wallenstein came to him to enlist his immediate action.

CHAPTER XVII.

RESTORATION OF WALLENSTEIN TO THE IMPERIAL COMMAND. — HIS METHOD AND SUCCESS OF RAISING AN ARMY. — GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS FAILS TO PREVENT THE JUNCTION OF THE ARMIES OF WALLENSTEIN AND MAXIMILIAN. — THE ARMIES OF GUSTAVUS AND WALLENSTEIN AT NUREMBERG. — ATTEMPT OF THE FORMER TO DRIVE THE IMPERIALISTS FROM THEIR POSITION. — GREAT LOSS OF BOTH ARMIES AROUND NUREMBERG, AND THEIR RETIREMENT FROM THEIR FORTIFIED POSITIONS.

THE continued successes of the king of Sweden, and the series of crushing disasters the imperial cause had suffered, beginning with the battle of Breitenfeld, finally drove Ferdinand to an expedient deeply humiliating to his pride and his exalted ideas of autocratic power. But his Jesuitical instructions had not been without their permanent influence on his haughty Hapsburg instincts, and in the hour of pressing emergency he did not hesitate to stoop to conquer. With his armies everywhere beaten, his resources crippled, the League disorganized and nearly overthrown, the capital and territories of its chief member and his strongest supporter in the possession of the enemy, his chief general defeated and wounded to death, he was forced to believe that his only chance of safety was to turn to him whom a few months before he had removed from command in a manner to inflict the greatest possible humiliation on that general, and to evince the striking ingratitude of the emperor, and of his friends and courtiers. None had been more bitterly hostile to

Wallenstein, and more influential in effecting his overthrow, than Maximilian. But now the imperative need of the imperialist cause was a general of sufficient capacity, experience, and prestige to assume general command of the armies, which could nowhere make a successful stand against the victorious advance of the enemy. The concentration of power in the hands of Gustavus Adolphus was manifestly of great advantage to his cause, and it was necessary to meet it by a like concentration of the military power of the empire. Tilly's loss of prestige at Breitenfeld, and his subsequent disasters, placed him out of the question before he had been struck by the mortal wounds which were about to carry him to his grave at Ingolstadt; and he had been too much the creature and servant of the elector of Bavaria, between whom and Ferdinand there was now more or less jealousy and distrust. Pappenheim was an able and experienced general, chivalrous and brave, a fanatical champion of Catholicism, sincerely loyal to the imperial cause, but too impetuous and hazardous for the chief command. Among all the generals of Ferdinand and the League then in service, there was none to whom could be committed the grave responsibility of uniting the scattered forces of the empire, and confronting the heretical invader and his allies. The Duke of Friedland must be called from his forced retirement, despite the disgrace and infamy which had been heaped upon him by those whom he was now called on to save. For this hour of imperial humiliation Wallenstein had been hoping, and had contributed to bring about to the extent his power of secret conspiracy and efforts would allow. In this way he had done all he could to make it easy for the Saxon army to have its way in Bohemia, and had corresponded with the king of Sweden, offering him powerful aid to the emperor's defeat. And while he was doing his utmost to promote the success of the Swedish army and its German allies, his paid agents were repeat-

ing, at the court of Ferdinand, bitter complaints of the public calamities, and openly declaring that the removal of the general was the cause of all the imperial misfortunes. These complaints began to find supporters in the emperor's own council, and to be echoed from many quarters. The voices for the restoration of Wallenstein were heard, not only in various parts of the empire, but even Spain was finally moved to give its advice to the same import. But Ferdinand was not driven to his decision by the general clamor: he knew the dilapidated state of his own finances, and the broken and disorganized condition of his armies. He was aware of the great wealth of the Duke of Friedland, of his readiness to spend it to gratify his insatiable ambition, and his great capacity and facilities for organizing a powerful army. Wallenstein understood equally well that stern necessity held the emperor in its iron grasp, and also knew the character of Ferdinand sufficiently to understand that he would not allow imperial pride or any sense of humiliation or inconsistency to stand in the way of the escape of his empire from its present dangers. Through his bribed instruments at the court he knew every thing which occurred in Ferdinand's cabinet to his advantage, and thus was enabled to play his part with great audacity, yet masked under cool self-possession and calm indifference. He saw clearly that it was in his power to dictate his own terms to the emperor, and he did not hesitate to use this advantage to the utmost. To those who spoke to him of returning to the imperial service, he pictured the charm of private life on his estates, and the happy tranquillity of retirement from military and political strife. With philosophic equanimity he spoke of glory as a phantom, and of the uncertainty of the favor of princes. Diogenes in his tub, and Cincinnatus at his plough, could not have seemed more indifferent to vain ambitions, or expressed a higher estimate of personal independence; while beneath

those unmoved iron features were seething the fires of revenge, and his brain was busy with colossal schemes of ambition and power. Knowing, from his complete information through numerous secret channels, as well as by the inevitable necessity of the imperial situation, that his restoration to command was certain, he refused the emperor's solicitation to come to Vienna, the better to avoid showing his impatience, and to conceal his real designs. It was first proposed to limit his real authority: the emperor's son, who was now known as the King of Hungary, should be with the army as the superior in rank; while all the effective duties of command should be discharged by the Duke of Friedland, yet second in rank. This plan was received with scorn by Wallenstein, who said, "No! never will I submit to a colleague in my office,—no, not even if it were God himself with whom I should have to share my command." Even when this obnoxious device was abandoned, Ferdinand's minister and favorite, Eggenberg, who had long been a friend of Wallenstein, vainly used all his arguments and flattering entreaties to overcome the assumed reluctance of the duke to take the chief command in the service of the empire. Eggenberg is represented to have said to him, that the emperor had in Wallenstein thrown away the most costly jewel in his crown. But unwillingly and compulsorily only had he taken this step, which he had since deeply repented of; while his esteem for the duke had remained unchanged, his favor for him undiminished. Of these sentiments he now gave the most decisive proofs by reposing unlimited confidence in his fidelity, and capacity to repair the mistakes of his predecessors, and to change the whole aspect of affairs. It would be great and noble to sacrifice his just indignation to the good of his country, dignified and worthy of him to refute the evil calumny of his enemies by the increased warmth of his zeal. This victory over himself would crown his other unparalleled services to

the empire, and render him the greatest man of the age. These humiliating confessions and flattering assurances finally resulted in the duke so far unlocking the secrets of his mind as to pour out his reproaches against the emperor, and a statement of his past services. Finally he deigned so far to encourage Eggenberg as to promise to accept command for three months. All this coyness, reluctance, and abnegation had been used that he might the more completely dictate his terms to the emperor; and the brief period he now assented to yield his services was, that he might show his marvellous power of raising and organizing an army, thus demonstrating to the emperor and his friends his importance, knowing well, and intending that friends and enemies should understand it also, that the army raised by his name, by methods and resources of his own, could be commanded and successfully used only by its creator. It did not take long for the news to circulate in Austria and Germany, and far beyond their limits, that Wallenstein had agreed to raise an army. It was a welcome opportunity to the large number of mercenary soldiers in the principal countries of Europe. All the officers who had formerly served under him, who had lived at his expense, and knew his methods of supporting war, flocked to his standard; and others followed their example. There soon appeared at the quarters of the Duke of Friedland, Piccolomini, Terzky, Holk, Gallas, Tieffenbach, Isolani, and others of like ambitions and hopes of glory or gain. These were instructed either to complete the old or to form new regiments; and to enable them promptly to accomplish his commands, Wallenstein gave them full powers and money. For this purpose he drew at once largely from his own funds. The ranks were rapidly filled with the gathering levies which his word had suddenly called into activity. The hope of liberal pay brought thousands from other lands, from Southern as well as from Northern Europe, from remote

Ireland, and from the shores of the Mediterranean; and Catholic and Protestant were alike welcome, and treated on equal terms. The scent of spoil was in the air, and the instinct of the eagle and the buzzard alike pointed the course of flight. The spirit of war, the hope of promotion, and the thirst of plunder, alike inspired and urged on the assembling hosts. It was the name of Wallenstein, and all it suggested to stirring ambitions and heated passions, and not loyalty to the emperor, love of country or religion, which aroused and called officers and soldiers to the hardships and perils of military campaign. The century had not before looked upon such a mighty mercenary host so guided by a single mind, yet uplifted by no lofty aim, borne on by no noble impulse.

Before the stipulated three months were expired, the promised army was raised, splendidly equipped, with all the necessary munitions and provisions, commanded by experienced officers, inflamed with martial enthusiasm, and eager for victory. He who was the head and the soul of this magnificent army now retired, and left Ferdinand free to appoint a commander. Again the emperor sent his favorite minister, and the friend of the Duke of Friedland, to urge him to assume command, and march at once to restore the fortunes of the imperial cause. This pressing demand of the emperor was received by Wallenstein with stern and stately refusal; but, after long and persistent arguments and efforts, Eggenberg induced Wallenstein to agree to name the conditions on which he would comply with imperial orders to assume command of the army. He demanded twenty-four hours for reflection, and to put his terms in writing. At the expiration of the required delay, Wallenstein presented his conditions, carefully drawn, accompanied by the declaration, if they were not accepted in their entirety, it would be impossible for him to take command of the army. The extravagant terms of the document placed in the minister's hand, when opened,

struck Eggenberg with astonishment, though he was familiar with the character of the man with whom he was dealing in the name of his sovereign. These were the terms:—

"1. The Duke of Friedland alone shall be general-in-chief of all the military forces, not only of the emperor, but of Spain. 2. The command in chief shall belong to the Duke of Friedland, without any exception. 3. The emperor shall not come in person to the army; still less shall he attribute to himself the right of commander. 4. The emperor shall promise to the Duke of Friedland, without any evasion, as ordinary recompense, one of the hereditary territories of Austria. 5. The emperor shall concede to the Duke of Friedland, as extraordinary recompense, the suzerainty over all the territories which shall be conquered in Germany. 6. The right of confiscation in the empire shall belong entirely to the Duke of Friedland, without submitting to the jurisdiction of the imperial Aulic Council, and to the imperial Chamber of Spires. 7. In all capital affairs the Duke of Friedland alone shall decide, without appeal; and letters of immunity and pardon shall not be valid unless ratified by the duke. 8. Letters of franchise for property passed to the crown shall not be solicited except from the Duke of Friedland, and cannot be granted except by him; the too generous emperor gives letters of franchise to all who have a friend at court, and thus disappear resources which ought to serve to pay and maintain the troops. 9. When peace is made, the interests of the Duke of Friedland as to Mecklenburg shall be taken into consideration. 10. The Duke of Friedland shall be provided with whatever may be necessary for the maintenance of the army and the continuation of the war. 11. The Duke of Friedland may, at his will, cross the hereditary Austrian territory, either to march forward or to retreat."

Surprised at the audacity and extraordinary demands of Wallenstein, the minister sought to modify the conditions proposed; but the haughty duke immediately interrupted him, firmly refusing to listen to any arguments for change of his terms. When Eggenberg returned to Vienna with the results of his mission, it is not difficult to understand what was the impression on the courtiers and servants of the emperor when they learned the demands a subject had dared to offer their master. But this insolent subject was now

indispensable to the salvation of the empire; and Ferdinand signed unconditionally all the required stipulations, which, if fully carried out, and in good faith, was little less than the abdication of all his imperial rights. But Ferdinand had dissimulation and pliancy equal to his necessities, and the imperial army had now a commander-in-chief believed to be equal to the task of confronting the heretic king of the North and his victorious army. The power which Wallenstein had so intensely coveted was now in his hands, and the favorable opportunity to use it was before him; and a powerful army was ready to execute his will. His first effort was to deal with the Saxons, whose invasion of Bohemia he had secretly promoted. He had previously sought to gain the confidence of the king of Sweden, and to negotiate with him such an arrangement as would compel the emperor to terms of submission. But Gustavus could not trust the Duke of Friedland, and perhaps underestimated his possibilities; and between two such men there could be no real confidence or harmony. The emperor having placed the power of a dictator in the hands of Wallenstein, the latter sought at once to detach the elector of Saxony from his alliance with the king of Sweden. He had a ready instrument in Arnheim, his former general, the Saxon minister and commander, through whom to ply his arguments, and offer his terms, to John George. With the sword in one hand, and the olive-branch in the other, he sought to arrange with the Saxons, offering to guarantee the revocation of the Edict of Restitution, which he could justly claim was in his power to offer in virtue of his plenary authority from the emperor. But weak as was John George in essential fibres of character, he was not entirely destitute of moral sense, and of all obligations of honor and good faith. He had given Gustavus his solemn pledge not to make terms with the emperor without the knowledge and assent of his heroic ally, to whom he had been indebted for the salva-

tion of his army and his territory by the result of the bloody struggle on the plains of Leipsic. He forwarded the propositions of the Duke of Friedland to the king of Sweden, who was ready to agree to the settlement of the religious issues on terms sufficiently liberal for Wallenstein and the Saxon elector, but he adhered to his plan of a Protestant league in close alliance with Sweden and under his direction; while the real purpose of Wallenstein was to maintain the unity of the empire, with himself as the emperor's right arm, — a plan which would inevitably result in forcing the Swedes out of Germany. John George hesitated, but did not break from his ally. The Duke of Friedland evidently was not impatient to move. But the raising of his army had excited great expectations; besides, his services were demanded in other quarters, where he did not care to go. He could not long keep his troops in idleness. Before the close of May the Saxons were driven out of Bohemia.

In the mean while the Swedish arms had been successful against the imperial resistance. The whole of Protestant Suabia had fallen into the hands of Gustavus, Duke Bernhard had marched triumphantly to Lake Constance and the Tyrol, and the king was gaining the control of one powerful city after another. While Tilly and Maximilian were being driven before him, and Bavaria exposed to his invasion, Wallenstein had raised his numerous army, and received his extraordinary powers from the emperor. Strong and persistent efforts had been made through various channels to induce the Duke of Friedland to send re-enforcements to aid the elector of Bavaria in his extremity. Maximilian urgently besought the emperor to send the Duke of Friedland to his aid, had himself made the same request of the restored general, and entreated him, if he could not come with his main army, to send him a few regiments with all haste; and Ferdinand had supported the supplication of the Bavarian elector with

all his influence. But Wallenstein cared little for the fate of Tilly, and less for what might happen to Maximilian, whom he hated as much as the elector of Bavaria disliked Wallenstein, to whose overthrow at Ratisbon he had so powerfully contributed. But Maximilian, like Ferdinand, could bend to necessity; and he had not only sought him whom he detested to save him in his extremity, but he is now compelled to march his Bavarian army to form a junction with the army of Wallenstein, and become himself subordinate to his orders.

While the king of Sweden was busily engaged at Nuremberg, he learned that Maximilian had abandoned his position at Ratisbon on the Danube, and was marching to the North with the evident design of uniting with Wallenstein; while the latter, having swept the Saxons out of Bohemia, was advancing to meet him. Gustavus made a strong effort to prevent this junction, marched on the 11th of June, hoping to intercept the Bavarians, and at the end of four days arrived at Vilseck. But Wallenstein and the Bavarian elector safely effected their union at Eger June 14. The Duke of Friedland had under his immediate command an army of sixty thousand men, and, in the confidence of his pride and power, is said then to have remarked, "In a few days we will know whether the Duke of Friedland, or Gustavus Adolphus, shall rule the world."

The king of Sweden had under his immediate command but eighteen thousand men, which rendered it impracticable for him to encounter the army of Wallenstein in the open field. Somewhat disconcerted in his plans by the rapid concentration of his adversaries, he waited several days at Hersbruck, that he might clearly comprehend the real intentions of the Duke of Friedland, and thus be in a position to cover Nuremberg if his adversary had hostile designs against it, and threatened it with the fate of Magdeburg. During his brief stay at Hers-

bruck his secretary, whom he had sent to treat with the city of Strasburg, brought to him the treaty of alliance concluded between the king of Sweden and the inhabitants of that important city, who gave the strongest assurances of their devotion to his cause. Strasburg stipulated to furnish assistance of men and money, passage through its territory, and entrance within its walls. At the same time deputies had come to Gustavus from Nuremberg to urge him to defend that city from the danger with which it was menaced, and informing him they had positive information that Wallenstein was about to make it his point of attack. Gustavus did not regard this danger impossible, and was fully resolved to defend that city at whatever cost. Nuremberg, rich and prosperous, had its strong attractions for soldiers eager for pillage, — extensive stores to feed a rapacious army, — and was likewise an important link of the chain which united the Swedish forces of Suabia, the territories of the Rhine, and of Northern Franconia. Strategically the possession of Nuremberg was of the highest importance to Gustavus; and he had a special regard for its numerous Protestant inhabitants, who had long shown great devotion to him and his cause. He said to the deputies of the city who came to him, "Return to your city, and tell your fellow-citizens to have good courage. So long as I live, with the aid of God Wallenstein shall never see the interior of your walls." Very soon the king left Hersbruck, and, arriving with his army at Nuremberg, was received as its liberator and defender. He did not lodge his army within the city, wishing to avoid, as much as possible, causing inconvenience to its inhabitants, and also the diseases which might result from gathering so large a number of persons within too restricted an area. At once he adopted the most effective measures for strengthening the fortifications of the city, and for the security of his camp from attack. A large body of laborers were promptly put

to the work of executing the extensive and elaborate defences, which he ordered to be completed with all possible despatch; and the inhabitants of Nuremberg seconded his efforts with great zeal and resolution. Around the whole fortifications was dug a trench twelve feet in width and eight feet deep; and to defend the intrenched lines, there were redoubts and batteries, while the gates were fortified by half-moons. More than three hundred pieces of cannon were well placed to make good these defences, and secure the city walls. The river Pegnitz, on both sides of which the city is situated, divided the whole enclosed camp into semicircles, the communication between which was maintained by several bridges. Such was the zeal of the inhabitants of the city and the neighboring villages, assisted by the Swedish soldiers on their arrival, that in a very few days the extensive and formidable fortifications were completed. In the mean time the burghers had been busy in accumulating a large quantity of grain and other provisions for the city and army. With a disquieting sense of his great inferiority of forces, Gustavus had expedited his orders for his generals to join him with their troops without delay. Duke Bernhard hastened with lively regrets from his successful advance southward, and joined Oxenstierna at Windsheim; and Baner likewise came with those under his command. There were of the city population thirty thousand capable of bearing arms; and prompt measures were adopted to make this force available in an emergency, and the young men were enrolled and trained to arms. In the mean while, in obedience to the orders of the king, the principal Swedish corps from different points in Germany had concentrated at Windsheim, under Oxenstierna, to the number of thirty or forty thousand men. Gustavus had fears that they might be attacked by Wallenstein before they could join him in his fortified camp. There were three roads leading from Windsheim to Nuremberg; and

these had been carefully studied by Gustavus, who left Oxenstierna to take his choice, at the same time indicating which he deemed preferable, — that of the north by Neustadt, through the valley of Aurach, that river covering the right of his army, — and at the same time advised him to form his troops each evening as though he were to arrive under a continuous intrenchment. Oxenstierna adopted the opinion of the king as to the choice of roads, and arrived with his re-enforcements unmolested, bringing a train of sixty pieces of cannon and four thousand baggage-wagons, on the 23d of August. After the junction of his troops, Gustavus gave expression to his joy and gratitude by ordering appropriate religious services. He had now under his orders more than sixty thousand men, not counting the thirty thousand Nurembergers capable of bearing arms; his regular troops and those of his adversary being nearly equal in numbers. Not long after Gustavus and his army had arrived at Nuremberg, and while his scattered troops were being concentrated, Wallenstein approached with his army. After carefully examining the position occupied by the Swedes, and their extensive and strong fortifications, he announced his resolution not to attack, though his army then was nearly threefold the regular troops of his antagonist, whose re-enforcements were then distant. Maximilian wished to attack at once, and crush the inferior enemy, — advice which Wallenstein repulsed with biting satire. His plan was not to risk a general assault against a foe strongly intrenched, driving him to desperation, but to wear out his opponent by a tedious blockade, cutting off his supplies of food and forage, and, by his possession of the surrounding country, making it untenable for the Swedish army and the numerous population of Nuremberg within their contracted limits. He therefore passed the city and the Swedish camp, crossed the Regnitz, chose a position where he could cut off from his enemy all supplies from Fran-

conia and Suabia, and constructed a strongly fortified camp north of the small river Regnitz, opposite Nuremberg, and not far from his enemy. He formed a very extended camp, the defence of which was greatly aided by three hills, which his troops took possession of, and strongly fortified. One of these was near the village of Aspach, and called by that name; a second, more elevated, known as Altenberg; and a third, higher and sharper, which was called the Old Fortress, because of the ruins of an ancient castle on its summit. These hills were surrounded with woods at the base, and more or less protected by muddy streams and marshy ground; the Regnitz, not fordable, passing them closely on one side. The small river Biber runs between Altenberg and the Old Fortress. Around these hills were made strong defences of ditches, palisades, and *abatis* of fallen trees, armed with cannon; and well up on the hills were strong redoubts supplied with powerful artillery, which served as a cover to the extensive camp on the adjacent plains. Wallenstein was thus very soon in a position as unassailable as the king of Sweden. Securely fortified as was the Duke of Friedland, with so numerous an army, nearly all veterans, it is not strange that Gustavus was anxious for the safe arrival of his re-enforcements, and justified in fearing that his antagonist might assail them before they could effect their junction with their comrades inside the Swedish lines at Nuremberg. Wallenstein did not deem it wise to make great risks, fearing that defeat at this time might be extremely dangerous to his prestige and to the part he was resolved to play. He thought, that, being master of the surrounding country, he could prevent his adversary receiving assistance from those territories in possession of the Swedish arms, thus firmly holding the city and its defenders in a state of siege. He hoped to render it impossible for the Swedish army and the numerous population of Nuremberg to maintain themselves in these con-

strained circumstances, that famine and pestilence might come to his aid; and thus time would work for him, while it would be equally dangerous for his enemy. But he underestimated the resources and possibilities of his enemies, the sleepless activity of their great leader, and the devoted enthusiasm of those whom he had liberated from persecution and imperial oppression. Wallenstein had not taken all the necessary precautions to secure himself from the difficulties and dangers which he hoped would be fatal to his antagonist. The whole surrounding country, which he thought to control by the commanding position of his fortified camp, had been abandoned by its inhabitants, who had taken their property with them; and the limited amount of provisions and forage they had been compelled to leave behind was obstinately sought by the armed bands of the hostile armies. Gustavus was as sparing as possible of the large supplies which the Nurembergers had gathered in before the investment of the city; and his strongly armed foraging parties not only contended successfully with the imperialists for what remained in the surrounding country, but were able to intercept convoys which were sent to the army of Wallenstein from a distance. Combats between these large foraging parties were frequent and sometimes bloody. Those of Wallenstein were chiefly composed of Croats commanded by Isolani, a bold and audacious chief. Those of Gustavus most celebrated in these expeditions were Stolhandske with his Finland cavalry, and Taupadel with his dragoons. In the first of these skirmishes the Croats, superior in number and better mounted than their opponents, had the advantage to such an extent that Isolani was called the scourge of the Swedes. But Gustavus very soon strengthened these detachments of his cavalry by placing in their support parties of infantry, which met the Croats with pike and musket charges; and thus the Swedes became more than the equals of the dashing riders of

the enemy. At one time Wallenstein was expecting a large convoy of cattle, horses, and bread from Bavaria, and had sent out an escort of two thousand picked troops to meet it and conduct it to his camp. Of this the Swedes received intelligence sufficiently in advance to be able to intercept it. Gustavus ordered Taupadel to surprise it, to capture or burn it, and to take sufficient troops for the enterprise. Taupadel, at the head of three regiments, arrived in the night, where the convoy was halting for rest in a small town. The whole convoy was taken, the imperial escort cut in pieces, the town set on fire, the cattle and horses safely brought away, and a thousand wagons loaded with bread burned, because of the inability of the Swedes, for want of time, to take it to camp. Wallenstein, growing uneasy as to this convoy, sent another and a larger body of infantry and cavalry to insure its safety and hasten its arrival. Gustavus, likewise growing anxious as to the success of Taupadel, with a body of troops advanced himself from his lines to insure the safety of his cavalry falling back after capturing the convoy, came in collision with the freshly despatched imperial force, and a severe and bloody struggle took place, the regiments of Wallenstein being driven back to their camp with the loss of four hundred men killed.

With the large number of troops under his command at Nuremberg, Gustavus endeavored to maintain the same discipline and order as previously he had sought to realize in Germany. Some of his regiments, composed mostly of old soldiers who had served under Tilly and Wallenstein, adhered to their former habits of pillage; and their example had an unfavorable influence over the Swedes. In their excursions after provisions and forage, away from the immediate control of the superior officers, they gave way more to cupidity and license, sometimes behaving as badly as the Croats. These disorders and abuses coming to the knowledge of the king, his indignation was aroused. He

had employed, to prevent them, all the remedies deemed practicable, but in vain. He then called together all the German princes in his army, the generals, the superior and the subordinate officers, and gave them a very pointed and significant address; his voice and gestures showing his strong displeasure at the evils and disgrace which had been brought on his army and its cause by such manifestations of disorder and lack of discipline. Knowing the Germans in his service to be the chief offenders, he said to them, —

"You princes, counts, lords, and noblemen! Numerous and painful complaints have come to my ears respecting the conduct of our troops towards our allies, among whom they carry murder, fire, and devastation. The people complain that their friend, the king of Sweden, treats them worse than Wallenstein, his enemy. The Swedes, they say, make war like the Croats. These reproaches rend my heart, especially because they are not without foundation. But I am innocent of these disorders. I have severely forbidden them. You, German lords, are showing your disloyalty and wickedness to your own fatherland, which you are ruining. It is you, from the colonels to the least officers, who steal, and rob all your compatriots without making exceptions. You plunder your own brothers in the faith. You have disgusted me with your unrestrained misconduct. God is my witness that my heart is filled with bitterness when I see any of you behaving so villainously. If you were real Christians you would consider what I am doing for you, how I am spending my life in your service. I have given largely of the treasures of my crown for your sake, and have not received from the whole German Empire enough with which to buy a suit of clothes; and I would rather return to my kingdom destitute than to clothe myself with your booty. All I have conquered I have returned to the legitimate sovereigns, or propose to divide among you; for I possess country enough to govern. I expected, in return, that my orders would be obeyed, and you would conduct yourselves like Christian warriors. If you murmur, if you forget God and honor to abandon me, or revolt against me, surrounding myself with my Swedes and Finlanders we will defend ourselves to the last; and the world shall see that a Christian king prefers to lose his life, rather than soil, by vices and crimes, the sacred undertaking with which the Lord has charged me. I supplicate you, in the name of divine mercy, to return to yourselves, to examine your hearts. I

blame not your conduct in battles: it has always been that of valiant and loyal warriors. In that respect I owe you a gratitude which I shall never deny. I conjure you, in the name of the glory you have won, in the name of your heart, of your conscience, of your country, to be loyal in the rest of your conduct; and remember that one day you will give an account to the Judge who sees all."

The want of provisions began to be severely experienced in both belligerent camps In addition to the one hundred and twenty thousand armed men who confronted each other, there were the numerous population of Nuremberg, and more than fifty thousand horses to be supplied with forage. Besides, in the camp of Wallenstein there were fifteen thousand drivers, and nearly as many women, largely prostitutes, — an adjunct which the imperialist armies then allowed. With the view to obviate the evils of this character, the care of Gustavus for the morals of the soldiers under his command had caused him to encourage marriage among them, and allow them to have their families with them in camp; so that the number of persons now within the Swedish lines, in addition to those bearing arms, were nearly equal to those in the imperial camp. This large agglomeration of human beings and animals within a contracted area, the surrounding territory of which had been stripped by the fleeing population and the numerous hostile marauding bands, could not fail to make the question of food a startling problem to both commanders, and especially so to the king of Sweden, who had a lively regard for his moral reputation, and a tender care for the inhabitants of Nuremberg, his devoted friends and allies. The necessaries of life arose to an excessive price. The utmost exertions of the burghers of the city could not secure sufficient forage to prevent the starvation of a large portion of the horses. The mills running continuously could not grind the necessary amount of grain required daily, and fifteen thousand pounds of bread each day sent into the Swedish camp was far inad-

equate to the hunger of the nearly ninety thousand persons who devoured it. It was amid the heat of summer, and disease and vermin did not delay to make their appearance to an alarming degree. To fatality among the horses was added increasing mortality among the soldiers of the camp, numbering more than one hundred per day. Gustavus Adolphus decided not to remain longer inactive within his lines He resolved, if possible, to force his adversary to accept battle. He marched his army from camp, formed it in line in presence of the enemy, and from several powerful batteries made a vigorous cannonade of his camp. But all in vain. Wallenstein would not stir from his intrenchments. He had no numerous city population within his lines to shield from danger and calamity, and no delicate scruples of morality as to methods of feeding his army, though its necessities were oppressive.

Gustavus now resolved to attack his adversary within his intrenchments, to drive him, by assault, from a position exceedingly strong both by nature and military art. With all his re-enforcements, the number under his command was nearly seventy thousand. He crossed the Rednitz at Fürth, at the north of Wallenstein's camp, easily driving the outposts of the enemy before him. This was on the fifty-eighth day of his encampment, Aug. 24, old style. He himself arranged the march of his troops, took the general command, with Duke William of Weimar under his immediate orders. Duke Bernhard was at the head of the cavalry, and Nils Brahe commanded the infantry. The whole was supported by Torstenson and a numerous artillery. Col. Burth and the white brigade were at the head of the advancing army. The main army of the Duke of Friedland occupied the two steep hills, the Altenberg and the Old Fortress, situated between the Biber and the Rednitz. It was against these Gustavus directed his chief assault. Wallenstein opened from these

fortified heights the fire of a hundred pieces of artillery, and a destructive discharge of musketry was maintained behind his strongly made breastworks. If the defence was vigorous, the attack was furious. The Swedish infantry, the better to recognize each other in the smoke of combat, had put foliage in their caps. The fight raged especially around the Old Fortress, as that was the key of the imperial position. The passage through which the attacking party must advance at this point was so limited that only a single regiment could be used at once. Exposed to a sweeping fire of the enemy's artillery, these brave men rushed forward with daring intrepidity to storm the heights, and were followed by cavalry to fill up the gaps which the deluge of balls made in their ranks. But it was in vain that this German regiment rushed forward in this desperate undertaking. It was compelled to give way, leaving a large portion of its numbers dead and wounded on the field. A veteran regiment of Finlanders, one of the bravest in the army, was next subjected to the terrible ordeal; but, like their intrepid comrades who had preceded them, they encountered such a tornado of resistance that they were driven back, and the regiment which followed in the third attack experienced the same deadly repulse. These assaults were six times repeated with fresh bodies of troops and like results. Wallenstein remained as firmly unshaken as Gustavus was resolute and undaunted. At the first discharge of Swedish guns in the morning Wallenstein started from his bed, and sprang to his horse. "The Old Fortress is taken," cried the terrified soldiers. "It is a lie!" exclaimed Wallenstein, who added, with a startling irreverence not inconsistent with his character, "God himself could not take that position from me." The entire day was passed in attacks at different points, and all the Swedish regiments were several times in the fight. While the fierce combat was raging for the possession of the Old Fortress, a sharp

contest had been going on between the imperial cavalry and the left wing of the Swedes, who occupied a piece of woods on the Rednitz, in which great bravery was shown on both sides. During the day Wallenstein and Duke Bernhard had each a horse killed under him, and the king of Sweden had the sole of his boot torn off by a cannon-ball. The ground was strewed with the dead, and slippery with blood. Just as night approached, and it commenced to rain, the news came to the king that Bernhard had gained possession of two hills, from which the Old Fortress could be successfully reached with heavy artillery; but an examination by Gustavus convinced him that the difficulty of drawing the guns to the necessary elevation, the increasing rain rendering the ground more muddy and the muskets useless, would make efforts against the fortified lines of the Duke of Friedland of no avail. As soon as practicable the king moved his whole army back to camp. The Swedes lost in this struggle two thousand killed, and the imperialists a little less. Both parties experienced severe losses of superior officers. Gustavus Adolphus was keenly dissatisfied with the result of this effort, while the rejoicing among the Catholics was immense. In announcing the intelligence to the emperor of his successful defence of his position, Wallenstein remarked, "The king of Sweden has broken his horns in the combat."

For two weeks more the two armies confronted each other, Gustavus finding it impossible to draw his antagonist to a battle in the open field. Every day the provisions were growing less, famine was making more serious inroads, and the excesses of the soldiers increased. By disease and the hazards of war Nuremberg had lost ten thousand of its inhabitants, the Swedish army twenty thousand of its numbers; the surrounding villages were in ashes, and the sufferings of the peasantry by pillage and destitution extreme. The havoc by famine and disease was nearly as great within the lines of Wallenstein as among his foes.

On the 8th of September Gustavus broke up his camp, leaving a sufficient force to garrison Nuremberg, under the command of Oxenstierna and Kniphausen, and marched to Neustadt, where he awaited to see what the Duke of Friedland might attempt. The imperial commander remained five days more within his lines, then, putting fire to his camp, marched rapidly towards Northern Franconia, marking his route with pillage and devastation. When the two armies arrived at Nuremberg, they numbered about sixty thousand each; when they marched away, Wallenstein had remaining but thirty-six thousand, and the king of Sweden thirty thousand, to which should be added the few thousands he had left to garrison Nuremberg.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE FIRST SERIOUS CHECK OF GUSTAVUS IN GERMANY. — MARCHES AGAIN INTO BAVARIA, AND PREPARES TO CARRY HIS ARMS INTO THE HEREDITARY DOMINIONS OF AUSTRIA. — RETURNS SUDDENLY NORTHWARD TO SAVE SAXONY FROM THE ARMY OF WALLENSTEIN. — ADVANCES TO NAUMBURG AND WEISSENFELS. — THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN. — THE SWEDISH ARMY VICTORIOUS, BUT THE KING IS SLAIN. — THE EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. — CONCLUDING REMARKS.

The king of Sweden at Nuremberg suffered his first serious check since his arrival in Germany. It could not be said in truth that a stunning blow had been inflicted on his prestige, or on the cause which he represented, and of which he was so powerful and successful a champion. But he had found in the Duke of Friedland an abler general than he had to deal with at Breitenfeld; and the ideas and policy by which his antagonist was now seeking to organize German resistance to the king of Sweden were more to be feared than the views and policy of Ferdinand and the League, whose faithful agents Tilly and his associate generals had been. Wallenstein would unite Catholics and Protestants alike against a foreign conqueror, casting aside the Edict of Restitution and other extreme Catholic demands, and seemed to have caught at least the statesman's glimpse of German unity. In this regard he was ahead of his time; though he had not in himself the necessary qualifications to accomplish the realization of the idea which sometimes dawned on his intellectual vision, even

had surrounding circumstances favored more strongly such a result. Yet at this time the thought of German unity possessed force enough in his mind, with such an army as he had organized and held in his hand, to tax the great Protestant leader to the utmost to maintain what he had achieved, and to weld the Protestant princes and cities into a unity sufficiently solid to withstand the shock of the imperial concentration of force guided by such a chief as Wallenstein.

When Gustavus learned that the Duke of Friedland had departed from his intrenched camp at Nuremberg, he resolved to divide his troops. Duke Bernhard was left with eight thousand men in Franconia for its protection, and with the remainder the king directed his march towards Bavaria. In taking this course southward, he seems to have had two important objects in view. One was, by renewing operations in the territory of Maximilian, to draw the war from Saxony, whose troops were now chiefly in Silesia under Arnheim; and the other was to secure important advantages in South Germany, where Strasburg, which a few weeks before had pledged him its alliance, and which, now in the possession of Horn, rendered the Swedes victors on the Upper Rhine. His presence in that quarter would enable him to establish the league between the Protestants of the upper circles, which, after his death, was completed at Heilbronn under the direction of Oxenstierna. The first of these objects was not attained; for Wallenstein was too astute a general to allow his adversary to gain this advantage, and he cared too little for the fate of Maximilian and his territories to be drawn in that direction at this time. He was willing enough to part from the elector of Bavaria, and allow him to take his chances in defending his own dominions. He despatched a division of Bavarian troops to subdue a revolt of the peasants in the hereditary Austrian territory, and sent Gallas to unite with Holk, in Meissen, where great ravages and cruelties

were perpetrated by the Croats. After resting his troops some days at Forchheim, Wallenstein proceeded with the remainder of his army towards Thuringia. He stopped a while at Bamberg, and then marched and took Baireuth and Coburg, but was repulsed by the garrison ably commanded by Dubatell, a Swedish officer, in his attempt to storm Coburg Castle.

During the time Wallenstein and Gustavus were confronting each other at Nuremberg, the Swedish arms in other sections had been generally successful. Duke Julius of Wurtemberg and Gen. Ruthven were victorious in Suabia; the Spaniards and the troops of the Duke of Lorraine had been driven from Germany; and in Pomerania and Mecklenburg the Swedish garrisons encountered no enemies. Pappenheim had not yet joined Wallenstein since the restoration of the latter to the command of the imperial army, but had been employed in another quarter. He had passed the spring months in opposing the Swedes under Tott, on the left bank of the Elbe, near the mouth, and devastating Lower Saxony. He had received orders from Vienna to join Wallenstein, and abandoned his positions after having sought to induce the Danes to accept them, and withdrew southward. He beat the Hessians at Volckmar, raised the siege of Calenberg, and approached the Rhine with the view of assisting Maëstricht, besieged by the Hollanders.

In retiring from Nuremberg, Gustavus had advanced to Windsheim, where he had arrived Sept. 23. This was an important strategical point, situated at the northern termination of a chain of mountains which separates the valleys of the Neckar, the Main, and the Danube, at the intersection of two old roads from Mayence to Nuremberg, and from Wurtzburg to Donauwerth. In leaving Windsheim, he had first entertained the thought of marching on Upper Austria, according to the cherished views of Oxenstierna: he had even returned to Nuremberg to

consult with his illustrious friend on the subject. But his final decision was to march southward. Could he risk leaving in his rear the formidable imperial forces under the command of the man whom he had recently encountered in his front? Could it not be said that the real power of Austria at this time was not in Vienna, but wherever the Duke of Friedland and his generals should concentrate their armies? Having left Duke Bernhard and his army to guard Franconia and the Rhine, Gustavus pushed forward, crossed the Danube and the Lech, and arrived in Bavaria, where the enemy, increased by troops arrived from Italy, had achieved some success. On this march the king was joined by four thousand Swiss raised on his account, who were afterwards among the troops he left behind to hold Bavaria. At the approach of Gustavus, Monticuculi, in command of the troops of Maximilian, fell back to Ratisbon; and the king was preparing to besiege Ingolstadt by sending provisions to Neuburg, supposing the garrison, weakened by pestilence, could not long resist him, when a courier sent by Oxenstierna arrived, Oct. 8, bringing the news, that, on the 5th, Wallenstein had begun his march for Saxony. The Duke of Friedland had at first entertained the design of penetrating into Thuringia, where he would meet Pappenheim, take Erfurt, and thus push his course into the territories of the dukes of Weimar, the allies of the king of Sweden, and take his winter quarters in Saxony, so as to be able in the following spring to attack Silesia, and sever Gustavus Adolphus from his important conquests in the direction of the Baltic. His design of gaining possession of Thuringia was foiled by the brave defence of Duke Bernhard in the defiles of the Thuringian forest; and Pappenheim did not venture to attempt his junction with Wallenstein until he had received information that the latter had, through Voightland, invaded Meissen, a rich territory of Saxony not remote from Dresden. As soon as Gustavus had received this

intelligence his resolution was taken at once. He was well aware of the strong and continued efforts which had been made by the diplomacy of his enemies to deprive him of his allies. Austria and Spain, as well as the Duke of Friedland, knew the importance of Saxony to the king of Sweden; and no efforts had been spared to arouse the jealousy of John George, and alarm his fears as to the designs of Gustavus Adolphus. Arnheim still maintained his relations with Wallenstein, and persistently labored to effect a private understanding between him and the elector of Saxony; and the latter would have preferred not to be dependent on the king of Sweden for the safety of his territories. Knowing what would be the dangerous consequences to his future prospects and plans in Germany of having Saxony detached from him by intrigue or force of arms, Gustavus deemed it important to respond at once to the earnest entreaty of the elector, who still feared the emperor and his army more than he was influenced by jealousy of the king of Sweden; and the latter knew well the importance of possession and near neighborhood in dealing with such an ally as John George. He therefore made no delay in abandoning his brilliant prospects on the Danube and in the hereditary territories of the emperor, marching rapidly towards Saxony, where he might hope to encounter the Duke of Friedland in the open field, and at the same time bring himself near his base of operations. He at once made the necessary preparations for his advance northward. He ordered Christian of Birkenfeld to take command of the Swiss troops, which had recently joined him, and other forces, to hold Bavaria against the enemy. He directed three brigades to accompany the queen, who was now with him, to the Thuringian forest. With a body of cavalry he himself took a rapid march to Nuremberg, where he united his force to those under Kniphausen, and held his last conference with Oxenstierna, his great political and military counsellor, whom King

Charles, his father, had commended to him in his youth. He charged the chancellor to secure, by negotiations, a closer alliance with the Protestants of the south and west of Germany, and to that end convoke the four circles of Suabia, Franconia, the Upper and the Lower Rhine, in the city of Ulm, and gave him advice with care and serious consideration, as though he might never again be engaged with his illustrious friend in such deliberations. He rejoined his army, accompanied by Oxenstierna, at Arnstadt, where Duke Bernhard joined him with his army, Oct. 23. He marched to Erfurt, where he arrived Oct. 28, and reviewed his army in a beautiful plain near that city. Many of the regiments were re-formed. Those of English and Scotch, having become very small, were dissolved, and their ranks united to others. His army was then less than twenty thousand men. On his arrival at Erfurt, he first visited the governor, Duke William of Weimar, who was then sick. The queen met him on the public square, and afterwards he took supper with her and Count Ernest Saxe-Weimar. He passed the night reading letters, giving orders, and despatching couriers. Early in the morning he made tender adieus to the queen, whom he was never to see again, warmly commended her to the kindness and fidelity of the inhabitants, then mounted his horse, and went to his army. He arrived at Naumburg Oct. 30, anticipating Wallenstein, who had designed to gain possession of that place. "The Swedes have flown, and made astonishing marches," remarked an officer of the Duke of Friedland. The inhabitants of Naumburg, having a horror at their danger from the army of Wallenstein, knelt before Gustavus at his passage into the city, and raised their hands towards him as their protector, at which he was painfully affected. "These people," said he, "honor me as a god. I fear God will punish me."

In the mean time Wallenstein had taken Leipsic, made a movement towards Torgau, and then united with Pap-

penheim near Merseburg, the same day the king of Sweden had arrived at Erfurt. The rapidity with which Gustavus approached him, and secured possession of Naumburg, had therefore surprised the Duke of Friedland, and embarrassed his plans. The armies of Gustavus and Wallenstein were now so near each other that the advanced posts constantly came in collision, but neither of the great commanders appeared inclined to try the issue of battle. The king of Sweden caused to be made the preliminary labors of a fortified camp near Naumburg. On his side the Duke of Friedland intrenched himself. His generals, whose opinions he solicited, advised him against risking a general engagement. The difficulty of the passes between Weissenfels — held by the imperialists — and Naumburg served to prevent Wallenstein making an attack on the latter city in front, where Gustavus held a strong position. Wallenstein and his generals arrived at the conclusion that Gustavus, with his inferiority of forces, would not think of moving from his intrenched position to attack his enemy. Pappenheim had solicited permission from his chief to march to the Rhine, where it was thought his force could be used to special advantage; and on his way he was to drive the Swedes from the castle of Moritzburg, near Halle. Wallenstein placed Colloredo in command of Weissenfels, several corps of his army took their winter quarters in the neighboring towns, while he himself, with the remainder of his troops, encamped between Merseburg and Lutzen, where he could maintain secure communication with Pappenheim, and observe the enemy. When Gustavus learned of this disposition of the imperial forces, and of the departure of Pappenheim, his resolution was taken immediately. Leaving his intrenched camp at Naumburg, he hastened rapidly to approach his enemy, now much reduced in effective strength. When the king learned of the actual position of the imperial forces at this time, in his joyful surprise

ERRATUM.

To face page 406.]

In lieu of the sentence, "The King of Sweden caused to be made the preliminary labors of a fortified camp near Naumburg," accidentally inserted in the text, please read:

"The King of Sweden ordered the preliminary surveys to be made for a fortified camp in the neighbourhood of Naumburg."

[*Gustavus Adolphus.*

he remarked, "Now do I verily believe that God hath given the enemy into my hands." Colloredo, the imperial officer left in command of the small force still remaining in Weissenfels, from the high castle discovered the approach of the Swedish army, and by the concerted signal of three cannon discharges informed Wallenstein. This bold and rapid movement of his adversary was a great surprise to the Duke of Friedland, who was forced to take immediate action. With his troops in hand he hoped to make good his defence until the return of Pappenheim, whom he at once ordered to rejoin him, and then moved, with his army, into the extensive plain near Lutzen, where he could cut off the communication of the king of Sweden with Leipsic and his Saxon allies, and prepared to arrange his forces in order of battle to meet the approach of Gustavus and his army. Wallenstein sent a body of cavalry, chiefly Croats, under Isolani, to take possession of the villages on the Rippach, a stream with marshy borders which the Swedish army must pass in approaching Lutzen. The efforts of Isolani delayed, but did not arrest, the march of the Swedes, who passed the stream near the village of Rippach, and took position below Lutzen, opposite the imperialists. When Gustavus had thus swept the Croats before him, and secured full freedom of action in the open plain, there was great confusion among the troops of the enemy, which had not had sufficient time to concentrate from their outlying positions. But it was now night, and impracticable for the king to make further efforts against the enemy until morning. Gustavus spent the night in his carriage with Duke Bernhard and Kniphausen, while his army remained on the open field. By cannon signals during the night the imperial regiments were called together, and in all directions orders were sent for the troops to hasten to camp. Wallenstein, who was at this time suffering with the gout, confided to Holk the difficult task of placing the troops as they

arrived during the night, — a work in which he was regarded equal to his superior commander. As the morning dawned on the 6th of November, old style, the imperial army stood east of Lutzen and north of the road which leads to Leipsic, so that the right wing was protected by the town and an elevation known as Windmill Hill. During the night the imperialist pioneers and dragoons had been busily employed to deepen the ditches on both sides of the main road running to Leipsic, which might serve as breastworks for the imperial musketeers; this road being in front of the Duke of Friedland's line of battle. His left wing extended into the open field to a canal which runs in a north-west course, and unites the Elster with the River Saale. This canal served as an effective cover to the imperial left. Wallenstein formed his centre of three divisions of infantry, composed of seventy-nine companies, which were placed in solid squares, with the pikemen on the sides and the musketeers at the corners. These squares were ten men deep, which, having the small squares at the corners, rendered them especially massive, and like fortresses of granite. Next to the infantry on the right wing were heavy dragoons, composed of twenty-four companies of cuirassiers in two divisions, then a division of infantry, adjoined by another body of dragoons and Croats intermixed with muskeeters, which formed the extreme right. While adopting Gustavus's method of combining musketeers with cavalry, Wallenstein still adhered to the large and unwieldy squares, terrible to those who assault them directly in front to sweep them aside, but clumsy to manœuvre when varied and rapid action is required. On the imperial left, next to the centre, were likewise two heavy divisions of cuirassiers, in serried columns, commanded by Piccolomini, against which would break the Swedish efforts in the shock in which the king lost his life. On the extreme left were placed the Croats and

Hungarians, numbering thirty-eight companies, in two divisions, under the command of Isolani. The artillery was divided, and located in a way to give the utmost possible defensive strength to the imperial lines. A battery of seventeen heavy field-pieces was mounted on the hill near the windmill, in front of the right wing, and another battery of seven guns planted in front of the centre. Both of these batteries were covered by redoubts hastily constructed during the night. The guns near the windmills were so arranged, that, by firing obliquely, they could sweep nearly the entire space between the two armies. In the road-ditches along nearly the entire front of the main line of the army, which was at the distance of three hundred yards in the rear, were placed musketeers. To make his array as formidable as possible to the eye of his adversary, the imperial commander had mounted all the camp-followers and sutlers, and posted them on the left wing; most of his baggage having been sent to Lutzen, so as not to impede the movements of his army. His whole force, including the four regiments of cavalry Pappenheim brought up in the afternoon, did not exceed thirty thousand men. The centre was under the immediate direction of Wallenstein, assisted by brave and skilful officers. The right wing was commanded by Holk, and the left by Gen. Gotz until the arrival of Pappenheim, who then took its direction. Occupying thus an advantageous position, admirably arranged and splendidly officered, yet the imperial army was stiff and difficult to handle as compared with the less numerous, more flexible, and more rapid and easily working army with which it was about to engage in terrible combat.

Disappointed that he had not been able to attack the enemy before the close of Nov. 5, and having strong reasons to fear that Pappenheim would rejoin his adversary early the next day, during the night he consulted his generals in council. Kniphausen, as prudent as he was

brave, advised against risking battle with the enemy concentrated and prepared. Duke Bernhard was in favor of immediate attack, and Gustavus shared his opinion. He said it was well to wash one's self completely when in the bath. "In war it is the favorable moment which accomplishes every thing." It was decided to assault the enemy very early in the morning, so as to determine the struggle before it would be possible for Pappenheim to arrive on the field of battle. The consultation of the council being concluded, and the necessary orders for the disposition of the army having been despatched, the generals urged the king to seek some rest. "Would you have me take my ease while so many men around me are deprived of it?" was his response. The army was arranged for its work the next day in nearly the same manner as at Breitenfeld in its victorious encounter with Tilly. It was drawn up within musket-shot of the enemy, favored by the thick mist of the morning, unmolested, and probably unobserved, by the imperialists. It was formed in two lines, the canal on the right, the Leipsic road in front, and the village of Lutzen on its left. The portions of the two lines formed of infantry were six men deep, and the cavalry three to four in depth. The right wing was composed of Finland and Swedish cavalry, led by Cols. Stolhandske, Soop, Sack, and Stenbock, under the direct command of the king in person. The centre was formed by the Swedish brigade, and three others known as the yellow, blue, and green brigades, commanded by Nils Brahe, one of the bravest of the brave, and sharing strongly the confidence of the king. The left was composed of German cavalry regiments under Duke Bernhard, who was to have the chief command in case the king should fall. The second line was made up almost exclusively of German troops, in the same order as the front line, and commanded by Kniphausen, who, though prudent before the fight, and averse to a decisive battle at this time, was sure to hold with the

tenacity of iron the position with which he was intrusted. There were four brigades in the second line, and at its centre a reserve of cavalry. Between the cavalry regiments of the right and left wings of the first line were placed small bodies of musketeers, of fifty to one hundred each, who were provided with forty-eight pieces of light artillery; and twenty pieces of heavier caliber were so placed that five were in front of each division.

The Swedish annalists differ considerably as to the number of troops in battle at Lutzen on the two sides. While absolute data on which to fix the number are not attainable, the best-considered estimate does not make the number of troops under Gustavus Adolphus at Lutzen above twenty thousand, — less than those of the Duke of Friedland prior to the arrival of the cavalry regiments of Pappenheim early in the afternoon. Gustavus estimated the force of his enemy, arranged in order of battle before the fight began, at thirty thousand. It was probably about twenty-five thousand prior to being joined by the troops of Pappenheim, of which there were not less than nine thousand in all, though the infantry regiments did not arrive until the battle was lost to the imperialists.

In the position already described, the two armies awaited the dawn of the morning to begin the combat long to be memorable, not from the numbers engaged, but partly from the remarkable character of the two men in command of the respective armies, yet more from the issues and interests at stake in this terrible arbitrament of the sword, and the long-enduring influence which was to flow from it. Europe had its eye on the combatants, and was about to learn who was its greatest general, and whether the hero of Breitenfeld and of the Lech had won his renown by the force of his genius and the sacredness of his cause, or by the aid of favoring circumstances and good fortune, and whether the strange personage who had one eye on the language of the stars and the other on the

secrets of kings should prove equal to imperial expectations, and justify the extraordinary price at which his services had been obtained.

The night preceding the battle was very dark; and daylight, usually late at this season, was more in delay this morning in consequence of the thick fog which covered the plains of Lutzen, rendering it impossible for the Swedish army to move to the attack very early, as the king had intended. In the mean while he was active in seeing that every thing was in proper order. His army engaged in prayer, and sang the song of Luther, — "Our God is for us a strong fortress," — after which the king struck up another religious hymn, composed by himself, — "Fear not, little flock." He was urged to put on his armor, but he refused. The wound which he had received at Dirschau still rendered the cuirass painful to him; and, besides, he had become averse to its use, regarding it, because of its heaviness, a relic of the Middle Age, which he had nearly suppressed in his army. To the advice for him to put it on now for the hot work before him he remarked, "God is my cuirass," and, mounting his horse without taking refreshments, passed through the ranks, and addressed the following words to the Swedish soldiers: —

"Beloved compatriots, the day has come for you to show to the world all you have learned in so many campaigns and combats. There is the enemy whom we have so long sought, not intrenched on inaccessible mountains, as at Nuremberg, but standing before you in the plain, not with advantages superior to ours. You know with what care he has hitherto avoided meeting us; and he now accepts battle with reluctance, because he is unable longer to flee. Prepare to show yourselves the brave soldiers you are. Hold firm, stand by each other, and fight valiantly for your religion, your country, and your king; and I will recompense you all, and you shall have reason to thank me. But if you conduct yourselves cowardly, not one of you will repass the Baltic, and again see your native land. May God preserve you all!"

He then rode to the German regiments, and addressed them: —

"My brave brothers and comrades, I urge you, by your Christian belief, your honor, your earthly and eternal welfare, to do your duty as you have always done it since you have been with me; especially since more than a year ago, when, near where we now are, you beat old Tilly. I expect the enemy before you will not escape a like fate. Attack with courage. You go to fight, not only under my eyes, and by my orders, but by my side. I will go at your head, and give you the example in exposing my life. Follow me. God, I hope, will give us a victory of which the memory will live with posterity. If not, there is an end of your religion, your liberty, your temporal and eternal welfare."

Wallenstein made no harangue to his troops. He had a disagreeable voice, and, in the language of the "Memoirs" of Richelieu, "by his sole presence, and the severity of his silence, seemed to make his soldiers understand, that, according to his usual custom, he would recompense them or chastise them." In the morning he caused mass to be celebrated before the whole army. Very early he assembled his generals before his carriage, and gave them his orders for the battle, in which he reckoned to maintain his strong position. For a short time he rode his horse, but his gout soon obliged him to be carried in a sedan-chair to the distant regiments. He gave as the battle-cry of his army the old Catholic watchwords, "Jesus and Mary," — the same as at Breitenfeld by Tilly. The Swedes had for their battle-words "God with us." Every soldier and officer in the two armies cared for the success and honor of their great commanders. All were inflamed by warlike ardor, and moved by the enthusiasm of religious faith, the hope of distinction, or the desire of pillage. Never were two hostile armies in presence more completely imbued with all the varied passions and sentiments which render war terrible, and give it some tinge of glory. During most of the forenoon the thick mist concealed from each other the enemies who were about to engage in the struggle for life or death. The light cavalry here and there on the outskirts engaged in skirmishes

until eleven o'clock, when the fog began to dissipate. Gustavus Adolphus could no longer restrain his impatience. Looking up to heaven, he exclaimed, "Now, in the name of God, onward! Jesus, Jesus, Jesus, make us fight to-day for the glory of thy holy name." He then waved his sword above his head, and cried, "Forward!" He let the cannon of Duke Bernhard, on the left wing, open the fight. By the order of Wallenstein the village of Lutzen was set on fire, to prevent his army being outflanked on that side, and to render the smoke annoying to his enemy. Gustavus himself led the Stenbock regiment of cavalry to the attack, the whole line moving forward at the same time. Received by a tremendous fire from the imperial artillery and the musketeers in the ditches, they pressed forward with undaunted courage, drove the musketeers from their positions, passed the trenches of the Leipsic road, captured the battery, turned it against the enemy, and carried confusion into the compact masses of the imperial infantry. By this irresistible onset of the Swedes three of the five imperial brigades were routed; but, in the impetuosity of their movement, the Swedes neglected to keep their ranks completely closed. Wallenstein saw his danger, and exerted himself with wonderful rapidity to save his imperilled infantry brigades. Aided by three regiments of cavalry, he formed anew his disorganized troops, and pressed vigorously into the unclosed lines of the victorious Swedes, retook the cannon, and, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight with sword, pike, and club, drove the exhausted and outnumbered enemy back over the trenches and the Leipsic road. Thus after fearful slaughter the two parties held positions at the centre precisely as before the first assault was made. While this bloody work had been going on at the centre, the right wing of the Swedes, led by the king himself, had attacked the imperial left. The impetuous onset of the Finland cavalry quickly dispersed the mounted Croats

and Poles, and these helped spread terror and confusion among the rest of Wallenstein's cavalry on that wing. As soon as the king had received the intelligence of the recoil of his infantry at the centre, and also that his left wing, under the sweeping fire of the imperial battery at the windmills, was showing signs of yielding ground, he gave the command of the Swedish right to Stolhandske, and with the Stenbock regiment of cavalry hastened to lead back his troops to the attack. Arriving at the wavering centre, he cried to his troops, "Follow me, my brave boys!" and his horse at a bound bore him across the ditch. Only a few of his cavaliers followed him, their steeds not being equal to his. Owing to his impetuosity, perhaps also to his near-sightedness and the increasing fog, he did not perceive to what extent he was in advance, and became separated from the troops he was so bravely leading. He had remarked to those near him, as he rode with the rapidity of lightning to the assault, "There in front of us is our most dangerous enemy," indicating the armored regiments of Piccolomini.[1] An imperial corporal, noticing the Swedes made way for an advancing cavalier, pointed him out to a musketeer, saying he must be a personage of high rank, and urged him to fire on him. The musketeer took aim; his ball broke the left arm of the king, causing the bone to protrude and the blood to run freely. "The king bleeds," cried the Swedes near him. "It is nothing; march forward, my boys," responded the wounded hero, seeking to calm their inquietude by assuming a smiling countenance. But, soon overcome by pain and loss of blood, he requested Duke Lauenburg, in French, to lead him out of the tumult without being observed; which was sought to be done by making a *détour*, so as to conceal the king's withdrawal from his brave Smolanders he was leading to the charge. Scarcely

[1] He had just before said to the Finland colonel, Stolhandske, "Tackle to the black lads: they are coming to do us mischief." — *Swedish Intelligencer*, 1633.

had they made a few steps when one of the imperial regiments of cuirassiers encountered them, preceded by Lieut.-Col. Falkenberg, who, recognizing the king, fired a pistol-shot, hitting him in the back. "Brother," said he to Lauenburg with a dying voice, "I have enough. Look to your own life." Falkenberg was immediately slain by the equerry of the Duke of Lauenburg. At the same moment the king fell from his horse, struck by several more balls, and was dragged some distance by the stirrups. The Duke of Lauenburg fled. Of the king's two orderlies, one lay dead and the other wounded. Of his attendants, only a German page named Leubelfing remained by him. There are differing accounts of the manner of the king's death; but this young man, who died of his wounds at Nauemburg five days after the battle, left a statement in his last hours, carefully taken in writing, which best accords with other facts, and may be justly considered the most authentic. This account declares, that, the king having fallen from his horse, the page jumped from his own, and offered it to the dying hero. The king stretched out his hands; but the young man had not sufficient strength to lift him from the ground, when the imperial cuirassiers hastened forward, and demanded the name of the wounded personage. The page would not reveal it; but the king himself gave his name, and received immediately on his head a wound which caused his death at once. The body of the king was stripped by the Croats, also that of his faithful page, who was left mortally wounded at the side of his master.

An officer in the king's suite enveloped in the flight, who had seen the king fall from his horse, rode immediately to inform Duke Bernhard and Gen. Kniphausen of the misfortune which had happened. Kniphausen, brave but cautious, who held the second line firm as a rock, advised retreat. But the young and gallant Bernhard, now invested with the chief command in virtue of the orders of

Gustavus prior to the commencement of the battle, determined immediately to continue the fight with the utmost energy. He declared that the death of the king must be avenged, that they must conquer or perish. The death of the king was already generally known, or at least suspected, in the Swedish army. His horse, with its empty saddle, covered with blood, running among the troops, had made known to the Swedish cavalry what had happened to their king. They knew he must have been slain, or was a wounded prisoner in the hands of his enemies. The soldiers of the fallen hero were filled with mingled sentiments of bitter grief, despair, and vengeance. Duke Bernhard made use of this strong feeling of the army, riding through its ranks exclaiming, "Swedes, Finlanders, and Germans! your defender, the defender of our liberty, is dead. Life is nothing to me if I do not draw bloody vengeance from this misfortune. Whoever wishes to prove he loved the king has only to follow me to avenge his death." The whole Swedish army, fired by a common enthusiasm, nerved by desperation, advanced to the attack. The death of their king, instead of destroying the courage of these brave troops, excited it into a wild and consuming flame. On the right wing, the five regiments of Swedes and Finlanders, where Stolhandske distinguished himself, with the fury of lions swept all before them. Nils Brahe, with the infantry brigades of the centre, passed the ditches, and the second time wrested the seven pieces of cannon from the enemy. On the left, Bernhard, though a ball passed through his arm, with the cavalry under his immediate command made a successful onset, and captured the artillery near the windmills. Isolani and his Croats, who had been driven from the imperial left early in the battle, but had formed anew, made a *détour*, and attacked the Swedish baggage in the rear, but were driven back by the second line, of which Kniphausen was in command, and appeared no more on the field. The army of Wallenstein

in the entire extent of its lines began to waver, to show signs of decreasing resistance, indicating the near approach of its defeat. The ammunition wagons of the imperialists in their rear now took fire, and a terrific explosion followed, which threw terror and confusion among them. The abbot of Fulda, who passed through their ranks exhorting them to do their duty, was struck dead by a ball. Piccolomini, covered with wounds, at the head of his black armored cuirassiers, continued to change horses, as one after another was slain under him. Wallenstein moved everywhere in the storm of death without injury, though his cloak was riddled with balls. The signs of giving way increased in his army. His left was already beaten, his right wavering, and its seventeen pieces of artillery at the windmills in the hands of the enemy. A few minutes more would decide the battle against him. Just then appeared on the field Pappenheim, who had received at Halle his orders to return to Lutzen. Of his force of nearly ten thousand, four regiments were of cavalry and the remainder infantry. Ordering the latter to follow him as soon as possible, he placed himself at the head of his cavalry, and rode with all speed to the assistance of the Duke of Friedland, whom he did not love; but his loyalty to the imperial cause was true, and his bigotry sincere for the Catholic faith, both in peril by the heretical army and its heretical king. As he arrived, observing the recoiling imperialists and the advancing Swedes, his first inquiry was to learn where the king of Sweden was engaged. His presence, and the re-enforcements he had brought, reanimated the imperialists; and, with their superiority of numbers, they renewed the offensive. Carried away by his wild bravery, Pappenheim, at the head of the re-organized ranks, supported by his cavalry, dashed furiously against the Swedes, who, after a gallant resistance, were overpowered. Wallenstein quickly availed himself of the favorable moment to re-form his lines. The fight at the

centre was now even more determined than it had been before. Nils Brahe fell of a wound which in the end proved mortal. The yellow brigade defended itself to the last man, covering the ground in nearly the same order in which it had fought. The blue brigade suffered the like fate, attacked by the imperial cuirassiers. The other infantry brigades of the centre were forced to retire again beyond the ditches, and again Piccolomini secured the seven guns in front of the imperial centre. Once more doubt and uncertainty hung over the bloody field. The result seemed to tremble in the balance.

But now comes the tidings that Pappenheim has received a mortal wound and been carried from the field. The Finland colonel, Stolhandske, who had just rescued the body of the king from the possession of the enemy, is said to have shot this chivalrous champion of the imperial cause. As he received his fatal wound in the breast, Pappenheim learned of the death of Gustavus Adolphus. "Go," said he to his *aide-de-camp*, "announce to the Duke of Friedland that I am mortally wounded; but I die content, having learned that the bitter enemy of our holy religion is dead." On his person, after death, was found, stained with his blood, the written order of his chief commander to lead his troops to Lutzen. The great misfortune which had happened to the imperialists could not remain a secret. The word went through their ranks, "Pappenheim is dead. All is lost!" The alarm was extreme, especially among the cavalry corps he commanded, whose services were now so necessary.

In the mean while Kniphausen had kept the second line of the Swedish army in perfect order, from time to time sparing from its ranks those necessary to fill up the gaps made in the front. This renewal of the strength of the first line by fresh troops from the second was executed so completely by Kniphausen, and with such good order, that it is said to have very much contributed to the final success

of the Swedes. Wallenstein now saw before him a new army ready to fight, while his own troops were in complete disorder. His cavalry was already flying towards Leipsic. Before sunset the fog lifted, which afforded Bernhard an opportunity to survey the field, and encourage his army to a new attack. This last charge of the Swedish brigades in serried columns completed the victory of Lutzen. The Duke of Friedland gave the order to retreat, which was effected with such precipitation that all his artillery was abandoned. Fortunately for him, the six infantry regiments of Pappenheim arrived from Halle just in time to cover his retreat to Leipsic, which had commenced in great confusion. The battle had lasted seven hours. Duke Bernhard and the victorious army spent the night on the field of battle, where lay dead ten thousand of the two armies, and the mangled, trampled corpse of the heroic king. The numbers of the slain in officers and men were nearly equal on the two sides, but to the Swedes and their allies the loss of Gustavus Adolphus was irreparable. The numbers of the wounded exceeded those of the slain, and of the imperialists few escaped from the field uninjured. Pappenheim died the next day at Leipsic. The gallant Brahe, whom the king had so often trusted with important commands, did not long survive his wounds. Holk, who had arranged the imperial order of battle, and commanded the right, was wounded. Piccolomini received six wounds, and had five horses killed under him, but remained erect, and held his squares firm to the last, yielding to the tide of retreat only when further resistance was hopeless. History gives us little information as to the prisoners; and the conclusion is but too apparent that few were taken, the animosity of the combatants causing them neither to give nor take quarter.

Though the imperialists had been beaten and driven in disorder from the field, with great loss of officers, soldiers, and artillery, the death of Gustavus Adolphus involved

such grave consequences to the Swedish army and the Protestant cause that the supporters of the emperor considered their own defeat compensated by the misfortune which their enemies had suffered. In Vienna, Madrid, and Brussels, there were great rejoicings: the Te Deum was sung in honor of the victory, and these tokens of triumph were echoed among the Catholics throughout Austria and Spain. But the Duke of Friedland acknowledged his defeat by speedily abandoning Leipsic and Saxony, leaving the Swedish army undisputed master of the advantages it had gained. Soon after, he marched to Bohemia, his army now reduced to twenty thousand men; and the Swedes and their German allies under command of Duke Bernhard took possession of Leipsic.

But the grief of Protestant Europe at the loss of its brave and gifted champion was profound. To the Protestants of Germany and to the Swedes it was overwhelming. The future, with its uncertainties and its dangers, was covered with gloom. The desperate resolution with which his army had been nerved on the field of Lutzen at the intelligence that the king had fallen, and which yielded not until the enemy was hurled back in defeat and disorder, was followed by those evidences of sorrow and sadness which the loss of such a leader inevitably produced. The lifeless body of the king was found stripped, trampled, and disfigured by blood and wounds. In the night after the battle it was borne in an ammunition-wagon from the field to the little village of Meuchen, in rear of the Swedish lines, and deposited in the church, where a Swedish officer made a funeral address, and the schoolmaster of the place performed divine service. The body, being found too much mangled to remain in the village church, was carried to a private dwelling, where it was enclosed in a plain coffin of boards constructed by the schoolmaster, who was likewise a joiner. On the following morning it was taken to Weissenfels, where it was embalmed by the apothecary Casparus,

though the king was known to have expressed strong aversion to the practice. From Weissenfels it was conveyed to Wittenberg, guarded by four hundred Smoland cavalry, — all that remained of the brave regiment of his countrymen, at the head of whom he had fallen in his last charge. From Saxony it was borne to the Baltic, tokens of grief and respect being strongly expressed in all the cities and towns through which the mournful *cortége* passed. It was conducted to Wolgast, where it remained until the following summer, when it was taken to Sweden by the fleet in command of the admiral of the kingdom, Gyllenhielm. It was brought to Nyköping, where it remained until the solemn burial, in June, 1634, when it was deposited in the tomb at Riddarholm Church, Stockholm, which had been selected and prepared by Gustavus Adolphus himself. The funeral honors paid him by his people were such as were then accustomed to be given to royal personages of great distinction ; and the sincerity of them illustrated their strong attachment to his memory, and their profound grief at their great loss.

Concerning the cause and circumstances of the king's death, there was a prolonged discussion, both in Sweden and Germany. There were dark suspicions against Duke Francis Albert of Lauenburg, who, it will be remembered, was with the king when he fell, who abandoned him, and fled from the field while the battle was raging. He soon after entered the imperial service; and his subsequent career, as well as the circumstances of his conduct while with the Swedes, tended to confirm the suspicions against him, and to form a strong chain of evidence to prove his guilt. Many a person in troublous times has lost reputation and life on weaker proof than that which pointed to this German prince as the assassin of the king amid the tumult of the assault in which he fell. His guilt was not only believed in by the Swedish soldiers, but extensively entertained as certain by contemporary annalists and per-

sons of intelligence. Even so high authority as Puffendorf, after an examination of the facts and circumstances in evidence, decided that Duke Lauenburg fired the fatal shot at the king. Yet the final verdict of both Swedish and German authors fully acquits the duke of the criminal charge, and sustains the account of the king's death given on a preceding page, which not only is supported by the statement of the page Leubelfing, but is corroborated by other conclusive testimony.

The effect of the death of Gustavus Adolphus on the affairs of Germany was great. There were reasons enough why Ferdinand and the adherents of the house of Austria should give evidence of their great relief at the fall of so powerful an adversary. Yet he had lived long enough to accomplish results for Protestant Germany which were to endure. The Edict of Restitution was dead. The Protestant cities and princes had learned how to resist imperial domination, and the Catholic persecution which had so been long carried on in its name. Gustavus had drawn around him men whom he had more or less inspired with his own lofty purposes, who had learned from him the art of war, and caught the fire of his dauntless bravery. These generals, aided by the wise counsels and remarkable leadership of Oxenstierna, remained a strong bulwark against the oppressive designs and persecuting policy of the house of Austria and its Spanish ally. Sixteen years later, after the exhaustion of the belligerents by their long strife of thirty years, when the passions of war seem to have been in a measure consumed by their own fires, the treaty concluded at Westphalia in 1648 gave security and permanence to the work which the king of Sweden and his brave soldiers had in a large degree achieved before his death. On the discussion of the question, What would have been the aim and policy of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany had he lived and continued successfully his military career? the writer of this volume does not

propose to enter at length. It is not strange that Swedish and German historians should differ somewhat in regard to it. That he had really formed in his mind the design of making himself emperor of Germany, it would not be correct to assert. But the plans he had actually matured, as evinced by conclusive proofs, seem to exclude the imperial idea. His Corpus Evangelicorum, which he so earnestly had in view at the time of his death, meant no more than the organized union of the Protestant princes and cities, with himself as the recognized protector, to secure the work which had been accomplished for German Protestant liberties. Equally manifest and avowed was his design of obtaining a permanent Swedish possession on the German coast of the Baltic, as an outpost of defence against imperial designs in the North, and to render certain Scandinavian ascendency on that sea.

The extent of his dynastic schemes in Germany seems to be fully covered by this language of Oxenstierna, given in a letter of February, 1633, from Berlin to the Swedish Senate, in which he relates an account of a discussion on the subject between himself and the king: —

"His Majesty, of Christian memory, when he was, a year ago, in Frankfort-on-the-Main, himself proposed to the commissioners of the elector of Brandenburg a marriage engagement between his daughter and the young elector, and commanded me to communicate further regarding it with the envoys, as I have at various times done, according as his Majesty, on his journey to Bavaria, repeated by written order. The principal motive was, that his Majesty would not cede Pomerania, and yet found that it could not be kept without notable detriment and great umbrage to the elector of Brandenburg; and the king also perceived that if Sweden and Brandenburg, with their dependencies, could be united, hardly such a State would be found in Europe; and they might offer the headship to whomsoever they wished. To try means thereto, if it were possible, and at least use this affection for the moment, the king caused a proposition to be made, through me, that he was resolved to give his daughter to the son of the elector, and to treat of the matter with the estates of Sweden, in the hope of their consent, under the following conditions as the

principal: 1. If the king shall have a son by his wife, he shall possess the crown of Sweden, Livonia, and what has been conquered in Prussia, and the electoral prince all which the king has already acquired or may acquire; a firm alliance being made between the two States. 2. If the king shall have no male heirs, the electoral prince shall receive with the king's daughter the crown of Sweden; and, in this case, such an alliance is to be concluded that the king of Sweden may also be elector of Brandenburg, and conversely. In the absence of the king, Sweden is to be governed by its own constitution, as also Brandenburg; that the dignity and regalities of each may be unimpaired, and both united with strong, indissoluble bonds. 3. In order that the electoral prince may be instructed in our religion, and accustomed to our language and manners, he is to receive his education in Sweden."

He was but thirty-eight when he perished at Lutzen, in the prime of his powers. Had he survived, and his successful career continued, would his ambition, "growing by what it feeds on," have passed beyond the protectorship of the Corpus Evangelicorum, some permanent possession on the German shores of the Baltic, marriage union with the elector of Brandenburg, and grasped at the imperial sceptre which the haughty Hapsburg had so long held? This is a speculative proposition, however strong may be its affirmative presumption, and outside of the domain of historic reality. His place among the great men of his century and the world's heroes must be fixed by the ideas he avowed and the means he put in use to realize them, and by these alone. WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, the hand of Providence has securely closed against the sharpest scrutiny of human ken.

To the Swedes the loss of the king was irreparable, yet he had lived long enough to accomplish great results for his country. In person he recalled to his subjects one of the type of men that the Northmen had been accustomed to consider the image of a brave and illustrious hero. He was tall and well formed, of fresh, fair complexion, blue eyes, bright yellow hair, — foreigners bestow

ing on him the name of "the golden king of the North." To his thoughtful, grave, and earnest expression were added a grace and dignity of bearing, an affability of manner, and a personal magnetism, which gave him a powerful influence over all who were brought into relations with him. He drew around him a circle of officers and public men whose characters he greatly influenced; and when he fell on the fatal field, there were Baner, Horn, Wrangel, Bernhard, and, the most gifted of them all, Lenart Torstenson, to take charge of the Swedish troops and their allies in Germany. Though it was impossible for them, in the years of struggle and trial which followed, to keep the cause for which they fought to the elevation where he had sustained it, yet they and the great chancellor gave remarkable success and renown to Swedish arms. By the enduring force which his genius and character imparted to the Swedish nation, it maintained an influence nearly a century among the leading powers of Europe much beyond what her natural strength and geographical position gave it. This commanding national importance of Sweden, which Gustavus Adolphus did so much to create, was terminated by the rash and purposeless ambition of Charles XII., whose character was not inspired by the lofty enthusiasm of Gustavus; who had no John Skytte to teach him wisdom in his youth, and no Oxenstierna to counsel him in his hours of victory; whose only ideal was military glory, and whose regard for his people seemed to be as destitute of human feeling and moral sentiment as the cold steel of his bloody sword. But the hazards of war and the work of diplomacy could not deprive Sweden of the valuable and enduring influence which Gustavus Adolphus has exerted on her national character. The examples are rare in history where a sovereign or national leader has so long and so entirely been an object of civic veneration and patriotic pride. He pervades the literature of the Swedes; he dignifies their history; he exerts a

purifying influence on their politics and statesmanship. Possibly his spirit is sometimes disregarded in blind adherence to forms and formulas which he, living amid the increasing light and reforming forces of the present time, would change, or entirely sweep away. If this be so, it is not strange; for thus it generally has been with those whose teachers and heroes lived and taught in preceding centuries. But this deep veneration for Gustavus Adolphus, their patriotic pride in his character aud career, the Swedes have no occasion to lessen or conceal. Their teachers wisely foster his memory among the youth; their artists and poets fittingly commemorate it in their statuary, painting, and song; and the present race of sovereigns strongly cherish it, surely not with less emphasis now the Vasa and Bernadotte lines of kings have been united by marriage, of which union has been born princely heirs to the throne.

00037826

Digitized with financial assistance from

HT Parekh FOUNDATION

An Initiative by HDFC

WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 15 October, 2018